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Estelle BADIE 
“Parliamentary Involvement in EU Affairs During Treaty 
Negotiations in a Historical Comparative Perspective: the Cases of 
the Austrian, Finnish and Luxembourgish Parliaments.” 
Abstract: 
Until recently, studies on the Europeanisation of national parliaments mostly tended to focus 
on the evolution of their institutional capacities rather than on their actual behaviour in EU 
affairs. This thesis seeks to identify variations in behavioural patterns between the Austrian, 
Finnish and Luxembourgish legislatures. The historical comparative perspective bases mainly 
on political and societal similarities between the countries. Based on historical and Sociological 
Institutionalism, the thesis aims to analyse the evolution and motivations of parliamentary 
involvement in the field of European affairs over a period running from the negotiations on the 
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe until the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and 
Governance in the EMU. By including both institutional and motivational indicators, the 
objective consists of identifying the extent to which parliamentary involvement in EU matters 
has been challenged in the framework of EU treaties and intergovernmental treaties on the 
EMU. We address the following questions: What institutional and motivational factors 
influenced parliamentary involvement in EU affairs? What parliamentary initiatives have been 
taken to improve participation in EU affairs? In which direction did institutional change happen 
and who triggered it? The present thesis bases primarily on qualitative data, i.e. interviews with 
parliamentarians, civil servants from parliamentary administrations and parliamentary group 
collaborators. Thereby we aim to produce empirical in-depth knowledge on actual 
parliamentary behaviour in each studied country. Thus, the assessment of parliamentary 
involvement in EU affairs through the lenses of parliamentarians’ motivations and their 
institutional context helps to investigate the parliamentary “black box”. 
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Estelle BADIE 
« L’implication parlementaire en matière européenne pendant les 
négociations de traités à travers une perspective historico-
comparative : les cas de l’Autriche, de la Finlande et du 
Luxembourg. » 
Résumé: 
Jusqu’à récemment, les études menées sur l’Européanisation des parlements nationaux se sont 
principalement focalisées sur l’évolution de leurs capacités institutionnelles plutôt que sur leur 
comportement effectif en matière européenne. Cette thèse vise à expliquer les variations 
comportementales entre les parlements Autrichien, Finlandais et Luxembourgeois. La 
perspective historico-comparative se base sur des similitudes politiques et sociétales entre les 
pays. Fondée sur l’institutionnalisme historique et sociologique, la thèse poursuit l’objectif 
d’analyser l’évolution et les motivations de l’implication parlementaire en matière européenne 
sur une période allant des négociations sur le Traité établissant une Constitution pour l’Europe 
jusqu’au Traité sur la Stabilité, la Coordination et la Gouvernance dans l’UEM. En incluant à 
la fois des indicateurs institutionnels et motivationnels, le but consiste à identifier comment 
l’implication parlementaire en matière européenne a été mise à l’épreuve dans le cadre des 
traités fondateurs européens et des traités intergouvernementaux sur l’UEM. Les questions 
suivantes vont être traitées : Quels facteurs institutionnels et motivationnels ont influencé 
l’implication parlementaire en matière européenne ? Quelles initiatives parlementaires ont-elles 
été prises pour améliorer la participation en matière européenne ? Dans quelle direction le 
changement institutionnel a-t-il eu lieu et qui en a été à l’origine ? Cette thèse se base avant tout 
sur des données qualitatives, tels que des entretiens avec des parlementaires, des fonctionnaires 
des administrations parlementaires et des collaborateurs de groupes parlementaires. De cette 
façon, la thèse vise à produire une connaissance empirique approfondie de l’implication 
parlementaire effective dans chacun des pays étudiés. De ce fait, l’évaluation de l’implication 
parlementaire en matière européenne au travers les motivations des parlementaires et de leur 
contexte institutionnel nous aidera à explorer la « boite noire » parlementaire. 
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Estelle BADIE 
“Parlamentarische Beteiligung in EU-Angelegenheiten während 
Vertragsverhandlungen aus einer historisch-vergleichenden 
Perspektive: die Fälle Österreichs, Finnlands und Luxemburgs.“ 
Zusammenfassung: 
Bis vor kurzem haben sich Europäisierungsstudien über nationale Parlamente hauptsächlich auf 
die Entwicklung ihrer institutionellen Fähigkeiten fokussiert, anstatt ihres effektiven Handelns 
in EU-Angelegenheiten. Diese Promotionsarbeit verfolgt das Ziel, Variationen der 
Verhaltensmuster zwischen den Österreichischen, Finnischen und Luxemburgischen 
Parlamenten zu identifizieren. Die historisch-vergleichende Perspektive basiert überwiegend 
auf politische und gesellschaftliche Ähnlichkeiten zwischen den Ländern. Die Promotionsarbeit 
beruht auf historischem und soziologischem Institutionalismus und zielt darauf, die 
Entwicklung und Motivationen parlamentarischer Beteiligung in EU-Angelegenheiten zu 
analysieren über einen Zeitraum von den Verhandlungen des Vertrags über eine Verfassung für 
Europa bis zum Vertrag über Stabilität, Koordinierung und Steuerung in der WWU. Durch die 
Einbeziehung von institutionellen und motivations- Indikatoren ist das Ziel zu erklären in 
welchem Maβ parlamentarische Beteiligung in EU-Angelegenheiten im Rahmen der EU-
Verträge und intergouvernementale Verträge über die WWU herausgefordert wurde. Wir 
behandeln folgende Fragen: Welche institutionelle und motivations- Faktoren haben 
parlamentarische Beteiligung in EU-Angelegenheiten beeinflusst? Welche parlamentarische 
Initiativen wurden ergriffen um Beteiligungsrechte in EU-Angelegenheiten zu stärken? In 
welcher Richtung ereignete sich der institutionelle Wandel und wer löste ihn aus? Diese 
Promotionsarbeit stützt sich überwiegend auf qualitative Daten, d.h. Interviews mit 
Abgeordnete, Beamte der parlamentarischen Verwaltungen und Mitarbeiter parlamentarischer 
Gruppen. Unser Ziel ist es, empirisches fundiertes Wissen über effektives parlamentarisches 
Handeln in jedes studierte Land zu erzeugen. Aus diesem Grund ist die Analyse 
parlamentarischer Beteiligung in EU-Angelegenheiten aus Sicht der Motivationen der 
Abgeordneten und deren institutionellen Kontext hilfreich zur Untersuchung der 
parlamentarischen „Blackbox“.  
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
Scholarly attention on national parliaments has shifted in the course of the past decades, 
starting from the so-called “de-parliamentarisation” thesis to the recognition that parliamentary 
capacities in EU politics have been strengthened, step by step. Studies on the role of national 
parliaments within the European Union have multiplied over the course of the last two decades. 
This growing interest in legislatures has been triggered by the realization that the strengthening 
of European institutions benefited national executives at the expense of national legislatures 
(O’Brennan/Raunio, 2007). However, the handling of EU affairs in legislatures does not 
translate into stronger formal prerogatives and reinforced legal bases. What has been 
insufficiently taken into account until recently is the actual use of instruments established within 
parliaments over the course of the European integration. The same goes for parliamentary 
actors’ motivation to engage in EU affairs and use these instruments. Therefore, how can we 
assess parliamentary involvement with regard to EU politics? How did it evolve and what role 
do parliamentarians play in the development of their legislatures’ formal capacities? The 
present thesis aims to contribute to the new research strand in Legislative Studies investigating 
the motivational dimension of Europeanisation (see Gava/Sciarini/Varone, 2017). 
Consequently, we chose to focus on historical events that represented big steps for both the 
European integration process and the role of national parliaments: European and 
intergovernmental treaties on the EMU. 
This chapter aims to outline the objectives, research questions and scope of our 
contribution to Legislative Studies. We will use a comparative research design that seeks to 
produce in-depth knowledge on the Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies, the Austrian National 
Council and the Finnish Eduskunta. The first section presents the overall evolution of scholarly 
attention on the role of parliaments in EU politics. The next section justifies the case selection. 
Finally, we will discuss the objectives, questions and hypotheses guiding this study.  
 
1.1 Evolution of scholarly attention on parliamentary involvement in EU affairs  
 
The focus on the role of national parliaments in the European decision-making process 
became especially reinforced in the 1990s when a series of European treaties mentioned their 
competences for the first time in the history of European integration. According to O’Brennan 
and Raunio, three phases can be observed in research trends since the 1990s: the first phase 
runs from the 1990s to the beginning of the 2000s and is characterised by the predominance of 
the “de-parliamentarisation thesis”. The second phase runs from the beginning of the 2000s 
until the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty and is reflected by the “re-parliamentarisation thesis” 
and a general agreement on the strengthening of parliamentary scrutiny prerogatives. Finally, 
the phase from the Treaty of Lisbon until now witnesses the return of sceptical studies on 
parliaments’ participation rights in the European decision-making process. With the entry into 
force of the Maastricht Treaty on 1st November 1993, the role of national legislatures in the 
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European decision-making process has been anchored for the first time in a supranational treaty. 
However, the broad wording of the “Declaration on the role of national parliaments in the 
European Union” attached to the treaty missed to clarify the exact prerogatives assigned to 
national legislatures in the European policy process. Moreover, the declaration had no legal 
binding character and merely encouraged legislatures’ stronger participation in “activities of 
the European Union”, promoting the need for better information exchange and cooperation with 
other national parliaments and the European Parliament1. The Treaty of Amsterdam, which 
entered into force on 1st May 1999, included a “Protocol on the role of national parliaments in 
the European Union”. This protocol widened substantially the participation rights of national 
parliaments2.  
Despite these evolutions and the growing awareness that the role of national parliaments 
should be strengthened, the “de-parliamentarisation thesis” persisted until the beginning of the 
2000s. Scholars supporting this thesis (Maurer/Wessels, In: Maurer/Wessels, 2001; Norton, 
1996) argued that European integration caused a shift of power, both from the national 
parliaments to their executives, and from national parliaments to European institutions. Their 
conclusions underlined the discrepancy between, on the one hand, the reinforcement of 
European and national legal bases and formal rules with regard to the participation rights of 
legislatures, and on the other hand the quasi-absence of implementation of these new 
prerogatives in parliaments’ daily work. Most scholars have thus perceived the impact of 
European integration on national legislatures negatively until recently.  
Research on the role of national parliaments has shifted towards more positive 
conclusions from the beginning of the 2000s onwards. Indeed, further declarations and treaty 
reforms, such as the Laeken Declaration from 15th December 2001, the Nice Treaty from 1st 
February 2003, the failure of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe and lastly the 
Treaty of Lisbon from 1st December 2009, revived the debate about the participation rights of 
legislatures in the European decision-making process. They gave new hopes with regard to the 
strengthening of parliaments’ role in EU affairs. Scholars called the “de-parliamentarisation 
thesis” into question, in particular in light of substantial evolutions regarding formal 
parliamentary participation rights in EU politics. They suggested that legislatures are no longer 
reactive actors, but try instead to shape actively EU policymaking. Authors defending this 
argument highlighted the fact that parliaments increasingly developed their scrutiny rights on 
the national level through institutional reforms in order to gain influence over their respective 
governments (Benz, 2004; Duina/Oliver, 2005; O’Brennan/Raunio, 2007; Richardson/Mazey, 
2006; Sverdrup, 2004). They did not reject the fact that governments and European institutions 
still play a predominant role in the decision-making process, but rather argued that the position 
of national parliaments within the national and European polities improved over the last two 
decades.  
 
1 See Declaration on the role of national parliaments in the European Union, In: Treaty on European Union – 
Maastricht Treaty, 29.07.1992, p.100. Available online under http://europa.eu/eu-law/decision-
making/treaties/pdf/treaty_on_european_union/treaty_on_european_union_en.pdf [last accessed on 20.07.2016]. 
2 See « Protocol on the role of national parliaments in the European Union », In : Treaty of Amsterdam, p.113. 
Available online under: http://europa.eu/eu-law/decision-
making/treaties/pdf/treaty_of_amsterdam/treaty_of_amsterdam_en.pdf [last accessed on 20.07.2016]. 
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This point of view started to change again in the aftermath of the Lisbon Treaty and the 
wake of the Eurozone crisis. Studies calling the “re-parliamentarisation thesis” into question 
have multiplied in recent years (Auel/Christiansen, 2015; Auel/Höing, 2015; Bellamy/Kroger, 
2014; Buzogany/Stuchlik, 2011; Cooper, 2006; Cygan, 2012 and 2013; Raunio, 2009; 
Wessels/Rozenberg et al., 2013). Despite a visible improvement of scrutiny rights in European 
affairs, scepticism remains whether national parliaments do effectively use their rights to 
participate in EU politics (Auel, 2015). Doubts have also been raised whether parliaments 
would effectively use the procedures in the framework of the Early Warning Mechanism 
(Buzogany/Stuchlik, 2011; Cooper, 2006). Cygan, for instance, analyses the extent to which 
the Treaty of Lisbon has improved the accountability and legitimacy of European legislation 
and therefore the role of national parliaments (Cygan, 2011). He concludes that the monitoring 
of the subsidiarity principle loses its significance due to the absence of direct control 
possibilities of European legislation. Similarly, the financial crisis represents an additional 
challenge for national parliaments, especially because national executives exclusively led 
negotiations on help packages. The crisis has shown that national executives are still the main 
decision-makers, especially during European Council summits (Wessels/Rozenberg et al., 
2013). No particular parliamentary tool exists to monitor directly the activities of the Council 
during Euro Summits. In this respect, European decision-making becomes increasingly opaque 
for national parliaments.  
Despite strengthened formal rules anchored in European Treaties and national laws, 
discrepancies between parliaments’ formal capacities and their actual involvement have 
widened over the last years. Our research aims to explain parliamentary involvement in EU 
affairs in the Luxembourgish, Austrian and Finnish lower chambers over the period running 
from the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, until the Treaty on Stability, 
Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG). In light of the 
academic debates outlined above, we deliberately chose to focus on a period characterised by 
parliaments’ growing awareness of their role in EU affairs. Scholars analysing the evolution of 
parliamentary involvement base their research mainly on the Europeanisation approach.  
 
1.2 Legitimisation of the comparison and case selection 
 
 The present thesis relies on a comparison of legislative chambers in three small states: 
Austria, Finland and Luxembourg. The choice of these cases relies on pragmatic reasons. In 
order to explain variations in parliamentary involvement between the cases, we sought to 
choose legislatures evolving in similar institutional environments in order to harmonise the 
comparative base. A coherent comparative base facilitates possible conclusions and eventual 
generalisations. Moreover, unlike lower houses, upper houses do not have the same control 
powers over the Executive, hence our choice to leave them out of our comparison (in this case 
the Austrian Bundesrat). For instance, the Austrian Bundesrat is described as a weak chamber 
with regard to the scrutiny of its government’s policy: “ […] the Federal Council is politically 
a rather impotent institution […]” (Pollak, 2003, p.709). However, voluntarily ignoring the 
Austrian upper house does not mean that it will not be taken into consideration during the 
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analysis of the lower houses’ activities. In fact, bicameralism is a more complex system where 
both houses are closely related to each other during the decision-making process. 
 
In the following sections, we expose the reasons to compare three legislatures. We decided to 
focus on similar cases with regard to their institutional settings in order to account for 
differences in parliamentary involvement in EU politics. Institutional features and macro-level 
indicators will help justify the similarities and differences between the three compared cases. 
 
1.2.1 Parliamentary strength in EU affairs  
 
The starting point of our comparison is the observation that despite several similarities, 
which will be outlined below, these three cases differ from each other in terms of parliamentary 
involvement in European affairs. We based the choice of the cases on several rankings made 
by scholars on legislatures’ institutional capacities to scrutinise EU politics 
(Auel/Rozenberg/Tacea, In: Hefftler/Neuhold/Rozenberg/Smith, 2015; Karlas, 2011; 
Maurer/Wessels, 2001; Raunio, 2005; Winzen, 2012). Each legislature studied in the present 
thesis is located at a different point on the established scales measuring parliamentary power in 
European affairs. In all rankings, we observe the same trend towards a gradation of 
parliamentary capacities, ranging from weakest legislatures (among them the Luxembourg 
Chamber of Deputies), to medium-strong (Austrian National Council) and strong parliaments 
(Finnish Eduskunta)3. Weakness, as defined by Kiiver, “is mainly indicated by a passive or 
reactive parliamentary attitude as regards the government’s policy formulation, a low level of 
expertise among MPs in European affairs, and little interest in scrutinizing this policy area” 
(Kiiver, 2006, p.62). While the Finnish and Austrian parliaments are described as “national 
players”, the Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies is presented as a “slow adapter” 
(Maurer/Wessels, 2001, p.462). A “national player” is characterised by its formal ability to 
“voice its interests within the national arena”, while a “slow adapter” is unable to adapt to 
European integration and is thus less able to influence EU politics due to a lack of resources 
(Maurer, In: Maurer/Wessels, 2001). However, unlike the other two legislatures, the Austrian 
parliament has a more ambiguous position in the rankings. Indeed, some scholars consider it as 
a strong parliament according to purely formal criteria, while others rank it as a medium-strong 
parliament characterised by insufficient practical use of formal tools. For example, Miklin 
states that “[t]he Austrian Parliament and its engagement in EU affairs has long been seen as a 
prototypical example of the gap between formal provisions and powers, on the one hand, and 
daily practice and influence, on the other” (Miklin, In: Hefftler/Neuhold/Rozenberg/Smith, 
2015, p.403). For the purposes of this thesis, we will support the stance of most scholars who 
agree to rank the Austrian parliament as a medium-strong legislature (Auel/ Rozenberg/ Tacea, 
In: Hefftler/ Neuhold/ Rozenberg/ Smith, 2015; Karlas, 2011; Winzen, 2012).  
To illustrate the differentiated institutional capacities of the three compared legislatures, 
we will give some examples hereafter. Although all three parliaments have established EACs 
at approximately the same time4, their status and competences differ greatly. For example, the 
 
3 See the ranking made by Kiiver (2006). 
4 The Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies established its EAC in 1989, the Austrian National Council in 1995 and 
the Eduskunta added European Affairs to the prerogatives of its Grand Committee in 1994. 
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Luxembourgish European Affairs Committee is not only competent for EU matters, but also 
for foreign affairs, migration, defence and cooperation. The Austrian National Council and the 
Finnish Eduskunta have “Grand committees”, even though with different prerogatives and an 
additional sub-committee for EU affairs in the Austrian lower chamber. On the one hand, in 
Austria5 and Finland6, parliamentary involvement and coordination mechanisms with their 
respective government are anchored in the Constitution and the parliamentary Rules of 
Procedures. In Luxembourg, on the other hand, parliament’s rights in EU affairs are only 
mentioned in the internal Rules of Procedures and have no constitutional status7. How can we 
explain these differences in terms of parliamentary involvement in EU affairs? Most 
importantly, why do we observe these differences despite the three cases having several 
institutional commonalities? The next sections will outline some of the criteria illustrating the 
most significant similarities between the cases. 
 
1.2.2 Small-sized legislatures 
 
 The first main common feature of the three cases is their size. The compared countries 
and their legislature are characterised by their small size. We assume that a legislature’s size 
might affect its ability to participate in EU politics, as well as MPs’ motivations regarding 
European affairs. Definitions of small states are not unanimous. While in International 
Relations the common understanding of smallness bases mostly on rigid criteria such as the 
geographical size, the GDP of a country, the number of votes in the Council of the European 
Union or general financial means (Panke, 2010), others argue that material resources should 
not be considered as main explanatory factors (Hey, 2003; Rothstein, 1968). Panke uses formal 
criteria to explain why small states are confronted to bigger challenges to influence EU policy-
making. According to the author, small states have less votes in the Council of the European 
Union as well as “undersized staff and fewer financial means”, less expertise and information, 
therefore “structural disadvantages for shaping European policies […]” (Panke, 2010, p.801). 
For instance, if we look at the parliamentary composition in the three studied legislatures, we 
observe that the number of parliamentarians is rather low. The Luxembourg Chamber of 
Deputies is composed of only 60 MPs8, while the Austrian National Council has 1839 and the 
Finnish Eduskunta 200 MPs10. The fact that two of the three legislatures (Luxembourg Chamber 
of Deputies and Finnish Eduskunta) are constituted of only one chamber also supports the 
argument that material resources determine parliamentary involvement. Considering only 
 
5 See Article 23 of Austrian Federal Constitution (Bundesverfassungsgesetz), 08.01.2016. 
6 See sections 96 and 97 of The Constitution of Finland, 11 June 1999 (amended in 2011). 
7 See Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies, Title V, Chapter 15 « Des Affaires Européennes », Article 
168 and  « Aide-mémoire sur la coopération entre la Chambre des Députés et le Gouvernement du Grand-Duché 
du Luxembourg en matière de politique européenne » (Annex 3) added to the Parliament’s Rules of Procedure. 
8http://chd.lu/wps/portal/public/!ut/p/b1/lY7LDoIwEEW_hS_odFpLuywPK6hIaSDajWFhjImPjfH7hcQNElHvbj
Ln5F7iyY4q5EKBoIJsib-
2j9OxvZ9u1_bc317sE0yaKuMIJrQcME_zsHYFM0nYAbsOgA_RMPQ3qROArGS6ctj9-
ctHKV1l9DpVqo4gg5i61EYIGf7WP1Ew5S_Yuz8Ghn6zpoBRxmxeKlZW-
O7LWHWrjV0tYzoDI2d_7h8XfPGLxe1yIBd_nveROgiehFmXCw!!/dl4/d5/L2dJQSEvUUt3QS80SmtFL1o2X0
QyRFZSSTQyMEc3UTQwMkpFSjdVU04zRzMz/ [last accessed on 24.05.2019] 
9 https://www.parlament.gv.at/WWER/NR/MandateNr1945/ [last accessed on 24.05.2019] 
10 https://www.eduskunta.fi/EN/kansanedustajat/Pages/default.aspx [last accessed on 24.05.2019] 
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material resources and distribution of power can indeed lead to the conclusion that smaller states 
might be weaker and less able to influence European decision-making than bigger states. On 
the other hand, it could also be argued that due to their resource disadvantages, they are more 
prone to get involved in the political process to defend their interests.  
 In addition to the resource argument, the small size of a legislature can also be measured 
through its activity. First, due to their low number, all MPs in the three studied legislatures have 
overlapping memberships in several parliamentary committees. Parliamentarians from smaller 
legislatures are thus confronted with a heavier workload and less opportunities to specialise in 
a specific policy field because of their multiple memberships. Moreover, in the case of the 
Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies, some MPs hold only part-time mandates (Bossaert, In: 
Maurer/Wessels, 2001). With regard to EU-related activities, the small size of a legislature can 
also be understood as the limited capacity of the latter to influence governmental EU policies. 
Even if formally speaking the Finnish Eduskunta and the Austrian National Council have strong 
mandating rights, they practically never use the opportunity to subject their respective 
governments to a binding mandate due to partisan logics or the reluctance to block the policy-
making process. Another example of limited parliamentary activity is the specific case of 
opinions sent in the framework of the Early Warning Mechanism and the Political Dialogue. 
Auel et al. have established activity scores considering these opinions (Auel/Rozenberg/Tacea, 
In: Hefftler/Neuhold/Rozenberg/Smith, 2015). Their measurements clearly show that the 
Finnish Eduskunta, the Austrian National Council and the Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies 
lag behind. Indeed, if we consider the number of reasoned opinions submitted by each 
parliament since the establishment of the EWM, we observe that the Finnish Eduskunta and the 
Austrian National Council count among the parliaments that submitted the less opinions 
(Auel/Rozenberg/Tacea, In: Hefftler/Neuhold/Rozenberg/Smith, 2015, p. 86). 
 Defining small states is thus not self-evident and depends on the adopted perspective. It 
can be understood either in terms of resources or in terms of psychological criteria 
(Thorhallsson/Wivel, 2006). Rothstein emphasises the latter, arguing that the size of a state 
depends primarily on how this state perceives itself and its environment:  
 
“Any new definition should also take account of the fact that there is a psychological, as well as a 
material, distinction between Great and Small Powers. The latter earn their title not only by being 
weak but by recognizing the implications of that condition. Thus, a Small Power is a state which 
recognizes that it cannot obtain security primarily by use of its own capabilities, and that it must 
rely fundamentally on the aid of other states, institutions, processes, or developments to do so; the 
Small Power’s belief in its inability to rely on its own means must also be recognized by the other 
states involved in international politics [author’s emphasis]” (Rothstein, 1968, p.29). 
Therefore, resources are less relevant characteristics than the perception that a state has of its 
position in its institutional environment. Small states are aware of their lack of influence on the 
international stage and therefore pursue a different strategy than big states. According to Wivel, 
small states tend to adopt a “smart state strategy”, i.e. a strategy centred on coordination, 
consensus and mediation (Steinmetz/Wivel, 2010; Thorhallsson/Wivel, 2006). Participation in 
international agreements and cooperation mechanisms permits them to avoid marginalisation 
and to secure their voice on the international stage. For instance, multilateralism and 
internationalism are the strategies adopted by Luxembourg, Austria and Finland in order to be 
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able to participate actively in economic agreements and to secure their position in the 
international and European decision-making process (Arter, 2000; Dumont/Spreitzer, 2012; 
Luif, In: Hanf/ Soetendrop, 1998). Membership in the European Union illustrates their objective 
to remedy isolation. 
 
1.2.3 Accession time to the EU 
 
 Luxembourg joined the European Union in 1957, while Austria and Finland joined in 
1995. While Luxembourg as a founding Member State adapted incrementally to the European 
integration process, the newer members had to comply abruptly with the “acquis 
communautaire” from the moment they joined the European Union (Falkner, 2000). The 
parliaments of Austria and Finland had to develop quickly their institutional capacities in order 
to be able to deal with the information flow emanating from the European level. The pressure 
to adapt to the new institutional settings was thus higher in Austria and Finland than in 
Luxembourg. The main motivation of all three states to join the EU relied mainly on economic 
and security concerns (Antola, In: Laursen, 2006; Dumont/Spreitzer, In: Brouard/Costa/König, 
2012; Luif, In: Hanf/Soetendrop, 1998). Indeed, Luxembourg’s main strategy is still its 
economic openness. As the country has few own economic sectors to rely on, its membership 
in the EU was a logical alternative. Before joining the EU, Luxembourg was already member 
of different alliances with its neighbour countries.  
 Austria and Finland joined the EU only in the 1990’s, but their objectives were the same 
as Luxembourg’s. Austria already sought to strengthen its relationship with the then European 
Coal and Steel Community in the 1950s. Its main aim at that time was to secure its access to 
the common European market. The positions on European integration in Austria differed among 
the political parties until the 1980’s (see Luif, In: Hanf/ Soetendrop, 1998). The ÖVP and the 
SPÖ changed their position towards the European integration in the late 1950s, fearing that the 
competition with the EEC countries would weaken the domestic industry.  In reaction to the 
enhanced competition emanating from the EEC countries, Austria decided to join the EFTA in 
the 1960s. Only in the mid 1980’s, when the EU increasingly pressured Austrian SME’s 
competitiveness and reduced substantially the performance of the Austrian economic 
performance did the country think of the possibility to join the EU. Austria first negotiated the 
EEA agreement (Agreement on the European Economic Area) in order to prepare itself for the 
accession, which occurred one year later in 1995. Joining the EU resulted in a calculation of 
economic and security interests (Austria gave up its neutrality with its accession to the EU).  
 The same can be said about Finland. After the declaration of independence and its 
progressive autonomy from Russia, Finland got involved in several Nordic agreements in order 
to ensure its security and the economic stability in the region (Helsinki Treaty, Nordic Council). 
Its accession to the EU was one way to ensure its influence and to prevent its national interests 
to be undermined by the EU (see Raunio, In: Hefftler/Neuhold/Rozenberg/Smith, 2015).  
Nowadays, while Luxembourg plays an arbitration and mediator role in the EU, Austria and 
Finland still try to defend their own interests in the European policy-making process. Thus, the 
accession period plays a significant role in the way each legislature conceives and scrutinises 
EU affairs. 
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1.2.4 Consociational democracies and neocorporatism 
 
 Our comparison founds on systemic and institutional similarities between the countries. 
Luxembourg has a parliamentary democracy in the form of a constitutional monarchy. Finland 
has been a semi-presidential regime until the constitutional reform in 2000, which triggered a 
shift of power from the President to the Government and Parliament. Finland moved closer to 
a parliamentary regime over the last years. While the former constitution gave more 
prerogatives to the President (Raunio/Wiberg, 2008), the constitutional reform transformed the 
rationalised parliamentarism by modifying the balance of power and removing some constraints 
on the Eduskunta. Formal parliamentary rules were strengthened and the parliament inherited 
strong control powers over governmental activities. However, actual parliamentary influence 
might still be limited due to the close link between governmental parties and their parliamentary 
party groups holding the majority of parliamentary seats. Austria’s political regime is de jure 
semi-presidential since 1929. However, since the President is practically deprived of political 
power, the regime can de facto be qualified as parliamentary (Miklin, 2012). The National 
Council (Nationalrat) has strong formal prerogatives, which are, just as in Finland, 
insufficiently used in practice because of partisan logics (Pollak, 2003). The upper house, the 
Federal Council (Bundesrat), has a weaker position in the legislative process than the National 
Council. It is reduced to giving its approval to law initiatives. The Prime Minister is not even 
accountable to the Bundesrat. Consociationalism and neocorporatism are well developed in 
Austria. 
 
 Despite different political regimes and differentiated forms of rationalised 
parliamentarism, all cases are characterised by a consociational and neocorporatist system. 
Such a system is politically fragmented, but relatively stable due to consensus-seeking practices 
(Lijphart, 1969). The search for compromises between actors with divergent political 
orientations reflects the “deliberate joint effort by the elite to stabilize the system” (Ibid, p.213). 
While neocorporatism is characterised by a culture of compromise between interest groups 
(mostly from business and labour organisations) and the State, a consociational system applies 
particularly to the relationship between parties and the ruling government (Falkner, 2001). A 
certain type of government mainly characterises consociational systems, as Lijphart states it: 
“The grand coalition cabinet is the most typical and obvious, but not the only possible, 
consociational solution for a fragmented system” (Lijphart, 1969, p.213). In our cases, the 
political constellation in Austria, Finland and Luxembourg takes the form of coalitions. All 
three countries have had coalition governments for a long time, which were characterised by 
their exceptional longevity, the fragmentation of the political forces and their ideological 
diversity. Decision-making under coalition governments can only be effective if all parties have 
managed to reach a common agreement within a consensual framework. Conflicts between the 
ruling parties are thus rare in consociational systems, because actors are aware of the risks of 
political deadlocks. Luxembourg’s governmental coalition (2013-2018) was composed of the 
Liberals (DP), the Socialist Workers Party (LSAP) and the Greens (Déi Gréng). In Finland, the 
coalition was composed of three parties (2015-2019): the Centre Party (KESK), the Finns Party 
and the National Coalition Party (KOK). In Austria, the Grand Coalition was formed of the 
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Social Democratic Party (SPÖ) and the Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) between 2013-201711. 
This political constellation has been in place since the end of the Second World War, apart from 
some episodes where the FPÖ managed to replace the ÖVP in the 1980s or the SPÖ in the early 
2000s. All coalition governments hold also a majority in their parliament. Thus, the lever of 
political action in the legislatures might be much higher for majority parties than for opposition 
parties. This in turn can potentially affect parliamentarians’ involvement with regard to 
European affairs and thus overall parliamentary involvement. MPs from majority parties may 
have better chances to impose their views and decisions on EU issues than MPs from the 
opposition. Indeed, majority parties represented in the government might have fewer incentives 
to oppose the policies of their own counterparts on the executive level than opposition parties.  
  
 Corporatism implies the decentralisation of governmental power across constitutional 
and non-constitutional institutions (Pelinka, 1999). Neocorporatism, which is based on active 
institutionalised bargaining, cooperation and coordination between the State and various 
interest groups (mainly trade unions and employers’ associations), is particularly prevalent in 
Austria (the so-called “austro-corporatism”). Social partnership is especially well-established 
between interest groups and governmental actors when it comes to economic and social 
policies. The federal organisations representing the largest socioeconomic groups are structured 
either in self-governed chambers or in independent associations and monitor the activities of 
their subnational units (Karlhofer, 2012). In particular, professional chambers enjoy an 
autonomous and influential status which is based on public law. Powerful interest groups and 
trade unions maintain close relationships with the political level, most of them being even 
linked to political parties. Political parties are represented for instance through professional 
associations in the five professional chambers: the Federal Chamber of Business (WKÖ), the 
Austrian Trade Union Federation (ÖGB), the Chamber of Labour (AK), the Chamber of 
Agriculture (LK) and the Association of Austrian Industrialists (VÖI). Moreover, each political 
party is also represented in the professional associations. For instance, the Austrian Business 
League and the Austrian Farmers’ League belong politically to the ÖVP and are majoritarian 
in the chambers of business and agriculture (WKÖ and LK). The SPÖ is linked to the ÖGB and 
the AK (Tálos/Stromberger, 2005). According to Falkner, both the “interest group set up” and 
their “involvement in policy-making” are well-developed in Austria (Falkner, 2001, p.6). 
Indeed, interest groups can issue opinions during the law-making process. Austrian associations 
and chambers do not only perceive themselves as interest groups, but also as political 
consultants producing expertise even used by the Austrian government (Karlhofer, 2007).  
 Cooperation and social dialogue between state actors and various societal stakeholders 
characterises also Luxembourg’s political system.  Several political and societal actors are 
involved in the legislative process: bodies such as the Council of State, without whose reasoned 
opinions the parliament cannot vote on a legislative draft, or the Economic and Social Council, 
which is the main interlocutor in the Social Dialogue. Whereas the six professional chambers 
are governed by public law, business and trade union associations are governed by private law.  
Business associations from the steel and banking sectors, such as the Business Federation 
 
11 The respective coalitions concern the following legislative periods: 2013-2017 for Austria, 2013-2018 for 
Luxembourg; 2015-2019 for Finland (status quo: 2016). 
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Luxembourg (FEDIL) or the Luxembourg Bankers’ Association (ABBL), are particularly 
powerful. Trade union federations such as the Luxembourg Confederation of Christian Trade 
Unions (LCGB) and the Independent Trade Union Organisation (OGB-L) are the main actors 
on the employees’ side. The chambers are constituted of the main socio-economic groups and 
are thus divided into the Chamber of Employees, the Chamber of Labour (both close to trade 
union associations), the Chamber of Civil Servants, the Chamber of Commerce, the Chamber 
of Agriculture and finally the Chamber of  Trade (Schroen, In: Ismayr, 2009). Interest groups, 
associations and chambers maintain informal contacts with political parties, parliamentary 
committees and the ministerial bureaucracy (Schroen, In: Ismayr, 2009). Personal relationships 
and participation in party working groups give interest group representatives a particular weight 
in the decision-making process. Chambers have the right to issue opinions on the state budget 
or legislative proposals and can even submit legislative initiatives to the Chamber of Deputies 
and the Government. Moreover, every legislative proposal of the Government that might be of 
interest for the chambers must undergo a consultative process in those chambers concerned 
with the policy field, hence their essential role in the policy process. The Luxembourg decision-
making model founds on a complex interrelation between various state and non-state actors 
seeking consensual decisions in the pre-parliamentary phase, which represents a significant 
challenge for the Chamber of Deputies (Hirsch, In: Lorig/Hirsch, 2008).  
 Interdependence between the State and civil society is also very strong in Finland 
(Rainio-Niemi, In: Alapuro/Stenius, 2010). One major characteristic of Finnish corporatism 
until the 1990s was the significant role of state committees. State committees have long been 
important actors in the policy-making process. Established by the government or a ministry, 
they examined matters of public concern by grouping representatives from the State and the 
civil society in rather informal formats. The close cooperation between representatives from 
associations and state actors ensures effective policymaking through compromise-seeking 
strategies and early-stage information exchange. The dissolution of the state committees since 
Finland’s accession to the European Union has led to the erosion of associations’ influence over 
the decision-making process (Rainio-Niemi, In: Alapuro/Stenius, 2010, p.262). Despite the 
fragmentation of the Finnish civil society, the biggest interest groups and trade unions are still 
actively involved and influential in the legislative process. Finnish interest groups are for 
instance the Central organisation of Finnish Trade Union (SAK), the Confederation of Finnish 
Industry and Employers (STK) and the Farm and forest producers (MTK).  
 
 In these three countries, the fragmentation of the political landscapes obliges political 
parties and actors involved in the decision-making process to make concessions and to seek 
compromises. Moreover, the existence of multiple domestic veto-players might affect 
parliamentary involvement with regard to European affairs. Indeed, the early involvement of 
interest groups, social partners and consultative bodies in the decision-making processes of the 
three countries has an impact on final political outcomes and thus on legislatures’ ability to 
assert their position in the respective political systems. Austria’s neocorporatist system 
represents a challenge especially for opposition parties that have less ties to the main 
stakeholders in the chambers, associations and trade unions. The biggest parties such as the 
ÖVP or the SPÖ have obvious advantages to influence policy-making at an early stage because 
of their various levers of action reaching deep into the local spheres of power. MPs’ incentives 
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and practices regarding EU affairs should therefore be put in the context of their more or less 
close ties to extra-parliamentary actors.  
The table hereunder (table 1) illustrates the main institutional similarities and differences 
between the studied cases. 
 
 
Table 1: Institutional similarities and differences characterising Austria, Finland and 
Luxembourg 
 
1.3 Timeframe 
 
The present thesis will focus on extraordinary events within European integration that 
affected parliamentary involvement in European politics: the Treaty Establishing a Constitution 
for Europe, the Treaty of Lisbon, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and the Treaty on 
Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG)12. The 
early 2000s represented a turning point in discussions on the role of national parliaments in the 
European Union. Atypical moments may indeed challenge parliamentarians’ daily routines and 
lead to institutional change. Research on Europeanisation in Legislative Studies tends to focus 
mainly on public policies and less on treaties, because the executives negotiate the latter. 
 
 
 
12 See the contributions on the Eurozone crisis of Auel/Höing (2015), Deubner (2013), Miklin (2014), Rozenberg/ 
Kreilinger et al. (2013) and on the Treaty of Lisbon of Auel/Christiansen (2015), Cygan (2012), Gennart (2010), 
Neuhold/Smith, In: Hefftler/ Neuhold/Rozenberg/Smith (2015). 
State Size Accession 
time 
Political 
regime 
Type of 
government 
Type of political 
system 
Parliamentary 
strength 
AT Small 
state 
1995 Parliamentary 
democracy in 
practice but de 
jure semi-
presidential 
Grand 
coalition 
Consociational, 
consensual, neo-
corporatist 
Medium-strong 
FI Small 
state 
1995 Parliamentary 
democracy in 
practice 
Coalition consensual, neo-
corporatist 
Strong, national 
player 
LU Small 
state 
1957 Parliamentary 
monarchy 
Coalition Consociational, 
consensual, neo-
corporatist 
Weak, slow 
adapter 
Sources : Size (Dumont/Spreitzer, 2012; Müller, In: Strøm/Müller/Bergman, 2006);  Accession time (Karlas, 2012; 
Raunio, 2005);  Political regime (Spreitzer, Raunio, In:  Hefftler/Neuhold/Rozenberg/Smith, 2015;  Müller, 
In:Strøm/Müller/Bergman, 2006);  Type of government (Karlas, 2012);  Type of political system (Hastings, In: De 
Waele/Escalona/Vieira, 2013; Poirier/Dumont et al., 2010; Pollak/Slominski, 2006; Raunio, 2004) ;  Parliamentary 
strength (Auel/Rozenberg/Tacea, 2015; Maurer/Wessels, 2001; Raunio, 2005). 
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1.3.1 From the Convention to the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe 
 
The context of the negotiation process that led to the ratification and the failure of the 
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe is the starting point of the temporal scale. Several 
initiatives emanating from heads of state set the path for the new treaty in the early 2000s. The 
kick off meeting between EU leaders in Laeken on the 15th December 2001 laid the foundation 
for thorough discussions on the role of parliaments in the EU. Heads of State and government 
decided to organise a Convention on the Future of Europe responsible for drafting a proposal 
for a new EU Constitutional Treaty. The Laeken Declaration outlined the premises for an 
enhanced role of national parliaments within the European framework13. The Convention on 
the Future of Europe set up by the Laeken declaration started on 28th February 2002 and ended 
on 10th July 2003. Its aim was to refine the institutional and political framework of the European 
Union. Six themes were discussed, among others the role of national parliaments in the future 
institutional setting. The Working Group IV on “The role of National Parliaments” drafted a 
report in 2002 and made recommendations to improve parliaments’ influence in the EU 
decision making, for example through the increase of transparency of Council meetings14. The 
particularity of the Convention was foremost its unique composition. Delegations of national 
parliamentarians were sent from each European Member States. Representatives from the 
European Parliament, as well as from national executives, also participated in the different 
working groups. For the first time since the beginning of the European integration process, 
national parliamentarians and government representatives led discussions about future 
developments on the EU level. Considering that EU and intergovernmental treaty negotiations 
were and are usually led by executives, the Convention represents an exceptional parenthesis 
in the negotiation processes of EU treaties.  
The Constitutional Treaty is thus the result of a long process that started with the 
European Convention and the Intergovernmental Conference in 2003 and ended with the 
signature of the Heads of State or government in Rome in October 2004. The treaty was meant 
to enter into force during the Finnish Presidency, at the end of 2006. The overall debate on the 
establishment of a Constitution for Europe was controversial and complex. The Constitutional 
Treaty was seen either as a project illustrating the emergence of a harmonious European 
political community, or as a project forcing European integration by eroding the sovereignty of 
the Member States (De Búrca, 2004).  Despite its failure, the treaty itself and the negotiations 
that took place have been perceived as a crucial moment in European integration. The treaty 
rejection by founding members gave birth to an unprecedented crisis in the European Union. 
According to Cohen, “[t]he debacle is significant evidence, therefore, that the European project 
is undergoing the most serious crisis of its half-century history” (Cohen, 2005, p.58). Political 
leaders were forced to rethink the European political and economic model in order to guarantee 
 
13 See the Laeken Declaration of 15.12.2001, p.5: 
http://www.cvce.eu/de/obj/laeken_declaration_on_the_future_of_the_european_union_15_december_2001-en-
a76801d5-4bf0-4483-9000-e6df94b07a55.html [last accessed on 18.07.2016]. 
14 Groupe de travail IV « Parlements nationaux » de la Convention européenne, Rapport du Président du groupe 
de travail IV « Parlements nationaux » aux Membres de la Convention, CONV 353/02 – WG IV 17, Bruxelles, 
22.10.02, http://european-convention.eu.int/pdf/reg/fr/02/cv00/cv00353.fr02.pdf [last accessed on 24.05.2019] 
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its legitimacy and efficiency. They agreed for a period of reflection on possible solutions to 
remedy paralysis in the European project.  
On 17th June 2004, EU Heads of State agreed on a version of the future Constitutional 
Treaty, which was signed on 29th October 2004. The treaty was ratified in Austria in June 2005, 
in Luxembourg on 10th July 2005 and in Finland on 5th December 2006 after both France and 
the Netherlands rejected it, respectively on 29th March 2005 and on 1st June 2005. While two 
ratification votes and a referendum took place in Luxembourg, the treaty was ratified in 
parliament in Austria and Finland. The absence of referendum in Finland and Austria can be 
explained by the low support and indifference of their public opinion regarding the new treaty. 
The population’s indifference moved away from the primarily positive attitude of the elites in 
these countries. Luxembourg’s, Finland’s and Austria’s positions can also be explained by their 
respective presidencies during the first semester of 2005, and the first and second semester of 
2006. All countries supported the Constitutional Treaty and sought to promote further reflection 
after the negative outcomes of the referendums in France and the Netherlands. The governments 
of Luxembourg, Austria and Finland were overtly enthusiastic about the new Constitutional 
Treaty and defended common interests such as the strengthening of Europe’s social 
dimension15. Austria in particular also highlighted the compatibility of its neutrality policy with 
the treaty.  
 
How did the negotiation process leading to the Constitutional Treaty affect 
parliamentary work, parliamentarians’ motivations and parliamentary structures? Reversely, 
how did MPs’ motivations with regard to EU affairs determine parliamentary involvement in 
the follow-up of the negotiations? Considering these questions, we seek to investigate how and 
why parliamentarians used their institutional framework in the context of these events. For 
example, the difficult context of the Constitutional Treaty and the rather low results of the 
Luxembourg referendum led to an internal re-organisation in the Chamber of Deputies 
(Spreitzer, In: Hefftler/Neuhold/Rozenberg/Smith, 2015). The Chamber established a “Europe 
strategy” in 2006. This strategy aimed to raise the awareness of MPs about EU affairs, to 
strengthen the overall participation rights of the parliament and to improve the information flow 
regarding EU matters. Moreover, the Chamber of Deputies created a representative office in 
Brussels in January 2006. The Austrian parliament also established a permanent representative 
in Brussels in 2005. Moreover, parliaments were given a new occasion to maintain direct 
contact with the EU level. The period of reflection between the failure of the Constitutional 
Treaty and the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon led to the establishment of the Political 
Dialogue between national parliaments and the European Commission in 2006.  
 
 
 
 
15 See http://www.bundespraesident.at/newsdetail/artikel/heinz-fischer-unterzeichnet-ratifikationsurkunde-fuer-
die-eu-verfassung/, http://www.eilen.fi/en/474/ and http://www.verfassung-fir-
europa.lu/fr/actualites/2005/07/10confpresse/index.html [last accessed on 24.05.2019] 
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1.3.2  The Treaty of Lisbon and the recognition of parliaments’ role in European 
policymaking 
 
The road to the Treaty of Lisbon has been long16. Negotiations on the Treaty of Lisbon 
can be placed in the context of the failed Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe with the 
“No” resulting from the referenda in France and the Netherlands. After the rejection of the 
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, the Heads of State agreed on a one-year period 
of reflection in June 2005. In May 2006, the then President of the European Commission 
Barroso launched the so-called Barroso initiative, which promotes a Political Dialogue between 
the European Commission and national parliaments. The drafting of the new treaty began in 
June 2007 and the signature on the 13th December 2007. Finally, after one negative referendum 
in Ireland, the treaty entered into force on the 1st December 2009. Opinions diverge on whether 
national parliaments managed to increase their participation rights in the wake of the Treaty of 
Lisbon (Buzogany/Stuchlik, 2011; Cygan, 2012). According to Neuhold and Smith, “the Lisbon 
Treaty can be seen as a turning point: for the first time, national parliaments were given the 
possibility of influencing European legislation, at least indirectly” (Neuhold/Smith, In: 
Hefftler/Neuhold/Rozenberg/Smith, 2015, p.673). The role of national parliaments has been 
anchored in the main body of the Treaty, as well as in two additional protocols17. The new 
provisions provide them with new prerogatives and do not reduce them, at least formally, to 
mere “ex post rubber-stampers” in the European decision-making process (Paulo, 2012). 
Indeed, the Treaty of Lisbon recognises the role of national parliaments as contributors to the 
good functioning of the European Union. Their information rights were extended in the protocol 
n°1 on the role of national parliaments in the European Union. Formally, the Treaty of Lisbon 
represented a big step forward in the recognition of parliaments’ role as scrutinisers of EU 
politics. With the subsidiarity monitoring procedure, parliaments can interact directly with the 
European level.  
The Austrian National Council ratified the Treaty of Lisbon on 9th April 2008, the 
Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies on 29th May 2008 by a majority of votes and the Finnish 
Eduskunta on 11th June 2008. In all three chambers, a large majority of parliamentarians 
supported the treaty. All three countries perceived the Treaty of Lisbon as an important 
achievement after the rejection of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe and the 
subsequent period of reflection. In Austria, the central topics dominating the debates on the new 
treaty were the compatibility between the country’s neutrality and the new provisions of the 
Lisbon Treaty, as well as the role of the Austrian parliament in the European decision-making 
process. The judgement of the German Federal Constitutional Court of 30th June 2009 on the 
ratification of the Lisbon Treaty particularly caught the attention of the Austrian National 
Council. The judgement claimed a strengthened role for the German Bundestag in the EU 
decision-making process. Following this judgement, Austrian parliamentarians from the SPÖ 
and Green parties decided to launch a revision of the parliamentary Rules of Procedure in order 
 
16 See http://www.dw.com/en/the-eu-treaty-the-long-road-to-lisbon/a-2827008 [last accessed on 18.07.2016] 
17 Protocol on the role of national parliaments in the European Union and Protocol on the application of the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality  
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to include extended parliamentary rights regarding EU affairs18. Similarly, some 
parliamentarians from the Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies welcomed the new provisions of 
the Lisbon Treaty on national parliaments19. The Rules of Procedure of the Chamber were also 
modified in 2009 with the addition of an annex aiming to strengthen its scrutiny rights in EU 
affairs (Spreitzer, In: Hefftler/Neuhold/Rozenberg/Smith, 2015). Overall, the Luxembourg 
Government and Parliament supported the Treaty of Lisbon as a project deepening the 
democratisation of the European Union20. Finland particularly welcomed the institutional 
innovations regarding security and defence aspects of the new treaty21. In its view, the Treaty 
of Lisbon was expected to be as close as possible to the Treaty establishing a Constitution for 
Europe. The democratisation of the European Union through the Treaty of Lisbon was seen as 
an important element to secure small states’ interests. Just as Austria and Luxembourg, Finland 
also defended the idea of increasing the competences of national parliaments in EU politics 
(Laursen, In: Carbone, 2010). Agricultural policy was another topic that was especially 
sensitive during the negotiations in the Finnish case (Gassen, In: Lieb/Maurer/Von Ondorza, 
2008).  
The Treaty of Lisbon was symbolically significant for Luxembourg, Austria and 
Finland, because it marked the achievement of a long process of negotiation and challenges that 
all three countries had to partially tackle during their respective EU presidencies. Moreover, it 
represented a big step towards the recognition of national parliaments’ role in the European 
decision-making process. The Treaty of Lisbon being almost a copy of the Constitutional 
Treaty, we may expect parliamentary involvement to be less challenged than during prior treaty 
negotiations. However, the new provisions might have led to institutional change within 
parliaments. 
 
1.3.3 The ESM and Fiscal compact in the wake of the Eurozone crisis 
 
The Eurozone crisis represents another challenging moment for parliamentary 
involvement in EU politics. While the impact of the economic crisis was rather moderate in 
Luxembourg and Austria, Finland has been facing a more serious situation since the beginning 
of the financial crisis in 2008. The country has lost significant parts of its industry since 2008 
and is now facing a more serious slump in GDP growth than during the crash in the 1990s22. In 
reaction to the worsening economic conditions, a Eurosceptic MP recently initiated a “Fixit” 
 
18 See http://diepresse.com/home/politik/eu/491552/LissabonVertrag_Urteil-hat-Auswirkung-auf-Osterreich and 
http://www.ots.at/presseaussendung/OTS_20100630_OTS0364/begleitgesetz-zum-lissabon-vertrag-passiert-
verfassungsausschuss-neben-spoe-und-oevp-sorgen-gruene-und-bzoe-fuer-breite-mehrheit [last accessed on 
24.05.2019] 
19 See http://www.europaforum.public.lu/fr/actualites/2008/05/ratification-luxembourg/index.html [last accessed 
on 24.05.2019] 
20 Idem. 
21 See 
http://www.formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=130002&nodeid=49298&contentlan=2&culture=en-
US [last accessed on 24.05.2019] 
22 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/12001895/Finlands-depression-is-the-final-indictment-of-Europes-
monetary-union.html [last accessed on 24.05.2019] 
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movement, claiming to exit the monetary union and to return to the old Finnish Markka 
currency. Luxembourg, on the other hand, never experienced an excessive public deficit 
situation despite a slowdown in economic growth. However, the country being an important 
European financial centre, the crisis measures triggered particular attention among 
parliamentarians. Despite negative growth trends between 2008 and 2010, Austria’s economic 
situation improved in the last three years23. The crisis measures pushed to national-centred and 
sovereignist positions within each country, influencing the way parliaments treat EU affairs. 
Within the timeframe of the Eurozone crisis, which encompasses a multitude of events, 
we chose to focus on two measures: the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and the Treaty 
on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG). In 
line with the above exposed arguments on the diminished power of national parliaments within 
the economic and financial crisis framework, Landfried also argues that the TSCG and the ESM 
in particular had negative consequences on their legislative power (Landfried, 2012). Contrary 
to reforms of the economic and financial policies, which were solely decided by the European 
institutions and implemented by the Member States (two-pack, six-pack, European Semester), 
the ESM and the TSCG are intergovernmental treaties negotiated exclusively between Heads 
of State and governments and ratified by national parliaments. Both treaties were concluded 
separately as intergovernmental treaties under international law alongside European treaties24. 
The TSCG itself foresees the integration of its substance into the EU’s legal framework within 
five years of the treaty’s date of entry into force (Article 16 TSCG). Nowadays, discussions are 
still underway between Member States and the European Institutions to integrate the ESM into 
EU Law as a European Monetary Fund25. The integration of the TSCG into EU Law was 
discussed in 2018 in the Ecofin Council and is still under discussion in the EP26. Therefore, 
contrary to the two other treaties, we will not qualify them as EU treaties in the present thesis, 
but as intergovernmental treaties on the EMU. 
The ESM’s predecessors were the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the 
European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM), “temporary rescue mechanisms” which 
were created by euro-area members on 9th May 201027. Their aim was to provide financial 
assistance in the form of loans or credit lines to those EU Member States confronted with 
financial difficulties. The European Stability Mechanism was ratified by the euro-area members 
and entered into force on 27th September 2012. The EFSF and the ESM ran alongside from 
October 2012 until June 2013. However, since 1st July 2013, the EFSF cannot launch new 
assistance programmes anymore, thus focusing solely on the “management and repayment of 
 
23 Wirtschaftsbericht Österreich 2016, Bundesministerium für Wissenschaft, Forschung und Wirtschaft, 
http://www.bmwfw.gv.at/Wirtschaftspolitik/Wirtschaftspolitik/Documents/Wirtschaftsbericht_WEBversion_neu
_GW_65%20HW26.pdf [last accessed on 24.05.2019] 
24 http://www.institutdelors.eu/media/fiscalpact_r.dehousse_ne_feb2012.pdf?pdf=ok [last accessed on 
18.07.2016] 
25 See http://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-deeper-and-fairer-economic-and-monetary-
union/file-integration-of-the-esm-into-eu-law-by-creating-an-emf [last accessed 24.06.2019] 
26 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-deeper-and-fairer-economic-and-monetary-union/file-
integration-of-the-fiscal-compact-into-secondary-eu-law [last accessed 24.06.2019] 
27 See http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/assistance_eu_ms/intergovernmental_support/index_en.htm and 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/eu_borrower/efsm/index_en.htm [last accessed on 18.07.2016]. 
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any outstanding debt”28. As a permanent intergovernmental institution based in Luxembourg, 
the ESM has a lending capacity of €500 billion29. The TSCG was signed at the European 
Council Meeting on the 2nd March 2012 by 25 EU Member States and is only binding for euro-
area members30. The treaty foresees common rules on economic and budgetary governance 
aiming to ensure that Eurozone members comply with the budgetary discipline. The signatories 
of the TSCG are required to reach gradually the Medium-Term Budgetary Objective (MTO) 
set in the framework of the Stability and Growth Pact without exceeding a structural deficit of 
0.5% of GDP (the so-called “Golden Rule”)31. If the objective of a balanced budget is not 
respected, the European Court of Justice has the competence to impose financial sanctions to 
the members who do not implement the budget rules in national law. The ESM and the TSCG 
are closely interrelated since 1st March 2013. Indeed, only Member States that have ratified the 
Fiscal Compact can benefit from the financial assistance of the ESM. 
While Luxembourg supported the ESM, it had an ambivalent position on the TSCG 
(Kroeger, 2014). Both treaties had a significant meaning for the country which economy relies 
mainly on external markets. A large majority in the Chamber of Deputies ratified the ESM. The 
TSCG generated debates and encountered opposition among members of government and 
parliament, the main criticism being that it favours austerity measures, reinforces national 
interests (which is against Luxembourg’s support towards federalisation), increases the shift of 
competence from the national to the European level32, threatens Luxembourg’s social and 
democratic model33 and deprives the Chamber of Deputies of budgetary powers. Just as 
Luxembourg, Austria as an export-oriented economy mainly supported the ESM treaty (with 
the exception of the far-right parties BZÖ and FPÖ), because it established sanctions against 
Member States in breach of budgetary rules34. The TSCG, on the other hand, did not get the 
same support among parties. The BZÖ, FPÖ and the Greens even brought the treaty before the 
Austrian Constitutional Court in order to check its constitutionality (Jaros, 2014). Political 
tensions considerably increased from 2011 and 2013 during negotiations on the ESM and 
TSCG. In Finland, a majority of parliamentarians has approved both treaties, except by the True 
Finns (Leino/Salminen, 2013). Compared to Luxembourg and Austria, political debates on the 
economic crisis in Finland were particularly controversial and up-to-date. Indeed, 2011 was 
marked by parliamentary elections and a particularly politicised election campaign that 
revolved around the economic crisis. The True Finns picked up the crisis as their main electoral 
argument and gained substantial popularity among voters, destabilising the pre-existing stable 
 
28 http://www.esm.europa.eu/about/index.htm [last accessed on 18.07.2016]. 
29 See http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/assistance_eu_ms/intergovernmental_support/index_en.htm [last 
accessed on 18.07.2016]. 
30 http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/articles/governance/2012-03-14_six_pack_en.htm [last accessed on 
18.07.2016]. 
31 See http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/convergence/index_en.htm and 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/preventive_arm/index_en.htm [last accessed on 
18.07.2016] 
32 http://www.europaforum.public.lu/fr/actualites/2012/01/asselborn-pacte-spiegel/index.html [last accessed on 
24.05.2019] 
33 http://www.europaforum.public.lu/fr/actualites/2012/10/csl-traite-gouvernance/index.html [last accessed on 
24.05.2019] 
34 https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/PR/JAHR_2012/PK0558/ [last accessed on 24.05.2019] 
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political landscape. By examining the economic and political contexts of these countries, we 
noticed that both negotiations on the ESM and TSCG triggered special attention.  
The Eurozone crisis underlined the gap between national parliaments’ institutional 
capacities to deal with the economic and financial crisis. According to Auel and Höing, the 
crisis constituted an unprecedented challenge for national parliaments, in the sense that it 
reinforced the power imbalance between legislatures and their executives in favour of the latter 
(Auel/Höing, 2015). Despite an overall trend among national parliaments towards enhanced 
parliamentary activities in European affairs, their main field of competence, namely budgetary 
power, became challenged and gutted by European and national executives. Since the beginning 
of the financial crisis, Heads of government manage to impose themselves in the European 
decision-making process, especially during European Council summits (Rozenberg/Kreilinger 
et al., 2013). No parliamentary tools have been established until now to monitor Euro Summits. 
As Deubner argues, national parliaments are not the main actors anymore with regard to 
decisions on public budgets, because of the growing intrusiveness of “external EMU 
governance actors” which are “inaccessible to their [the parliaments’, personal emphasis] voice 
and vote” (Deubner, 2013, p.14).  
These challenges have not only consequences on the institutional capacities of 
legislatures and their parliamentary practices, but also on national political dynamics as well as 
the overall political system. Indeed, Rozenberg/Kreilinger et al. (2013) point out for example 
that the Eurozone crisis has enhanced the government-opposition cleavage in Finland and thus 
affected the Finnish consensual political system. The emergence of a “politicization of EU 
affairs” (Raunio, 2016) within legislatures translates into stronger cleavages and polarisation 
between actors, the growing salience of EU issues because of their direct influence on national 
interests and a higher participation rate among parliamentarians in the European decision-
making process. The financial crisis challenges consensus-oriented political practices by 
triggering political contestation on EU affairs in a system normally based on compromises. As 
Statham and Trenz state it, “the Euro-zone crisis has led to an unprecedented degree of 
politicization and transformed the context for European integration” (Statham/Trenz, 2012, 
p.23). Politicisation might thus also have consequences on parliamentary involvement. As Auel 
and Höing notice, “[s]ince the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty, national parliaments 
even have an explicit role within the EU’s legislative process as the new guardians of the 
subsidiarity principle. What we know far less about is how parliaments have accompanied the 
management of the crisis. Are backbenchers still ‘fighting back’ or were they marginalized by 
a highly technocratic, executive-dominated crisis management?” (Auel/Höing, 2015, p. 1184). 
The TSCG includes the role of national parliaments into the body of the text. Article 13 TSCG 
bases on Protocol N° 1 on the role of national Parliaments in the European Union of the Lisbon 
Treaty and establishes a framework within which national parliaments and the European 
Parliament can decide to organise common meetings on budgetary policies and all issues related 
to the Treaty. However, to what extent are these new instruments efficient? Do they contribute 
to the reinforcement of parliamentary participation? How did parliaments react to the crisis 
measures and their creeping loss of budgetary competences? These questions will be addressed 
when assessing parliamentary involvement in the context of the economic and financial crisis. 
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The table below (table 2) sums up the main features of the historical moments taken into 
account.  
Table 2: Main features of the studied treaties 
 Treaty 
establishing a 
Constitution for 
Europe 
Treaty of Lisbon European Stability 
Mechanism 
Treaty on Stability, 
Coordination and 
Governance in the 
EMU 
Context Definition of 
EU’s institutional 
framework 
Definition of 
EU’s institutional 
framework 
Crisis measure to 
preserve financial 
stability 
Crisis measure to 
ensure budgetary 
discipline 
Legal status European treaty European treaty Intergovernmental 
treaty, International 
public law 
Intergovernmental 
treaty, International 
public law 
Members All Member 
States (rejected 
by France, 
Netherlands) 
All Member 
States 
Euro-zone members All Member States 
(except UK, Czech 
Republic) 
Parliamentary 
competences 
Title III, Art. I-
11, I-48, I-42; 
Title IV, Art. I-
46; Title IX, Art. 
I-58; Chapter IV, 
Section I, Art. III-
258, III-260, III- 
261, III-273, III-
276; Part IV, Art. 
IV-443, IV-444; 
Protocol 1 and 2 
Art. 12, 48, 69 
TUE; Protocol 1 
and 2 
Art. 30 
Predominance ESM 
Board of Governors 
Art. 13 
Predominance Heads 
of State and 
Government 
Source: Own compilation. 
1.4 Research goals and questions 
 
 Our project seeks to explain the evolution of parliamentary involvement in the context 
of EU and intergovernmental treaty negotiations. We will compare involvement patterns in EU 
affairs in the Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies, the Austrian National Council and the Finnish 
Eduskunta. These cases have two similarities: their legislatures are small and their political 
systems found on a consociational and consensus-oriented decision-making culture 
characterised by long-lasting governmental coalitions. The main difference between these cases 
lies in the parliamentary participation rights of each chamber. While we know that there is a 
difference in parliamentary involvement between our selected cases, we know less about the 
factors that drove to this difference. Actual parliamentary involvement should be measured by 
looking at formal capacities as well as parliamentarians’ motivations to engage in EU affairs 
and promote/use formal instruments to scrutinise EU politics. We seek to go beyond prior 
Europeanisation studies that focused merely on institutional capacities and turn towards the 
motivational perspective of Europeanisation. We conceive national parliaments as bodies 
composed of a variety of actors, each of them having specific tasks, positions, strategies, roles 
and incentives. Parliaments are not unitary actors, hence the need to open the parliamentary 
“black box” and to explain how actors and structures are interrelated. The evolution of 
parliamentary involvement with regard to EU politics will be “unpacked” through the lenses of 
parliamentarians. The involvement of MPs in European affairs implies to take account of their 
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embeddedness in a specific institutional framework. Each legislature evolves in a particular 
political environment, surrounded by different veto players. Such veto players could be 
typically second chambers (in Austria), governments, civil society, European institutions, other 
national bodies (for example the Council of State in Luxembourg), other national parliaments, 
interparliamentary cooperation fora, etc. 
 The main research goal of our thesis is to acquire in-depth knowledge on the studied 
cases (“thick” case studies) and to explain variation patterns in parliamentary involvement. 
Based on existing concepts and theories (institutional and motivational Europeanisation, new-
institutionalism), we investigate the mechanisms and incentives underpinning parliamentary 
involvement in EU matters. Starting from a deductive method, we try to apply new-
institutionalist approaches to investigate under-researched perspectives. In the end, the thesis’ 
main objective will be to refine the Europeanisation concept through complementarity between 
institutional and motivational factors.  
 In this regard, the following research question will try to assess the above-mentioned 
cross-case involvement variations: How does parliamentary involvement in EU affairs vary 
across small European parliaments in the context of EU and intergovernmental treaty 
negotiations? This question raises also several other ones. To what extent do parliamentarians 
get involved in EU affairs? Do they fully use the formal parliamentary instruments to scrutinise 
EU politics? Which motivations drive parliamentarians to scrutinise EU affairs, and in 
particular to follow-up EU and intergovernmental treaty negotiations? Did EU treaties and 
intergovernmental treaties on the EMU push to a mainstreaming of EU affairs within 
parliaments? To what extent did the chambers adapt their scrutiny systems to the new legal 
provisions established by the treaties on the EU level? 
 A comparison will help identify the factors encouraging parliamentary involvement 
during treaty negotiations. The next section outlines the key variables guiding the research, as 
well as the hypotheses that we seek to test to answer the main research question. 
 
1.5 Variables and hypotheses 
 
 We selected the cases according to their systemic similarities. However, the “most 
similar” research design is not entirely appropriate for this thesis. It bases on cases showing 
high degrees of similarities except for the independent variable. By keeping constant as many 
intervening variables as possible, the MSSD aims to search for variations in the independent 
variable on the systemic level. However, keeping intervening variables constant is almost 
impossible and may lead to the omission of subtle patterns of variations. Indeed, even if our 
selected cases are similar, they are not identical with regard to the condition variables. The 
“Most Different Systems Design” (MDSD) focuses on cases characterised by intervening 
variables that are as different as possible, while the outcome is similar across compared systems 
(Anckar, 2008). Some scholars combine both MSSD and MDSD in an attempt to account for 
variations that are more complex across cases. The “Most Similar Different Outcome” (MSDO) 
procedure starts from cases with a different outcome and tries to explain the difference by 
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Formal capacities 
(IV1)
•Scrutiny
infrastructure
•Scrutiny procedures
•Legal bases
MPs’ motivations 
(IV2)
•Profile/Experiences
•Political ideologies
•Position within
parliament
•Salience of EU affairs
Parliamentary involvement
during EU and 
intergovernmental treaty
negotiations (DV) through:
• Parliamentary activity (DV1)
• Institutional change (DV2)
checking possible condition variables that led to the outcome (De Meur et al., In: 
Rihoux/Grimm, 2006). For the purpose of our thesis, we aim to understand which factors might 
potentially influence the outcome.  We seek to explain the diverging parliamentary involvement 
despite several institutional similarities between the cases. De Meur et al. dichotomise their 
outcome and condition variables. The outcome, for instance, can be graded. Scholars have 
graded parliamentary involvement from weak to strong (see for instance Kiiver, 2006). In the 
present thesis, parliamentary involvement as the dependent variable (DV) can be separated into 
two features: actual parliamentary activity in the follow-up of EU and intergovernmental treaty 
negotiations (DV1) and the degree of institutional change within each legislature in the wake 
of EU treaties and intergovernmental treaties on the EMU (DV2). The condition variables that 
we will investigate will also be subdivided into several categories and will help explain and/or 
call into question variations in the outcome observed in the literature. The condition variables 
that might explain parliamentary involvement in the context of treaty negotiations are the 
legislatures’ formal capacities (IV1) and parliamentarians’ motivations (IV2). These two 
independent variables can be subdivided. Formal capacities mean parliaments’ scrutiny 
infrastructure, scrutiny procedures and legal bases. MPs’ motivations include their profile and 
experiences, their political ideologies, their position within parliament and the salience of EU 
affairs. In our understanding, formal capacities are closely interlinked with motivations when 
it comes to parliamentary involvement. Thus, both variables’ influence on the DV cannot be 
assessed separately. 
Figure 1: Independent and dependent variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Considering the variables exposed above, we formulated following hypotheses to 
investigate parliamentary involvement with regard to EU affairs: 
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H1: The higher the ideological polarisation on EU affairs between parties, the higher was 
parliamentary activity during EU and intergovernmental treaty negotiations. 
The polarisation level between parties may have influenced parliamentary involvement 
in the context of EU and intergovernmental treaty negotiations. All three cases have 
consociational systems based on consensus-oriented decision-making. Nonetheless, internal 
political dynamics may play a role in MPs’ involvement. Parliamentarians belong to different 
political orientations and have different positions on European integration and European 
treaties. Thus, political ideologies may play a significant role in the degree, frequency and 
willingness to scrutinise EU affairs (H1.1). Whether a parliamentarian defends a pro-European 
or a Eurosceptic line, the level of involvement, the motivations underpinning it and the use of 
parliamentary instruments to control the government may not be identical. Eurosceptic 
parliamentarians may tend to make more usage of scrutiny instruments to control or contest 
their government’s EU policy and negotiation position in the context of EU treaties and 
intergovernmental treaties on the EMU. The purpose of using scrutiny instruments may thus be 
different depending on the political interests that parliamentarians have with regard to EU 
issues. Pro-European MPs would support European treaties, while Eurosceptic MPs would 
criticise and reject them.  
Whether MPs’ are from the opposition or the majority may also play a role in their 
involvement (H1.2). Opposition MPs may tend to use more often the opportunity given by the 
context of European treaties to push reforms strengthening parliamentary scrutiny rights or the 
right for minorities within parliament. On the contrary, majority MPs may tend to support their 
government’s position without mobilising as many parliamentary instruments as opposition 
MPs.  
Finally, political conflict on EU issues may influence MPs’ scope and nature of 
involvement (H3.3). The more the political landscape is polarised on EU and intergovernmental 
treaties, the more parliamentarians may use these treaties to defend their party’s position vis-à-
vis their counterparts. It also implies that parties strengthen the requirement for strong party 
discipline in order to reinforce their credibility. A parliamentary arena with increased dynamics 
of political contestation may trigger intensive debates on EU issues compared to a 
parliamentary arena characterised by highly consensual policymaking. MPs would then be 
motivated to stick to their party’s ideological line and respect strict group discipline within 
parliament to ensure their influence on the decision-making process through political 
unanimity.  
H1.1: Whether MPs had a pro-European or Eurosceptic opinion on European integration 
affected their parliamentary activity in EU and intergovernmental treaty negotiations.  
H1.2: Whether MPs belonged to the majority or the opposition affected their parliamentary 
activity in EU and intergovernmental treaty negotiations. 
H1.3: The higher the ideological polarisation between political parties on EU treaties and 
intergovernmental treaties on the EMU, the more MPs defended their party’s position and stuck 
to strong group discipline within parliament. 
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H2: The higher the salience of EU treaties and intergovernmental treaties on the EMU 
within parliament, the more likely trends towards the mainstreaming of EU affairs emerged.  
European treaties as potential triggers of increased polarisation on EU affairs, i.e. 
political conflicts over legislatures’ scrutiny powers, may have led to the mainstreaming of EU 
affairs within parliaments. According to Gattermann et al., mainstreaming can be defined as 
“the integration of EU affairs scrutiny into the work of the standing committees and a wider 
circle of MPs of a parliament with a view towards the normalization of the treatment of EU 
affairs also in terms of procedures” (Gattermann/Högenauer/Huff, 2013, p.5). As exceptional 
events, EU and intergovernmental treaties may have appeared to be more salient to parliaments, 
triggering a sudden generalised attention on EU issues among MPs. 
Mainstreaming may be caused by an increased awareness about EU politics among 
parliamentarians. However, even in the scenario of a mainstreaming of EU affairs, only the 
most “Europeanised” parliamentarians may be willing and able to get fully and durably engaged 
in these matters (H2.1). Indeed, EU politics may request specific knowledge and represent a 
lower electoral benefit compared to national issues. “Europeanised” would mean in that case 
that MPs would have prior experience linked to EU affairs before their mandate, a long-term 
mandate within their parliament giving them the required political experience, membership in 
the EAC or in any other specialised committee where they would deal frequently with EU 
politics, etc. 
The diversity of issues addressed by the treaties and growing political tensions within 
parliaments may have forced parliamentarians without specific interests for EU matters to 
handle them (H2.2). European treaties cover several institutional and policy aspects that do not 
concern only European Affairs Committees. Sectoral committee members get involved because 
some aspects of EU and intergovernmental treaties fall into their field of competences or touch 
upon strategic interests.  
H2.1: MPs with a “Europeanised” profile tended to be the most involved during EU and 
intergovernmental treaty negotiations due to their extensive experience in EU affairs. 
H2.2: The higher the ideological polarisation on EU treaties and intergovernmental treaties 
on the EMU between parties, the more sectoral committee members became key players of 
parliamentary activity. 
H 3: The higher the perceived misfit between treaty provisions on parliamentary participation 
rights and domestic parliamentary scrutiny systems, the more MPs initiated institutional 
change. 
The last hypothesis aims to test meso-level trends in each legislature. We assume that 
European treaties represented extraordinary events that may have triggered parliamentary 
reforms. We expect European treaties as “external stimuli” to have encouraged a general 
scrutiny reinforcement of EU affairs within parliaments. The “misfit” (Börzel, 2000) between 
EU-level provisions and national scrutiny systems may be the origin of change within our three 
cases. 
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European treaties affected Member States’ legal and institutional framework. The 
economic crisis and the financial packages in particular affected parliaments’ budgetary power 
(Auel/Höing, 2015). Here, the “misfit” concept of Börzel, i.e. the “incompatibility between 
European-level processes, policies and institutions, on the one hand, and domestic-level 
processes, policies and institutions, on the other” (Börzel, 2000, p.1), takes on its full meaning. 
The more an EU issue in the context of EU and intergovernmental treaties becomes salient 
within a parliament, the more parliamentary actors may exert pressure to improve their 
participation rights in response to the institutional changes brought by the treaties. However, 
we expect institutional change in contexts where parliamentary scrutiny rights are rather weak, 
such as the Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies. Indeed, we think that strong participation rights 
might not motivate MPs to trigger reforms within their parliament, because they believe that 
their scrutiny system is satisfactory. Therefore, strong scrutiny systems will be less exposed to 
change (H3.1). Just as in the case of parliamentary activity, MPs’ motivations to trigger 
institutional change depends on their parliamentary culture and their socio-demographical 
characteristics (H3.2). Finally, we assume that institutional change within parliaments may 
have been incremental through a “layering” process and punctually implemented in the context 
of each studied treaty (H3.3). “Layering” means that parliaments amended successively their 
scrutiny procedures and structures to adapt their participation rights to new rules set by EU 
treaties and intergovernmental treaties on the EMU. 
 
H3.1: The stronger a parliament’s scrutiny system, the less MPs engaged in institutional 
change. 
H3.2: The parliamentary culture (conflictual vs consensual) determined whether MPs with 
“Europeanised” or “specialised” profiles became the “political entrepreneurs of change”. 
H3.3: Institutional change within parliaments happened through “layering” in the wake of the 
ratification of EU treaties and intergovernmental treaties on the EMU. 
These hypotheses will be tested according to the theoretical approaches outlined in chapter 3. 
The next chapter exposes the main debates in the Europeanisation literature and their 
limitations. 
 
1.6 Plan of the study 
 
 The second chapter outlines the main elements found in the Europeanisation literature 
on parliaments’ involvement in EU affairs. We will see that authors focused mainly on formal 
capacities and somewhat neglected the motivational aspect in their studies. We try to place our 
study in this research gap, by highlighting the motivational origins of parliamentary activity 
and institutional change in our three cases. 
 The third chapter explains the choice of historical and Sociological Institutionalism as 
two complementary approaches used to analyse parliamentary involvement during negotiations 
on EU treaties and intergovernmental treaties on the EMU. We decided to include both 
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institutional and motivational aspects of parliamentary involvement in our analysis, with an 
emphasis on the latter as a predominant factor. We argue that the Theory of Endogenous 
Institutional Change helps to analyse the direction of change and the role played by 
parliamentary actors. The latter’s motivations underpinning parliamentary activity and 
institutional change can best be studied thanks to the motivational approach. Indeed, we argue 
that MPs’ profiles were constitutive of their motivations and influenced their involvement. 
 The fourth chapter justifies our research design, the type of data used and our analytical 
strategy. We chose a historical-comparative design to understand variations between similar 
cases (in terms of political system and the size of the chambers) with a different outcome 
(parliamentary strength in EU affairs). We developed indicators to measure MPs’ motivations 
linked to EU affairs, as well as the formal strength of their parliament’s scrutiny system. Based 
on these criteria, we decided to rely on data such as parliamentary documents and interviews to 
proceed with a Qualitative Content Analysis.  
 The fifth, sixth and seventh chapters analyse in detail parliamentary involvement during 
negotiations on EU treaties and intergovernmental treaties on the EMU in each of our three 
cases. First, we thoroughly test our hypotheses for the Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies, then 
we proceed with the Austrian National Council and finally with the Finnish Eduskunta. 
 The eighth chapter presents the main results of our three cases in a comparative manner. 
We state that the countries’ institutional contexts, i.e. their political systems and their position 
towards European integration, as well as the parliaments’ formal capacities, are the main 
foundation of parliamentary involvement in EU affairs. We proceed with analysing the 
evolution of parliamentary activity and institutional change within the three chambers, each 
time explaining the origins of the observed dynamics. On the motivational side, parliamentary 
activity depends on the parliamentary culture and MPs’ socio-demographical features. 
Institutional change depends on the legal developments brought by the treaties touching upon 
parliaments’ role in the EU, but also on the parliamentary culture, MPs’ socio-demographical 
features and their normative interpretation of their parliament’s role in the EU.  
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Chapter 2. Literature review 
 
 Europeanisation research has given birth to a dense corpus of articles over the last 
decades. The focus of scholarly attention evolved alongside European integration. The interest 
in national parliaments’ role in the European decision-making process grew especially since 
the Maastricht Treaty that initiated first steps towards enhanced parliamentary participation in 
European affairs. Since then, scholars could not agree on the role that should be assigned to 
parliaments, some arguing in favour of the “de-parliamentarisation” thesis, while others 
defending the “re-parliamentarisation” argument. Until recently, independently from the thesis 
supported, scholars focused mainly on the evolution of formal parliamentary capacities through 
large-N quantitative and comparative studies. In recent years, however, the attention shifted 
towards more subtle changes within parliaments, highlighting the role played by individual 
parliamentary actors, their incentives and their actual practices. Conclusions became more 
mitigated and less focused on formal capacities. The past decade has seen an increase in studies 
on the evolution of internal parliamentary structures, as well as a growing inclusion of 
motivational components in the analysis of parliamentary involvement in EU affairs. 
Nonetheless, as Auel (2009) explains, individual legislative behaviour remains largely 
understudied. Most attention has been given to the US Congress. Legislative studies in EU 
affairs rarely focus on parliamentarians’ behaviour in a comparative perspective.  
In this chapter, we will explain how the Europeanisation approach contributed to the 
understanding of the nature and evolution of parliamentary involvement in EU affairs. We will 
then outline the most relevant approaches that turn out to be useful for the present thesis. 
 
2.1 Europeanisation from a bottom-up perspective 
 
The concept of Europeanisation has been defined numerous times and in numerous ways 
in the literature (Buller/Gamble, 2002; Risse/Cowles/Caporaso, 2001; Ladrech, 2010 and 1994; 
Olsen, 2002). Until recently, scholarly attention has mainly centred on top-down dynamics 
(Duina/Oliver, 2005; Ladrech, 2010; Maurer/Wessels, 2001; Norton, 1996; Olsen, 2002). The 
top-down perspective relies on the notion of “impact” and presents parliaments as reactive 
actors adapting to pressures emanating from European integration. This viewpoint fails to 
explain how individuals produce institutional change. Some scholars try to depart from the 
dominating top-down perspective in legislative studies by highlighting the interrelation existing 
between European and national levels, adopting the so-called “bottom-up-down approach” 
(Vink/Graziano, In: Graziano/Vink, 2008, p.10) or circular perspective (Dyson/Goetz, 2003, 
p.20). However, Radaelli’s definition is the closest to the notion we use in the present thesis. 
The scholar’s definition includes both institutional and constructivist perspectives. Thus, 
Europeanisation is defined as “[p]rocesses of (a) construction (b) diffusion and (c) 
institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of 
doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the 
making of EU decisions and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, 
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political structures and public policies” (Radaelli, 2000, p.4). In his definition, Radaelli 
emphasises the incorporation in the national level of European formal and informal institutions. 
Radaelli points out that domestic actors make use of Europe on the national level, even on a 
voluntary basis without explicit pressure from “Brussels” (Radaelli, 2004).  
In contrast to the top-down perspective, the bottom-up approach starts and finishes at 
the domestic actors’ level. It stresses the importance of domestic actors’ role in shaping EU 
matters. Our thesis focuses on parliaments as domestic actors embedded in a broader European 
and national setting. Like Radaelli, we start from the premise that parliaments try to shape 
actively European politics. European affairs are thus becoming increasingly part of 
parliamentary work and culture. In parallel, events on the European level might also influence 
parliamentary involvement. The bottom-up perspective is the most appropriate to investigate 
MPs’ involvement during EU and intergovernmental treaty negotiations and the way they 
pushed to parliamentary reforms. Parliamentarians from the Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies, 
the Austrian National Council and the Finnish Eduskunta might have used Europe in different 
ways and with different objectives to trigger institutional change within their respective 
parliaments. Depending on institutional resources and individual motivations, usages of Europe 
among parliamentarians can vary from one chamber to the other.  
The bottom-up perspective permits to explain the effective use of parliamentary 
instruments during EU and intergovernmental treaty negotiations and thus the actual 
parliamentary involvement based both on institutional and motivational indicators. Indeed, we 
believe that the evolution of parliamentary involvement is mainly due to the action of 
parliamentarians, who push to an improvement of their formal scrutiny rights. Institutional 
change within legislatures is thus seen as an endogenous and actor-driven process. European 
treaties are seen here as triggers of increased parliamentary involvement and of a potential 
“mainstreaming” of European affairs, the latter being “[…] increasingly integrated into the 
work of parliaments in all policy sectors” (Gattermann/Högenauer/Huff, 2015, p.2) and their 
treatment normalised in parliamentary routines (Gattermann//Högenauer/Huff, 2013, p.5). EU 
treaties and intergovernmental treaties on the EMU comprise a wide range of topics covering 
several policy fields. MPs’ from sectoral committees might thus be increasingly engaged in EU 
affairs in exceptional times of European integration. 
 
2.2 Europeanisation approach in Legislative Studies: institutional and motivational 
perspectives 
 
The main research focus within the Europeanisation literature has long been the 
evolution and comparison of parliaments’ formal capacities regarding EU affairs. Although our 
research project moves away from this restricted perspective, we base the country choice for 
the comparison on contributions from this literature. The present section outlines the main 
branches in the literature on the role of national parliaments. While attention has been payed 
predominantly on the evolution and adaptation of parliamentary scrutiny infrastructures and 
procedures, the trend changed over the last decade. Studies are now aiming to open the 
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parliamentary black box through the study of parliamentarians’ motivations and their impact 
on parliamentary activity.  
Studies on the Europeanisation process of national parliaments emerged in the middle 
of the 1990s (Buller/Gamble, 2002; Ladrech, 1994; Olsen, 2002; Radaelli, 2000), after the entry 
into force of the Maastricht Treaty. While Europeanisation is a fuzzy and multifaceted term that 
is not exclusively used in Legislative Studies (see Olsen, 2002), most scholars agree that it is 
an incremental adaptive process that can lead either to change or to continuity on the national 
level (Exadaktylos/Radaelli, 2009; Ladrech, 1994; Olsen, 2002).  Literature based on the 
Europeanisation concept seeks to explain the evolution of parliamentary involvement in EU 
affairs. We have identified three main research perspectives while reviewing the literature on 
the Europeanisation of national legislatures (table 3). The first perspective focuses exclusively 
on the evolution of parliaments’ institutional capacities. The second perspective relies on a 
sociological approach by concentrating on parliamentary actors’ motivations in EU affairs, 
mostly within a rational choice approach. Recently, a new research strand emerged combining 
both institutional and motivational perspectives of Europeanisation (thick border).  
Table 3: Main research strands in the Europeanisation literature 
Source: Own compilation. 
Research strands “Institutional Europeanisation” Motivational approach 
to Europeanisation 
Combination of 
institutional and 
motivational 
Europeanisation 
Research foci - Overall evolution of parliaments’ 
formal competences in EU affairs: 
“de- and re-parliamentarisation” 
thesis 
- Internal structural adaptation  
- Evolution of NPs’ participation 
rights within a given timeframe 
(Lisbon Treaty, Eurozone crisis) 
- Parliamentary actors’ 
role orientations and 
motivation 
- Socialization processes 
in European institutions 
- MPs’ or parliamentary 
staff’s effective 
involvement in EU affairs 
Methods/Theories/ 
Research design 
- Qualitative/Quantitative cross-
national comparative empirical 
studies 
- Large-N 
- Dominance of top-down 
perspective 
- Rational-choice 
institutionalism/principal-agent 
model 
 
- Qualitative empirical 
thick case-studies 
- Small-N 
- Bottom-up perspective 
- Rational-choice 
institutionalism, role 
theory, cognitive and 
sociological approaches 
 
- Qualitative empirical 
thick case-studies 
- Small-N 
- Comparative 
perspective 
- New-institutionalism 
 
References Auel 2007, Auel/Höing 2015, Benz 
2004, Bergman 1997, 
Buzogany/Stuchlik 2011, 
Christiansen/Högenauer/Neuhold 
2012, Gattermann 2013 , Kaczynski 
2011, Kiiver 2006, Maurer/Wessels 
2001, Norton 1996, O’Brennan/ 
Raunio 2009, Strøm 1998, Winzen 
2012 
 
Beauvallet/Michon 
2012, Georgakakis 2010, 
Pegan 2013, 
Saalfeld/Müller 1997, 
Wessels/ Katz 
1999,Winzen 2011 
Auel, 2006, 
Auel/Christiansen 2015, 
Auel/Rozenberg/Tacea 
2015, De Ruiter 2013, 
Gattermann/Hefftler 
2015, 
Högenauer/Neuhold 
2015, Karlas 2012, Kropp 
2010, Navarro/ Brouard 
2014, Schneider 2014, 
Sprungk 2010, Strelkov 
2015, Wonka/Rittberger, 
2014  
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For the purpose of the present thesis, we believe that recent developments in the 
Europeanisation literature focusing on the interlink between formal capacities and 
parliamentary actors’ motivations helps best explain effective parliamentary involvement in EU 
affairs. The next two sections will outline the two first research strands. We will then explain 
how they complement each other.  
 
2.2.1 “Institutional Europeanisation”: the evolution of formal parliamentary capacities 
 
The first strand in Europeanisation research appeared in the middle of the 1990s and 
groups together literature on the institutional adaptation of national parliaments to the European 
integration, the so-called “institutional Europeanisation”35. To date, few empirical studies have 
focused on in-depth analyses of effective parliamentary involvement, both formal and informal. 
Small-N research designs are still lacking. Internal parliamentary structures and activities are 
still largely under researched. Instead, the review of the Europeanisation literature brought into 
light the dominance of large-N empirical quantitative and qualitative studies, mostly in the form 
of cross-national and comparative research designs. Scholars from this first identified branch 
either tend to focus on the overarching evolution of formal parliamentary competences or on 
reforms of internal parliamentary structures dedicated to EU matters36. In this regard, large-N 
studies dealing with formal parliamentary capacities are mainly relying on the top-down 
perspective of Europeanisation.  
On the theoretical side, scholars paying attention to Europeanisation dynamics base their 
work either on the principal-agent model or on rational-choice institutionalism. Both theoretical 
approaches aim to explain power distribution among actors, but from different perspectives. 
While the principal-agent theory relies on a delegation model and often serves to explain the 
redistribution of competences among domestic actors and thus their ability to influence EU 
policymaking, rational-choice institutionalism tries to explain how parliamentary structures 
evolve and constrain actors’ behaviour. By focusing exclusively on formal scrutiny powers, 
both theories underline the variations in parliamentary control across legislatures, but fail to 
explain how national parliaments actually use these capacities (Sprungk, 2010).  
Most large-N studies reduce parliaments to unitary actors in order to facilitate 
comparisons. Based on institutional indicators, several authors established rankings of 
parliaments, classifying them according to their institutional strength with regard to EU 
affairs37. However, these rankings rely on subjective criteria proper to each author and are thus 
not homogeneous. Bergman, for instance, concentrates on the analysis of European Affairs 
Committees (EAC). He classifies the EACs of fifteen legislatures from EU Member States 
according to their influence within their respective parliament (Bergman, 1997). Raunio, on the 
 
35 See Auel, In: Holzhacker/Albaeck, 2007 
36 Auel 2007, Auel/Höing 2015, Benz 2005, Bergman 1997, Buzogany/Stuchlik 2011, 
Christiansen/Högenauer/Neuhold 2012; Gattermann 2013, Harfst/Schnapp 2003, Kaczynski 2011, Karlas 2011 
and 2012, Knutelska 2011, Miller/Ware 1996, Norton 1996, Raunio 2005, O’Brennan/Raunio, 2007; Sprungk, 
2010; Winzen, 2012 and 2013 
37 See for example Karlas, 2011; Kiiver, 2006; Raunio, 2005. 
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other hand, measures parliamentary control over EU affairs by establishing indicators such as 
the involvement of specialised committees in the scrutiny of EU policies, the access to 
information and the ability of parliaments to mandate ministers (Raunio, 2005). Using a fuzzy-
set approach, the author identifies the factors influencing the degree of parliamentary scrutiny 
over governments’ EU policies. Similarly, Kiiver compares scrutiny procedures and methods 
among national parliaments by distinguishing between ex-ante and ex-post scrutiny procedures 
and between centralised and decentralised committee systems (Kiiver, 2006). Based on these 
criteria, he then differentiates parliaments according to their scrutiny methods. “Mandate-
givers” (Kiiver, 2006, p.54), among them the Austrian National Council and the Finnish 
Eduskunta, brief their governments before Council meetings and can adopt binding mandates. 
“Systematic-scrutinisers” sift all EU documents, while “informal influencers” only organise 
debates on EU affairs when considered necessary. Kiiver identifies several types of parliaments 
according to their scrutiny power: the Austrian National Council and the Finnish Eduskunta are 
ranked as strong or moderate parliaments, whereas the Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies 
counts among the weak scrutinisers (Kiiver, 2006, p.62).  
Complementing the above-mentioned (partially outdated) rankings, the more recent 
study led by Auel/Rozenberg/Tacea aims to include not only indicators on institutional 
capacities, but also on parliamentary activity in EU affairs. The latter component is largely 
missing in previous rankings. Relying on available OPAL scores on institutional strength and 
parliamentary activity38, they demonstrate the existence of a correlation between institutional 
strength and parliamentary activity in EU affairs: the stronger the institutional rights of a 
chamber, the more likely it will use its rights to influence the decision making process 
(Auel/Rozenberg/Tacea, In: Hefftler/Neuhold/Rozenberg/Smith, 2015). They conclude that 
parliaments are “fighting back” through an improvement of their formal capacities and an 
increased use of parliamentary instruments by MPs. However, evolutions in parliamentary 
involvement are not homogeneous across Member States. Similarly to the ranking of Maurer 
(2001), the authors rank the Finnish Eduskunta among the strongest parliaments, while the 
Austrian National Council has moderate and the Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies weak 
institutional capacities (Auel/Rozenberg/Tacea, In: Hefftler/Neuhold/Rozenberg/Smith, 2015). 
These rankings might be useful for us, because they highlight the commonly accepted 
conclusions that the three legislatures investigated in our thesis are characterised by different 
levels of involvement in EU affairs despite similar domestic settings. Indicators used to measure 
parliamentary scrutiny power in EU affairs are very useful for the present thesis. Access to 
information, the type of scrutiny procedures and systems, the mandating rights, the 
establishment of specialised committees, etc are indicators that can be used and applied to the 
context of EU and intergovernmental treaty negotiations. However, even if they appear to be 
useful as background information, they fail to assess effective parliamentary involvement in 
EU affairs, especially in challenging times. Therefore, it is necessary to complement the 
assessment of formal capacities with motivational factors retrieved from other analyses. 
 
38 See Observatory of Parliaments after the Lisbon Treaty, available online: http://www.opal-europe.org/index.php 
[last accessed on 24.05.2019]. The OPAL scores on institutional strength include access to information, 
parliamentary scrutiny infrastructures, oversight instruments. The OPAL activity scores include among others the 
number of mandates, committee meetings and debates on EU issues. 
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Scholars pay attention primarily to the evolution of formal capacities outside the framework of 
a specific EU context, even though some recent studies analyse the impact of the Treaty of 
Lisbon or the economic crisis on legislatures’ formal capacities and try to some extent to assess 
effective parliamentary involvement (Cooper, 2012 and 2015; Auel/Höing, 2015). The latter 
cannot be fully explained with sole institutional criteria. The next section deals therefore with 
another research strand focusing mainly on individual actors’ motivations rather than on the 
development of parliamentary structures. 
 
2.2.2 The motivational approach to Europeanisation 
 
The second research strand that we identified in Europeanisation literature deals with 
motivational aspects of parliamentary involvement in EU affairs. While older literature has 
been dealing primarily with the evolution of parliaments’ formal capacities, recent studies have 
been concentrating on parliamentarians’ behaviour and motivations (see for example Wessels, 
2005). Motivations of parliamentarians have been assessed through rational and sociological 
institutionalist lenses. De Ruiter (2013), for example, explains MPs’ incentives to scrutinise EU 
affairs with rationalist arguments. According to the author, parliamentarians weigh costs and 
benefits of their involvement in EU issues. Re-election strategies drive their behaviour and 
pushes them to focus mainly on domestic issues because of the higher costs that the scrutiny of 
EU affairs represents. The author concludes that due to the complexity and low salience of EU 
dossiers as well as the lack of resources, parliamentarians are less inclined to engage in EU 
affairs compared to national issues. Even though this argument might be valid, the study does 
not mention other non-strategic reasons for scrutinising or not EU affairs. Indeed, motivations 
are not always determined by rational considerations, but also by cognitive factors.  
Other authors investigate the other dimension of motivations through sociological 
lenses. Mainly relying on Searing’s role theory39, they investigate parliamentarians’ role 
orientations and incentives with regard to EU affairs, either on national or European level 
(Beauvallet/Michon, 2012; Hooghe, 2012; Michon, 2014; Rozenberg, 2012; Winzen, 2011). 
Even though the present thesis does not rely on role theory, it is worth noticing that the cognitive 
component of behaviour represents an interesting point for the study of parliamentary 
involvement in EU affairs. American literature on legislative staffing can be seen as the pioneer 
in this field, with studies focusing on the profile, role and influence capacities of legislative 
actors (Bibby, 1966; DeGregorio, 1988; Manley, 1968; Kampelman, 1954; Moncrief, 1999; 
Patterson, 1970; Salisbury, 1981; Squire, 1988; Hammond, 1984; Zwier, 1979). Role theory 
has contributed to European legislative studies by refocusing attention back to individual 
actors’ profiles and motivations, whether parliamentarians or parliamentary staff. As 
Rozenberg and Hefftler point out, “[s]tudies of the [parliamentary] procedures related to the 
EU could indeed gain from more systematically considering the motivations of MPs for 
engaging in EU affairs” (Rozenberg/Hefftler, In: Hefftler/Neuhold/Rozenberg/Smith, 2015, 
p.27). Methods used in this second research strand are mainly qualitative-oriented and rely on 
 
39 See Searing, Westminster's world: understanding political roles, 1994. 
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small-N case studies. The most emblematic study that underlined the need to close the research 
gap on parliamentarians’ motivations is Rozenberg’s analysis on the so-called “emotional 
Europeanisation of national parliaments”40. The author argues that Europeanisation research 
should include parliamentarians’ “motivations for engaging into European activities” 
(Rozenberg, 2012, p.3) in order to assess effective parliamentary involvement. MPs’ interests 
and specialisation level with regard to EU matters determines to a large degree their willingness 
to use parliamentary tools to influence EU decision-making. In his article, Rozenberg focuses 
on the role played by chairs of EU committees in the House of Commons and the French 
National Assembly. The author argues that individual parliamentarians, through their 
motivations and their role within parliaments, contribute to incremental institutional change. 
Rather than relying on rational considerations, MPs’ behaviour tend to be driven by emotional 
elements (Rozenberg, 2012, p. 29). Awareness about EU issues constitutes an important feature 
of MPs’ motivations. The more they pay attention to and support European integration, the 
more they become sensitive to European matters and tend to deal with them more often 
(Rozenberg, In: Costa/Kerrouche/Magnette/Blondel, 2004). 
European treaties, in this regard, may have triggered more attention among 
parliamentarians. The Europeanisation of the Austrian, Finnish and Luxembourgish legislatures 
not only depends on the existence and evolution of formal parliamentary instruments to control 
EU issues, but also on their MPs’ incentives to use these instruments (Navarro/Brouard, 2014, 
p.106). This argument is especially valid for our cases. From an institutional point of view and 
basing on existing rankings of parliaments, we already know that the Luxembourg Chamber of 
Deputies counts among the weakest legislatures and the Finnish Eduskunta among the strongest 
in terms of formal parliamentary involvement in EU affairs. However, would the inclusion in 
those rankings of parliamentarians’ incentives and their use of informal channels modify the 
results? More specifically, if we consider parliamentarians’ motivations to get involved in EU 
and intergovernmental treaty negotiations, would the Luxembourgish Chamber of Deputies still 
be the weakest parliament among the three, considering that the number of Austrian and Finnish 
Eurosceptic parliamentarians have grown since the last legislative elections? Parliamentary 
involvement might thus also be determined by parliamentarians’ beliefs and opinion on EU 
issues and the role of their parliament within the national and European arena. Depending on 
the political party’s ideological stance or position within parliament, MPs might react 
differently. According to Rozenberg, parliamentarians’ membership to specific structures 
within parliament determines to what extent they tend to become “European specialists” 
(Rozenberg, 2012). Whether an MP defends pro-European or Eurosceptic positions within 
parliament also constitutes factors influencing parliamentary involvement. For example, the 
Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies is mainly composed of pro-EU parties also represented in 
government41. Their lever for political action might thus be more important than for opposition 
parties (ADR, Déi Lénk). Eurosceptic parties such as the ADR in Luxembourg, the True Finns 
in Finland or the FPÖ in Austria might either react passively to EU affairs or on the contrary 
 
40 See Rozenberg O., ‘The Emotional Europeanisation of  National Parliaments: Roles Played by  EU Committee 
Chairs at the Commons  and at the French National Assembly.’, OPAL, OPAL Online Paper Series, 2012 
41 The current government elected in December 2013 is composed of the DP, LSAP and Déi Gréng, representing 
32 out of 60 MPs in the Chamber of Deputies. 
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invest time and resources in EU related activities in order to counteract pro-EU decisions. 
Parliamentarians’ incentives might even more drift away from each other’s position during 
treaty negotiations. While Eurosceptic parties may refuse any step towards “more Europe”, pro-
EU parties would show less reluctance. Therefore, MPs’ experiences, interests and incentives 
regarding EU affairs represent valuable indicators for measuring effective parliamentary 
involvement during challenging events, i.e. European treaty negotiations. However, as 
explained in the previous section, Europeanisation and subsequently parliamentary 
involvement in the framework of EU-treaty negotiations cannot be assessed only through 
motivational criteria. Parliamentarians are embedded in specific political, historical and 
institutional contexts that need to be taken into account. The next section outlines the last strand 
in Europeanisation literature that emerged within recent years and that tries to combine 
institutional and motivational factors to explain parliamentary involvement in EU affairs. 
 
2.2.3 Parliamentary involvement in light of institutional and motivational factors 
 
Scholarly attention on national parliaments has changed in the last decade. Research on 
parliaments’ involvement in the European decision-making process concluded that formal 
capacities have been strengthened over the course of the European integration. European 
treaties, such as the Treaty of Maastricht, Amsterdam or more recently the Lisbon Treaty, have 
contributed to these changes. However, less attention has been given to the way 
parliamentarians use formal and informal means to interact with other actors, obtain 
information on EU topics, and in sum influence EU decision-making. The last identified strand 
in Europeanisation research appeared recently and tries to combine several approaches to assess 
as precisely as possible effective parliamentary involvement in EU affairs. Authors tend to 
complement the predominant rational institutionalist dimension of parliamentary involvement 
with other new-institutionalist strands in order to assess more thoroughly the interplay between 
political behaviour and institutions (see for example Auel/Christiansen, 2015). Europeanisation 
literature tends more and more to analyse the role of individual parliamentary actors, either 
through historical institutionalist lenses (Dimitrakopoulos, 2001), sociological institutionalist 
lenses (Jacquot/Woll, 2003), a mixture of different institutionalist branches (Bergman, 1997) 
or even through cognitive theory (Kropp, 2010). Incentives, be they rational or cognitive, 
occupy more and more the centre stage. The focus has shifted from formal parliamentary 
capacities to informal parliamentary practices and the effective use of parliamentary tools by 
parliamentarians and parliamentary civil servants. Research became more actor-centred and 
tried to understand the link between individual parliamentary actors’ motivations and actual 
parliamentary activity, the former influencing the latter. Scholars realise that parliamentary 
involvement in EU affairs depends also largely on the way parliamentary tools are used by MPs. 
Europeanisation of national parliaments might happen without any pressure from the European 
level, i.e. on a voluntary basis depending of domestic actors’ willingness to get engaged in EU 
affairs. These recent developments in Europeanisation literature is valuable for the present 
thesis, because it seeks to complete research gaps on MPs’ actual practices in EU affairs by 
opening the parliamentary black box. The complementarity between theoretical approaches and 
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research objects aim to portray parliamentary involvement in EU affairs as close as possible to 
the empirical reality. It permits to give account of the multiple explanatory factors of variations 
in parliamentary involvement across Member States. 
The Austrian parliament is the most emblematic case in the literature illustrating the 
need to complement approaches. The parliament is characterised by a significant discrepancy 
between institutional and actual capacities in EU affairs (Pollak/Slominski, 2009). While its 
formal powers have been strengthened in the course of European integration and would thus 
place it as a strong parliament among the available quantitative rankings, the reality is different. 
Firstly, it has been demonstrated that Austrian MPs scarcely use the formal tools at their 
disposal. Secondly, even if they would use these, it still does not mean that MPs are effectively 
influencing European policy. Parliamentarians’ motivations are thus an important explanatory 
factor of actual involvement in EU affairs as well as institutional change within parliaments. 
Katrin Auel counts among the first few scholars that suggested a new approach to 
Europeanisation, arguing that institutional and motivational aspects cannot be strictly separated 
in the analysis of parliamentary involvement in EU affairs (Auel, 2006; Auel, In: 
Holzhacker/Albaeck, 2007). She points out that “[f]ocusing only on the ‘visible’ use of formal 
parliamentary scrutiny rights and instruments therefore leads us to overlook more informal 
means of inﬂuence and control and to underestimate the involvement of […] [parliamentarians] 
in EU affairs” (Auel, 2006, p.260). According to Auel, parliamentary involvement in EU affairs 
cannot be measured merely by relying on quantitative indicators such as parliamentary scrutiny, 
but should also include indicators measuring how parliaments make use of their scrutiny system 
(Auel/Christiansen, 2015). The article of Auel and Christiansen combines elements from 
previous analyses focused on the evolution of formal parliamentary capacities and Rozenberg’s 
actor-centred motivational approach. The most attractive aspect of this article is the fact that 
the authors insist on the complementarity between institutional and motivational aspects of 
Europeanisation as two key explanatory factors of parliamentary involvement. In their article, 
they investigate how national parliaments make use of their institutional rights in the post-
Lisbon era. Their effort to link the three new-institutionalist branches together to explain MPs’ 
behaviour is an interesting element. Parliamentarians are seen as rational actors embedded in 
particular parliamentary traditions characterised by certain norms and values. Their behaviour 
is defined by rational factors, such as electoral benefits, the salience of EU-specific issues and 
the political game, but also by sociological factors, such as the political and parliamentary 
culture, personal attitudes towards European integration and parliamentarians’ profiles and 
position within parliament.  
The “logic of appropriateness” (see March/Olsen, 1998) might also guide 
parliamentarians’ actions. The authors cite parliamentary culture as an example and explain 
how it might affect the use of scrutiny instruments. Whether parliaments are dominated by 
conflictual or consensual cultures influences the way parliamentarians engage in the scrutiny 
of their government’s EU policy. The more the political system is conflictual, the more 
parliaments would tend to scrutinise their government’s EU policy. On the contrary, a 
consensual decision-making system would diminish parliaments’ participation rights because 
parliamentarians would not use the scrutiny instruments to the same extent as in the previous 
scenario. In the end, as Auel and Christiansen point out, a scrutiny system can only be efficient 
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if MPs decide to make use of it. According to them, “[…]what matters is not only what powers 
a legislature has in terms of scrutinizing the national executive or the EU decision-making 
process, but whether MPs are willing and able to make effective use of these” 
(Auel/Christiansen, 2015, p.275). The measurement of parliamentary involvement from this 
perspective is trickier, because it does not merely rely on quantitative indicators, but also on 
less obvious and more blurred qualitative criteria.  
 This new approach in the Europeanisation literature became more popular over the years 
and other authors took up the complementary perspective. Empirical studies on 
parliamentarians’ actual behaviour in EU affairs bloomed. Awareness about the need to study 
parliamentary involvement through MPs’ motivations translates into Navarro and Brouard’s 
(2014) affirmation:  
“[A]ttempts to strengthen the role of national parliaments in the EU will succeed only if they are 
accompanied by a change in the attitudes and behaviour of MPs. The discussion on the 
Europeanisation of national parliaments has tended to focus on the organisational adaptation of 
domestic legislatures. […]the capacity of national parliaments to cope with the consequences of 
European integration depends not only on the creation of institutional procedures but also on the 
willingness and ability of their members to get involved in EU affairs (Navarro/Brouard, 2014, pp. 
93-94).” 
 
 Navarro and Brouard deal with MPs’ issue attention as an element of Europeanisation. 
Based on a top-down approach, they analyse to what extent Europeanisation produced political 
conflicts and increased the salience of particular issues. They analyse the proportion of 
parliamentary questions on EU issues in the French National Assembly. Depending on the 
salience of topics and the political positioning of MPs towards European integration, 
parliamentarians pay more or less attention to EU matters. They conclude that in the French 
National Assembly, questions are mainly asked for electoral purposes and attention is thus less 
significant for EU matters. They also find that the amount of question is similar between 
opposition and majority MPs. But more than the results, it is the research strategy and the 
objective of the authors that are interesting here. They acknowledge that parliamentarians’ 
motivations, more than formal capacities, play a significant role in the scrutiny process of 
governments’ EU politics. More recently, an empirical study conducted by Gava et al. 
(Gava/Sciarini/Varone, 2017) investigated the behavioural dimension of Europeanisation in the 
Swiss parliament. They focus on the role and positions of political parties as contributors of the 
Europeanisation of parliamentary agendas. Their actor-centred approach permits to analyse 
how parliamentary instruments are being used by MPs and for which purpose. Drawing on the 
rational choice approach, they seek to understand how MPs mobilise EU matters to pursue 
strategic goals. They conclude that MPs’ attention to EU politics is driven by both policy-
seeking, i.e topic-related issues, as well as domestic re-election goals. 
If we apply the above-mentioned reasoning to the present thesis, it is possible to argue 
that reasons for engaging in EU affairs might be either purely political and rational, 
corresponding to re-election prospects for example, or a result of personal experiences and 
interests. The question is then: what drove MPs to follow EU and intergovernmental treaty 
negotiations? Institutional factors alone cannot explain this aspect. Parliamentarians from the 
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Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies, the Austrian National Council and the Finnish Eduskunta 
evolve in political systems based on similar characteristics. However, their formal rights to 
participate in EU affairs differ and might affect parliamentarians’ motivation to follow treaty 
negotiations. For this reason, organisational factors are not sufficient to assess actual 
parliamentary strength in EU-related activities. The focus has to shift from purely 
organisational factors to actor-centred qualitative indicators. For example, the political game 
and the interaction between parliament and government in each country has to be taken into 
account to assess its influence on parliamentarians’ practices and motivations.  
Austria, Luxembourg and Finland rely on coalition governments and consensual policy-
making. Two effects of this institutional setting on parliamentary involvement can be identified: 
on the one hand, majority MPs have more opportunities and resources to invest time in EU-
related matters than MPs from the opposition; on the other hand, the proximity of the former 
with the ruling coalition hinders them from counteracting their government’s EU policies and 
discourages them from using parliamentary tools threatening governmental actions. In 
Luxembourg, the overall pro-European culture and the quasi absence of opposition gives a 
significant leverage to the government. In Austria, political polarisation increased over the 
years, giving opposition parties such as FPÖ or the Greens more weight in parliament. EU 
affairs are thus not only determined by formal tools, but also for example by the existing 
political constellation and party ideologies. For pro-European parties such as the CSV in 
Luxembourg or the ÖVP in Austria, EU and intergovernmental treaty negotiations are crucial 
events that encourage the establishment of a Federal European Union. For opposition parties, 
the stakes are completely different and oriented towards the preservation of national 
sovereignty. The political culture determines to what extent formal capacities are used and 
changed. These are some aspects illustrating the importance of combining the analysis of formal 
parliamentary capacities with a motivational approach.  
These scholars neither take parliaments as unitary actors, nor ignore their institutional 
context. Their main interest lies in explaining the effective use of parliamentary instruments by 
drawing on empirical examples staying as close as possible to the real situation. Attention has 
shifted from broad quantitative studies to the production of deepened knowledge on 
parliamentary involvement in EU affairs. Just as these authors, we seek to take account of 
parliamentarians’ diversified institutional environment, their interactions with parliamentary 
and non-parliamentary actors as well as their incentives for engaging (or not) in EU affairs to 
explain parliamentary involvement patterns during treaty negotiations. Formal institutional 
capacities provide national parliaments with instruments ensuring their parliamentary 
involvement in EU affairs, but institutional opportunities are not always used and “translated 
into actual activity” (Auel/Höing, 2015). Research is still insufficient on the way MPs use 
institutional opportunities and constraints, both at the European and national levels.  
To sum up, Europeanisation research has to move beyond the mere focus on formal 
capacities by bringing the micro-level back in. Therefore, we seek to assess parliaments’ 
Europeanisation through the link between their institutional capacities and MPs’ political 
motivation. 
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2.3 Conclusions 
 
This chapter reviewed the literature on the participation rights of national parliaments 
with regard to European affairs. Parliaments have undeniably been the object of an increased 
attention since the 1990s. Drawing on the Europeanisation concept, most scholars were 
focusing until recently on the evolution of formal parliamentary capacities, noticing an 
incremental development that did not systematically reflect the reality of parliamentary 
involvement. Indeed, parliamentary strength in EU affairs remains circumscribed to the 
existence of formal instruments, most rankings using quantitative data to illustrate the trends. 
Since the 2010s, some scholars redirected their research towards measuring the effective 
involvement of parliaments in EU affairs by incorporating parliamentarians’ motivations in 
their analysis. Empirical research basing on this new research strand is slowly growing and the 
present thesis aims to contribute to it.
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Chapter 3. Theoretical Fundament: Sociological and Historical-
institutionalism 
 
After having outlined the main discussions in the literature on the Europeanisation of 
national parliaments, this chapter will explain the theoretical approaches that will be used to 
assess the evolution of parliamentary involvement in the light of atypical moments of European 
integration. Chapter 2 presented the different strands in Europeanisation literature. We 
highlighted in particular the interesting contributions of the recent strand seeking 
complementarity both from a theoretical and analytical side. Authors try to combine theoretical 
approaches in order to draw the most complete picture of actual parliamentary involvement in 
EU affairs. By doing so, they pay attention to the close relationship between parliamentarians 
and their institutional framework. Participation in EU affairs is increasingly assessed through 
the role of MPs within parliaments and how their motivations influence the way they use 
scrutiny instruments.   
The comparative nature of the present thesis integrates both evolutionary and motivational 
dimensions. Institutional change within each legislature will be assessed through temporal 
lenses, while the reasons and incentives underpinning these changes will be assessed through 
sociological lenses. The combination of historical and Sociological Institutionalism permits to 
integrate micro and meso-level perspectives in the analysis and provide a broader vision of 
parliamentary involvement in EU affairs. The present chapter first describes shortly the general 
premises of new institutionalism. It then motivates the choice of both new-institutionalist 
branches for the present thesis, explaining the added-value of seeking complementarity between 
different theoretical approaches. 
 
3.1 New institutionalism: origins and branches 
 
Research on parliamentary involvement in EU politics founds primarily on new-
institutionalist theories, the rational-choice approach being the most used among the strands 
(see for example Auel, 2009; De Ruiter, 2013; Sprungk, 2010; Strelkov, 2015). The 
fundamental assumption of new institutionalism is that agents and structures are closely 
intertwined and influence each other. Agents are embedded in a specific institutional framework 
that impacts their actions, but are at the same time the shapers of those institutions that guide 
their actions. Several factors caused the emergence of new institutionalism: the absence of a 
concrete theoretical framework and the exaggerated emphasis on structures in the old 
institutionalist approach, the narrow focus on agency of the behavioural approach, and finally 
the growing awareness among organisation theorists that organisations’ institutional 
environment should be taken into account in the analysis of organisational dynamics. 
 
Old institutionalism and behaviouralism are both seen as the predecessors of new-
institutionalism. The old institutionalist school dominated political science until the middle of 
the twentieth century (Peters, 2005). As a rather descriptive and less theory-driven approach, 
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old institutionalism emphasised the importance of structures and assumed that they mainly 
determined agents’ behaviour. Studies on political institutions drawing on old institutionalism 
classified them according to predefined typologies or institutional ideal-types. Descriptions of 
institutions relied on abstract preconceptions, i.e. authors using the old institutionalist 
perspective would describe the functioning of an institution according to pre-established formal 
criteria and values (Stone, 1992). In reaction to the formal legal framework of old 
institutionalism, behaviouralists criticised the purely structuralist stance which neglected the 
role played by individuals. Behavioural theory emerged in the 1950s and relied on the social 
and cultural underpinnings of political life, assuming that individuals should be at the heart of 
explanation in political science. Distinguishing themselves from old institutionalists, 
behaviouralists underlined the need for theory development and relied mainly on quantitative 
and statistical research designs. They argued that formal rules and structures do not suffice to 
explain actors’ actual behaviour or policy outcomes, hence the need to shift the focus of research 
towards attitudes, political behaviour and the informal distribution of power (Steinmo/Thelen, 
1998). Political behaviour was thus at the centre of their analysis (Thelen/Steinmo/Longstreth, 
1992). Behaviouralism bases on methodological individualism and tends to neglect actors’ 
institutional environment in the explanation of political outcomes. Their main analytical focus 
lies on individuals’ choices, attitudes and interactions in the process of decision-making. 
Behaviouralism centres its attention on the psychological traits of politicians, investigating their 
attitudes, beliefs and personality. We do not deny that these elements are of importance to 
understand parliamentary involvement, but we need to complement the behavioural approach 
with institutionalist elements that draw attention on contextual features and formal structures. 
These theoretical evolutions led to new reflections on the explanation of political behaviour.  
 
New-institutionalism first emerged in 1984 when March and Olsen started to develop a 
new conception of political behaviour in contrast to old institutionalist and behaviouralist 
premises (Peters, 2005, p.16). Departing from a purely descriptive and agent oriented approach, 
the authors normative institutionalist perspective emphasises the importance of institutions as 
shapers of political behaviour. Structures and agents are conceived as mutually interdependent. 
While rational choice approaches dominated old institutionalist studies, March and Olsen’s 
concept of “normative institutionalism” defends the idea that political behaviour within a given 
institutional framework depends also on a socially constructed context and agents’ motivations. 
Institutions are conceived as a loose framework within which actors conform not only to rules, 
but also to common norms and values (March/Olsen, 1998). Political institutions can take 
several forms and endorse autonomous roles. They are not only formal rules constraining 
agents’ actions, but encompass also informal structures (Aspinwall/Schneider, 2000; Keohane, 
1988, p.383). An institution can thus either be a formal entity (i.e. an organisation) such as a 
parliament, or “collections of standard operating procedures and structures that define and 
defend values, norms, interests, identities, and beliefs” (March/Olsen, 1989, p.17). Different 
logics may underpin agents’ political behaviour. The authors differentiate between the “logic 
of appropriateness”, where actors behave according to a set of rules and procedures established 
by an institution, and the “logic of consequentialism”, where agents’ actions are driven by the 
calculation of their consequences. In their understanding, institutions are largely normative and 
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“defin[e] appropriate behaviour for specific groups of actors in specific situations” 
(March/Olsen, 1998, p.948).  
 
March and Olsen’s new-institutionalist approach lays the foundation for a new 
understanding of the role of political institutions. They posit that political institutions provide 
actors with a normative framework composed of rules. Political behaviour is thus not only 
influenced by cost and benefit calculations, but also shaped by rules, identities and beliefs 
constructed and reinterpreted within political institutions.  
 
New institutionalism developed into a more complex theory over time. Three strands 
emerged, each of them conceptualising institutions and their impact on political behaviour in 
different ways: “rational choice institutionalism”, “Historical Institutionalism” and 
“Sociological Institutionalism”. The rational choice perspective conceives institutions as formal 
rules merely determining agents’ action options and the costs and benefits related to the latter 
(Checkel, 1999; Peters, 2005). The rationalist argument is still predominant in Europeanisation 
research. The main research focus of rational choice institutionalists in Legislative studies is 
the power distribution among actors, either between organisations at the meso-level by using 
the principal-agent model (Auel, 2007 and 2009; Harfst/Schnapp, 2003; Sprungk, 2010) or at 
the micro-level between individual political leaders (Auel, 2009; Strelkov, 2015; Strøm, 1997). 
Within the Europeanisation research strand, several authors have analysed the scrutiny power 
of national parliaments by using the principal-agent framework (Auel, 2007; Harfst/Schnapp, 
2003; Holzhacker, 2002; Sprungk, 2010). The “calculus approach” of rational choice 
institutionalism conceives parliaments as purely formal institutions providing MPs with 
information, resources and sanction mechanisms relevant for their actions. While interactions 
between actors also play an important role in the rationalist approach, they are mainly conceived 
in a balance of power perspective where actors are competing for information and resources to 
influence political outcomes. The balance of power argument in legislative studies translates 
into the analysis of parliament-government relationship and in particular the ability of the 
former to control the latter. Sprungk (2010) argues for example that agency loss for parliaments 
is higher in EU affairs than in domestic matters, because of information asymmetries between 
parliaments and governments. Interactions between government and opposition parties within 
parliament are the main research object of these analyses, with the aim to explain parliamentary 
scrutiny power (Holzhacker, 2002). 
 
Rational choice institutionalism exogenises actors’ preferences and postulates that they 
remain unchanged during the process of strategy choice (Jørgensen/Pollack/Rosamond, 2007). 
The assumption of scholars basing on the “calculus approach” is that parliamentarians’ 
incentives to get involved in European affairs would depend on a calculation of costs and 
benefits to scrutinise EU affairs. Driven by electoral and national career goals, MPs would tend 
to focus on domestic issues because re-election chances and their influence on decision-making 
would be higher than for EU politics (De Ruiter, 2013). Auel (2009) combines for example role 
theory and the principal-agent model to explain parliamentary behaviour in EU affairs, in 
particular how parliamentarians use their oversight functions to scrutinise their government’s 
EU policy. The author conceives behaviour as strategies used by MPs to participate in the 
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decision-making process through the pursuit of preferences and their adaptation to institutional 
opportunities and constraints. These strategies are driven by MPs’ roles as “agents of their 
voters or parties, but also principals of the government […]” (Auel, 2009, p.6). Auel argues that 
MPs aim to reduce agency loss towards their government. However, strategies to control 
governmental EU policies differ from one parliament to the other and depends on the 
availability of formal capacities and MPs’ preferences to get active in these matters. 
 
Even though rational choice has been used extensively in Europeanisation literature, it 
remains too restrictive for the purpose of our thesis. Firstly, the branch focuses on actors at the 
expense of their institutional context. Secondly, the benefit-maximising aspect of political 
behaviour does not take account of actors’ “bounded rationality” (Hermann, In: Monroe, 2001) 
and the role of changing preferences and ideas. Even though EU affairs may not constitute an 
electoral incentive, some parliamentarians spend time scrutinising these matters for other 
reasons (Auel/Rozenberg/Tacea, 2015). 
Scholars increasingly combine several strands of new-institutionalism to analyse the 
involvement of national parliaments in EU affairs (Bergman, 1997; Maurer/Wessels, 2001). 
The following sections outline the main features of the two institutionalist branches on which 
the present thesis relies, i.e historical and Sociological Institutionalism. We will then discuss 
the reasons for seeking complementarity between these two approaches. 
 
3.2 Parliamentary involvement in a Historical Institutionalist perspective: explaining 
institutional change 
   
The first aspects that we aim to explain in the present thesis are evolutionary trends in 
institutional structures. In order to explain the process of institutional change within each 
legislature, we will rely on Historical Institutionalism. This branch appeared in the 1980s and 
is considered as the “first version of new institutionalism” (Peters, 2005, p.72). Historical 
Institutionalism tries to understand specific political outcomes by basing on thick description 
and temporal processes. As a middle-ground theory between rational choice and Sociological 
Institutionalism, Historical Institutionalism conceives institutions and political behaviour in the 
light of arguments present in both branches, mixing “elements of rationalistic and constructivist 
explanations” (Immergut, In: Wimmer/Kössler, 2006). Historical Institutionalism defines 
institutions as “the formal or informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded 
in the organizational structure of the polity […]” (Hall/Taylor, 1996, p.938). Institutions are 
both formal and informal. While rational choice institutionalism assumes that institutions are 
means orienting actors’ strategies to attain specific goals (Geddes, 2010, p. 177), Historical 
Institutionalism assumes that the link between institutions and agents is more complex and 
interdependent. Historical Institutionalism does not reject the rational postulate, but adds a 
cultural dimension by emphasising the role of agents’ changing preferences in the process of 
institutional change. Focusing primarily on developments on the meso-level, Historical 
Institutionalism has been used in Legislative studies to analyse the adaptation of parliaments’ 
formal capacities to the European integration process (Benz, 2004; Dimitrakopoulos, 2001).  
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3.2.1 Parliamentary involvement in the light of temporal factors: the theory of endogenous 
institutional change 
 
The temporal dimension, which is absent from Rational and Sociological 
Institutionalism, is a crucial component of Historical Institutionalism. Europeanisation is by 
definition an evolutionary process and can only be assessed through historical lenses. The 
chosen timeframe for the present thesis encompasses several significant treaties that might have 
triggered institutional change within the parliamentary chambers of Austria, Luxembourg and 
Finland.  The failed Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe and the Treaty of Lisbon, in 
particular, represented big steps towards a strengthened parliamentary involvement and 
triggered attention in all Member States. In times of economic and financial crisis, the European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM) and the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the 
Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG) brought renewed attention to parliamentary 
participation rights in EU affairs. Parliamentary involvement in EU politics is not static and 
needs to be contextualised in order to understand and explain institutional and behavioural 
evolutions. Steinmo and Thelen point out that “[…]institutional change is important not only 
because it alters the constraints in which actors make strategic choices but ultimately because 
it reshapes the very goals and ideas that animate political action” (Steinmo/Thelen, 1998, p.27).  
Therefore, the temporal context of EU and intergovernmental treaties is a significant factor that 
can only be incorporated in the thesis through the historical institutionalist approach. Time 
matters in politics (Pierson, 2004). Institutions are not static but change over time. Specific 
contexts might trigger different outcomes and as Hall states it, “similar causal factors may have 
more impact in some periods than in others” (Hall, In: Fioretos/Falleti/Sheingate, 2016, p.38). 
In a broad sense, Historical Institutionalism focuses on “how temporal processes and events 
influence the origin and transformation of institutions that govern political and economic 
relations” (Fioretos et al., In: Fioretos/Falleti/Sheingate, 2016, p.3). The focus on institutional 
change in Historical Institutionalism can be separated into two research strands: the first wave 
of authors explains change in a broader sense by differentiating historical periods and their 
specificities, while the second wave goes deeper into the explanation of change, its causes and 
consequences. Assumptions about institutional change differ between the first and second wave 
of studies. Authors from the first wave assume that institutional evolution is mainly caused by 
exogenous shocks called “critical junctures” (Capoccia/Kelemen, 2007; Collier/Collier, 1991), 
i.e “moments of openness for radical institutional change, in which a relatively broad range of 
options are available and can plausibly be adopted” (Fioretos/Falleti/Sheingate, 2016, p.98), 
leading institutions to “alternative paths” (Coman/Thelen, In: Fioretos/Falleti/Sheingate, 2016; 
Hall/Taylor, 1996). In the end, historical institutionalists from the first wave conclude that this 
model of “punctuated equilibrium” (Krasner, 1984, quoted in Peters, 2005) causes mainly path-
dependence, understood here as an irreversible trajectory either limiting or causing institutional 
change (Mahoney/Mohamedali/Nguyen, In: Fioretos/Falleti/Sheingate, 2016; Peters, 2005; 
Pierson, 2004). Research on the evolution of parliamentary involvement in EU affairs draws 
mostly on this first strand of Historical Institutionalism.  
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Benz (2004) uses historical and rational arguments and asserts that parliamentary 
democracy on the European level depends not only on institutional structures, but also on 
actors’ strategies. He takes three empirical examples to illustrate his arguments: parliaments of 
UK, Denmark and Germany. In response to the process of European integration and the shift of 
power from parliaments to executives, parliaments had to undergo structural reforms to improve 
their information rights and their scrutiny power. According to the author, these reforms “have 
changed the opportunity structures and incentives for actors” (Benz, 2004, p.885). Due to this 
shift in the strategical goals of parliamentary actors, “a certain group of members of parliament 
is strongly motivated to take part in European multi-level governance” (Benz, 2004, p.885) 
while others are not. The strategic behaviour of actors translates into the competition between 
opposition and majority parties. Alongside the strategic role of actors, Benz also argues that the 
adaptation of parliaments to European integration correspond to path-dependent changes of 
parliamentary rules and organisation. Existing institutions are seen here as constraints on MPs’ 
involvement in parliament as well as on institutional change. The analysis of MPs’ political 
strategies and interactions with the government when handling EU affairs leads to the 
conclusion that these strategies encourage path-dependent developments within parliaments. 
According to the author, parliaments have changed their structures to adapt to European 
integration, but internal political competition hinders an efficient use of the new instruments. 
Parliaments are thus falling back into prior practices that may confirm path-dependency.  
Dimitrakopoulos uses Historical Institutionalism to compare the adaptation of three 
parliaments (France, UK, Greece) to the European integration process. The author argues that 
change within these legislatures happened incrementally and followed pre-existing institutional 
settings, which confirms path-dependent trends. Path-dependency in these cases translated into 
the use of existing procedures to scrutinise EU politics. Departing from the notion of “critical 
junctures”, Dimitrakopoulos recognises that change can be incremental, even though the 
direction of change remains path-dependent. 
First versions of this branch of Historical Institutionalism tended to rely on a 
deterministic vision that did not reflect the reality of institutional changes. In fact, European 
treaties as exogenous triggers cannot be considered as the only causes of institutional change in 
national parliaments, neither can they be seen as “critical junctures”. The “punctuated 
equilibrium” model reduces the causes of institutional change to exogenous factors and ignores 
the role of actors in the process.  
The second wave of studies in Historical Institutionalism departs from the “punctuated 
equilibrium” model and serves as background to the present thesis. Authors from this wave 
developed a new conception of institutional change, rejecting the deterministic and narrowly 
scoped perspective of early historical institutionalists. They understand institutional change as 
“slow-moving processes of gradual change rather than singular historical break points” 
(Fioretos et al., In: Fioretos/Falleti/Sheingate, 2016). The theory of endogenous institutional 
change relies on the premise that change occurs incrementally and takes five different forms: 
displacement, layering, drift, conversion and exhaustion (Capoccia, 2016; Fioretos et al, In: 
Fioretos/Falleti/Sheingate, 2016; Streeck/Thelen, 2005). While the authors apply these different 
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directions of change to the macro-level (organisational fields), we will use them to explain 
dynamics on the meso-level (parliaments). 
Displacement: institutional change through displacement may be originating from some 
incoherence in the institutional framework translating into missing or conflicting rules. 
Incoherence leads to changing interests among actors embedded within the institutional 
framework, who consider new institutional arrangements as better serving their interests. Thus, 
there is a shift in salience of institutional arrangements, which may lead to the replacement of 
traditional arrangements with new institutions. Existing rules are removed and replaced by new 
ones, because actors’ defect from current institutions and “cultivat[e] of a new logic of action” 
(Streeck/Thelen, 2005, p.57). 
 
Layering: institutional change through layering is characterised by the establishment of new 
rules onto pre-existing ones through amendments or revisions. Political actors introduce 
amendments in order to refine the existing institutional framework. The consequence of such 
reforms is a differential growth between old and new institutions, the new ones slowly winning 
more support than the pre-existing ones. 
 
Drift: institutional change through drift means that rules are not adapted to their changing 
environment in order to change their effects. Rules deliberately remain unchanged despite 
contextual evolutions. Political actors strategically choose to avoid re-setting institutions, which 
leads to a transformation in the enactment of institutions. Institutional change thus happens 
through “deliberate neglect” from actors (Streeck/Thelen, 2005, p.57). 
 
Conversion: institutional change through conversion refers to institutions’ redirection to serve 
different objectives. Redirection is caused by changes in the institutional framework and 
appearing gaps between existing rules and their practical implementation. Political actors 
exploit environmental changes and institutional gaps to adapt the goals of pre-existing 
institutions. Old institutions are converted to serve new purposes. 
 
Exhaustion: institutional change through exhaustion implies the breakdown of existing 
institutions. The increasing incoherence and complexity of existing institutions, mostly 
resulting from measures taken by political actors, as well as the limited life span of institutions, 
may lead to their breakdown. 
These five modes help characterising the transformative processes undergone by parliaments in 
response to European integration. The theory of endogenous institutional change attributes a 
significant weight to agents’ preferences and incentives as explanatory factors of institutional 
change.  
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3.2.2 The role of agency in institutional change 
 
Endogenous institutional change implies in the first place that agency plays a significant 
role in the process. Scholars from the second wave of Historical Institutionalism support the 
idea that “agents [are situated] within a context that shapes the plausible strategies available to 
them – but which they may also be able to change” (Conran/Thelen, In: 
Fioretos/Falleti/Sheingate, 2016, p.66). Mobilisation of actors is a crucial factor of institutional 
change. Change can occur because agents initiated it. The focus is less on the influence of 
institutions over political interactions than on the way the latter change the former (Capoccia, 
2016). This understanding of institutional change requires considering as explanatory factors 
agents’ interests and incentives embedded in specific institutional and contextual environments 
(Steinmo, In: Fioretos/Falleti/Sheingate, 2016, p.119). Actors with changing incentives, 
interests and preferences shape and modify institutions. Contrary to rational institutionalism, 
which assumes that “relevant actors have a fixed set of preferences or tastes […], behave 
entirely instrumentally so as to maximize the attainment of these preferences, and do so in a 
highly strategic manner that presumes extensive calculation” (Hall/Taylor, 1996, p. 944), the 
theory of endogenous institutional change in Historical Institutionalism adds a cultural 
perspective to political behaviour. Agents’ preferences and interests are not fixed and stable. 
They might not always correspond to strategic calculations because actors’ have a bounded 
rationality.  
Just as sociological institutionalists, historical institutionalists endogenise preferences 
and admit that the latter change over time. Historical Institutionalism does not treat preferences 
as being exogenous, but rather as a product of their institutional context and the complex 
interaction between agents and structures (Koelble, 1995, p.232). Therefore, according to the 
theory of endogenous institutional change, the transformative process of an institution is mainly 
caused by bottom-up dynamics, pushed by “political contestation over the form, functions and 
salience of specific institutions” (Capoccia, 2016, p.1101). “[C]ontestation from below” 
(Capoccia, 2016, p.1099) arises from agents’ perception of institutions as “arenas of conflict” 
(Capoccia, 2016, p.1099). The latter are characterised by competition between actors setting 
institutional rules and actors that have to comply with these rules, despite their dissatisfaction 
with the institutional status quo. Thus, gaps emerge within institutions between existing formal 
rules and their practical implementation. These “gaps between what a rule says and how it is 
applied allows incremental processes of rule defection and reinterpretation” (Capoccia, 2016, 
p.1101), and may become the main objects of contestation among actors forming coalitions. It 
ensues competition between actors in the process of rule reinterpretation in order to adapt the 
institutional framework to the contestants’ needs and interests. This rule reinterpretation 
originates from actors’ changing “material interests”, but also from the transformation of actors’ 
ideational framework (Capoccia, 2016, p.1102).  
According to Streeck and Thelen, contestation over political institutions is not punctual 
and rather the “object of ongoing skirmishing as actors try to achieve advantage by interpreting 
or redirecting institutions in pursuit of their goals, or by subverting or circumventing rules that 
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clash with their interests” (Streeck/Thelen, in Streeck/Thelen, 2005, p.27). During the 
competition process over the reinterpretation of institutions, actors with similar preferences and 
priorities may build coalitions in order to impose the rules they designed upon other actors. 
Coalitions and political contestation might be initiated by political entrepreneurs, i.e. individual 
actors taking the lead in initiating change or putting reforms on the agenda. Several factors 
might help political entrepreneurs to initiate change through rule reinterpretation: the 
inconsistency and incompleteness of rules (Capoccia, 2007, p. 1101, and March/Olsen, 1989), 
the evolving external context or contestation within an institution over existing rules.  
3.2.3 Conclusion 
 
The theory of endogenous institutional change as such has barely been applied to 
measure empirically parliamentary involvement in EU affairs, even though some authors refer 
to some aspects of this theory in their arguments on evolutionary patterns and the role of agents 
in institutional change (see for example Saalfeld, 2003; Rozenberg, 2012). In closing, the theory 
of endogenous institutional change posits that the transformative nature of institutional change 
is caused by political contestation originating from actors’ changing interests and goals and 
aiming at reinterpreting political institutions. However, even though this theory goes beyond 
rational choice institutionalism by postulating that actors’ evolving interests and preferences 
play a role in institutional change, we notice that motivations, their origins and their position in 
this transformative process are not being incorporated enough in Historical Institutionalism. 
Motivations are all the more important as the present thesis focuses on bottom-up dynamics of 
institutional change. The next section will therefore outline the sociological institutionalist 
branch, which will serve as complementary approach to Historical Institutionalism to explain 
underpinning reasons of parliamentary involvement as observed during EU and 
intergovernmental treaty negotiations. 
 
3.3 Parliamentary involvement in a sociological institutionalist perspective: explaining 
the motivations underpinning institutional change and parliamentary activity 
 
While Historical Institutionalism permits to explain institutional change and the 
relationship between interests and institutions, Sociological Institutionalism (more precisely the 
motivational approach) seeks to explain the origins of beliefs, how they are being shaped by the 
institutional framework and reversely, how institutional change and parliamentary activity 
originates from agents’ evolving interpretations of their institutional framework. The impact of 
parliamentarians’ motivations on their institutional context and conversely represents the 
second step of our research. In order to assess parliamentary involvement within parliaments, 
agents’ roles and incentives to act in a specific way should be taken into account. Focusing on 
the micro-level, the sociological institutionalist approach does not conceive institutions as mere 
constraints on agents’ behaviour, but suggests that the former are constitutive of the latter. 
Sociological Institutionalism is embedded in organisation theory and emerged in the 1970s.  
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The interest of this branch of new-institutionalism lies in explaining the emergence of 
specific institutions within organisations. The establishment of institutions does not 
automatically correspond to rational considerations, but may result from “cultural-specific 
practices” (Hall/Taylor, 1996, p.946). While historical institutionalists conceive institutions as 
being composed of formal and informal rules only, sociological institutionalists underline the 
cognitive elements of institutions. In their understanding, agents’ actions are defined by an 
institutional framework understood as a set of formal rules, procedures, norms, cultures, but 
also “symbol systems, cognitive scripts, and moral templates” (Hall/Taylor, 1996, p.947) giving 
them the keys to interpret behaviour. Institutions contribute to the formation of actors’ 
identities, ideas and beliefs, which in turn influence political behaviour and institutions 
themselves. Political behaviour is not only conceived as being strategically determined by 
formal institutions, but also by norms, cultures and values inherent to those institutions. Political 
behaviour would then depend on both rational calculations and ideas (Hall/Taylor, 1996). Thus, 
actors’ ideas and motivations play a significant role in the way an institution evolves. In 
Legislative Studies, the sociological approach is commonly used to explain parliamentarians’ 
roles and incentives, be it in European institutions (Beauvallet/Michon, 2012; Georgakakis, 
2010) or in national parliaments (Rozenberg, 2012; Wessels, 2005). The “motivational 
approach” developed by Rozenberg and based on Searing’s role theory bases on the postulate 
that agents’ behaviour is not merely originating from rationalist considerations, but first and 
foremost from emotional factors consisting of desires, beliefs and incentives (Rozenberg, 2012 
and 2018). 
Like historical-institutionalism, but to a greater extent, Sociological Institutionalism 
adds a “cultural” or “constructivist” perspective to rational institutionalist arguments in the 
sense that it does not reject the postulate of instrumentally-oriented actors, but assumes that 
they also “choose strategies […] from culturally-specific repertoires” (Hall/Taylor, 1996, 
p.951). Hermann points out that “[h]ow people define what is in their self-interest, what is 
salient to them, what they feel compelled to act on can differ depending on the lenses through 
which they view the world” (Hermann, In: Monroe, 2001, p.48). Actors might take decisions 
intuitively, without explicit calculations (Lau, In: Sears et al., 2003). Individuals embedded in 
a specific organisational environment are “socialized into particular institutional roles [and] 
internalize the norms associated with these roles” (Hall/Taylor, 1996, p.948). Institutions thus 
affect actors’ behaviour by providing them with a frame of reference within which they form 
their own preferences and identity according to their institutional environment (Checkel, 1999). 
Agents’ social background and personal experience play a role in the way the former interpret 
their position within the institution, the construction of their interests, how they behave and how 
they influence and shape future evolutions of their institutional framework by reinterpreting 
rules and changing routines (Navarro, 2009). Agents are not reacting passively to their 
environment, but shape it actively through their own personal beliefs and perceptions 
(Hermann, In: Monroe, 2001; George, In: Falkowski/George, 1979). 
Unlike Historical Institutionalism, Sociological Institutionalism states that 
parliamentary activity may originate from non-strategical considerations, i.e. normative beliefs 
forged through personal experiences or socialisation processes. Moreover, the theory does not 
focus on explanations of institutional change. However, the notion of change is still present in 
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the sense that evolving ideas and motivations might incite agents to reinterpret institutions. 
Agents have different visions on the enactment of institutions, which may lead to gaps between 
the existence of institutions and their actual use. Differences in normative commitment to the 
existing institutional framework causes agents’ dissatisfaction about existing rules. The level of 
dissatisfaction with the institutional status quo thus determines the degree of institutional 
change. The latter is conceived as evolutionary, i.e. incremental. This conception of institutional 
change is quite close to the theory of endogenous institutional change outlined in the previous 
section. In both approaches, agency plays a crucial role in the reinterpretation of institutions. 
Whereas agents’ discrepant interests and political contestation are the core explanatory factors 
in the theory of endogenous institutional change, the mismatch between agents’ normative 
conception of an institution’s purpose is the explanatory factor of change in Sociological 
Institutionalism. 
 
3.4  Own contribution: complementarity between Historical and Sociological 
Institutionalism  
 
Both branches of new-institutionalism outlined in the above sections define institutions 
and conceive their influence on political behaviour in different ways. Assessing the evolution 
of parliamentary involvement implies to take account both of institutional features, agents’ 
motivations driven by interests and ideas, and the interplay between these two levels. Historical 
Institutionalism already combines the “calculus” and “cultural” approaches to explain 
institutional change, but misses to explain how behaviour is influenced by institutions. 
Sociological Institutionalism explains how institutions affect the normative framework of 
political behaviour, but misses to incorporate agents’ rational interests and competition over 
power in the process of institutional change and parliamentary activity (Hall/Taylor, 1996). 
Thus, several authors suggest combining new-institutionalist branches to cover all explanatory 
dimensions of political behaviour and the impact of institutions on behaviour 
(Aspinwall/Schneider, 2000; Hall/Taylor, 1996). Each strand completes the other, and their 
interchange may allow obtaining accurate explanation on the link between MPs’ motivations 
and institutional change. As Hall and Taylor put it, “an actor’s behaviour may be influenced 
both by strategic calculation […] and by reference to a familiar set of moral or cognitive 
templates, each of which may depend on the configuration of existing institutions” (Hall/Taylor, 
1996, p.955). Involvement may thus be determined both by rules established in a given 
institutional framework and agents’ beliefs that were moulded within this framework. The 
present thesis seeks to combine two institutionalist approaches to explain parliamentary 
involvement in EU affairs. The following table (table 4) sums up the main differences and 
similarities between Historical and Sociological Institutionalism. 
 
Table 4: Main features of Historical Institutionalism and Sociological Institutionalism 
Features Historical Institutionalism (Theory 
of Endogenous Institutional 
Change) 
Sociological Institutionalism 
(Motivational approach) 
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Research objective Analysis of institutional change 
dynamics and the role of agency in 
institutional transformation 
Analysis of the influence of political 
institutions on actors’ behaviour and 
reversely 
Research focus Meso- and micro levels Micro-level 
Definition of institutions Informal and formal rules, 
conventions, routines 
Set of formal rules, procedures, 
cultures, symbols, cognitive scripts 
Establishment of 
institutions 
Bottom-up dynamics, political 
contestation through conflicting 
interests and competition over power, 
coalition formation, reinterpretation 
of rules 
Mismatching normative conception 
of  institutions, normative 
reinterpretation 
Development of 
institutions 
Transformative, gradual, endogenous Evolutionary 
Agents’ preferences Endogenous, “Bounded rationality”, 
evolving interests and preferences 
Endogenous, “Bounded rationality”, 
motivations 
Relationship between 
institutions and actions 
Calculus and cultural approaches Cultural approach, cognitive 
dimension 
Sources: Aspinwall/Schneider, 2000, p.7; Capoccia, 2007; Hall/Taylor, 1996; Streeck/Thelen, 2005 
 
Both facets of new-institutionalism have different conceptions of agents’ influence on 
institutions and how the latter evolve. If we take each feature of both theories summed up in the 
table above and apply them to the present thesis, we can identify which elements from both 
theoretical approaches complement best each other. First, the main research objectives differ 
considerably if we focus on the temporal dimension. The Theory of Endogenous Institutional 
Change in Historical Institutionalism aims to explain dynamics of institutional change, while 
Sociological Institutionalism focuses on the interdependence between institutions and agents’ 
behaviour. Both theories see change as being an evolutionary and gradual process, but contrary 
to the Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change, which focuses on explaining the dynamics 
of change, Sociological Institutionalism considers change as a potential consequence emanating 
from the interplay between institutions and agents’ behaviour.  
Even though the Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change acknowledges the role of 
individuals in the transformation and evolution of institutions, Sociological Institutionalism will 
be more helpful in explaining the reasons underlying the action of individuals. In this regard, 
the latter theory will complement the first by digging deeper into the reasons of actions and 
understanding how institutions influence or are influenced by these actions. This will permit to 
explain more thoroughly the direction of institutional change and the reasons underpinning 
parliamentary activity. The theory of institutional change is focused on institutional 
developments on the meso-level, hence the need to rely also on Sociological Institutionalism in 
order to understand how actions on the micro-level affected the overall evolution of 
parliamentary involvement in EU affairs. Historical Institutionalism alone would miss to 
explain the causes of evolutions, but would rather settle for the explanation of the direction in 
which an institution changed. Concerning the definition of an institution, the use of both theories 
will allow to broaden the understanding of parliamentarians’ institutional framework. Indeed, 
institutions are both informal and formal rules, procedures (translated into parliamentary 
practices, legal bases, etc), but also cultures (political cultures, such as consensual versus 
conflictual parliamentary culture) and cognitive scripts. Sociological Institutionalism permits 
here to widen the definition of institutions by adding the normative and cognitive dimension to 
the definition given by Historical Institutionalism mainly based on rules.  
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By enlarging the understanding of the nature of institutions, we take into account easily 
measurable elements of parliamentarians’ institutional framework (parliamentary structures, 
rules) and normative elements that are more difficult to measure, but exert a significant 
influence on the way parliamentarians’ behave and influence (or not) change in their 
institutional framework. This change originates from similar causes according to both theories, 
but diverges in the nature of these causes. Both theories admit that the evolution of institutions 
is caused by contestation and the reinterpretation of institutions by agents. However, for the 
Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change, change is due to contestation triggered by 
diverging interests between agents on the nature and functions of institutions, which leads to 
the reinterpretation of rules. Sociological Institutionalism, on the other hand, argues that 
institutional change is caused by the widening gap between the effective role of an institution 
and agents’ normative conception of this institution, which leads to the normative 
reinterpretation of the institution’s role. While political competition and interests are at the heart 
of change in the Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change, Sociological Institutionalism 
focuses on normative explanations.  
Both arguments are interesting for the present thesis, because institutional change can 
be caused by strategic as well as normative considerations on parliamentary involvement in EU 
affairs. The main difference between both theories regarding agents’ preferences and their 
impact on institutional change lies in the definition and nature of these preferences. Historical 
and Sociological Institutionalism acknowledge that preferences are endogenous, which means 
that they change over time depending on the context in which the agent evolves. These same 
agents might not always be purely rational, but might be guided by interests and ideas 
(Historical Institutionalism) and motivations originating from personal backgrounds 
(Sociological Institutionalism). The added value of the latter theory and its conception of 
agents’ preferences is that it tries to explain the origins of these preferences, the factors 
influencing them and how they impact on behaviour. Historical Institutionalism misses to dig 
deeper into the reasons why individuals act in a specific way. It focuses on explaining the 
influence of agents’ preferences on change and the direction in which change happens. In the 
present thesis, motivations are essential elements underpinning parliamentarians’ involvement 
in EU affairs and the way they influenced parliamentary reforms in exceptional times. 
Therefore, the use of Sociological Institutionalism will complement the theoretical basis of the 
thesis by explaining the reasons that drove MP’s behaviour in the context of parliamentary 
activity and institutional change. Hereunder, we will explain how we use both theories to fulfil 
the thesis’ research objectives. 
 
Historical Institutionalism: We will use this theoretical strand to explain dynamics of 
institutional change and parliamentary activity within the three studied legislatures. The focus 
will thus be on meso-level developments taking the form of evolving formal capacities pushed 
by parliamentary actors with conflicting interests. Indeed, European treaties may have 
represented opportunities or constraints for legislative work in the sense that these exceptional 
events may have challenged pre-existing routines and structures, changed the salience level of 
European affairs among parliamentarians and fuelled higher political contestation among 
parties. Following the postulate of the Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change, we believe 
that change within legislatures in response to the follow up of EU and intergovernmental treaty 
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negotiations might have happened gradually and be caused by internal initiatives from 
parliamentarians with conflicting interests. Hence the importance of taking agency into account. 
Institutional change can be understood as any reform of legislatures’ legal framework or formal 
parliamentary capacities to improve their participation rights in EU affairs. Amendments to the 
internal Rules of Procedures, the establishment of new parliamentary structures, constitutional 
revisions or the adoption of national information and cooperation laws in EU affairs might be 
some examples of dynamics of institutional change. The scope of institutional change depends 
on the impact that treaty negotiations may have had on parliamentarians’ interests and routines. 
MPs may have pushed institutional reforms in Luxembourg, Austria and Finland in response to 
the changing European context. Moreover, apart from the temporal aspect, the thesis also founds 
on the historical institutionalist postulate that both rational and ideational motivations may 
underpin MPs’ involvement. Several factors may be at the origin of political contestation within 
parliament over the handling of EU affairs: the political constellation, the rights of opposition 
parties within parliament and the access to resources, MP’s goals in the performance of their 
mandate. For instance, majority MPs may be less inclined to contradict their government’s EU 
policy and even less question the institutional status quo. Moreover, opposition parties may be 
more inclined to contest their government’s EU policy and call for reforms to strengthen 
parliamentary rights in the follow-up of EU and intergovernmental treaty negotiations.  
 
Sociological Institutionalism: We can only explain meso-level dynamics if we also take into 
account micro-level features. The present thesis aims to explain parliamentary involvement 
through the analysis of formal capacities and MPs’ motivations. The latter are twofold: 
motivations to engage in European affairs and motivations to push to institutional reforms in 
order to strengthen their parliament’s participation rights in EU affairs. Sociological 
Institutionalism permits to complete the historical institutionalist argument according to which 
conflicting interests and political contestation are at the origin of institutional change. We go 
even further by assuming that parliamentarians’ sociological background, experiences, 
ideological stance on EU politics and the role of their parliament also represent factors 
influencing their involvement in the context of treaty negotiations. Cognitive elements and 
sociological features inherent to each MP are important elements that will help explaining the 
reasons underpinning institutional change. Moreover, Sociological Institutionalism will help 
explain potential phenomena of mainstreaming of EU affairs within each legislature, i.e. if we 
observe a wider awareness and interest for EU matters independently from strategical 
considerations. For example, the theory will help explaining how ideological positions or MPs’ 
degree of specialisation in EU politics may determine their involvement level in the follow-up 
of EU and intergovernmental treaty negotiations. The following table (table 5) sums up the 
hypotheses and sub-hypotheses orienting our research on the evolution of parliamentary 
involvement, as well as the theoretical approaches used to test these hypotheses. 
Table 5: Hypotheses and related theoretical approaches 
Hypotheses Theoretical approach 
H1: The higher the ideological polarisation on EU 
affairs between parties, the higher was 
parliamentary activity in EU and 
intergovernmental treaty negotiations. 
Historical Institutionalism 
(Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change) 
 
Sociological Institutionalism (Motivational approach) 
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H1.1: Whether MPs had pro-European or Eurosceptic 
positions on European integration affected 
parliamentary activity in EU and intergovernmental 
treaty negotiations. 
Sociological Institutionalism (Motivational approach) 
H1.2: Whether MPs belonged to the majority or the 
opposition affected parliamentary activity in EU and 
intergovernmental treaty negotiations. 
Historical Institutionalism 
(Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change) 
H1.3: The higher the ideological polarisation between 
political parties on EU treaties and intergovernmental 
treaties on the EMU, the more MPs defended their 
party’s position and stuck to strong group discipline 
within parliament. 
Historical Institutionalism 
(Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change) 
H2: The higher the salience of EU treaties and 
intergovernmental treaties on the EMU within 
parliament, the more likely trends towards the 
mainstreaming of EU affairs emerged. 
Sociological Institutionalism (Motivational approach) 
 
Historical Institutionalism 
(Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change) 
H2.1: MPs with a “Europeanised” profile tended to 
be the most involved during EU and 
intergovernmental treaty negotiations due to their 
extensive experience in EU affairs. 
Sociological Institutionalism (Motivational approach)  
H2.2: The higher the ideological polarisation on EU 
treaties and intergovernmental treaties on the EMU, 
the more sectoral committee members with 
“technician” profiles became key players of 
parliamentary activity. 
Sociological Institutionalism (Motivational approach)  
Historical Institutionalism 
(Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change) 
H 3: The higher the perceived gap between EU 
and intergovernmental treaties’ provisions on 
parliamentary participation rights and domestic 
parliamentary scrutiny systems, the more MPs 
took initiatives towards institutional change. 
Historical Institutionalism 
(Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change) 
H3.1 : The stronger a parliament’s scrutiny system, 
the less MPs engaged in institutional change. 
Historical Institutionalism 
(Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change)  
H3.2: The parliamentary culture (conflictual vs 
consensual) determined whether MPs with 
“Europeanised” or “specialised” profiles became the 
“political entrepreneurs of change”. 
Historical Institutionalism 
(Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change) 
Sociological Institutionalism (Motivational approach)  
H3.3: Institutional change within parliaments 
happened through “layering” in the wake of the 
ratification of EU treaties and intergovernmental 
treaties on the EMU. 
Historical Institutionalism 
(Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change) 
 
We will test each hypothesis in the empirical chapters with the help of interviews and 
parliamentary documents.  
H1: The aim of the first hypothesis is to explain the influence of political positions and 
ideologies on parliamentary involvement during EU and intergovernmental treaty negotiations. 
Parliamentary involvement will be measured through quantitative criteria (frequency of an 
MPs’ appearance in parliamentary documents related to EU and intergovernmental treaties, the 
frequency of use of individual parliamentary instruments such as motions or parliamentary 
questions, individual initiatives to strengthen parliamentary participation rights) and qualitative 
criteria (MPs’ opinion on their engagement in EU affairs). Political polarisation is understood 
here as the divergence in MPs’ ideological positioning of on EU affairs affecting the culture of 
interaction between parties within parliament. Both theoretical approaches will be used to test 
the sub-hypotheses. The main hypothesis also bases on both theories, because it implies to check 
for dynamic temporal trends. While the Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change emphasises 
53 
 
the strategical considerations of MPs regarding EU affairs, Sociological Institutionalism will 
help to explain the origins of political ideologies and their influence on parliamentarians’ 
behaviour in the context of treaty negotiations. Therefore, we link MPs’ engagement during 
treaty negotiations to their political framework and incentives. Interviews are the main data 
used to test this hypothesis and sub-hypotheses, because the information needed is of qualitative 
nature. 
H1.1: The motivational approach will help to explain the origin and nature of parliamentarians’ 
political ideologies with regard to EU affairs. Whether MPs are closer to pro-European or 
Eurosceptic positions depends on their opinion on their parliament’s role in national and 
European politics, on their opinion on parliament’s scrutiny infrastructure and activities related 
to EU affairs, as well as on their opinion on European integration. Measuring parliamentarians’ 
position on these matters and the origin of such positions will enable a better understanding of 
their involvement level during EU and intergovernmental treaty negotiations. 
H1.2: The positioning of parliamentarians on the political spectrum within their respective 
parliaments means whether they belong to the opposition or to the parliamentary majority. 
Political positioning may determine MPs’ use of parliamentary instruments, the goals pursued, 
the interests defended and initiatives taken to preserve the party’s influence within parliament. 
Strategical considerations may motivate MPs to engage in EU affairs, depending on the strength 
of their scrutiny system. The Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change tries to explain the 
role of interests and political competition as factors of potential transformation. EU treaties and 
intergovernmental treaties on the EMU may represent moments where differences in interests 
between opposition and majority grew bigger and led to the reinterpretation of the institutional 
framework. The discrepant views on EU issues during treaty negotiations may have led to 
polarisation and conflicts between MPs over the institutional status quo. 
H1.3: Like the sub-hypothesis H1.2, this sub-hypothesis founds on the Theory of Endogenous 
Institutional Change, because it highlights the logical consequence of diverging interests on 
interactions between parties within parliament. EU treaties and intergovernmental treaties on 
the EMU may increase political contestation over established rules and push parliamentarians 
to reinterpret their institutional framework and initiate reforms. The conflictual situation that 
might emanate from the context of EU and intergovernmental treaty negotiations can be 
measured through parliamentary instruments (votes, questions, interpellations, etc), but also the 
content analysis of discourses during plenary sessions. We can thus expect that the more 
divergences exist between parties over treaty issues, the more MPs will become active in 
defending their positions and stick to stronger group discipline. 
H2: The second hypothesis aims to test how EU and intergovernmental treaties triggered wider 
attention among parliamentarians on EU issues. Mainstreaming is understood here as increased 
parliamentary activity in EU affairs, but also MPs’ wider awareness about the importance of 
EU issues in parliamentary everyday work. Historical Institutionalism will be helpful to explain 
overall evolutionary trends in the involvement and awareness of MPs with regards to EU affairs. 
We assume that the mainstreaming of EU affairs originates both from institutional factors, but 
also from parliamentarians’ opinions and sociological profiles. On the one hand, the Theory of 
Endogenous Institutional Change permits to assess the role of MPs’ strategical considerations 
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when dealing with EU affairs. On the other hand, Sociological Institutionalism helps explaining 
how MPs’ personal experiences, their conceptions and beliefs on European integration and the 
role of parliaments may influence mainstreaming trends.  
H2.1: To test the first sub-hypothesis, we use qualitative data such as interviews. Sociological 
Institutionalism will help to understand to what extent parliamentarians’ profiles influenced 
their involvement in EU affairs. To assess whether an MP has a “Europeanised” profile, we will 
check for personal and political experiences linked to EU affairs, political positions within 
parliament (position occupied for example as EAC Chair or EU speaker, participation in 
interparliamentary conferences, etc) and opinions on European integration.  
H2.2: The second-sub-hypothesis bases on Sociological and Historical institutionalist 
approaches of agents’ preferences. We will use parliamentary documents to check which 
sectoral committees were involved in discussions on EU and intergovernmental treaties. The 
analysis of the use of scrutiny instruments will also indicate which MPs were the most active. 
Based on biographical data, we will be able to check when sectoral committee members will be 
more, less and equally active than EAC members. 
H3: The last hypothesis aims to test to what extent European treaties triggered institutional 
change within parliaments. The emphasis here is on dynamics of change. The combination of 
institutional capacities and MPs’ motivations affects the degree and direction of change in each 
chamber. While the main hypothesis and sub-hypotheses base mostly on Historical 
Institutionalism and meso-level dynamics, the second sub-hypothesis can also be linked to the 
motivational approach of Sociological Institutionalism because it deals with sociological 
profiles of “political entrepreneurs of change”. 
H3.1: The comparison of legal bases (constitutional amendments, amendments to Rules of 
Procedures), scrutiny procedures (establishment of EU topical debates, participation rights of 
MEPs in plenary sessions) and infrastructures will allow us to assess parliamentary strength in 
EU affairs. Moreover, the measure of MPs’ satisfaction about their scrutiny system through 
interviews will give us an overview of each parliament’s perception of its formal capacities. All 
three parliament are small, but are not equipped in the same way when it comes to participation 
rights in EU affairs. Whether a parliament is perceived as strong or not depends not only on its 
formal capacities, but also on MPs’ perception of their parliament’s role in the EU. Therefore, 
both Historical and Sociological Institutionalism will be used to test this sub-hypothesis. The 
first theoretical branch helps assessing parliaments’ formal capacities and their evolution, while 
the second theoretical branch helps understanding MPs’ normative perception of their 
institution.  
H3.2: The second sub-hypothesis bases once again on the two complementary neo-
institutionalist approaches to explain how parliamentary culture (consensual vs conflictual) 
determined which category of MPs endorsed the role of “political entrepreneurs of change”. 
Here, the analysis of minutes of committee and plenary meetings, as well as biographical data, 
will allow us to identify the key players. According to the Theory of Endogenous Institutional 
Change, reforms happen through rule contestation and subsequent competition between agents 
over rule reinterpretation. In that case, political competition between majority and opposition 
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might have led to institutional change. Sociological Institutionalism assumes that differences in 
agents’ normative perception of existing institutions leads to change without political 
competition. MPs with “Europeanised” and pro-European profiles might be more inclined to 
trigger change because of personal conviction in a consensual atmosphere, while Eurosceptic 
opposition MPs and/or “specialised”/sectoral committee MPs might be motivated by political 
strategies in a competitive atmosphere.  
H3.3: The last sub-hypothesis founds solely on the Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change, 
as the aim is to find out about the nature and direction of change in parliaments. At the same 
time, we will check if there is a correlation between institutional change and treaty negotiations.  
Complementarity between theories and the data will help testing the above-mentioned 
hypotheses and draw as complete a picture as possible of parliamentary involvement in the 
context of EU and intergovernmental treaty negotiations. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter exposed the main features of Historical and Sociological Institutionalism, 
two strands of new institutionalism with different explanatory paradigms on the role of 
institutions, their origin and their evolution. The Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change 
within the Historical institutionalist strand will serve as theoretical background to explain 
institutional evolution in the context of treaty negotiations, as well as the role of 
parliamentarians’ divergent interests in this process. Sociological Institutionalism will be used 
as a micro-level based theoretical approach to identify MPs’ motivations, their origins and how 
they affected parliamentary involvement in EU affairs. While Historical Institutionalism 
focuses on the temporal dimension of political institutions, Sociological Institutionalism 
considers ideas and motivations as central elements determining the interactions between 
political institutions and their agents. In the end, parliamentary involvement in Luxembourg, 
Austria and Finland will be explained through the lenses of two complementary institutionalist 
approaches combining both “calculus” and “cultural” perspectives.  
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Chapter 4. Methods, data and research design 
 
The previous chapter outlined the theoretical approaches used in this thesis. The 
combination of Historical and Sociological Institutionalism helps to understand the interplay 
between parliamentarians’ motivations, parliamentary activity and institutional change in an 
evolutionary perspective. While the evolution of formal capacities can be assessed 
quantitatively because focused solely on evolutionary trends, motivations need to be explained 
through qualitative data. Interviews are the most common method used in studies focused on 
sociological aspects of motivations. In his study on the role of EAC chairs, Rozenberg applies 
the motivational approach by conducting interviews with key players (Rozenberg, 2012 and 
2018). The same goes for the investigation of political contestation and conflicting interests 
through the Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change. Gaining knowledge on the reasons 
underpinning coalition formation, mechanisms of rule reinterpretation and their influence on 
parliamentary involvement implies to assess in detail parliamentary culture and MPs’ interests. 
Qualitative Content Analysis will help to extract this information from interviews.  
The present chapter describes our comparative research design, the indicators, the data 
collected and the methods used to analyse the data. Our research is based on a qualitative-
oriented historical comparative design. Qualitative data was retrieved from both semi-structured 
interviews and documentary resources, while quantitative data was obtained thanks to 
calculations made from statistics provided by each parliament. 
 
4.1 Research design: historical-comparative analysis 
 
A qualitative-oriented comparative research design seemed the most appropriate for the 
present thesis, as it allows explaining variations across national parliaments in terms of 
motivational and institutional factors. Even if a single-case study may have sufficed to gain in-
depth knowledge on parliamentary involvement, conclusions may have possibly omitted 
explanatory factors otherwise discovered through a comparison. Lijphart has outlined the nature 
and use of comparative methods in an article published in 1975. The author distinguishes the 
comparative method from other research methods, such as the experimental and statistical 
methods or the case study. He uses the definition given by Warwick and Osherson, who 
characterise comparative methods as “social scientific analyses involving observations in more 
than one social system, or in the same social system at more than one point in time” (Warwick 
and Osherson, 1973, p.8, In: Lijphart, 1975, p.160). The main goal of the comparative method 
is to assess rival explanations in order to “[bring] into focus suggestive similarities and contrasts 
among cases” (Collier, 1993, p.105). 
While the case study method relies on the examination of single cases, the experimental 
and statistical methods aim to include as much cases as possible, taking the form of large-N 
designs. The case study method allows “thick descriptions” that cannot lead, however, to 
generalisations. The distinction between single case studies and comparative methods is blurred 
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to some extent. Indeed, case studies might also be of comparative nature if they are meant to 
serve as particular example in a broader comparative framework or if the focus remains on 
within-case variations over time. Statistical methods, on the other hand, are not able to provide 
detailed explanations on each case, as they tend to “be limited to national political systems” 
(Lijphart, 1975, p.167). In Legislative Studies, scholars using statistical methods often consider 
parliaments as unitary actors and do not differentiate parliamentary actors and structures. On 
the contrary, the comparative method founds on a careful selection of cases and the focus on 
smaller units of analysis. We use Rohlfing’s notion of “integrative comparative case study” 
(Rohlfing, 2012), because this thesis comprises more than one case and is designed both as a 
cross-case and within-case comparison. The main objective of comparative designs is to 
develop, test or refine theories (Hopkin, In: Marsh/Stoker, 2010, p.285). In our case, we seek 
to base on existing theories and approaches to refine them depending on the empirical results.  
Designed as a small-N study, the purpose of the cross-case comparison is to identify patterns of 
variation in parliamentary involvement across the three studied parliaments. The examination 
of variations between parliaments will be complemented by a within-case comparison, i.e. the 
analysis of motivational and institutional variations within each parliament separately. The 
within-case comparison should serve as a starting point for cross-case comparison. The choice 
for “thick case studies” was deliberate in view of previous research conducted on the role of 
national parliaments. As mentioned in the literature review, the predominance of quantitative 
large-N comparisons led to a lack of in-depth knowledge on parliamentary involvement. 
Moreover, the quasi-absence of literature on the Luxembourgish case and the mostly outdated 
sources on the Austrian parliament made us realise that a small-N design would be more suited 
to provide detailed explanations on internal dynamics until now neglected by large-N designs. 
The quasi-absence of secondary sources on most compared legislatures forced us to adopt both 
an inductive and deductive approach to gather the necessary data in order to be able to elaborate 
a refined theoretical framework applicable to our cases. Starting from the theory, we seek to 
gather concrete evidences in order to confirm arguments from Historical and Sociological 
Institutionalism. Our empirical research borrows also from the inductive approach, because we 
seek to observe the evolution of actors’ involvement and their interests at the micro level, so 
that a theory or concept refinement may be possible (Muller/Torbjörn/Strøm, 2000). 
We are of course aware of the limitations of such a small-N comparison. Indeed, the risk 
exists that the compared cases are unrepresentative of trends otherwise observed in large-N 
designs. Thus, generalisations are limited and results might be specific to the sole three cases. 
Moreover, the small-N research design relies mainly on qualitative data and methods and the 
results might run the risk to be biased and to reflect subjective observations of the situation 
(Hopkin, In: Marsh/Stoker, 2010). The added-value of the research is our ability to identify 
variations within a smaller scale and to integrate qualitative data that is difficult to measure with 
statistical or experimental methods.  
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4.2 Indicators 
 
 We developed indicators to measure the institutional and motivational features of 
parliamentary involvement in EU affairs. First, we need to assess the formal capacities and their 
evolution in each chamber. The aggregation of institutional capacities and parliamentary 
practices might then allow us to determine effective parliamentary involvement. Several 
rankings of parliaments were made according to their institutional strength in EU affairs 
(Auel/Rozenberg/Tacea, In: Hefftler/Neuhold/Rozenberg/Smith, 2015; Karlas, 2011; 
Maurer/Wessels, 2001; Raunio, 2005; Winzen, 2012). Scholars understand parliamentary 
involvement differently, but all of them focus merely on formal structures and rules (Auel 
/Rozenberg/Tacea, In: Hefftler/Neuhold/Rozenberg/Smith, 2015). The measurement of 
parliamentary involvement in EU affairs does not elicit unanimity among scholars. Winzen 
measures parliamentary control of European affairs using indicators such as the availability and 
scope of information transferred to the parliament, the resources and structures to process the 
information (distinction between European Affairs Committees and standing committees) and 
the mandating rights (Winzen, 2012). Karlas focuses on the scrutiny power of parliaments using 
four dimensions: the information access, the scope and decentralisation of scrutiny as well as 
the ability of the parliament to issue binding mandates (Karlas, 2011). Bergman focuses 
exclusively on EACs and takes account of their composition, their competences depending on 
the EU policy pillars and their ability to bind their government’s position (Bergman, 1997).  
 The main criticism that can be addressed to these rankings is their tendency for biased 
and outdated results. Indeed, the authors grade parliamentary involvement according to formal 
capacities without including informal tools and actors’ motivations in their analysis. Most 
studies were conducted in the 2000’s and do not take future evolutions into account. Measuring 
motivations is all the more difficult as it has to found on qualitative criteria, which are absent 
in these quantitative-oriented rankings. Auel et al. try to integrate both formal, informal and 
motivational aspects of parliamentary control (Auel/Rozenberg/Tacea, 2015). They assess 
activities such as the issuing of mandates and resolutions, the number and times of EAC 
meetings and plenary debates, the number of submitted opinions to the European Commission 
in the framework of the political dialogue, as well as MPs’ motivation to engage in European 
affairs. Both institutional capacities, parliamentary activities and some motivational aspects 
underpinning the former are included in their analysis. However, it remains largely quantitative 
and gives only hints for further investigation into actors’ motivations regarding EU politics.   
 Treaty negotiations might affect parliamentary rules and organisation to a significant 
extent. Therefore, one objective will be to analyse the evolution of formal parliamentary 
capacities in the three chambers, determining the causes of such an evolution and further 
consequences. Institutional capacities comprehend parliaments’ formal capacities to deal with 
EU affairs, be it through their legislative function, their scrutiny function or their 
communication function. Institutional aspects of parliamentary involvement are easier to 
measure due to their predominant quantitative nature and the easy access to the sources. This 
first aspect can be labelled “institutional Europeanisation”. Institutional factors such as 
parliamentary control capacities of governmental activities or a parliament’s internal 
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organisation might have an impact on the actual parliamentary involvement in EU affairs. 
Depending whether the EU scrutiny procedures are decentralised such as in the Luxembourg 
Chamber of Deputies, or centralised in the Austrian National Council and in the Finnish 
Eduskunta, MPs will deal differently with EU matters. Parliamentary resources in general, 
dependent on the small size of these countries, determine the ability of parliamentarians to make 
use of scrutiny instruments.  
Another objective will be to examine MPs’ attitudes and ideological position towards 
European integration, their beliefs regarding their parliament’s role during and after 
negotiations, in sum their motivations for engaging in EU affairs during treaty negotiations. The 
establishment and measurement of motivational factors turns out to be trickier because of their 
blurred definition and the large leeway for subjective interpretation. As scholarly attention on 
motivational aspects of Europeanisation is rather new, no homogeneous method and indicators 
have been developed to measure incentives, even less in European matters. Thus, we developed 
criteria partly retrieved from secondary literature and partly elaborated according to our 
research objectives. Motivational factors encompass parliamentarian’s personal and/or political 
experiences, their current involvement in parliament and more specifically in EU affairs and 
finally their opinion on their parliament’s role, on EU affairs, as well as on EU and 
intergovernmental treaties. The following table (table 6) sums up the main indicators 
established in the framework of the present thesis that served as background for the analysis of 
parliamentary documents and interviews. Both list of explanatory factors have to be considered 
as constantly interdependent from each other, in the light of the new-institutionalist argument 
of close interdependency between agents and structures. 
Table 6: Indicators measuring parliamentary involvement 
MOTIVATIONAL FACTORS 
Indicator Description Data 
1. Experiences Political and personal experiences 
prior to parliamentary mandate 
and linked to EU affairs 
 
1.1 political experience regarding 
EU affairs and treaty negotiations 
Political experience prior to 
parliamentary mandate 
 
1.1.1 Membership length and 
position in political party 
Level and type of engagement in 
political party prior to 
parliamentary mandate 
Interviews, profiles on 
parliamentary websites 
1.1.2 Experience in the Executive Functions in the Executive 
(ministries, embassies etc) prior or 
in between parliamentary 
mandates 
Interviews, profiles on 
parliamentary websites 
1.1.3 Length of parliamentary 
mandate 
Long-term or short-term 
membership in parliament  
Interviews, profiles on 
parliamentary websites 
1.1.4 Overlapping mandates: local 
vs national 
Simultaneous political mandates 
on local and national level 
Interviews, profiles on 
parliamentary websites 
1.2 Personal experience linked to 
EU affairs 
Personal experience prior to 
parliamentary mandate 
 
1.2.1 Studies Type of studies and link to EU 
affairs 
Interviews, profiles on 
parliamentary websites 
1.2.2 Professional experience 
linked to EU 
Professional experience prior to 
parliamentary mandate, public vs 
private sector 
Interviews 
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1.2.3 Associative commitments 
linked to EU 
Membership in national or 
European associations with link to 
EU affairs 
Interviews 
2. Involvement within 
parliament  
Individual level of involvement 
within parliament in EU affairs 
and in particular during EU and 
intergovernmental treaty 
negotiations 
 
2.1 Distribution of functions 
within parliament 
Positioning within parliament  
2.1.1 Member of majority vs 
opposition 
Political positioning within 
parliament 
Interviews, profiles on 
parliamentary websites 
2.1.2 Number of committee 
memberships 
Multiple/ overlapping committee 
memberships 
Interviews, profiles on 
parliamentary websites 
2.2 Type of functions within 
parliament 
MPs’ functions and competences 
within parliament 
 
2.2.1 Membership in specialised 
parliamentary committees vs EAC 
Type of membership in 
parliamentary committees and 
reasons for membership 
Interviews, profiles on 
parliamentary websites 
2.2.2 Rapporteurship on issues 
related to EU and 
intergovernmental treaty 
Specialisation in specific EU 
dossiers  
Interviews, parliamentary 
documents 
2.2.3 Chairman of a committee Responsibility functions Interviews, profiles on 
parliamentary websites 
2.2.4 EU- or foreign affairs 
speaker of a parliamentary group 
Speaker function with potential 
specialisation in specific EU 
dossiers 
Interviews 
2.2.5 Member of an 
interparliamentary 
delegation/conference 
Level of participation in 
interparliamentary cooperation 
formats 
Interviews, profiles on 
parliamentary websites 
2.3 Parliamentary activity MPs’ effective level of 
involvement in EU affairs 
 
2.3.1 Initiatives regarding 
parliamentary participation rights 
Individual or party initiatives 
taken to strengthen parliamentary 
rights through amendments to 
legal bases 
Interviews, parliamentary 
documents 
2.3.2 Use of parliamentary 
instruments (questions, motions, 
interpellations etc) 
Frequency, purpose and 
distribution of the use of 
parliamentary tools among MPs 
Interviews, parliamentary 
documents 
3. Opinion on parliament MPs’ opinion on the role of their 
parliament in national and 
European politics 
 
3.1 Opinion on relations with 
other institutions 
 
(Dis)satisfaction with the 
interaction of parliament with 
other national and European 
bodies 
 
3.1.1 Relation with executive Information policy and 
coordination with the Executive 
on EU affairs 
Interviews 
3.1.2 Relation with upper chamber 
(AT) 
Coordination on EU affairs with 
the Federal Council in Austria 
Interviews 
3.1.3 Relation with European 
institutions 
Direct information exchange and 
cooperation mechanisms with EU 
institutions (political dialogue) 
Interviews 
3.1.4 Relation with MEPs Direct contact with MEPs from the 
same country 
Interviews 
3.1.5 Relation with civil society Cooperation with civil society 
(professional chambers, trade 
unions) on EU affairs through 
Interviews 
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meetings, hearings, auditions, 
opinions etc 
3.2 Opinion on parliament’s 
scrutiny infrastructure in EU 
affairs 
 
(Dis)satisfaction with scrutiny 
infrastructure in EU affairs 
 
3.2.1 Opinion on organisational 
structures/resources 
Opinion on the availability of 
resources for parliamentary work 
Interviews 
3.2.2 Opinion on support of 
parliamentary administration 
Opinion on the availability, 
competences and support of 
administrative personnel within 
parliament 
Interviews 
3.2.3 Opinion on party internal 
organisation/support in EU affairs 
Opinion on availability of 
resources and personnel within 
parliamentary groups and political 
parties 
Interviews 
3.3 Opinion on parliamentary 
activity 
(Dis)satisfaction with the level of 
parliamentary activity and 
awareness of MPs about EU 
affairs, in particular during EU 
and intergovernmental treaty 
negotiations 
 
3.3.1 Opinion on overall level of 
activity in EU affairs 
Opinion on the level of 
involvement of MPs and their 
awareness about EU affairs 
Interviews 
3.3.2 Opinion on activity during 
EU and intergovernmental treaty 
negotiations 
Opinion on MPs’ level of 
involvement in the follow-up of 
EU and intergovernmental treaty 
negotiations  
Interviews 
4. Opinion on EU (Dis)satisfaction with the 
European integration process and 
salience of EU treaties and 
intergovernmental treaties on the 
EMU 
 
4.1 General opinion on EU affairs Position on European integration 
process and perception of EU 
affairs 
 
4.1.1 Ideological/political position 
on EU integration 
Pro-EU vs euroscepticism Interviews, party electoral 
programmes 
4.1.2 Opinion on the nature and 
salience of EU affairs 
Characterisation of EU issues and 
their level of importance for each 
MP, general level of interest for 
EU issues 
Interviews 
4.1.3 Opinion on cooperation with 
the EU level (EU institutions, 
interparliamentary cooperation) 
(Dis)satisfaction with 
interparliamentary cooperation 
formats and cooperation with 
other European bodies 
Interviews 
4.2 Position on EU treaties and 
intergovernmental treaties on the 
EMU 
Political position on and salience 
level of each EU and 
intergovernmental treaty 
 
4.2.1 Ideological/political position 
on EU treaties and 
intergovernmental treaties on the 
EMU 
Support or rejection of EU treaties 
and intergovernmental treaties on 
the EMU 
Interviews, parliamentary 
documents 
4.2.2 Opinion on 
interparliamentary cooperation 
formats  
(Dis)satisfaction about Article 13 
Conference 
Interviews 
 
INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS 
62 
 
Indicator Description Data 
1. Legislative function  Oversight functions in EU affairs  
1.1 Information policy Exchange of information with 
different national and European 
bodies 
 
1.1.1 Legal basis Legal framework regulating 
information exchange  
National constitutions, laws and 
internal Rules of procedures 
1.1.2 Coordination with 
government 
Mechanisms of information 
exchange with the government, 
within and outside parliament 
 
1.1.4 Cooperation with other 
national actors (civil society, 
national jurisdictions, professional 
chambers etc) 
Mechanisms of information 
exchange with different national 
bodies 
National constitutions, laws, 
parliamentary documents, 
interviews 
1.1.5 Party 
meetings/parliamentary group 
meetings 
Mechanisms of information 
exchange internal to parliamentary 
groups and political parties 
Interviews 
1.1.6 EU working groups within 
parties 
Organisation, composition, 
competences of party EU working 
groups 
Interviews 
1.1.7 Use of MEPs staff resources 
within NPs 
Availability and mechanisms of 
MEPs’ staff resource mobilisation 
Interviews 
1.1.8 Direct cooperation with 
MEPs 
Direct exchange of information 
with MEPs, either within political 
party, within parliament or on 
European level within EP and 
interparliamentary cooperation 
formats 
Parliamentary documents, 
interviews 
1.1.9 Direct contact with 
parliament permanent 
representation in Brussels 
Mechanisms of information 
exchanges with parliaments’ 
representative in Brussels 
Interviews 
1.1.10 Direct contact with 
countries’ permanent 
representation in Brussels 
Mechanisms of information with 
countries’ permanent 
representation in Brussels 
Interviews 
1.1.11 Cooperation with other NPs Mechanisms and formats of 
information exchange with MPs or 
civil servants from other NPs 
Parliamentary documents, 
interviews 
1.1.12 Individual contact networks Information gathering through 
personal channels 
Interviews 
1.2. Scrutiny infrastructure Organisation of scrutiny within 
parliament  
 
1.2.1 Legal basis Legal framework regulating the 
organisation of scrutiny of EU 
affairs within parliaments 
National constitutions, laws and 
internal Rules of procedures 
1.2.2 Parliamentary administration Resource availability, 
composition, competences, 
functions in EU affairs 
Internal Rules of procedures, 
interviews 
1.2.3 Parliamentary group Resource availability, 
composition, competences, 
functions in EU affairs 
Interviews 
1.2.4 Political party Resource availability, 
composition, competences, 
functions in EU affairs 
Interviews 
1.2.5 Committee system Resource availability, 
composition, competences, 
functions in EU affairs, set up of 
special committees to deal with 
EU treaties and intergovernmental 
treaties on the EMU 
Internal Rules of procedures, 
interviews 
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1.3 Scrutiny procedure Control mechanisms of EU affairs 
within parliament 
 
1.3.1 Legal basis Legal framework regulating 
scrutiny mechanisms 
National constitutions, laws and 
internal Rules of procedures 
1.3.2 Parliamentary instruments Parliamentary questions, motions, 
interpellations, debates etc 
National laws and internal Rules 
of procedures 
1.3.3 Parliamentary mandates Ability to issue binding mandates Internal Rules of procedures, 
Interviews 
1.3.4 Degree of involvement of 
specialised committees 
Decentralisation vs centralisation 
of EU affairs 
Internal Rules of procedures, 
Interviews 
1.3.5 Participation of MEPs in 
parliamentary debates 
Mechanisms and rights of MEPs’ 
participation in national 
parliament 
Internal Rules of procedures, 
Interviews 
2. Communicative 
function 
Parliaments’ publicity level of EU 
affairs 
 
2.1 Communication instruments Websites, TV channels Parliaments websites, interviews 
2.2 Public auditions/meetings on 
treaties 
Organisation of auditions, 
meetings, hearings with civil 
society on EU treaties and 
intergovernmental treaties on the 
EMU 
Parliamentary documents, 
interviews 
2.3 Plenary debates  Frequency of plenary debates on 
EU affairs/ EU and 
intergovernmental treaties 
Parliamentary documents, 
interviews 
2.4 Public party 
meetings/workshops on EU 
treaties and intergovernmental 
treaties on the EMU 
Frequency and purpose of public 
party meetings on EU affairs 
Interviews 
 
4.3 Data collection 
 
In this section, we will outline our data collection methods. We relied on different types 
of sources: secondary literature on parliaments, primary sources (parliamentary documents, 
parliamentary statistics, party programmes, discourses) and interviews. Most information for 
the thesis was retrieved from these sources, even though quantitative data was also gathered in 
order to get an overview of parliaments’ institutional framework and evolutionary trends in 
parliamentary activity. Prior to the conduction of interviews, we submitted an authorisation 
request to the Ethics Review Panel of the University of Luxembourg, as well as to the 
Luxembourg National Commission for data protection, which was accepted after thorough 
review.  
 
4.3.1 Qualitative Data 
4.3.1.1 First step: identifying research gaps and key issues 
 
Secondary sources 
 We used secondary literature at the beginning of the project in order to draw a picture 
of existing contributions in Europeanisation research and legislative studies. Sources 
encompassed books, conference papers and journal articles from different research fields:  
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- Legislative Studies, more specifically within European Studies 
- Empirical case studies retrieved from European and Legislative Studies 
- Public Administration literature 
- Political Sociology and Political Psychology, both within European and American 
literature 
- Methods guidebooks in Political Science 
- New-institutionalist literature 
Primary sources 
We assessed parliaments’ participation rights thanks to several sources summed up in the 
following table:  
Table 7: Used primary sources 
European legal bases 
European treaties Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, Treaty 
of Lisbon, European Stability Mechanism, Treaty on 
Stability, Coordination and Governance in the EMU 
National legal bases 
National Constitutions - Austria: Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz 
- Finland: Suomen perustuslaki 
- Luxembourg: Constitution du Grand-Duché du 
Luxembourg 
Parliaments’ Rules of Procedures - Austria: Geschäftsordnung des Nationalrates 
- Finland: Parliament’s Rules of Procedure 
- Luxembourg: Règlement de la Chambre des 
Députés 
National information laws / Memorandum on 
cooperation between parliament and government 
- Austria: ESM-Informationsordnung, 
Informationsordnungsgesetz (InfOG), 
Informationsverordnung (InfoV), EU-
Informationsgesetz 
- Finland: / 
- Luxembourg: Aide-mémoire sur la coopération 
entre la Chambre des Députés et le Gouvernement du 
Grand-Duché de Luxembourg en matière de politique 
européenne (Annexe 3, Règlement de la Chambre des 
Députés) 
Parliamentary documents 
Minutes of committee meetings All selected committees involved in the negotiation 
process of EU treaties and intergovernmental treaties 
on the EMU 
Minutes of plenary sessions All relevant plenary sessions dealing with EU treaties 
and intergovernmental treaties on the EMU 
Committee reports All relevant committee reports dealing with EU 
treaties and intergovernmental treaties on the EMU 
Opinions from the civil society (trade unions, 
professional chambers) 
All relevant opinions dealing with EU treaties and 
intergovernmental treaties on the EMU 
Other 
Newspaper articles All relevant national newspaper articles handling EU  
and intergovernmental treaties or parliaments’ 
behaviour towards EU treaties 
Party programmes, Electoral programmes All party and electoral programmes since 2004 
 
65 
 
In the following chapters, primary sources will be cited directly in the foonotes instead of being 
included in the main bibliography. 
4.3.1.2 Second step: Identifying key players 
 
After we obtained an overall view on the state of the art in the Europeanisation literature 
and the formal competences of each parliament, we sought to identify key players in each 
chamber in order to conduct interviews. Before examining parliamentary documents, we tried 
to reach all MPs from the three chambers with a designed survey mixing both qualitative and 
quantitative indicators. 
Survey 
The first step of the empirical research took the form of an online survey sent to current 
parliamentarians from each studied legislature. The objective of this survey was to obtain 
preliminary information on their parliamentary work, with a special focus on European affairs, 
and thus to identify those MPs actively involved in these matters. The answers given to the 
survey were meant to determine future interviews with those members of parliament identified 
as involved in European affairs, especially during negotiations on the Treaty of Lisbon, the 
ESM and the TSCG. The universal design and the question wording aimed to facilitate the 
administration of the survey to all current and former MPs from the three parliaments. A French 
and German adapted version were sent to the MPs from the Luxembourg Chambers of Deputies; 
a German version to the MPs from the Austrian National Council and an English version to the 
MPs from the Finnish Eduskunta. The survey mixed quantitative and qualitative oriented 
questions (both open-ended and closed questions), but its design aimed to be mainly qualitative. 
The quantitative-oriented questions helped to accelerate the filling of the questionnaire. 
Participants could skip questions according to their answers. The invitation mail was sent to 
each MP individually between the 07th and 9th June 2016. The personalised mail contained a 
description of the project and explanations on the survey’s objectives and duration. The survey 
could be filled in in different ways: either online through the survey platform “Typeform” by 
clicking on a link inserted in the mail; or by filling in the PDF document converted into a fillable 
form and translated into French, German and English. In addition to the PDF document that 
was attached to the invitation mail, an information sheet and consent letter were also added, 
summarising the context and aim of the research, as well as informing the participants about 
their rights in the framework of the project (guarantee of anonymity, possibility to end the 
participation at any time). The confidentiality and anonymity clause was repeated in the online 
survey, in the mail and in the PDF document. Although the survey itself contained questions on 
personal details, such as party affiliation and names, the participants were guaranteed absolute 
confidentiality through an anonymisation process that was undertaken afterwards to exclude 
any identification. The personal information merely served practical and organisational 
purposes, namely the identification of MPs actively involved in European Affairs, especially 
during the negotiations on the Treaty of Lisbon, the ESM and the TSCG.  
The survey turned out to be a challenge for different reasons: firstly, we could not reach 
former parliamentarians because of the absence of contact details on the parliaments’ webpages. 
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While in Austria, information about former MPs’ profiles was more complete, no information 
could be found for the Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies and the Finnish Eduskunta. The 
answers were thus limited to current MPs. Secondly, the response rate turned out to be very 
low, especially in Austria and Finland, despite a second e-mail reminder. In the end, we decided 
to drop this method and to pick out all key players from parliamentary documents related to EU 
treaties and intergovernmental treaties on the EMU. 
Parliamentary documents 
The examination of specific parliamentary documents related to each studied treaty 
enabled the identification of current and former parliamentarians involved directly or indirectly 
in negotiations. Documents produced by parliamentary administrations, committees and parties 
served as a useful basis. 
While documents outlining the legal bases for parliamentary involvement in EU affairs 
helped understanding the institutional framework, the second category of documents helped 
identifying key players for future interviews. Parliamentarians who contributed to negotiations 
on one or several of these EU-treaties were identified either in parliamentary documents (mainly 
for the Luxembourgish case), or thanks to legislatures’ openly accessible databases containing 
the names of parliamentarians from previous legislative periods (Austria and Finland). We first 
searched for all the documents mentioning the names and functions of parliamentarians who 
were directly involved in EU-treaty negotiations. These documents were found on the websites 
of the respective legislatures. The website of the Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies has a 
section dedicated to archived documents, where we could access different types of documents 
by typing key words and selecting specific timeframes related to the European treaties 
investigated in our thesis42. Documents from the period preceding 2006 were consulted on the 
spot in the archives of the chamber. On the Austrian National Council’s website, we first 
searched in the news section (“Parlamentskorrespondenz”) and then expanded our research to 
the archives section of the parliament, where we found committee and plenary session 
protocols. Document research on the Eduskunta’s website was more difficult due to language 
issues. The English version of the parliament’s website does not show the archives section. 
Therefore, we had to activate the “Google translate” option on the website to identify the 
relevant sections. We then retrieved all the necessary documents translated in English.  
Types of documents found on each website were the following ones: committee reports, 
minutes of committee meetings, minutes of plenary sessions, opinions produced by diverse state 
actors to the parliament, summaries of treaty negotiations on news websites such as 
Europaforum.public.lu, questions, motions, interpellations, parliamentary blogs such as the 
“Parlamentskorrespondenz” of the Austrian National Council43. All these documents were 
dealing with the studied treaties. We collected the names of key players (MPs) found in the 
 
42 See 
http://chd.lu/wps/portal/public/!ut/p/b1/04_SjzQyNTM3N7Y0M9OP0I_KSyzLTE8syczPS8wB8aPM4l2MXMK
CPE2MDNzNA00MjLxcvcxDg_2M3S1BGiKBCgxwAEcDVP3-
rsFmBkbGAcaOQcFGQHkTqH4jC4vgIHdHX1dLy1AnA08DZ8Ng10AnIwNPI-Lsx2MBAf1-
Hvm5qfq5UTlubhaOigAT4awH/dl4/d5/L2dJQSEvUUt3QS80SmtFL1o2XzI4SEhBTkVUMkdPTEUwQVVEO
EtKMFAxR0g1/ [last accessed on 24.05.2019] 
43 https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/PR/ [last accessed on 24.05.2019] 
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documents and summarised in an Excel sheet the most important information about them (party 
affiliation, committee membership, length of mandate, involvement during EU and 
intergovernmental treaty negotiations, etc). Then, we prioritised key players according to the 
number of times they participated in discussions on the treaties. Contact details of current MPs 
were retrieved from the parliaments’ websites. However, contact details of former MPs’ were 
more difficult to find. The Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies does not display the names of 
former MPs on its website. Former MPs’ profiles can still be found on the Eduskunta’s and 
National Council’s websites, but not their contact details. We contacted former MPs either 
through simple search on the internet, or by contacting the secretariat of their respective political 
parties.  
 
4.3.1.3 Third step: Conducting Interviews 
 
As a first step, we designed three interview grids, one for parliamentarians, one for civil 
servants from EU secretariats and one for parliamentary group collaborators. We designed the 
questions according to the information retrieved from parliamentary documents and our list of 
explanatory factors. We divided the grid destined for MPs into four main sections: the first 
section focuses on MPs’ motivations to get involved in EU affairs; the second section deals 
with their working methods during negotiations on the four studied treaties; the third section 
handles potential evolutions of their parliamentary practices after EU-treaty negotiations and 
the last section focuses on their perception of European integration and the role of their 
parliament in EU affairs. The second interview grid destined for civil servants contains three 
sections, concentrating on the working methods of the parliamentary administration with regard 
to EU affairs, the staff’s role during treaty negotiations and finally some information about 
important institutional reforms undertaken by their parliament. 
We decided to start the interviews with civil servants from the parliamentary 
administrations in order to obtain background information on working methods in EU affairs. 
We contacted in parallel all the parliamentarians listed in our Excel table, starting with 
Luxembourg in January and February 2017, continuing with Austria in March 2017 and Finland 
between January and May 2018. We led most interviews face-to-face. Few were conducted via 
telephone or answered in written form due to distance and time related issues. We recorded all 
interviews with the participants’ prior consent. Each participant got an information letter 
itemising our research objectives and framework prior to the interview. Before the interview 
(or after in case of non-face-to-face interviews), participants received a consent form that had 
to be signed both by the interviewee and the interviewer. The consent form explained the rules 
of data protection as requested by the Ethics Review Panel of the University of Luxembourg. 
Further contacts were obtained thanks to the snowball sampling method, which consists in 
asking the interviewees about information on other known key players and eventually their 
contact details. Overall, we conducted 58 interviews, distributed among the different actor 
categories (MPs, civil servants and group collaborators). 
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Table 8: Summary of conducted interviews 
 Austria Finland Luxembourg TOTAL 
Current MPs (last 
legislative period 
until 2015) 
10 2 8 20 
Former MPs 5 4 6 15 
Civil servants, 
parliamentary 
administration 
5 2 4 11 
Group collaborators 2 4 2 8 
Other (trade union 
organisations, etc) 
0 1 3 4 
TOTAL 22 13 23 58 
Source: Own calculations 
 
4.3.2 Quantitative data 
 
Our research is mainly qualitative-oriented, but we decided to rely on some quantitative 
measurements to underpin our arguments and crosscheck arguments from interviewees. 
Quantitative data on parliamentary activity and parliamentarians’ profiles provided us with an 
overview of parliaments’ institutional features and evolutionary trends in the handling of EU 
affairs since 2004. The evolution of parliamentary involvement in EU affairs can best be 
measured by assessing used parliamentary tools over the period running from 2004 to 2013. By 
parliamentary tools, we mean the proportion of parliamentary questions, motions, 
interpellations, plenary debates and opinions on EU topics; the number of meetings of the 
respective European Affairs Committees compared to meetings of specialised committees per 
legislative year and legislative period since the early 2000s. All this data was retrieved from 
yearly parliamentary reports and parliaments’ websites (digital archives). We had to count most 
data manually, because parliamentary statistics do not separate between EU and non-EU 
matters. While we found easily debates on EU topics on the webpage of the Austrian National 
Council, they were less accessible for the other chambers. Parliamentary questions on EU 
affairs had to be counted manually in all cases. Their link to EU matters was identified in their 
title. When the overall number of questions was not too significant, like in Luxembourg, we 
counted them individually. However, when the number was too high, like in Austria, we 
proceeded with key words (for example EU, Europe, European, Parliament, Presidency, 
Council, directive, Lisbon Strategy, Europe 2020, European Commission). This method 
allowed counting the proportion of questions on EU affairs in relation to the total number of 
parliamentary questions during a legislative year and a legislative period.  
 
4.4 Strategy for data analysis: Qualitative content analysis 
 
The data was analysed according to the grounded theory method. Grounded theory is a 
research strategy composed of diverse inductive methods aiming to either generate, refine or 
verify theories and concepts (Glaser/Strauss/Paul, 2008; Mey/Mruck, 2011). Empirical data 
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plays a significant role for theoretical foundation or refinement. Considered as a « constant 
comparative method » (Strübing, 2008 p.15), grounded theory draws on a permanent interlink 
between data collection, data analysis/interpretation and theory building/refinement. The 
researcher goes back and forth between the collected raw data and the analytical framework in 
which the data will be incorporated. This iterative process (Mey/Mruck, In: Mey/Mruck, 2011) 
permits to interpret directly the data according to the theoretical background used in the 
research. Our contribution aims to refine the “Europeanisation” concept as a notion combining 
both institutional and motivational perspectives of parliamentary involvement in EU affairs. To 
proceed so, we started with a deductive method based on theoretical concepts (Europeanisation, 
motivational approach) and analyses developed in Legislative Studies (see for example 
Auel/Christiansen, 2015) to create categories corresponding to our research strands44.  
Then, we collected the data according to these categories and concepts, refining and 
completing our list with every interview. The use of pre-existing concepts and theoretical 
approaches regarding parliamentary involvement in EU affairs permitted to identify 
theoretically relevant elements in the empirical data. The interview grid itself is divided into 
sections, each corresponding to different but complementing research directions. Parallel to the 
process of data collection, we used the inductive method through data coding in order to obtain 
new evidence for concept refinement. Coding is an important element of grounded theory and 
serves as a multi-level tool for empirical data analysis (Strübing, 2008). We coded interviews 
based on the analytical strategy of Qualitative Content Analysis. Qualitative Content Analysis 
obeys a systematic procedure laid out by the researcher and adapted to the research questions 
and objectives (Mayring/Fenzl, 2014). Contrary to free analysis, content analysis follows 
specific analytical steps led by research guidelines. In this respect, category formation is an 
important part of the method in order to facilitate the classification of data and ultimately answer 
the research question. Content analysis is thus not a rigid technique, but is constantly evolving 
and readapted with each findings. In the present thesis, we relied on content analysis exclusively 
for interviews. Each interview was transcribed into verbatim transcript format, i.e. reproducing 
the original wording of the interviewees. We pseudonymised immediately interviewees’ names 
in the transcription process. We used the Atlas.ti software to proceed with the qualitative 
analysis of interviews’ content. All interviews were coded according to the criteria developed 
to measure parliamentary actors’ motivations with regard to EU affairs. Moreover, these 
interviews served also to collect information on the functioning of parliamentary scrutiny 
systems, the organisation of the parliamentary administration and groups, as well as the relation 
between parliament and government. Codes were then grouped together in order to facilitate 
the analysis.  
The results of the analysis of parliamentary documents and interviews are laid down in 
the following three empirical chapters. 
  
 
44 Factors as well as concepts determining parliamentary involvement can be found in multiple sources of 
secondary literature (see the literature review chapter). We retrieved the most salient factors, arguments and 
approaches on parliamentary participation in EU politics, adapting and completing them to the present thesis’ 
research objectives (see table of indicators). 
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Chapter 5. Parliamentary involvement in EU affairs in the 
Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies 
 
The present chapter explains the mechanisms of the Chamber of Deputies’ involvement 
in EU affairs in the context of EU and intergovernmental treaty negotiations. The aim is to 
outline the Chamber’s formal capacities and their evolution, as well as to explain what role 
MPs’ played in institutional change over the course of the last two decades. Based on the 
hypotheses from Chapter 3, we seek to check correlations between the evolution of 
parliamentary participation rights and MPs’ motivations with regard to EU affairs. The first 
section (5.1) seeks to outline the general institutional framework in Luxembourg. We will then 
explain how the Chamber of Deputies proceeds with the scrutiny of EU affairs (5.2). The third 
section will focus on socio-demographic features and MPs’ general motivations to get involved 
in EU affairs (5.3). The next parts will then take each treaty and explain parliamentary 
involvement in the context of the Constitutional Treaty (5.4), the Lisbon Treaty (5.5) and the 
ESM and TSCG (5.6). 
 
5.1 Luxembourg: general institutional framework 
 
Luxembourg’s political system is characterised by a combination of parliamentary 
democracy and constitutional monarchy anchored in a unitary state (Article 51 Constitution). 
This means that three actors lead the legislative process: the Government, the unicameral 
parliament and the Grand Duke of Luxembourg. Consociationalism and neocorporatism are the 
two main systemic features of the relationship between actors in the legislative process, through 
consensus-seeking practices and dialogue with the civil society. Consociational democracies 
aim to establish compromises at the state level to ensure the regime’s stability through 
agreements between political and economic elites (Poirier/Dumont et al., 2006). The longevity 
of Luxembourg’s coalition governments is one aspect of the consociational nature of the 
political system. Decisions on the national level can be reached only through compromises. The 
first section aims to outline the legislative process in Luxembourg by presenting the main actors 
as well as the rules and procedures. The presentation of the general institutional framework is 
essential to understand how EU affairs are being handled on the national level. Consensus-
seeking strategies among parties and institutions involved in the legislative process are 
particularly visible in the case of EU affairs. In Luxembourg, European integration is perceived 
as an essential part of the country’s history. It permitted to provide Luxembourg with a voice 
and an influential position on the European decision-making process through its equal position 
with bigger Member States (Gillissen, 1998; Hey, In: Hey, 2003; Majerus, In: Hirsch, 2008). 
Public opinion is mostly pro-European and supports Luxembourg’s membership in the 
European Union45. The second section of this first part will therefore analyse how the Chamber 
 
45 According to Eurobarometers, 77% of the population supported EU membership in 1997 for an EU average of 
46% (http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb47/eb47_fr.pdf, last accessed 24.01.2018), 75% in 2000 
for an EU average of 49% (http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb53/eb53_fr.pdf, last accessed 
24.01.2018), 85% in 2003 for an EU average of 54% 
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of Deputies examines EU affairs, taking into account its formal capacities, its composition and 
MPs’ profiles. 
 
5.1.1 Actors of the legislative process 
 
This section presents the different actors of the legislative process in Luxembourg, the 
two most important being the Government and the Chamber of Deputies. However, other bodies 
such as the Council of State, professional chambers, the civil society or political parties exert a 
significant influence on the legislative process and parliament’s activities. 
  
5.1.1.1 The Executive: the Grand Duke and the Government 
 
The Executive power in Luxembourg is bicephalous: on the one hand, the Grand Duke 
which powers have been limited by the Constitution, and on the other hand the Prime Minister 
and the Government. The Grand Duke’s functions are twofold: he is the Head of State as well 
as the Head of the executive power. Democratisation of Luxembourg’s political system began 
in 1919, when the Grand Duke’s role as representative of the nation was anchored in the 
Constitution (Dumont/Jarir/Spreitzer, In: Poirier, 2014). Limitations to the monarchical power 
were set in Article 32 of the Constitution. The sovereign power belongs to the nation and the 
Grand Duke exerts his functions in accordance with it. As Head of State, the Grand Duke 
represents the nation when receiving personalities on Luxembourgish ground. He concludes 
international treaties (Article 37 Constitution), appoints state civil servants (Article 35 
Constitution) and magistrates (Article 90 Constitution). He is the guardian of the State 
institutions and guarantees the good functioning of the State. He is also the Head of the army 
(Article 37 Constitution).  
In theory, the Grand Duke has the responsibility to form the government by nominating 
and revoking government members (Article 77 Constitution). However, in practice, the Prime 
Minister is responsible for the government’s formation with the support of the Chamber of 
Deputies. The Grand Duke nominates a party candidate, the future Prime Minister 
(“formateur”), based on the results of national elections, who will be responsible to form the 
government with a support from the majority in parliament (Dumont/Jarir/Spreitzer, In: Poirier, 
2014). As head of the executive, the Grand Duke has a right of initiative and can submit law 
proposals to the parliament (Article 47 Constitution). He can also dissolve the Chamber and 
call for new elections in case of a negative vote of confidence in the government (Article 74 
Constitution). Finally, the Grand-Duke enacts the laws within the three months after the 
parliament’s vote (Article 34 Constitution) and has a regulatory power, which means that he 
 
(http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb59/eb59_rapport_final_fr.pdf, last accessed 24.01.2018),  79% 
in 2009 for an EU average of 53% (http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb71/eb71_std_part1.pdf , last 
accessed 24.01.2018) and 72% in 2011 for an EU average of 47% 
(http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Chart/getChart/themeKy/3/groupKy/3, last 
accessed 24.01.2018). 
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can produce two types of rulings (Article 36 Constitution): Grand-ducal decisions (“Arrêté 
grand-ducal”) and Grand-ducal regulations (“Règlement grand-ducal”). Grand-ducal decisions 
aim to enforce the law. Their adoption requires the opinion of the Council of State (“Conseil 
d’Etat”), with an exception in emergency cases, and needs to be signed by the responsible 
minister. Decisions can also be taken to organise the government and determine ministerial 
departments (Dumont/Jarir/Spreitzer, In: Poirier, 2014). Grand-ducal regulations require the 
opinion of the Council of State before their adoption as well as the signature of the responsible 
minister. The regulatory power of the Grand Duke allows him to implement sovereign acts 
(international laws and treaties). The role of the Grand Duke in the Luxembourgish political 
system has been revised over the last years in order to diminish his powers and to increase the 
democratic character of the legislative process. In 2009, the Grand Duke’s legislative powers 
have been totally removed, giving the exclusive legislative functions to the Chamber of 
Deputies46 (Dumont/Jarir/Spreitzer, In: Poirier, 2014).  
The Government and the Prime Minister represent the second branch of the executive. 
Governments in Luxembourg are defined by their “extraordinary stability and continuity” 
(Bossaert, In: Wessels/Mittag/Maurer, 2003, p.304). Coalition governments are the common 
formation in Luxembourg (Spreitzer, In: Hefftler/Neuhold/Rozenberg/Smith, 2015), because 
parties usually do not obtain the absolute majority in parliament after legislative elections. 
Coalition governments were usually formed of the two biggest parties (CSV and LSAP), except 
since 2013 with the formation of a coalition between three parties without the Christian 
Democrats (Democratic Party DP, Luxembourg Socialist Workers’ Party LSAP and the Greens 
Déi Gréng).  
Table 9: Coalition governments in Luxembourg from 1999 until 2018 
Period Coalition government 
1999-2004 CSV-DP 
2004-2009 CSV-LSAP 
2009-2013 CSV-LSAP 
2013-2018 LSAP-DP-Déi Gréng 
Source: Own calculations 
 
The Government is led by the Prime Minister who chooses in practice the ministers. The 
composition of the Government is not fixed. The minimum number of required government 
members according to the Constitution is three (Article 76 Constitution). Ministerial functions 
are incompatible with other mandates or state functions (parliamentary or local mandates, 
magistrate, member of Council of State). The Prime Minister is responsible for the organisation 
and management of the Government, which implies the coordination between the ministerial 
departments. The Council of Government meets once per week and is composed of all 
government members, the Prime Minister and the Secretary General of the Council of 
Government. The latter depends directly from the Prime Minister. Ministers have a right of 
initiative concerning bill proposals. They take enforcement measures, countersign the Grand 
 
46 See the law of 12th March 2009 amending Article 34 Constitution (Loi du 12 mars 2009 portant révision de 
l'article 34 de la Constitution). 
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Duke’s decisions and control their implementation. Government and Parliament are closely 
connected, mainly due to the frequent interchangeability between the position of minister and 
Member of Parliament. Government members pass almost all through the Chamber at some 
point in their political career and some of them even return to parliament once their mandate is 
over. On top of that, independently from the Grand Duke’s responsibility, ministers are also 
accountable to the Chamber of Deputies. 
 
5.1.1.2 The Chamber of Deputies 
 
According to Article 51 of the Constitution, parliamentary democracy is Luxembourg’s 
political regime. In this framework, the Chamber of Deputies as a small unicameral parliament 
represents the Legislative in Luxembourg and is composed of sixty Members of Parliament 
elected for five years. The election mode is based on the proportional representation list ballot. 
Overlapping mandates are frequent, which means that most parliamentarians exert also a local 
mandate in parallel to their national representative functions.  
The Chamber of Deputies has four main competences. It exerts legislative functions; it 
controls the government; it participates in the budgetary procedure and implements EU 
directives. The legislative functions are subdivided into a right of legislative initiative, shared 
with the Government, and law-making. The Government can submit bill proposals in the name 
of the Grand Duke to the Parliament. The Chamber can also submit law proposals, formulated 
by one or several parliamentarians. EU directives pass first through the Government, which 
then submits draft implementation laws to the Chamber to be adopted. Government bills and 
law proposals are examined within parliament by the competent committees and are then 
transferred to the plenary for a final vote. The government control functions are exerted through 
different parliamentary instruments: parliamentary questions, motions, resolutions, 
interpellations, petitions, the right of inquiry against government or the state administration and 
the right to initiate proceedings against government members. Once per year in October, the 
Chamber also examines and adopts the state budget once the Government submitted it.  
The Chamber is composed of a Bureau chaired by the President of Parliament, three 
vice-presidents and seven members. The President of the Chamber manages parliamentary 
sessions, monitors the proceedings during debates, represents the Chamber in public and 
international relations and plays the role of an honest broker between government and 
parliament (Article 9 RoP). The Conference of Presidents is composed of the President of 
Parliament and all presidents of the political groups. It is responsible for organising parliament’s 
work (Article 28 RoP). Parliamentary committees mirror ministerial jurisdictions. In practice, 
parliamentary committees often outnumber ministerial cabinets, which makes the 
Luxembourgish Chamber one of the best equipped parliaments in terms of formal legislative 
monitoring tools (Poirier, 2014). Usually, the committee Chair comes from the same political 
party as the minister (Spreitzer, In: Hefftler/Neuhold/Rozenberg/Smith, 2015). Functions and 
the composition of committees are fixed in Chapter 5, Title I of the internal Rules of Procedures. 
The distribution of committees within parliament aims to decentralise both the scrutiny and the 
specialisation of legislative matters (Spreitzer, 2014). The Chamber is composed of permanent 
74 
 
committees constituted of minimum five to maximum thirteen parliamentarians. These 
permanent committees can establish sub-committees. The so-called “regulatory” committees 
have organisational and administrative tasks47. The parliament can also establish special 
committees and committees of inquiry, which are generally temporary and handle a specific 
issue. Each parliamentarian belongs to a parliamentary group or “leaning”. Parliamentary 
groups are composed of minimum five members.  
Figure 2: Composition of the Chamber of Deputies (in total), 2013-2018 
Source: Own calculations48. 
Groups are represented in parliamentary committees and the Conference of Presidents. 
Parliamentary “leanings” are composed of less than five parliamentarians. The difference 
between these two political groupings lies in their resources. Parliamentary groups get more 
speaking time as well as offices compared to political leanings and independent 
parliamentarians. The latter do not belong to any of the first two groupings and have fewer 
financial and personnel resources. In the Chamber of Deputies, there are currently four political 
groups49 and two political leanings50 since 2013. Due to the small size of the Chamber, 
parliamentarians belong to multiple committees. Their work is supported by the parliamentary 
administration. Over the last thirty years, the Chamber constantly increased its personnel 
resources, passing from sixteen parliamentary staff in 1945 to ninety-four civil servants in 
201851.  
 
47 Such as for example the Audit committee, the Committee on Petitions or the Committee on Rules of 
Procedure. 
48 Based on the data on the parliament’s website 
http://www.chd.lu/wps/portal/public/Accueil/OrganisationEtFonctionnement/Organisation/Deputes/DeputesEnF
onction (last accessed 25.01.2018). 
49 Parliamentary groups of the Democratic Party (DP), the Luxembourg Socialist Workers’ Party (LSAP), the 
Christian Social People’s Party (CSV) and the Greens (Déi Gréng). 
50 The political leaning « Alternativ Demokratesch Reformpartei » (ADR) and The Left (Déi Lénk). 
51 Own calculations, see parliament’s website http://www.chd.lu/wps/wcm/connect/public/e4fe3465-fd32-4296-
86a4-bb4ca8f81cda/2018+01+24+Divers.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CVID=m4E-
teb&CVID=luQ83zx&CVID=luQ83zx (last accessed 25.01.2018) 
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Figure 3: Evolution of the number of parliamentary staff in the Chamber of Deputies (in 
total) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Nicolas Als, La chambre des députés, histoire et lieux de travail, p.446; Own calculations52. 
The Secretary General nominated for the duration of the legislative period (Article 159 
RoP) leads the parliamentary administration. The Secretary General is the Head of the 
parliamentary administration and is assisted by two Deputy Secretaries-General nominated by 
the Bureau of the Chamber (Article 160 RoP). Each parliamentary committee has a secretariat. 
The Department of International Relations deals with international and European affairs, 
preparing for example international and European parliamentary conferences. Within this 
Department, the “Cellule Européenne” handles specifically all matters related to EU affairs. 
The Chamber of Deputies tends to serve as a springboard for parliamentarians wishing 
to integrate the Government (Interview 16, 2017). As an intermediary step towards ministerial 
positions, the Chamber is seen as benefitting from a low attractiveness among politicians. The 
position of parliamentarians may represent for most MPs a political path by default while 
awaiting any opportunity to switch to the executive (Interview 16, 2017). This may contribute 
to the weakening of parliament’s influence on the legislative process, as MPs may not be willing 
to get fully involved in their work and prefer pursuing electoral goals.  
 
5.1.1.3 The Council of State 
 
The Council of State (“Conseil d’État”) can somehow be considered as Luxembourg’s 
second chamber because of its veto rights and law monitoring competences (Spreitzer, In: 
 
52 Based on the data from the parliament’s website http://www.chd.lu/wps/wcm/connect/public/e4fe3465-fd32-
4296-86a4-bb4ca8f81cda/2018+01+24+Divers.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CVID=m4E-
teb&CVID=luQ83zx&CVID=luQ83zx (last accessed 25.01.2018) 
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Hefftler/Neuhold/Rozenberg/Smith, 2015). As one of the main actors in the legislative process, 
it is a consultative body composed of twenty-one councillors of state, controlling the 
compatibility and constitutionality of laws before their adoption in parliament (Article 83bis 
Constitution; Schroen, In: Ismayr, 2009). The Council of State has both legislative, regulatory 
and administrative powers. Compared to the Chamber of Deputies, it possesses more analytical 
competences thanks to its specialised departments. As a legislative body, it gives its non-
binding opinion to pre-legislative drafts initiated by the Government. Its consultation for 
legislative proposals or draft bills is compulsory. Usually seized by the Government, the 
Council of State then submits an opinion which has to be taken into account during the 
examination of the proposals in parliament. If the Council of State has doubts about the 
constitutionality of the legislative proposal or draft bill, it can express its opposition (the so-
called formal opposition, “opposition formelle”). It can also suggest amendments or make a 
counterproposal (Besch, 2019; Dumont/De Winter, 2006). In case of a negative opinion, 
changes have to be made by the Government or Parliament. If the Chamber amends a proposal 
during the parliamentary examination process, the new version has to be submitted again to the 
Council of State. If required changes are not implemented according to the Council’s opinion, 
the latter can use its suspensive veto power to block the legislative process for three months. 
This suspensive veto right aims to establish a sort of second parliamentary chamber on the 
national level (Besch, 2019). Continuous exchanges, mostly informal, facilitate the 
coordination between both bodies (Interview 13, 2017). The Council of State also decides if a 
law, once voted in parliament, requires or not a second parliamentary vote three months later, 
according to the rules of law making in Luxembourg (Article 59 Constitution). Within its 
regulatory powers, the Council of State controls the conformity of grand-ducal decisions to 
superior norms. The Council of State’s opinions are thus essential for the continuation of the 
legislative process and parliamentary work. 
Within the Council of State, EU affairs are handled by several departments and 
distributed among committees depending on their field (Interview 13, 2017). There are no 
experts specialised in these matters. The only time the Council of State gets fully involved in 
EU affairs is whenever the Parliament has to ratify a European treaty. In that case, it proceeds 
with a legal analysis of the EU and intergovernmental treaties. 
 
5.1.1.4 The “Tripartite” and the role of civil society 
 
Luxembourg’s political system is characterised by constant interactions between the 
different actors of the legislative process. The consensus-seeking strategy in the Luxembourgish 
neocorporatist model translates into continuous dialogue with the civil society, including trade 
unions and professional chambers. Social partners and professional chambers play a significant 
role in the sense that they give opinions on law initiatives and can even draft law proposals 
(Schroen, In: Ismayr, 2009). The Government is particularly supportive of neocorporatist 
practices, which translate into the voluntary cooperation between different actors in a 
parliamentary democracy. For the Government, this cooperation permits to secure the 
legitimacy of its political decisions (Thill/Thomas, 2009). In general, trade unions are closely 
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connected to political parties. For example, the LSAP has close ties to the workers’ trade union 
OGBL (Onofhängege Gewerkschaftsbond Lëtzebuerg), while the CSV is very close to the 
employees’ trade union LCGB (Christliche Gewerkschaftsbund Luxemburg). Parliamentarians 
can have functions in trade unions parallel to their national mandates. Some exerted both the 
function of president of a national trade union and their function as MP (Thill/Thomas, 2009). 
However, civil society has more frequent exchanges with the Government than with the 
Chamber of Deputies, notably through the “Tripartite” negotiations.  
Tripartism characterises Luxembourg’s social model, based on a social dialogue 
between business sectors, trade unions and political actors. The tripartite coordination 
committee established in 1978 in reaction to the crisis of the steel industry reflects this 
neocorporatist logic. It is composed of government members, representatives from professional 
chambers and trade unions. The “Tripartite” takes the form of informal meetings analysing 
matters related to employment and competitiveness, where the Government is not obliged to 
transfer any information about the negotiations to the Chamber of Deputies (Poirier, 2014). 
Another format of dialogue between the civil society and the Government is the national 
tripartite conference, which composition is decided by the Government. This conference has no 
legal basis and is thus not institutionalised. Representatives of the State meet with 
representatives from the economic sectors. The Government nominates the latter following 
suggestions from social partners.  
Apart from the tripartite formats, other bodies endorse an influencing role on the 
legislative process. The economic and social council established in 1966 is a permanent 
consultative body of the Government interacting among others with the latter, the Chamber of 
Deputies and the Council of State (Poirier et al., In: Poirier, 2014). It accompanies the social 
dialogue with the above-mentioned involved actors. It examines either on its own initiative or 
on the Government’s request economic and social problems and establishes every year an 
opinion on the economic, social and financial situation of the country. The Government can 
decide to consider the opinion for future decisions.  
Finally, professional chambers are also involved in the national legislative process and 
represent essential advisers for both the Government and Parliament. Professional chambers 
with electoral basis and compulsory affiliation are not anchored in the Constitution (Interview 
18, 2017). They were created by law in 1924, which was amended in 2010 for the Business 
Chamber and in 2011 for the Chamber of Trades (Interview 18, 2017). In Luxembourg, there 
are five professional chambers that can give their opinion on law proposals, initiate law 
proposals and submit them to the Government, and can be consulted in the framework of the 
budgetary procedure (Poirier et al., In: Poirier, 2014). In Luxembourg, there is a general 
understanding that professional chambers are essential interlocutors of the Government in the 
decision making process (Interview 18, 2017). Professional chambers as “official lobbyists” 
defend their members’ interests, but negotiate also with the State, i.e. with ministries and public 
administrations. The relationship between professional chambers and Parliament are less 
intense than with the Government, but exchanges exist between the first two ones, even though 
less frequently. For example, opinions of the Business Chamber are systematically included in 
committee documents. They also appear on the parliament’s website. Most exchanges happen 
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informally, in the form of bilateral meetings between parliamentarians and representatives of 
the Business Chamber. These meetings are organised ad hoc, usually with the rapporteurs of 
parliamentary dossiers (Interview 18, 2017). Representatives of professional chambers can also 
be invited in committee meetings, when their position needs to be heard, but the framework of 
these interviews remains non-formalised.  
Regarding EU matters, some trade unions such as FEDIL53, OGBL and LCGB54 
established representation offices in Brussels and Luxembourg. On the Luxembourgish level, 
the European platform of the UEL coordinates the positions of professional chambers and trade 
unions (Interview 23, 25.04.2018). The Luxembourgish Business Chamber has a representative 
in Brussels and is co-founder of Eurochambres, a European Association of European Chambers 
of commerce and industry established in 195855. While the Chamber of Employees has no 
representation in Brussels, it cooperates actively with the European Parliament’s information 
office in Luxembourg for the organisation of conferences on EU topics, as well as with the 
European Secretariat of the OGBL and LCGB. Relationships between the Chamber of Deputies 
and EU representations of professional chambers and trade union are rare, if not non-existent. 
However, exchanges exist with Members of the European Parliament, either through the direct 
transfer of opinions or informal meetings (Interview 23, 2018). 
 
5.1.1.5 Political Parties 
 
This part aims to present the political parties and the type of relationship between them. 
Luxembourg has currently ten political parties56. Six are represented in parliament and have a 
sufficient political weight to influence the decision-making process. The Christian-Social 
People’s Party (CSV) was created in 1914 as a party highlighting Christian social values 
(Schäfer, 2001). The party is close to the trade union LCGB as well as the national newspaper 
“Das Luxemburger Wort”. The Luxembourg Socialist Workers’ Party (LSAP) was established 
in 1903 as the “Sozialdemokratische Partei Luxemburgs” and defended socialist reform 
policies. It is close to the trade union OGBL and the newspaper “Tageblatt”. The DP exists 
since 1945 but was renamed as such in 1954. The party represents middle to high-class citizens. 
Déi Gréng was established more recently, in 1983. Before being renamed as such in 1995, the 
party was split between three movements (Gréng Alternativ Partei GAP, Gréng Lëscht 
Ekologesch Initiativ GLEI, Gréng Alternativ Allianz GRAL). The party’s main objective is the 
ecological structuring of the economy. Finally, the ADR was created in 1987 as 
“Aktiounskomitee 5/6 Pensioun fir jiddfereen” and changed its name in 1992 into “Alternativ 
Demokratesch Reformpartei”. The left-wing party Déi Lénk was born as a dissident movement 
inside the communist party KPL in 1999. 
 
Luxembourg’s political system takes the form of moderate pluralism. Moderate 
pluralism translates into coalition governments, because the number of parties able to govern is 
 
53 Fédération Des Industriels Luxembourgeois. 
54 OGBL and LCGB established a common European secretariat: http://www.secec.lu/ (last accessed 14.06.2019) 
55 http://www.eurochambres.eu/Content/default.asp?pagename=Home (last accessed 29.01.2018) 
56 As of January 2018. 
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usually higher than two. According to Sartori, coalitions are established due to the fact “[…] 
that no party generally attains the absolute majority, and that it appears irrational to allow the 
major or dominant party to govern alone when it can be obliged to share its power” (Sartori/Mair 
et al., 2016, p.158). Coalitions are thus the rule in Luxembourg, generally between the two 
biggest parties CSV and LSAP. Since 2013, three parties form the governmental coalition 
(LSAP, Déi Gréng and DP) and represent one of the rare coalitions without the CSV57. In 
Luxembourg, political parties are relatively weak and need mutual support. This is mainly 
caused by the personalised election system giving more weight to charismatic personalities 
from different political horizons, as well as the lack of constitutional framework 
(Dumont/Fehlen/Poirier, In: Lorig, 2008). The vote-splitting system leads to clientelist and 
corporatist practices without big political conflicts for fear of losing support among the 
population and the civil society (Gaudron, 2004).  
Contrary to other countries, there are no significant inter-party debates, but rather 
personal strategies. Even though several parties share the power, they remain anchored in a two 
party logic. Sartori argues that systems of moderate pluralism still follow a bipolar structure. In 
Luxembourg, competition between parties happens triagonally (Schroen, 1986). However, 
polarisation between majority and opposition parties remains weak. Sartori concludes that “ 
[…] a system of moderate pluralism is characterised by (i) a relatively small ideological distance 
among its relevant parties, (ii) a bipolar coalitional configuration, and (iii) centripetal 
competition” (Sartori/Mair et al., 2016, p.159). Sartori’s definition needs to be adapted to the 
Luxembourgish case, which is indeed characterised by a small ideological distance between 
political parties (Dumont/De Winter, 2006), a bipolar or tripolar coalitional configuration, as 
well as centrifugal and centripetal competition. Centripetal competition concerns the three 
biggest parties (CSV, LSAP, DP) as well as the left wing parties (Greens, Déi Lénk). All 
opposition parties (Greens, Déi Lénk, ADR) compete centrifugally with the biggest parties 
(Schäfer, 2001). The ties between governmental parties and their members in parliament is 
particularly strong, which might undermine parliamentary autonomy and the rights of 
opposition parties (Spreitzer et al., In: Poirier, 2014). 
 
Consociationalism in Luxembourg is also reflected in parties’ positions on EU affairs. 
Opinions of political actors on European integration are relatively similar, with few lines of 
conflict. Even though some parties are more sceptical towards the EU, there is a wide consensus 
in the political arena that European integration benefitted Luxembourg as a small country 
(Spreitzer, In: Hefftler/Neuhold/Rozenberg/Smith, 2015). EU affairs are part of Luxembourg’s 
identity and integral part of national interests. On the scale of support for the European Union, 
the political landscape can be divided in three camps: the pro-integrationists and pro-
Europeanists LSAP and CSV; the critical Europhiles DP and Déi Gréng, and the pro-
sovereignists ADR and Déi Lénk (Poirier et al., 2006). While pro-integrationist parties are in 
favour of a federalist European Union in accordance with the subsidiarity principle with strong 
national parliaments, the ADR defends the idea of a Europe of Nations, emphasising the need 
to reinforce parliaments’ scrutiny rights. There is no fundamentally Eurosceptic party in 
 
57 The CSV’s absence from governmental coalitions happened only once between 1974 and 1979 during the Thorn-
Vouel-Berg government of DP and LSAP. 
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Luxembourg. Opinions on the European integration diverge between the two first and the last 
camp, but even the last group of parties support European integration, even though in another 
configuration. The table hereafter (table 10) sums up the main positions of each party on the 
EU, based on the parties’ electoral programmes. The four biggest parties and Déi Lénk support 
the community method and the idea of a federal EU, even though Déi Lénk insists on the 
importance of the subsidiarity principle (Interview 14, 2017). 
Table 10: Parties’ position on European integration, Luxembourg 
  2004 2009 2013 
CSV - federal Europe, community 
method  
- supports CSDP 
- strengthened bilateral 
cooperation with other MS 
- equality between small and big 
countries 
- supports EU enlargement  
- subsidiarity principle, EU closer 
to citizens  
- political, economic and union 
- qualified majority voting 
- strengthening of NPs role 
- “European party of 
Luxembourg”,  
- favours solidarity in Europe 
- EU closer to citizens 
- strengthen CSDP 
- community method  
- Widen European competences in 
fields where MS cannot act 
- establish Banking Union 
- supports minimal set of rights for 
workers on European level 
- solidarity  
- stable euro 
- supports full time presidency of 
Eurogroup 
- Merge competences of President of 
European Council and president of 
EU COM 
- strengthen role of NPs  
- strengthen CSDP 
- Social Europe 
LSAP - strengthen bilateral cooperation 
- supports transparent, legitimate 
EU institutions, one 
commissioner per country 
- supports EU enlargement 
- development of political, 
economic and social Europe, 
ecological market economy 
- supports CSDP  
- subsidiarity principle, closeness 
to citizens 
- strengthen EU’s social 
dimension  
- strong and solidary EU 
- supports EU climate strategy 
- develop immigration 
standards in EU 
- supports CSDP 
- supports Turkey’s accession 
negotiation  
- supports coordinated 
economic policies 
- community method  
- supports solidary and social Union 
- EU closer to citizens 
- strengthen EU’s democratic 
accountability through European 
elections 
- strengthen role of NPs 
 
DP - ensure representation of 
Luxembourg in EU institutions 
- better coordination of economic 
and financial policies 
- supports European social model 
- supports CSDP 
- EU closer to citizens 
- against nuclear weapons in 
EU 
- strengthen EP and NPs,  
- supports social Union 
- community method 
- clarify competence distribution 
between MS and EU 
- strengthen role of NPs  
- equality between MS in decision 
making 
Déi 
Gréng 
- favours social Europe, 
strengthening of right to strike on 
EU level and trade unions’ 
closeness to citizens 
- environmental friendly: 
sustainability should be 
strengthened in policymaking 
process 
- rejects nuclear energy  
- coordination of employment 
policies  
- favours EU enlargement 
- favours CSDP, but focus on 
peace keeping operations 
- ensure appropriate 
representation of Luxembourg in 
EU institutions 
- strengthen participation rights of 
CHD in EU affairs 
- favours qualified majority 
voting in CSDP and 
codecision power of EP 
- continue fight against 
climate change on EU level 
- rejects EURATOM 
- promotes renewable 
energies 
- favours social protocol on 
EU level protecting social and 
labour rights from 
liberalisation trends 
- favours CAP reform to 
ensure animal and 
environment protection 
- favours active EU migration 
policy 
- increase publicity of EU 
affairs on national level 
- favours deepening of political and 
democratic Union 
- consolidate European institutions by 
enhancing community method 
- favours tax on financial transactions 
and banking union 
- deepen social union by establishing 
minimal social norms 
- strengthen parliamentary control 
over EU affairs: permanent EAC, 
increase personnel in charge of EU 
affairs, forbid double mandates on 
national and local level, increase 
transparency 
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ADR - In election programme: mention 
only strengthening of ex ante 
participation rights of NPs 
- Party Manifesto 2006: in favour 
of state sovereignty, Europe of 
Nations 
- favours subsidiarity principle 
- strengthen ex ante participation 
rights of NPs 
- favours CSDP 
- supports Europe of nations 
- favours CSDP and European 
integration 
- rejects Turkey’s accession to 
the EU 
- favours renationalisation of 
specific competences 
- favours subsidiarity 
principle 
- favours CSDP 
- favours European integration, but 
against federalism and welcomes 
intergovernmentalism 
- favours referendum on EU 
accessions 
- rejects Turkey’s accession to the EU 
- strengthen border control  
- favours European social dimension  
- rejects increase of EU budget 
- eurozone should be reserved to MS 
with solid financial situation 
Déi Lénk / - ECB should be put under 
political control 
- supports sustainable 
development on EU level 
- rejects FRONTEX 
participation 
- rejects CSDP and favours 
civilian missions/peace 
keeping  
- strengthen role of NPs in EU 
decision making process 
instead of EP 
- EUCOM should be elected 
democratically  
- rejects lisbon treaty 
- EU should guarantee social 
justice 
- favours minimal European social 
standards 
- need to regulate financial markets 
- need to rethink the organisation of 
the EU 
- increase citizen participation in EU 
decision making 
Sources: Political programmes, CSV Wahlprogramm 2004; CSV Wahlprogramm 2009; CSV Wahlprogramm 
2013; LSAP - Am Mëttelpunkt vum Liewen, Parlamentswahlen 2004, Wahlprogramm der LSAP; De roude 
Fuedem, LSAP-Wahlprogramm 2009; LSAP-WAHLPROGRAMM 2013 LOSCHT OP MUER !; Zesummen no 
vir- De Programm vun der Demokratescher Partei fir d’Walen vum 13. Juni 2004; DP, Nei Weeër wielen, 
Wahlprogramm 2009; DP, Besser léisung fir eist land, Wahlprogramm 2013; Déi Gréng, NEIT KAPITAL FIR 
LËTZEBUERG - PROGRAMME ELECTORAL 2004; Déi Gréng, Ecologie- Economie-Edukatioun, Programme 
électoral 2009; Déi Gréng, Programme 2013, Plus Vert. Plus Responsable; ADR Wahlprogramm 2004; 
Grundsatzprogramm der ADR, 02.04.2006; ADR, Chamberwalprogramm 2009; ADR, Chamberwahlen 2013, 
Wahlprogramm; Déi Lénk, PROGRAMME POUR LES ELECTIONS LEGISLATIVES ET EUROPEENNES DU 
7 JUIN 2009; Déi Lénk, Programme électoral 2013, Déi Lénk. Maintenant. 
 
5.1.2 The legislative process: rules and procedures 
 
Mechanisms of the legislative process will be presented in this section, before exposing 
how EU affairs are perceived and handled on the national level. The position of the Chamber 
of Deputies in the decision-making process tends to be weakened because of resource 
disadvantages compared to the government. The latter plays a powerful role in initiating and 
determining the direction of the legislative process. Considering these elements derived from 
the general institutional framework, we will explain how EU affairs are being dealt in 
Luxembourg. These two sections will deal with the general mechanisms of the legislative 
process, both for domestic and European affairs.  
 
5.1.2.1 The legislative process step by step 
 
The legislative process starts with a legislative initiative, either from the Government in 
the name of the Grand Duke in form of a draft bill, or from the Parliament in form of a law 
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proposal (Dumont/De Winter, 2006). Furthermore, the Council of State also participates 
actively as the only consultative organ anchored in the Constitution (Besch, 2019). In case of a 
draft bill (“projet de loi”) initiated by the Grand-Duke, it is first formulated in ministerial 
departments and then approved by the Government during the Government Council meeting, 
depending on the opinion submitted by the Council of State. After the approval in the 
Government Council, the competent minister decides when to consult the professional 
chambers concerned by the draft bill as well as the Council of State (Besch, 2019). The minister 
has also to request the Grand-Duke’s approval to submit the draft bill to the Chamber of  
Deputies. The referral to the Council of State should happen the latest concomitantly to the 
deposit of the draft bill to the Chamber of Deputies. As the Grand-Duke has the sole competency 
to submit draft bills to the Chamber of Deputies, the competent minister has to prepare a Grand-
Ducal decision authorising the minister to submit the bill in the Grand-Duke’s name (Besch, 
2019). Once the Ministry of State approved the Grand-Ducal decision, the competent minister 
can introduce the bill to the Chamber of Deputies. The draft bill enters parliament with all 
attached documents, among others the consultative reports of the Council of State and the 
professional chambers. The parliament’s Conference of Presidents, composed of the Chamber’s 
President and the heads of the political groups, sends the draft to the competent parliamentary 
committee. In case of a law proposal (“proposition de loi”), one or more MPs have a right of 
initiative. The law proposal is submitted either to the President of the Chamber or the 
parliamentary administration during a plenary session. The Conference of presidents decides 
about its admissibility and transfers it to the competent parliamentary committees. The 
President of the Chamber transfers the law proposal to the Government and the President of the 
Council of State. The Government then seizes the professional chambers for an opinion.  
Even though the opinions of the Council of State are not binding, they can suspend the 
legislative process for three months. Within the Council of State, opinions are established 
during committee meetings and under the responsibility of a rapporteur. After the opinion has 
been voted in plenary, it is transferred via the Central Directorate for Legislation (“Service 
central de legislation”) to the President of the Chamber of Deputies. At this stage, contacts 
between the Chamber and the Council of State are direct and bilateral (Interview 12, 2017). 
During the preparation of the opinion, civil servants from the Council of State maintain regular 
contacts with the civil servants from the parliamentary administration. Less frequently, 
meetings are organised between civil servants from the Council of State (its committees) and 
parliamentary committees working on a specific dossier. These exchanges happen mostly 
informally (Interview 12, 2017). Only opinions are public and accessible on the websites of the 
Council of State and the Chamber of Deputies. Each opinion assesses the general framework of 
a law proposal or draft bill, examines the articles and contains legislative observations 
(Interview 12, 2017).  
After the Council of State and professional chambers submitted their opinion on the law 
proposal, it is sent back to the Conference of presidents, which then forwards it to the competent 
committee. At this stage of the procedure, amendments to the proposal or the draft bill are 
possible during discussions in the committee. A rapporteur is responsible to draft a report on 
the proposal, which is adopted by the committee and presented in the plenary. The Parliament 
votes during the plenary session on the law proposal or draft bill. During a plenary session, 
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parliamentarians can use different instruments to hold the Government accountable: written or 
oral (urgent) questions, question times, topical debates, interpellations, resolutions or motions 
(Poirier, In: Poirier, 2014). Interpellations are individual requests formulated by 
parliamentarians to government members to put a matter on the agenda of a plenary session. 
Motions are adopted by parliament and destined for the government to draw its attention on the 
necessity to take initiatives or adopt a specific position. Resolutions are adopted by parliament 
and destined for itself, exposing its willingness to take a decision or position. 
The specificity of Luxembourg is the procedure of the second parliamentary vote, which 
has to take place three months after the first vote (Article 59 Constitution). Parliament can be 
exempted from the second vote if it agrees with the Council of State that it is not needed. The 
opinion of the Council of State is here mandatory, which confers it strong veto powers. 
According to Marc Besch, “[the] competency to grant an exemption of a second constitutional 
vote, attributed by the constituent to the Council of State to exert a second legislative assembly’s 
moderating influence on the Luxembourg unicameral system, is independent from its 
consultative mission” (Besch, 2019, p.274). The decision to proceed with a second 
constitutional vote belongs to the Chamber of Deputies. If parliament decides to discard a 
second vote, it transfers the adopted law proposal to the Council of State. The latter discusses 
the exemption during a plenary within the three weeks following the transfer of the adopted law 
proposal. However, second votes are relatively rare in practice, which means that both bodies 
usually agree on the exemption. Finally, the Grand-Duke needs to promulgate the law within 
the three months following the vote in the Chamber of Deputies. 
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Figure 4: Legislative process in Luxembourg (draft bills and law proposals) 
 
DRAFT BILLS 
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LAW PROPOSALS 
 
In Luxembourg, the government keeps a hand on the different stages of the legislative 
process (Dumont/De Winter, 2006; Interviews 3 and 11, 2017). Parliamentary initiatives are 
rather limited (Dumont/Spreitzer, In: Brouard/Costa/König, 2012; Schroen, In: Ismayr, 2009). 
The main reasons explaining the Chamber’s limited pro-active role in the decision-making 
process are the lack of sufficient parliamentary resources in terms of personnel, expertise, 
documentation and financial means. Governmental draft bills have usually priority within 
parliament and the Council of State (Dumont/Spreitzer, In: Brouard/Costa/König, 2012). 
Majority MPs can block initiatives from the opposition through their influence on the committee 
agenda or by voting against the proposal (Dumont/De Winter, 2006). In general, unbalanced 
information exchange between the Government and the Chamber gives the first more leeway 
in negotiations, be it on the national or European level. As the parliament is aware of its power 
disadvantage, it may be less inclined to oppose the government’s positions (Interview 3, 2017). 
Coalition parties benefit from the resources of the ministries and tend to follow governmental 
positions to ensure the coherence of their political line. Resource disadvantage and party 
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political strategies may then also affect the way EU affairs are being handled on the national 
level.   
5.1.2.2 The handling of EU affairs on the national level 
 
The Luxembourgish Constitution lays the foundation of the country’s participation in 
international treaties and specifically in European treaties (Articles 37 and 49b). The Grand 
Duke signs the treaties. European treaties have to be implemented in national law, either on the 
initiative of the Grand Duke or the Government. At governmental level, the Ministry for Foreign 
and European Affairs is the main interlocutor in charge of European affairs, together with the 
Prime Minister. The latter also endorses the role of Minister for European Affairs because of 
the significance of EU politics for the country (Interview 16, 2017). Due to the transversality 
of European matters, technical ministries are also involved in the examination process of EU 
dossiers. The department of international economic relations and European affairs within the 
Ministry for Foreign and European Affairs coordinates the European policies of the ministerial 
departments, ensures the coordination of European law implementation on the national level, 
prepares the annual report on the government’s European policy and the annual report on the 
implementation of directives for the Chamber of Deputies.  
The handling of EU affairs happens in two ways: either “upstream” or “downstream” 
(Dumont/Spreitzer, In: Brouard/Costa/König, 2012). During the “upstream” process, technical 
ministries analyse EU documents on their own initiative depending on Luxembourg’s current 
interests. They draft comments on the documents and send their observations to the Permanent 
Representation of Luxembourg in Brussels. In case of diverging opinions between the 
Permanent Representation and the technical ministries, debates take place in the inter-
ministerial committee for European policy (CIPCE). The CIPCE is chaired by the department 
of international economic relations and European affairs and groups ministerial high officials 
concerned with European affairs and Luxembourg’s permanent representative or deputy 
permanent representative. The objective of the CIPCE’s meetings is to coordinate the 
Luxembourgish position on EU matters and to follow-up the implementation of directives on 
the national level. During the “downstream” process, technical ministries analyse the 
consequences of adopted EU directives on the national level. They suggest implementation 
instruments to the Ministry for Foreign and European Affairs. The draft legal implementation 
text is then submitted to the Council of Government. After governmental deliberations on EU 
documents and concomitantly to the deposit of law proposals at the Chamber, the Council of 
State is seized to give its opinion on the European legislative acts or treaties. Professional 
chambers can also become active during this phase, basing their action either on their European 
network or on EU representations to obtain the needed information. After deliberation in the 
Council of Government, based on the opinion of the Council of State, the Parliament receives 
the draft law implementing the directive or European treaty.  
The handling of EU affairs in Luxembourg is, like the general legislative process, 
slowed down by a continuous lack of administrative resources, be it on the ministerial or 
parliamentary side (Dumont/Spreitzer, In: Brouard/Costa/König, 2012). Luxembourg has a 
chronic problem with the implementation of directives. Coalition MPs usually benefit from 
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more information on EU affairs, thanks to the political proximity with the Minister for Foreign 
and European Affairs. The latter is backed by an extensive network of embassies and facilitates 
contacts to the Permanent Representation in Brussels (Interview 16, 2017).  
5.1.3 Conclusions 
 
The presentation of the main actors of the legislative process gave a general overview 
of their competences, roles and relationship between each other. The small size of the country 
and its political system is the most significant factor explaining the proximity between political 
actors and the civil society (Interview 16, 2017; Gaudron, 2004). This proximity is especially 
visible between the Government and the civil society, as well as between Government and 
Parliament through political parties. The latter exert a particular influence on the way 
Parliament participates in the decision-making. Most contacts, be they among national 
institutions or with the civil society, are informal and bilateral. For example, the Council of 
State has almost no direct contact with the Chamber of Deputies, despite its important role as 
veto player and guardian of the constitutionality of laws. Professional chambers maintain 
infrequent and non-institutionalised contact with the Parliament. The lack of coordination 
between institutions may result in divergent positions and confusion in the decision-making 
process. Consensual practices between the Government and the Chamber prevail at every steps 
of the legislative process, but can lead to the undermining of parliament’s power due to a lack 
of conflictual culture. The triangle of institutions influencing decision-making is composed of 
the Government, the Chamber of Deputies and the Council of State. Opinions from other bodies 
(professional chambers, social partners) are usually non-binding. The legislative process in 
Luxembourg tends to be dominated by the executive, which might explain why some matters 
are being granted with more importance than others in parliament. Despite the large pro-
European consensus among political actors in Luxembourg, the handling of EU affairs in 
government and parliament is exposed to the same problems as domestic matters.  
 
5.2 Parliamentary participation rights in EU affairs: current status quo 
 
After having exposed the general institutional framework and the way EU affairs are 
being handled on the national level, this section aims to enter into details about the current 
scrutiny infrastructure and procedures in the Chamber of Deputies with regard to EU affairs. 
The aim of this section is to provide first answers to the hypothesis H2. Indeed, we assume that 
the Chamber’s small size facilitates the scrutiny of EU affairs and thus a larger involvement of 
MPs in these matters. By analysing only the formal capacities in this section, we seek to 
determine to what extent the parliament’s procedures and infrastructures represent opportunities 
or constraints for the mainstreaming of EU affairs among parliamentarians. The Chamber of 
Deputies improved its scrutiny procedure in EU affairs over the last two decades. Since 2009, 
a memorandum between the Parliament and the Government regulates their cooperation on EU 
politics. Scrutiny within the Chamber is document-based, which means that it focuses mainly 
on the examination of EU documents rather than mandating the Government. Decentralisation 
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of EU affairs towards permanent committees permits to involve the whole Parliament, 
depending on the topic on the agenda. Dedicated personnel in the parliamentary administration 
and parliamentary groups support MPs’ EU activities. The data used to outline Parliament’s 
formal capacities are interviews with MPs, civil servants and parliamentary group collaborators, 
as well as parliamentary documents (minutes of committee meetings and plenary sessions) and 
secondary literature. 
 
5.2.1 The legal basis of parliamentary participation in EU affairs 
 
The Luxembourgish Constitution barely evokes EU affairs and the role of the Chamber 
of Deputies (Spreitzer, 2014). The only articles indirectly mentioning European treaties, 
without referring to the Parliament, are article 37 and 49b Constitution, specifying that the 
Grand Duke signs international treaties, which have to be implemented into national law after 
ratification of the parliament. Parliamentary scrutiny of EU affairs thus bases entirely on the 
Chamber’s internal Rules of Procedure. The latter has been amended several times since 2003 
to include European affairs in parliamentary work. A new chapter on “European Affairs” was 
added in 2003 with additional information rights (Poirier, In: Poirier, 2014).  
In 2009, a memorandum on the cooperation between the Chamber of Deputies and the 
government on EU affairs was added to the Rules of Procedure58. The memorandum sets the 
information exchange between Parliament and Government on EU affairs. The Government 
commits itself to inform the Chamber of Deputies on a regular basis and at the earliest possible 
stage on current questions and evolutions on the European level59, as well as on all issues that 
concern directly Luxembourg’s interests. Information can be communicated orally or in written 
form, in which case it takes the form of “explanatory notes” outlining the potential impact of a 
European draft legislative act on Luxembourg. The memorandum foresees that parliamentary 
committees can invite government members to expose their position on specific EU matters, 
notably before meetings in the European Council or the Council of Ministers60. The 
Government should transfer every EU document to the Parliament at the earliest possible stage 
and encourage exchanges and cooperation between European institutions, government 
members and parliamentary committees61. During the information exchange, the memorandum 
specifies that enough time has to be given to the Chamber to transfer its position on EU matters 
to the Government62.  
In the case of the subsidiarity monitoring, the Parliament should inform the Government 
of any initiatives taken in this framework (reasoned opinion). The Chamber can ask the 
Government to provide additional information on the impact of legislative acts on 
 
58 « Aide-mémoire sur la coopération entre la Chambre des Députés et le Gouvernement du Grand-Duché du 
Luxembourg en matière de politique européenne », Appendix 3, RoP (2014). 
59 « Aide-mémoire sur la coopération entre la Chambre des Députés et le Gouvernement du Grand-Duché du 
Luxembourg en matière de politique européenne », Title I§2 and 3. 
60 « Aide-mémoire sur la coopération entre la Chambre des Députés et le Gouvernement du Grand-Duché du 
Luxembourg en matière de politique européenne », Title I§4 and 5. 
61 Ibid., Title I§6 and 7. 
62 Ibid., Title II§1 and 2. 
89 
 
Luxembourgish legislation63. Once per year, the Government should present an annual report 
to the Chamber of Deputies on its European activities as well as on the implementation of EU 
directives in national law64. Finally, the Government and Parliament agreed that the former 
should inform the Chamber about any upcoming intergovernmental conference on EU treaty 
reforms or accession treaties and communicate its position without undue delay65. The 
memorandum constitutes a substantial effort made both by the Government and the Parliament 
to increase the latter’s formal participation rights in EU affairs.  
The entry into force of the Lisbon treaty encouraged new amendments to the Chamber’s 
Rules of Procedure in 2010 to include the procedure on the subsidiarity monitoring. Before the 
amendments made in the course of the last years, the formal information level, consultation and 
participation rights of the Chamber were relatively weak (Poirier, In: Poirier, 2014). However, 
despite these changes, scrutiny procedures in Parliament remain scarcely institutionalised. 
Participation rights in EU affairs have not been specified and depend more on everyday practice 
than on institutionalised written rules (Bossaert, In: Maurer/Wessels, 2001). The unique article 
168 of Chapter 15 named “European Affairs” revised in 2010 mentions the memorandum 
signed between the Parliament and the Government and merely regulates the procedure of 
reasoned opinions in the framework of the subsidiarity monitoring66. The decentralisation of 
EU affairs applies primarily to matters touching upon the subsidiarity principle, because of their 
specificity. Each parliamentary committee can decide to submit a reasoned opinion within the 
four weeks following the transfer of an EU legislative draft falling into their competence. If a 
committee concludes that a draft legislative act violates the subsidiarity principle, a draft 
resolution is submitted to the Parliament during a plenary session and adopted without debate 
(Article 168§5 RoP). The same procedure is applied to political opinions in the framework of 
the political dialogue with the European Commission (Article 168§7 RoP). In case the reasoned 
opinion has not been taken into account, the Chamber can lodge an appeal to the European 
Court of Justice against the draft legislative act (Article 168§6 RoP).  
In terms of formal scrutiny procedures, most current and former parliamentarians agree 
that the Chamber’s EU competences need to be strengthened (Interviews 2, 3 and 14, 2017). 
Evolution potential exists, but reforms remain mostly at the stage of ideas and are not effectively 
implemented (Interview 10, 2017). Amendments to the Rules of Procedure were not very 
frequent and the scope of change remains limited, especially since the Treaty of Lisbon. 
Procedures have not fundamentally changed or transformed the working practices of the 
Chamber in EU affairs (Interview 6, 2017). In March 2009, the Committee on Institutions and 
Constitutional Review examined a draft proposal submitted by the ADR parliamentary group, 
requesting the introduction of a chapter on EU affairs in the national Constitution67. However, 
this initiative was dropped from the parliamentary agenda in November 2009. Apart from minor 
amendments to the Rules of Procedure in 2010, the establishment of the European Semester in 
 
63 Ibid., Title III§2 and 3. 
64 Ibid., Title IV. 
65 Ibid., Title V. 
66 Article 168 RoP (2014), Paragraphs 5, 6 and 7. 
67 A-CHD-P-2009-IR-10 ; 18.03.2009, « Projet de proposition de révision de la Constitution visant à introduire 
un Chapitre XII De l’Union Européenne ». 
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2014 represented the last episode of reflexion in Parliament about reforms of the internal Rules 
of Procedure (Interview 6, 2017).  
 
5.2.2 Parliamentary administration and EU affairs: composition and tasks 
 
The Chamber of Deputies attributed more and more competences and personnel to its 
administration to deal with EU politics. The European Unit “Cellule Européenne” was created 
in 2006 within the International Relations Department as part of the Chamber’s “European 
strategy”. The International Relations Department is composed of nine to ten civil servants, six 
of which belong to the “Cellule Européenne” (Interview 1, 2017). However, in practice, only 
three staff deal regularly with EU affairs. Due to the small size of the structures dealing with 
EU affairs, civil servants tend to have generalist profiles and their expertise is thus limited 
(Spreitzer, In: Hefftler/Neuhold/Rozenberg/Smith, 2015; Interview 1, 2017). Interviewees from 
the European Unit all have a study background close to their current functions. They studied 
either International Relations, Political Science or Law. The low number of personnel in the 
administrative structures forced them to move from one position to the other, sometimes 
occupying positions with no link to their current or former ones. While one civil servant had a 
long-lasting career in several administrative departments without direct link to EU affairs, 
switching from the department managing the plenary sessions to the International Relations 
Department, most had experiences in structures dealing more or less with EU politics. Some 
worked in the Secretariat of the Committee on Foreign and European Affairs, Defence, 
Cooperation and Migration (EAC), others worked for the COSAC secretariat, the Parliament’s 
representation in Brussels and the Benelux parliament. Prior to their position in parliament, 
some civil servants also exerted functions in International Organisations or trade union 
representations in Brussels. In general, the staff from the European Unit has extensive 
professional experience and a long-term interest in European matters. Their diversified 
experience within the parliamentary administration provided them with a generalist profile and 
a deeper knowledge of the Chamber’s functioning. Their flexibility is thus also a factor 
explaining the absence of specialisation. With regard to EU affairs, civil servants can benefit 
from trainings if their technical knowledge needs to be improved (Interview 1, 2017). 
The European Unit’s main task consists in selecting and classifying incoming EU 
documents to redistribute them to parliamentary committees. The European Commission 
transfers directly all EU documents (legislative proposals, Green and White books) to the 
European Unit of the Chamber through an email address common to its staff. In the Chamber 
of Deputies, the selection is made through a programme. In 2008, the parliamentary 
administration developed its IT programme to optimise the management of EU documents and 
their selection. The system is still in continuous evolution. The establishment of tables grouping 
all incoming EU documents first started on paper when the European Commission decided to 
fine Member States for their delays in the implementation of EU directives (Interview 1, 2017). 
Changes in the selection system happened also after 2006 in the framework of the Chamber’s 
“European Strategy” and accelerated with the Treaty of Lisbon and the attached protocols on 
national parliaments. The first established procedure consisted in sending letters to the 
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Government six months before the implementation deadline, to draw the attention on the need 
to submit a draft implementation law. The IT programme was created to ensure a follow-up of 
these matters. The programme facilitates the classification of EU documents according to their 
type and level of emergency. It contains information on the uploaded documents, the follow-up 
of the transfer process, the analyses made by the committees, the guests invited in committees 
and finally the follow-up of implementations. A person in the European Unit is responsible for 
the management of the table and the programme. EU documents are classified into A and B 
documents depending on their significance for the parliament or Luxembourg.  
The table in electronic format is updated and uploaded every week on the Parliament’s 
website. “A” documents are those without special political, economic, financial or legislative 
importance, such as documents transferred in the framework of the subsidiarity control and the 
political dialogue (Interview 13, 2017). “B” documents are those relevant for Luxembourg and 
necessitating further examination. Only B documents are considered for the elaboration of 
reasoned opinions in the framework of the subsidiarity monitoring. The European Unit also 
makes suggestions on which parliamentary committee might be concerned with the EU 
documents. Once the selection is established, the table is transferred to the EAC, which can 
rearrange it according to its own political interests. Every Monday morning, the EAC amends 
and adopts the table during its meeting. The civil servant responsible for the secretariat of the 
EAC is responsible for the transfer of the table to the committee. The secretary participates in 
the meetings of the EAC and informs the rest of the International Relations Department about 
the committee’s opinion on the table (Interview 1, 2017). Once the table is adopted, the civil 
servants from the European Unit send appeal letters (“lettres de renvoi”) to each sectoral 
committee, signed by the President of the Chamber. Once the committee receives the letter, it 
is free to analyse the matter or not. It might then happen that documents classified as A 
documents are perceived as politically more significant for MPs.  
The transversality of EU matters renders the classification of documents and the 
attribution of competences difficult. Indeed, for a same issue, several parliamentary committees 
might be concerned. The final decision thus belongs to MPs, who can change the suggestions 
in the table. Sometimes, a sectoral committee can also decide to transfer the received EU 
document to another committee, if it considers that the matter does not fit its competences. The 
staff from the European Unit also supports the work of sectoral committees when EU issues fall 
into their competences by providing them with summaries. The support of the European Unit 
is particularly needed in the framework of the subsidiarity monitoring, when sectoral 
committees handle matters falling in their respective competences. One civil servant in the 
European Unit is also IPEX correspondent and member of the IPEX board. The IPEX 
correspondent is responsible for the upload of opinions adopted by the whole chamber on the 
IPEX website. Any information on the intention of a parliamentary committee to issue a 
reasoned opinion is also submitted on the IPEX website, so that national parliaments get 
informed about the Chamber’s intention and can coordinate their actions (Interview 1, 2017).  
In the framework of their daily tasks, staff from the European Unit and the parliamentary 
administration in general have very few contacts to the staff from ministries. Eventual contacts 
happen via exchanges of email if information is needed on a dossier, but no common meetings 
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are scheduled (Interview 1, 2017). The same applies to professional chambers, where no direct 
contact exists. At some point, the European Unit was sending the tables with EU documents to 
the professional chambers, but stopped it when they started to be published on the Parliament’s 
website. However, in case a parliamentary committee issued a reasoned opinion, the European 
Unit transfers it via email to the professional chambers. Moreover, whenever a professional 
chamber wishes to submit an opinion to the Chamber, it passes directly through the committees 
and not the parliamentary administration (Interview 1, 2017). 
Other tasks of the European Unit consist in preparing delegation trips to 
interparliamentary conferences. While the logistics of such delegations are organised by the 
Service of Protocol, the political preparation remains in the hands of the International Relations 
Department. Civil servants prepare files for MPs containing briefings, notes and press articles. 
Each staff from the European Unit follows several delegations due to the small size of the 
structure and the lack of personnel (Interview 5, 2017). On the European level, the Chamber 
established a temporary representation in Brussels in 2004 in the framework of Luxembourg’s 
EU Presidency. The position became permanent in 2006 when several other national 
parliaments decided to create such a function. As an intermediary between the Chamber and 
European institutions, the parliamentary representative in Brussels participates in the European 
Parliament’s committee meetings depending on the topics on the agenda and their salience for 
Luxembourg. Every three or four weeks, the representative sends a Brussels report (“Bulletin 
de Bruxelles”) to the parliamentary administration, MPs and group collaborators in charge of 
EU affairs, summing up the current issues on the European level. On an everyday basis, the 
representative is constantly in touch with the civil servants from the European Unit and follows 
the work of the EAC and other sectoral committees. The parliamentary representative maintains 
also close contacts to representations from other national parliaments. This is facilitated by the 
fact that all offices of the parliamentary representations are situated within the premises of the 
European Parliament. Every Monday, institutionalised meetings called “Monday Morning 
Meetings” are scheduled between parliamentary representatives to exchange on current topics 
and coordinate their position. 
 
5.2.3 Parliamentary group staff: composition and tasks 
 
Apart from the International Relations Department, parliamentary groups also provide 
administrative support to MPs’ parliamentary work with regard to EU affairs. In the Chamber 
of Deputies, administrative support is not attributed to individual MPs in the form of personal 
assistants. Instead, each parliamentary group or leaning possesses pools of group collaborators. 
Staff fluctuation in parliamentary groups is relatively high (Interview 16, 2017). Collaborators 
do not stay long and use their temporary position as a springboard for other employment 
opportunities, be it in legal affairs or politics. The constant renewal of staff also means that they 
cannot acquire a thorough knowledge and specialisation on specific issues. The parliament 
allocates a certain budget to parliamentary groups according to their size. They decide about 
the distribution of tasks among the collaborators. Within the biggest parliamentary groups such 
as the CSV or LSAP, budget is allocated to a collaborator responsible for EU affairs. The small 
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size of opposition parties does not allow them to engage a person specifically focused on these 
matters. The ADR and the Greens do not have enough personnel resources to assign such 
functions to their collaborators. EU affairs are mainly handled by the collaborators in charge of 
EU affairs, but are also redistributed to other group collaborators in case the matters fall into 
their field of competences. All MPs from the same parliamentary group benefit from the 
technical competences of collaborators. Each parliamentary group designates an EU speaker 
among the MPs, who is the main interlocutor of collaborators in charge of EU affairs. Sectoral 
committee members can also request information at any time, for example during parliamentary 
group meetings. Group collaborators working on EU dossiers tend to have professional and 
personal experiences linked to EU affairs. For example, one collaborator was journalist in a 
national newspaper prior to the position in the parliamentary group. The tasks as journalist 
already consisted in writing on foreign and European affairs (Interview 16, 2017). Another 
collaborator studied European studies and did an internship as Blue Book trainee at the General 
Secretariat of the European Commission (Interview 13, 2017).  
Each collaborator is assigned to follow the work of one or several parliamentary 
committees depending on the topics they deal with. Collaborators dealing with EU affairs 
examine matters that touch upon the EAC’s competences. They receive the EU bulletins sent 
by the parliamentary representative in Brussels, as well as the tables containing the EU 
documents from the parliamentary administration. Collaborators support MPs with research 
tasks on law proposals and get the necessary information for the elaboration of discourses. MPs 
from sectoral committees can also ask EU group collaborators for advice, for example on the 
role or impact of EU issues on their policies. Collaborators can make summaries or analyses of 
current topical debates on the European level or of European draft legislative acts from the 
European Commission and the European Parliament. They provide also observations on the 
political news in other countries. EU group collaborators are also responsible to organise press 
conferences on European politics. The preparation of such press conferences led by MPs implies 
to anticipate questions and answers, which makes communication one of their essential tasks. 
Collaborators in charge of EU affairs do not participate frequently in interparliamentary 
conferences, leaving this task to MPs and civil servants from the International Relations 
Department. 
The crosscutting nature of EU issues and their generalist profile forces group 
collaborators in charge of EU politics to coordinate with their colleagues from the same 
parliamentary group to obtain specialised information on policy fields impacted by the 
European level. The role of EU group collaborators is thus to draw their colleagues’ attention 
on EU dossiers that might affect their policy field and be of importance for Luxembourg and 
the party (Interview 16, 2017). Due to the small number of staff and the fact that EU affairs 
concern multiple domestic policies, collaborators do not have time to enter into details. They 
need to make a selection of the topics that they will examine according to their political 
significance. Whenever they find a topic of interest for the party, collaborators can suggest it to 
the MP endorsing the role of EU affairs Speaker in the group. The topics can then be discussed 
in a working group dedicated to EU affairs with other party members, ministers from the same 
party or experts from ministries. Exchanges are also quite frequent with MEPs’ collaborators. 
Their office within the parliamentary group ensures proximity to and a constant dialogue with 
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MEPs. Due to the limited administrative resources on the national level, MPs from the biggest 
parties benefitting from a presence on the European level take advantage of their MEPs’ 
resources to obtain information.  
Access to European information also depends on each collaborator’s personal network, 
as well as the position of the party in the national political landscape. Collaborators from a 
parliamentary group belonging to the majority tend to have an easier access to information and 
privileged contact to ministers from the governmental coalition (Interview 13, 2017). 
Exchanges with civil servants from ministerial departments tend to be facilitated. Collaborators 
in the CSV parliamentary group, even though currently in the opposition, benefit additionally 
from privileged contacts with the President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, 
and his administrative and political resources. The President of the European Commission kept 
his membership in the CSV party in Luxembourg and still participated in meetings within the 
parliamentary group (Interview 16, 2017). The CSV collaborator in charge of EU affairs even 
has personal and informal contacts with Juncker and his cabinet in the European Commission. 
This relationship facilitates early and privileged ex-ante information exchange on EU issues. 
The collaborator also maintains direct contact with other European Commissioners. Within 
Parliament, contacts between collaborators from different parliamentary groups are however 
non-existent. The International Relations Department within the parliamentary administration 
is the main interlocutor of group collaborators in charge of EU dossiers, whether they need 
informal or official information. However, meetings between them are infrequent. Only if the 
EAC Chair, who belongs to the LSAP parliamentary group, decides to organise a work meeting 
with the committee staff will there be an opportunity for the collaborator belonging to the same 
parliamentary group as the Chair to participate in the meeting (Interview 13, 2017). 
Collaborators from other parliamentary groups are not allowed to join.  
On top of the administrative support, MPs also benefit from a discussion format within 
their party that enables exchanges on EU topics. The contact between MPs and MEPs from the 
same party is more frequent within the parliamentary group than within Parliament. 
Collaboration serves to establish coordinated and common positions on EU policies. Within 
each group, MPs and MEPs meet every week to discuss their work and to find consensual 
positions. Exchanges of views happen in a different format outside of parliament. The objective 
of these regular meetings is to achieve internal cohesion and seek coordination on dossiers, with 
the presence of group collaborators. Discussions can focus on the preparation of reports or 
dossiers in the framework of parliamentary committee meetings, which are then discussed by 
all MPs from the group. Common meetings enable the gathering of opinions and individual 
expertise and obtain diversified views on similar topics. Priorities might be different between 
MPs and MEPs and these common meetings internal to parliamentary groups allow raising 
awareness, from one or the other side, on issues that were not perceived as relevant at first sight. 
Coordination is also sought on the European level, where MPs from same political families 
meet in European party congresses, pre-summit meetings (before European Council summits) 
or meetings of the Bureau of political groups to elaborate consensual positions and exchange 
views (Interview 16, 2017). During pre-summit meetings, political groups meet informally to 
discuss negotiation guidelines and define common positions. Exchanges between political 
families are not formalised and take mostly the form of networks assembling different 
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horizontal and vertical political levels (local/national/European; parliamentary and party level). 
Participation in these formats enables an early-stage involvement of MPs in the European 
decision-making process and a privileged access to information. Smaller parliamentary groups 
on the national level, such as the ADR or Déi Lénk in the opposition, do not have access to such 
information to the same extent because of their absence from the European political sphere. 
However, MPs from these parliamentary groups still participate in common meetings on the 
European level with their counterparts from other countries.  
Each parliamentary group decides if it wishes to establish working groups. EU working 
groups are arenas of dialogue that are not proper to parliamentary groups. For example, the 
LSAP working group “European questions” (“Questions Européennes”) aims to inform on and 
raise awareness about EU affairs among citizens and politicians and increase the European 
dimension of the party (Interview 13, 2017). Working groups are party structures, even though 
the group collaborator in charge of EU affairs in parliament manages them. As party structures, 
they are not only open to MPs, but also to all party members. This means that ministers, as well 
as MEPs, are invited to participate in these meetings. In the LSAP EU working group, the co-
responsible is an MEP (Interview 13, 2017). The frequency of EU working group meetings 
depends on the topics on the political agenda, but base on different priorities put on the EAC’s 
agenda (Interview 13, 2017). The working group discusses political position papers and focuses 
on current issues, while the EAC discusses legislative matters based on official EU documents. 
Thus, topics of EU working group meetings can be wider than those of the EAC and more 
oriented towards the European level. After working group meetings, protocols are established, 
which become the party’s official position on the examined matter.  
 
5.2.4 Parliamentary committees and EU affairs 
 
Scrutiny of EU affairs within the Chamber of Deputies is decentralised. The main 
committee dealing with European issues is the Committee on Foreign and European Affairs, 
Defence, Cooperation and Migration (EAC). Its predecessor, the Committee on Foreign and 
Community Affairs, was established in 1989. Its scope of competences was extended in 2000 
to Defence and in 2004 to Cooperation and Immigration (Spreitzer, In: 
Hefftler/Neuhold/Rozenberg/Smith, 2015). The particularity of the EAC is its transversal 
competences, which are not only centred on EU affairs, but also on four additional policy fields 
(foreign affairs, defence, cooperation and migration). The large scope of competences permits 
to follow a larger agenda, including various diplomatic issues.  
Reflexions on the establishment of a permanent European Affairs Committee (EAC) 
animated numerous debates68 among MPs over the past years, without results. A permanent 
committee was seen as an opportunity to specialise in EU issues, which may have facilitated 
parliamentary work in a context of increasing complexity of EU dossiers (Interview 6, 15, 17, 
 
68 See « Note relative à l’analyse des documents européens », Isabelle Barra, 03.11.2003 ; 13.02.2003, 31st 
plenary session, TOP 2 « Débat d’orientation relatif à la Convention sur l’avenir de l’Europe » ; Meeting of the 
CFEADCM, A-CHD-P-2007-O-AEDCI-52; 02.07.2007. 
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2017). The debate about a permanent EAC was closely linked to the nature itself of the 
Chamber’s scrutiny system and whether it should be decentralised or centralised. The CSV 
parliamentary group was especially supportive of this idea once the party lost the legislative 
elections in 2013, but even during the legislative periods where it was part of the governmental 
coalition, no substantial changes happened in this direction. Several MPs expressed their doubts 
about the necessity of such a committee. Backed by the government, some argued that a 
permanent EAC would increase the institutional complexity of parliamentary structures 
(Interview 10, 2017). Some others pointed out that EU affairs become more and more complex 
and transcend all political fields, hence the need to distribute them to competent committees 
instead of centralising them in an EAC (Interview 11, 2017).  
The current scrutiny infrastructure allows all parliamentary committees to engage in EU 
affairs. Sectoral committees receive all EU matters falling in their field of competences, once 
the European Unit selected the documents with the EAC’s approval. Every committee can 
organise hearings and submit opinions. Each sectoral committee fixes its own procedures for 
the examination of EU dossiers, which increases the heterogeneity of scrutiny procedures within 
the Chamber. The EAC redistributes EU documents to sectoral committees and can submit 
opinions on EU matters after deliberation. MPs that participated in interparliamentary 
conferences, be it in the European parliament or with other national parliaments such as 
COSAC, report to the EAC or to the sectoral committee depending on the topic. The civil 
servant from the International Relations Department that accompanied the delegation can draft 
reports. 
Sectoral committees are responsible to draft reasoned opinions in the framework of the 
subsidiarity monitoring. The secretariat of the concerned committee drafts the opinion, which 
is adopted during a committee meeting and transferred to the plenary, where the Chamber of 
Deputies officially adopts it without debate. The reasoned opinion then becomes a 
parliamentary resolution that needs to be accepted by the majority of MPs. Then, it is sent 
directly to the European institutions. If EU matters fall into the competences of several 
committees, joint committee meetings can be established, chaired by the respective committee 
Chairs (Interview 17, 20, 2017). However, joint committee meetings are rather rare. In general, 
cooperation between parliamentary committees is not systematic. Apart from the infrequent 
joint committee meetings, committees do not collaborate between them. Committee meetings 
are not public, but committee reports are published and accessible on the Chamber’s website69. 
Group collaborators cannot participate in committee meetings. However, MEPs are 
systematically invited in every EAC meeting (Interview 2, 4, 2017). Due to their geographical 
closeness to Luxembourg, MEPs are usually able to participate in the Monday morning 
meetings of the EAC. MEPs also have the possibility to participate in meetings of other 
parliamentary committees if the topic on the agenda is linked to EU issues. Once per month, a 
special meeting called “reports of MEPs” can be organised within the EAC, where the priority 
is given to MEPs’ news reports from Brussels. European Commissioners are also invited in the 
 
69 Reports can be found for each committee under the following link : 
http://www.chd.lu/wps/portal/public/Accueil/TravailALaChambre/Commissions/TravauxEnCommission (last 
accessed 01.02.2018). 
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EAC. Representatives from Eurojust and Europol can come to the Constitutional Affairs 
Committee. 
  
5.2.5 Cooperation between Parliament and Government on EU affairs 
 
The Chamber of Deputies bases the scrutiny of EU affairs mainly on the examination of 
EU documents, which makes it highly dependent on information received from the 
Government. Before the establishment of the political dialogue by the European Commission, 
which initiated a direct exchange of documents with national parliaments, the Luxembourg 
Chamber scarcely received any information from the Government (Spreitzer, 2014). 
Discussions on the structuration of the collaboration between Government and Parliament in 
EU affairs were already led in the mid-nineties in the Chamber (Bossaert, In: Maurer/Wessels, 
2001). At that time, MPs criticised the lack of transparency and asymmetries of information 
that limited Parliament’s effective participation rights. However, procedural changes were 
implemented only in 2009, with the signature of a memorandum between the Parliament and 
the Government on EU affairs. In practice, government members are invited in committees and 
plenary sessions to expose their positions. According to the memorandum, they are supposed 
to transfer their position on an EU matter at the earliest possible stage and to report orally before 
and after Council meetings on request of the Parliament or one of its committees (Spreitzer, 
2014). The interaction with the executive depends on the topic on the agenda of the respective 
committees, as the latter correspond more or less to ministries’ competences. Cooperation 
between the EAC and the Ministry for Foreign and European Affairs is perceived as satisfying 
(Interview 2, 2017). However, ministers and especially the Minister for Foreign and European 
Affairs do not come to sectoral committees to discuss EU affairs. The presence of a minister in 
a parliamentary committee to debate on EU issues depends on his/her willingness to do so 
(Interview 17, 2017).  
In general, the information received from the Government on EU politics is perceived 
as satisfying by most MPs (Interview 2, 6, 11, 2017). The access to information is made easier 
in Luxembourg due to the small size of the country and the proximity, be it geographical and 
in terms of relations, between the Government and the Chamber of Deputies. In Luxembourg, 
interpersonal and informal contacts between political actors prevail during the decision-making 
process. The political sphere is a microcosm where everybody knows each other. Most 
decisions are taken outside of the Parliament’s arena during informal dialogues, which might 
either facilitate information gathering or hinder it for those who do not maintain extensive 
informal contacts with other actors. In general, the quality and the management of the 
information received depends on the position of the party in Parliament. Indeed, majority parties 
can get more diversified information compared to opposition parties. The main problem for the 
latter is not the lack of information, but rather the information overflow, which renders a 
selection difficult. The Government treats opposition parties the same way in terms of 
information exchange, but limits exist on the side of the ministerial departments’ willingness to 
share their knowledge with opposition parties (Interview 11, 2017). According to interviewees 
currently in the opposition, interactions between the Government and Parliament have room for 
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improvements, especially regarding the transparency of information and the frequency of 
contacts with ministers (Interview 14, 17, 20, 2017). Cooperation on the European level with 
bodies linked to the national executive, such as the Permanent Representation of Luxembourg 
or the COREPER, are still seen as insufficient according to former opposition MPs (Interview 
14, 2017). While majority MPs can contact directly their respective ministers, civil servants in 
the ministerial departments or representatives in Brussels (Interview 4, 2017), opposition MPs 
face reluctance from these same actors and request more exchanges (Interview 6, 2017). The 
difficult access to governmental information for opposition parties makes it more difficult for 
them to anticipate and prepare positions. While official information is distributed among all 
parliamentary groups, informal documents are kept either secret or only accessible for majority 
parties. For example, notes written by diplomats and ministers are not public and available for 
opposition parties. 
Even though anchored in the memorandum on the cooperation between Government 
and Parliament on EU affairs, ex-ante discussions in Parliament on EU dossiers with the 
presence of ministers are not institutionalised (Interview 14, 2017). The Minister for Foreign 
and European Affairs comes regularly to the meetings of the EAC, but usually after European 
Council meetings. Ex-ante discussions are rare and remain at the stage of consultations or 
information rounds, where the committee cannot issue a position or opinion that might impose 
a negotiation guideline to the minister. In general, the Chamber cannot give binding mandates 
to the Government before meetings of the European Council or the Council of ministers. The 
absence of binding mandates gives the Government more freedom in terms of selection of 
information destined for the Parliament. Indeed, according to civil servants from the 
parliamentary administration, information might be lacking because the Government refuses to 
share internal documents exposing its position on specific issues (Interview 1, 2017). The 
Parliament can give its position on EU matters, but the Government “[…] is not obliged to take 
it into account” (Bossaert, In: Maurer/Wessels, 2001, p. 304). By keeping governmental 
positions secret, ministers ensure their negotiation power on the European level during Council 
meetings, and tend to report ex-post to the Parliament. Usually, the Minister for Foreign Affairs 
dominates discussions on EU affairs within Parliament. The Chamber tries to diversify its 
instruments and contacts with EU institutions to counteract the Government’s reluctance to 
share information and reinforce its scrutiny powers. Interpellations represent for example 
individual tools to control the Government’s EU policy and can be submitted just before 
Council meetings.  
 
5.2.6 Discussion 
 
This section outlined the main characteristics of the Chamber’s scrutiny system 
regarding EU affairs and the interactions between MPs, their parliamentary group, the 
parliamentary administration and the Government. The descriptive elements of the past 
paragraphs will enable to determine if conditions are met within Parliament for a mainstreaming 
of EU affairs. We assume that the Chamber’s small size might constitute a significant criterion 
facilitating the general redistribution of EU matters among a high number of MPs. The 
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decentralisation of EU scrutiny within the Chamber, even though not formally institutionalised, 
allocates more EU competences to sectoral committees. Decentralisation also applies within 
most parliamentary groups, where EU dossiers are redistributed among collaborators according 
to their domain of competences. Collaborators responsible for EU affairs within bigger 
parliamentary groups cooperate frequently with their colleague. The crosscutting nature of EU 
dossiers as well as the small size of parliamentary groups obliges collaborators and MPs to 
remain generalists. Specialised committees decide autonomously on the subsidiarity monitoring 
procedure, i.e. the submission of reasoned opinions and the relevance of a European legislation 
for Luxembourg.  
In practice, however, the redistribution of EU matters among committees is unbalanced. 
Some are more involved than others depending on their field of competences. Most B 
documents selected by the European Unit are transferred to the EAC, followed by the 
Committee for Economic Affairs and the Finance and Budget Committee. The least active 
committees in EU affairs are the Housing Committee, the Committee for Institutions and 
Constitutional Revision, the Committee for the Control of Budgetary Implementation, the 
Justice Committee and the Committee on National Education, Childhood and Youth (Interview 
3, 11, 2017). Even the EAC is perceived as exerting a weak influence on EU politics (Interview 
8, 2017). Sectoral committees are still lagging behind when it comes to handling EU affairs. 
Peaks of activity depend on EU documents transferred in the framework of the subsidiarity 
monitoring. The salience of topics determines the extent to which committees decide to get 
involved in EU affairs (Interview 2, 2017). Once committees submitted their reasoned opinion, 
their EU involvement decreases again (Interview 17, 2017).  
In general, the use of the subsidiarity monitoring instrument is not considered satisfying 
(Interview 3, 6, 2017). The main reason lies in the constraints in terms of time and expertise 
requested for the EU documents to be examined. Sectoral committees are not sufficiently 
equipped with resources to deal with the overwhelming quantity of documents and information. 
Despite improvements in the Chamber’s and parliamentary groups’ resource allocation, 
scrutiny infrastructure and information policy, the handling of EU affairs still requires more 
specialised personnel on the political and administrative levels. MPs are generally satisfied with 
the parliamentary administration’s support (Interview 10, 15, 17, 2017), but admit that 
resources are not sufficient, be it from the perspective of parliamentary groups, opposition 
parties or the Parliament as a whole (Interview 2, 3, 7, 10, 11, 15, 20, 2017). MPs would 
welcome additional structural and procedural reforms. The parliamentary administration needs 
legal experts with analytical tasks. Indeed, most civil servants exert rather logistical than 
analytical functions. 
The absence of harmonisation of scrutiny procedures regarding EU affairs within 
sectoral committees also contributes to unbalanced involvement levels. Already in 2007, a CSV 
MP regretted that some permanent committees had still no fixed procedure to examine EU 
dossiers70. The absence of procedure also concerns exchanges with MEPs. Sectoral committees 
 
70 On the 29th January 2007, discussions were led during a meeting of the CFEADCM on the evaluation of the 
Chamber’s working methods in EU affairs (A-CHD-P-2007-O-AEDCI-21; 29.01.2007) 
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are not used to invite MEPs in their respective meetings and ignore developments on the 
European level that could potentially be relevant for their own work (Interview 4, 2017). 
Sometimes, initiatives to participate in committee meetings emanate from MEPs themselves, 
but this remains an exception. Most sectoral committees still lack information on activities in 
Brussels and ignore salient issues or the agendas of MEPs. Even joint committee meetings with 
the EAC remain infrequent and closely dependent on the topic on the agenda (Interview 20, 
2017). Regular exchanges within parliamentary groups might not be sufficient to discuss all the 
issues with MEPs, due to their tight schedule and MPs’ lack of awareness about topics that 
could raise problems. 
All things considered, when observing the legal basis and formal capacities of the 
Chamber of Deputies, mainstreaming trends are nuanced. The Chamber has made efforts to 
encourage decentralisation and the involvement of multiple actors within the parliamentary 
arena. Committees split the examination of EU documents among them and decide about their 
own scrutiny procedure.  However, the legislature’s small size might be an explanation of its 
low influence on the national and European level. The executive in Luxembourg holds a 
dominant position within the legislative process. Unbalanced information exchange between 
Parliament and Government provides the latter with more negotiation power on the EU level. 
The scrutiny procedure is restrictively institutionalised, which gives leeway of interpretation to 
both MPs and government members when it comes to examine and report on EU affairs. The 
majority in parliament uses this lever of action to limit any change that might tie the hands of 
the Government during negotiations in the European Council or Council of ministers. Both the 
limited information from the Government, the absence of binding mandates and the influence 
of the parliamentary majority on the handling of some EU issues might discourage generalised 
involvement within the Chamber. Moreover, some sectoral committees still seem to 
underestimate the significance of EU affairs for their own work, either because their field of 
competence is not directly affected by EU politics, or because their priority lies foremost in 
domestic issues that might be more rewarding from an electoral perspective. To encourage 
involvement in EU affairs, the current EAC Chair expressed the wish that committee secretaries 
and chairs should be assigned to follow the agenda of Council meetings in Brussels (Interview 
4, 2017). Even though the formal conditions for mainstreaming of EU affairs are given, 
parliamentary practices show a different picture. Therefore, next section focuses on effective 
parliamentary activity in EU affairs and the factors influencing MPs’ involvement. 
 
5.3 EU affairs in parliamentary work: opportunities and constraints 
 
The third part of this chapter deals specifically with the effective involvement of MPs 
in EU affairs and the factors influencing their parliamentary work. We will identify the 
opportunities and constraints encouraging or limiting parliamentary EU activity. The aim is to 
test several sub-hypotheses that might help explaining trends in parliamentary involvement 
during EU and intergovernmental treaty negotiations. To do so, we will rely on interviews and 
parliamentary statistics. The first section will outline the general socio-demographic 
characteristics of the Chamber of Deputies. We assume that one motivational factor may 
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primarily determine effective parliamentary involvement in EU affairs: the extent to which 
MPs’ profiles are “Europeanised”. Independently from their political ideas on the European 
integration process (pro-European vs Eurosceptic), a “Europeanised” MP would have 
professional and personal experience linked to EU affairs prior to the parliamentary mandate, a 
deep interest for EU politics, an active engagement in European interparliamentary delegations 
and hold a position within Parliament encouraging active involvement in EU affairs71. These 
assumptions aim to test sub-hypothesis H2.1. The second section will focus on MPs’ actual 
level of involvement in EU affairs. Depending on their profile and their institutional framework 
outlined in the previous part, we will try to explain how these factors might influence MPs’ 
parliamentary activities. This section will test the effective mainstreaming trend within 
Parliament by checking if trends observed in the previous part (5.2) are also reflected in MPs’ 
work. Thus, the second section aims to complete the arguments already made on hypothesis 
H2. The Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change will help to understand how MPs make 
use of their parliamentary environment depending on their political position and interests. 
Through the motivational approach, we seek to explain how MPs’ profile forged their 
motivations to engage in EU politics.  
 
5.3.1 General socio-demographic characteristics of the Chamber of Deputies 
 
Apart from formal procedures and structures regulating the scrutiny of EU affairs, 
sociological factors and individual motivations also determine to what extent MPs include EU 
affairs in their everyday working practices. This section analyses the opportunities and 
constraints on parliamentary involvement in EU affairs. Motivational factors such as MPs’ 
political and personal experience, as well as their functions within Parliament, will help 
identifying the causes of their (non) involvement in EU affairs. 
 
5.3.1.1 Composition of the Chamber of Deputies: MPs’ profiles 
 
The analysis of the Chamber’s composition shows that most MPs exerted mandates 
already in the previous legislative periods. 45% held the MP position for three or more 
legislative periods, while 23% of MPs exerted two mandates. For 32% of MPs, their current 
mandate is their first one. Some MPs from the smallest parties are even forced to rotate in the 
middle of their mandate72.The graph below illustrates these trends. 
 
71 Such as member of the CFEADCM, EU speaker or president of a parliamentary group, committee Chair, etc.  
72 This applies to mandates within the parliamentary group Déi Lénk, which is composed of only two MPs. 
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Figure 5: Number of exerted parliamentary mandates per MP (in %), Chamber of 
Deputies, 2013-2018 
Source: Own calculation, 
http://www.chd.lu/wps/portal/public/Accueil/OrganisationEtFonctionnement/Organisation/Deputes/DeputesEnF
onction [last accessed 24.05.2019] 
Long-lasting mandates signify that MPs are used to working practices and procedures 
within Parliament. They might be more familiar with the parliamentary culture than newly 
elected MPs. Some of them even held positions in the Government, either prior to their first 
mandate, or between parliamentary mandates, switching from Parliament to Government and 
inversely. These MPs have a double experience of governmental and parliamentary work. 
Whenever they return to Parliament, they tend to take their ministerial practices and privileged 
contacts with them. As we outlined in section 6.1.1, the fact that almost 22% of MPs were 
Government members can be explained by the function of the Chamber as a springboard to 
ministerial positions. Once an MP leaves Government, return to parliamentary functions might 
be facilitated and considered as temporal until the next nomination in the executive. In that case, 
they might use the Parliament as an arena for political profiling until they are nominated again 
in the Government. 
Figure 6: Number of MPs with an experience in the executive (in total), Chamber of 
Deputies, 2013-2018 
Source: Own calculation, 
http://www.chd.lu/wps/portal/public/Accueil/OrganisationEtFonctionnement/Organisation/Deputes/DeputesEnF
onction (last accessed 05.07.2019) 
This extensive political experience might provide them with knowledge advantages on 
the mechanisms of parliamentary work. As a small parliament composed of sixty MPs, several 
factors linked to the Chamber’s small size represent also constraints for parliamentary 
involvement in EU affairs. A small legislature implies a higher workload. The latter is 
reinforced by the lack of personnel, overlapping political mandates and multiple committee 
memberships. The lack of structural resources has already been addressed in the previous part 
32%
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(5.2). Overlapping political mandates mean that MPs can exert parallel mandates to their 
parliamentary one, be it on the local, national or European level. In the Chamber of Deputies, 
only fifteen percent of MPs do not hold any local position additionally to their MP functions. 
Mandates in the Chamber of Deputies are part-time, which means that the rest of the time, MPs 
focus either on their parallel mandates, or they continue to exert their profession, unless their 
prior functions belonged to the ones incompatible with a mandate in Parliament (Article 54 
Constitution). Parallel functions thus reduce MPs’ flexibility. The graph below (figure 7) shows 
the proportion and type of local and European functions exerted parallel to the MP position in 
the Chamber of Deputies. 
Figure 7: Distribution of representative functions among MPs (in %), Chamber of 
Deputies, 2013-2018 
Sources: Own calculations, 
http://www.chd.lu/wps/portal/public/Accueil/OrganisationEtFonctionnement/Organisation/Deputes/DeputesEnF
onction (last accessed 05.07.2019) 
Among the sixty members of the Chamber, 35% exert another political mandate on the 
local level, be it as municipal councillor, alderman or mayor. Overlapping mandates are very 
common in Luxembourg and limit the time of MPs in Parliament. 3% of MPs also hold a 
position in a local political party. The local level remains an important element of MPs’ political 
careers. Most MPs started their political career in local constituencies or local branches of their 
political party before being elected in Parliament. However, ties to local parties does not seem 
to be very determinant to enter the Chamber of Deputies, probably because of the geographical 
proximity of the local and national levels. MPs do not have to pass through local political parties 
before legislative elections, contrary to Austria. Moreover, the electoral system in Luxembourg 
places individual candidates at the frontstage, which implies that re-election depends on MPs’ 
popularity and personal profiling strategies (Interview 3, 2017). Hence, the priority given 
mostly to domestic issues and work in their respective constituencies, with some exceptions. 
On the national level, 41% are member of unions73. As explained earlier (section 6.1.1), the 
proximity between MPs and unions originates mainly from the close ties between national 
 
73 Apart from the Union of Towns and Cities, national unions are understood here as professional chambers, 
syndicates, political associations, networks, federations, academies, think tanks, Non-Governmental Organisations 
etc). 
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parties and affiliated trade unions, illustrating the consociational and corporatist nature of the 
Luxembourgish political system. Trade unions are especially close to LSAP and CSV and thus 
represented in Parliament through affiliated MPs. 6% are member of a European association, 
network or the Committee of the Regions. Several functions are exerted sometimes 
simultaneously.  
Debates took place repeatedly among MPs about the problematic issue of overlapping 
mandates, which might hinder an efficient involvement in parliament and in EU affairs in 
particular. Due to the small size of the Parliament, overlapping mandates might represent a 
burden for MPs’ parliamentary schedule and workload. The controversial idea advanced by 
some MPs consists in removing the possibility to cumulate several mandates74. On top of 
multiple mandates, MPs also have multiple committee memberships, which means that an MP 
usually belongs to several committees at the same time. The graph below (figure 8) shows the 
proportion of MPs with five or more committee memberships. 
Figure 8: Number of committee memberships per MP (in %), Chamber of Deputies, 2013-
2018 
Source: Own calculations, 
http://www.chd.lu/wps/portal/public/Accueil/OrganisationEtFonctionnement/Organisation/Deputes/DeputesEnF
onction (last accessed 05.07.2019) 
More than half of parliament members belong to more than five parliamentary 
committees. Within the Chamber of Deputies, there are no formal limitations of memberships. 
The Parliament’s small size might force MPs to belong to many committees. The RoP indicates 
that the Conference of Presidents determines how many places each parliamentary group can 
allocate in the committees. MPs can also be observers in all parliamentary committees without 
being able to take decisions. In practice, MPs must be able to handle committee work and 
guarantee the efficiency of decision-making. Multiple memberships might affect parliamentary 
work in the sense that MPs might tend to focus primarily on their own dossiers because of the 
diversity and large scope of policy fields to be covered (Interview 3, 11, 2017). Therefore, 
specialisation might be complicated within the Chamber of Deputies due to the multiple 
committee memberships (Spreitzer, 2014). The influence of small parties on committee work 
is even more limited as they face a serious lack of resources. 
 
74 See minutes of the meetings of the CFEADCM on the 04.05.2009 (A--CHD-P-2009-O-AEDCI-42), 28.11.2005 
(A-CHD-P-2005-O-AEDCI-11) and 02.07.2007 (A-CHD-P-2007-O-AEDCI-52).  
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Factors such as the length and number of parliamentary mandates, multiple committee 
memberships, political or union affiliations or the size of the parliamentary group represent 
opportunities and constraints for parliamentary involvement in EU affairs. MPs actively 
involved in EU politics and/or EAC members have specific profiles that reflect some specific 
features of the general composition of the Chamber of Deputies.  
 
5.3.1.2 Profiles of parliamentary key players in EU affairs 
 
This section takes a closer look at the profile of MPs actively involved in EU affairs and 
in the follow-up of treaty negotiations. We identified two types of MPs dealing with these 
matters. Most MPs that followed the EU treaties and intergovernmental treaties on the EMU 
analysed in the present thesis were or are still EAC members. Others belong to different sectoral 
committees, but their number is reduced. While the first ones are used to deal with EU related 
issues, the second category of MPs become active only if strategical benefits are at stake. 
EAC members 
The political profile of EAC members reflects more or less the general composition of 
the Chamber. The current EAC is composed of fifteen parliamentarians mirroring the political 
weight of each parliamentary group. Eight members come from the majority and seven belong 
to the opposition. The number of seats are distributed almost evenly between the two camps, 
which might require consensual practices if MPs want to reach decisions. The EAC Chair comes 
usually from the majority, which provides the Government with significant influence on 
European Affairs in Parliament. 
Figure 9: Ideological distribution of EAC membership (in total), Chamber of Deputies, 
2013-2018 
Source: http://www.chd.lu/wps/wcm/connect/public/eebc7fda-ca8b-4053-bfe0-
53efd7ea464a/2018+01+10+CommAppartPol.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CVID=m3vKDwZ (last accessed 
05.07.2019) 
More than half of the members belong to five or more committees. The absence of 
committee membership limitation explains why EAC members reflect the general trend in 
Parliament. Some MPs argue that the multiplicity of committee membership allows them either 
to raise awareness about EU affairs in the other committees where they belong to, or to bring 
relevant topics from other committees on the EAC’s agenda. Multiple committee memberships 
87
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permits a knowledge transfer from the EAC to sectoral committees, and vice-versa. MPs use 
their EAC membership to handle sectoral issues with a European perspective. 
Figure 10: Number of committee memberships per EAC member (in %), Chamber of 
Deputies, 2013-2018 
Source: Own calculations, 
http://www.chd.lu/wps/portal/public/Accueil/OrganisationEtFonctionnement/Organisation/Deputes/DeputesEnF
onction (last accessed 05.07.2019) 
The proportion of overlapping mandates also corresponds to the average proportion 
within the Chamber of Deputies. 31% of the committee members hold a political mandate in 
their constituency, while 4% exert functions in a local political party, 38% in national unions 
(including the Union of Towns and Cities), 8% in European associations or the Committee of 
the Regions and 19% do not have additional mandates or functions. Compared to the total 
number of MPs, the proportion of EAC members belonging to national unions is slightly lower, 
but still reflects Luxembourg’s strong neocorporatist culture. Membership in European 
organisations is higher than the average, which proves that EAC members are more sensitised 
to EU issues and more involved in international and European activities. Direct contacts on the 
EU level give them opportunities to network and to diversify their sources of information. 
Figure 11: Distribution of representative functions among EAC members (in %), 
Chamber of Deputies, 2013-2018 
Sources: Own calculations, 
http://www.chd.lu/wps/portal/public/Accueil/OrganisationEtFonctionnement/Organisation/Deputes/DeputesEnF
onction (last accessed 05.07.2019) 
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The number of MPs with experience in the Government is higher in the EAC than in the 
rest of the Chamber. Within the committee, five out of fifteen MPs (approximately 33%) held 
a position in the Government prior to their current mandate, compared to 21% of all MPs in the 
Chamber. They usually belonged to the Foreign Affairs Ministry or ministries close to the 
EAC’s competences, which gave them higher legitimacy to become EAC members due to their 
past experience. Only one MP had also an experience in the European Parliament.  
In the Chamber of Deputies, there is a general perception that EU affairs are reserved to 
MPs with extensive political experience. Subsequently, the EAC benefits from a certain prestige 
and attracts primarily experienced senior MPs. Indeed, the EAC has a higher proportion of MPs 
with prior experience in Government, which could mean that MPs use the EAC for political 
profiling. These MPs do not seek re-election, but rather a nomination in Government. This could 
explain why some MPs without experience in EU affairs or with less political experience were 
surprised that their parliamentary group chose them to become EAC members (Interview 2, 
2017).  
Figure 12: Political experience of EAC members (in total), Chamber of Deputies, 2013-
2018 
Source: Own calculations, 
http://www.chd.lu/wps/portal/public/Accueil/OrganisationEtFonctionnement/Organisation/Deputes/DeputesEnF
onction (last accessed 05.07.2019) 
In the same line of thoughts, the idea that the EAC requires extensive political 
experience could also explain why the proportion of MPs with long-lasting mandates is higher 
than in the rest of the Parliament. Indeed, 67% of the EAC members are in the Chamber since 
three or more legislative periods. 
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Figure 13: Number of exerted parliamentary mandates per EAC member (in %), 
Chamber of Deputies, 2013-2018 
Source: Own calculations, 
http://www.chd.lu/wps/portal/public/Accueil/OrganisationEtFonctionnement/Organisation/Deputes/DeputesEnF
onction (last accessed 05.07.2019) 
Just as in the Austrian National Council, long-term mandates show that EAC members 
know parliamentary procedures and possess in-depth knowledge on European integration. It 
also means that renewal of EAC members is limited, especially on the side of the majority, 
which might secure the Government’s control over EU policies.  
All in all, constraints in terms of workload remain the same for EAC members as for the 
rest of parliamentarians because of their multiple committee memberships and overlapping 
mandates. However, the main difference lies in MPs’ political experience, which is higher than 
the average, be it in the Legislative or the Executive. Their profiles seem to be more 
professionalised than the average MP in the Chamber of Deputies. The reason might lie in the 
complexity and large scope of EU affairs, which require a specific social capital that only 
experienced MPs might possess. In her thesis about the “[e]ffects of European integration on 
parliamentary control” in Luxembourg, Spreitzer underlines that “[t]he EAC […] is chosen by 
senior MPs with prior experience in the issue areas. Such experience may consist in a former 
government responsibility or activity in international parliamentary assemblies” (Spreitzer, 
2014, p.145). 
Key players in the follow-up of EU treaties and intergovernmental treaties on the EMU 
This section focuses on two elements: the profile of MPs identified as particularly 
involved in the follow-up of EU and intergovernmental treaty negotiations and factors 
influencing their involvement. Interviewed key players (current and former MPs) can be divided 
into two categories: those dealing constantly with EU affairs (including EU and 
intergovernmental treaties) and those that became active only during the follow-up of the 
treaties. While the first ones belong(ed) to the EAC, the second ones are usually MPs from 
sectoral committees. 
In general, interviewed key players identified as particularly active in EU affairs have 
an extensive experience in national politics, be it in Parliament or Government. Most key 
players started with a mandate on the local level, where they focused primarily on domestic 
topics (Interview 3, 4, 6, 2017). Before getting engaged in EU affairs, they needed to gain their 
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voter’s support. Being member of a municipality council ensured them for instance the needed 
link to the local level, before being elected in Parliament and dealing with less locally oriented 
matters. They exert(ed) long-lasting parliamentary mandates. Out of fifteen interviewed current 
and former MPs, six exerted a mandate during three legislative periods and six others during 
more than three legislative periods. Among the fifteen MPs interviewed, six started their first 
mandate in 2004-2005 during the negotiation rounds on the Treaty establishing a Constitution 
for Europe. Long-lasting political experiences provide key players with knowledge on 
parliamentary practices and the European context. Usually, interviewees witnessed several EU 
treaty negotiations and became familiar with negotiation templates and the issues discussed. 
Thus, senior MPs detached from re-election prospects might be more competent to identify the 
country’s and parliament’s stakes during treaty negotiations.  
Figure 14: Interviewees’ average length of parliamentary mandates (in %), Chamber of 
Deputies 
 
Source: Own calculation, interviews and current MPs’ profiles on the parliament’s website 
http://www.chd.lu/wps/portal/public/Accueil/OrganisationEtFonctionnement/Organisation/Deputes/DeputesEnF
onction (last accessed 05.07.2019) 
MPs constantly dealing with EU affairs often held political positions linked to EU affairs 
outside the Chamber prior to their parliamentary mandates. Some of these positions were held 
on the EU level and triggered their awareness on and interest for EU politics. For example, an 
interviewee particularly active in promoting EU affairs within Parliament during previous 
legislative periods exerted an MEP mandate (Interview 3, 2017). Leadership positions within 
Parliament might also impact MPs’ involvement in EU affairs. Indeed, parliamentarians dealing 
more frequently with EU affairs were committee chairs (either EAC or sectoral committees), 
presidents of parliamentary groups, EU speakers, members of interparliamentary conferences 
or rapporteurs on EU issues. These positions concern only a small proportion of MPs with 
privileged knowledge on EU politics. Some functions are even reserved to MPs with specific 
political affiliations. Indeed, as explained before, the function of EAC Chair is usually attributed 
to MPs from the majority, i.e. the governmental coalition (Interview 3, 2017). Key players with 
leadership positions become active because either they want to leave a political mark, or 
because they need to represent their party’s position on the treaties due to their privileged 
function as main expert or spokesperson in parliament.  
Contrary to political experience and political functions within parliament, MPs’ personal 
experience has a fluctuant influence on their involvement in EU affairs. Firstly, key players’ 
professional experiences prior to their mandate are very diversified and rarely linked to EU 
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affairs. Professional experience prior to the parliamentary mandate might play a role in MPs’ 
involvement in EU affairs, but to a lower extent than political experience. Among the 
interviewees, some were teacher, translator, school inspector, journalist, doctor, diplomat or 
psychologist. Most MPs had experiences in both the public and private sector. For some, their 
prior profession might have been an incentive for the choice of their committee memberships, 
with or without link to EU affairs (Interview 8, 11, 20, 2017). For example, an EAC member 
and EU speaker of his parliamentary group studied diplomatic affairs and worked for twenty 
years in the diplomatic corps of Luxembourg. This experience influenced his choice to become 
EAC member and get involved in EU affairs (Interview 8, 2017). Another MP spent most of 
his career in the educational sector, as teacher and school inspector. He belongs among others 
to the Committee on Higher Education and focuses mainly on these issues and less on EU affairs 
despite being member of the EAC (Interview 11, 2017). Moreover, associative commitments 
linked to EU topics are non-existent in Luxembourg. Some MPs are involved in national 
associations directly related to their prior profession or topic of interest; others are member of 
European professional associations. In both cases, EU affairs are not the main theme.  
The above-mentioned factors that might influence involvement in EU affairs give a 
picture of an ideal-typical “Europeanised” parliamentarian. An MP with a “Europeanised” 
profile would have an extensive professional, personal and political experience linked to EU 
affairs prior to the parliamentary mandate, exert a long-term mandate in parliament, occupy 
either parliamentary positions directly linked to EU affairs (Chair of the EAC, EU speaker) or 
a leadership position (president of a parliamentary group, Chair of a sectoral committee), and 
would actively participate in interparliamentary cooperation formats. We assume that these 
“Europeanised” MPs, which represent a minority in parliament, might be the most active during 
EU and intergovernmental treaty negotiations. In fact, among the interviewees, we observed 
that the predispositions to get involved in EU affairs also affect the involvement in the follow-
up of treaty negotiations. Most interviewed key players mentioned in parliamentary documents 
related to the four studied treaties ha(d)ve a “Europeanised” profile. Most already dealt and 
continued to deal actively with EU affairs before and after each treaty negotiation round.  
The main driver of their involvement is their personal interest for EU affairs. For 
instance, one of the most involved MPs with a particularly “Europeanised” profile was a former 
member of the LSAP parliamentary group until 2013 (Interview 3, 2017). He participated in 
the Convention on the Future of Europe and followed closely negotiations on the Treaty 
establishing a Constitution for Europe and the Treaty of Lisbon. He was rapporteur for the latter. 
He exerted his mandate between 1984 and 2013, with a break between 1989 and 1999 where 
he became MEP. His long-lasting parliamentary mandate allowed him to follow numerous EU 
treaties. He was member of several parliamentary delegations, among others COSAC. During 
his mandate, he occupied the positions of EAC Chair and President of the LSAP group. As a 
convinced pro-European, he focused particularly on strengthening the Parliament’s 
participation rights in EU affairs. For him, his European political experience triggered his 
interest for EU affairs and pushed him to get involved in parliament. Another former MP from 
the DP parliamentary group was a member of the national delegation to the Convention on the 
Future of Europe and actively followed negotiations on the Treaty establishing a Constitution 
for Europe and the Treaty of Lisbon (Interview 10, 2017). He also counts among the 
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“Europeanised” MPs, because he had a diplomatic career closely linked to foreign and EU 
affairs prior to his mandate. He exerted his parliamentary mandate for five legislative periods 
(four consecutive ones) between 1984-1989 and 1994-2012. On top of his experience in the 
Government and his long-lasting political career on the local level, he was also EAC member 
during his mandates.  
Overall, MPs’ socialisation into EU norms seems to be independent from political 
affiliations and positioning on the political spectrum. Indeed, an MP belonging to the 
sovereignist party ADR always dealt with EU affairs prior to his parliamentary mandate by 
serving in the diplomatic corps of Luxembourg. He is the EU speaker of his parliamentary group 
because of his extensive professional career in these matters (Interview 8, 2017). These MPs 
particularly sensitive to EU issues, either pro-Europeans or Eurosceptics, might also be 
considered as “political entrepreneurs” of change according to the Theory of Endogenous 
Institutional Change. Indeed, their experience in the handling of EU affairs within the Chamber 
of Deputies might give them the legitimacy and credibility needed to initiate reforms towards 
the strengthening of parliamentary participation rights and the mainstreaming of EU affairs 
among MPs. The role of “political entrepreneurs” with “Europeanised” profiles will be analysed 
more thoroughly in the next parts of the present chapter.  
Apart from the “Europeanised” MPs, another category of players followed EU and 
intergovernmental treaty negotiations. Some MPs that did not belong to the EAC or did not 
handle EU affairs on a regular basis became punctually active. Contrary to MPs with extensive 
experience in EU affairs, the second category of MPs belonged mainly to sectoral committees 
and had political experiences closely linked to domestic issues (Interview 7, 17, 20, 2017). Most 
MPs only punctually involved in the follow-up of treaty negotiations had either no 
parliamentary functions linked to EU affairs or were EAC member only for a short period. 
Moreover, their tasks within the Chamber remain rather centred around domestic issues and are 
only punctually concerned with EU matters whenever these affect directly their field of 
competence. Their involvement in the follow-up of EU and intergovernmental treaty 
negotiations is only topic- or policy-related. The absence of knowledge and interest for EU 
affairs might thus explain their low and fluctuant level of involvement. Indeed, sectoral 
committee members tend to get involved in EU affairs whenever they can benefit from issue-
mediatisation and increased popular support. Opposition MPs were particularly active in 
sectoral committees during treaty negotiations.  
The nature of committee competences also plays an important role, as some sectoral 
committees are more concerned with EU affairs than others. For example, a current MP from 
the CSV parliamentary group never belonged to the EAC and always dealt with national topics 
(Interview 17, 2017). Even though he participated in the Convention on the Future of Europe 
as a government representative, in public auditions as an MP during the referendum campaign 
in 2005 and followed the Treaty of Lisbon, he only got interested in the legal aspects of the 
treaties as member of the Committee on Institutions and Constitutional Revision. Currently, the 
MP rarely handles EU affairs in his daily parliamentary work and maintains rare contacts with 
MEPs. Another former MP from the Déi Gréng parliamentary group never dealt with EU affairs 
before becoming deputy member of the parliamentary delegation to the Convention on the 
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Future of Europe (Interview 7, 2017). According to the MP, becoming a member of the 
delegation was motivated by the closeness of the Convention’s topics with her own fields of 
competences and interest.  
This section analysed the profiles of EAC members and of the interviewed key players 
that followed EU treaties and intergovernmental treaties on the EMU. We observed that a 
correlation exists between the involvement in EU affairs and the follow-up of treaty 
negotiations. Political experience prior to parliamentary mandates, as well as political functions 
within parliament, seemed to represent the main motivations for MPs and forged their interest 
for EU affairs. Usually, the most active MPs during negotiations on the studied treaties seem to 
be senior MPs belonging to the EAC with a particularly “Europeanised” profile. The next 
section focuses on the effective involvement of parliamentarians in EU affairs and tries to check 
how it might be influenced by MPs’ profiles and interests. 
 
5.3.2 Parliamentarians’ level of involvement in EU affairs 
 
The present section aims to outline general trends in parliamentary involvement over 
the past years. Based on MPs’ institutional framework outlined in part 6.2, their profiles and 
their opinion on EU affairs, we will check to what extent we might observe a mainstreaming 
trend within the Chamber of Deputies. While Historical Institutionalism will permit to examine 
how involvement changed and which strategical interests prevailed, Sociological 
Institutionalism will help to explain how MPs’ profiles and motivations affected parliamentary 
activity. The measurement of parliamentary involvement in EU affairs will rely on indicators 
such as the evolution of the number of EAC meetings, the number of motions, interpellations 
and resolutions on EU affairs, the number of question hours on EU topics and the number of 
parliamentary questions on EU affairs. These indicators will then be confronted to results 
obtained through interviews, which will explain the motivations hidden behind statistical trends. 
 
5.3.2.1 General trends 
 
Before the Convention on the Future of Europe, the handling of EU affairs within the 
Chamber of Deputies was not systematic and rather underdeveloped (Interview 10, 14, 2017). 
The main reasons might be the insufficient institutionalisation of scrutiny mechanisms within 
the Chamber and the fact that EU affairs were commonly accepted as non-conflictual matters 
that did not require thorough examination. The quasi absence of scrutiny procedures within the 
Chamber and the overtly EU-friendly attitude might have resulted in a passive control of the 
Government’s EU policy. After the Convention, EU affairs became increasingly part of 
parliamentary work. However, we observe that involvement in EU affairs tends to be rather 
fluctuant from one parliamentary session to the other. This trend is reflected in the number of 
EAC meetings shown in the graph hereafter (figure 15). 
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Figure 15: Number of EAC meetings (in total), Chamber of Deputies, 2002-2015 
 
Source: Own calculations based on the annual analytical tables provided by the Chamber of Deputies, 
http://www.chd.lu/wps/portal/public/Accueil/TravailALaChambre/SeancesPubliques/ComptesRendusSeances 
(last accessed 05.07.2019) 
We observe indeed that despite being fluctuant, the number of EAC meetings increased 
between the parliamentary session 2002-2003 and 2014-2015, passing from 26 meetings in 
2002-2003 to 74 meetings in 2014-2015. Variations observed in this graph might correspond to 
legislative elections. Indeed, elections were held in 2004, 2009 and 2013, which could explain 
the lower involvement of the EAC due to the priority given to electoral campaigns. Moreover, 
negotiations on the Constitutional Treaty in 2004, the Treaty of Lisbon in 2008 and the ESM 
and TSCG in 2011 seemed also to have affected EAC meetings with noticeable increases of 
meetings around these events. Indeed, the EAC was the sole parliamentary body competent to 
scrutinise IGCs. 
Compared to sectoral committee meetings, the EAC met the most over the same period, 
as illustrated in the following graph (figure 16).  
Figure 16: Comparative evolution of the number of committee meetings (in total), 
Chamber of Deputies, 2002-2015 
 
Source: Own calculations based on the annual analytical tables provided by the Chamber of Deputies, 
http://www.chd.lu/wps/portal/public/Accueil/TravailALaChambre/SeancesPubliques/ComptesRendusSeances 
(last accessed 05.07.2019) 
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The high number of EAC meetings could be explained by its large scope of 
competences, which require to deal with more than only EU matters. The same trends can be 
observed in the evolution of parliamentary questions on EU issues. The overall trend is an 
increase from 21 questions in 2002-2003 to 36 questions in 2014-2015, with a peak of activity 
between 2005 and 2007. This period corresponds to the Constitutional Treaty, Luxembourg’s 
EU Presidency in 2005 and the subsequent negotiations on the Treaty of Lisbon. However, the 
latter did not seem to have triggered much interest, as the number of parliamentary questions 
decreased after 2007, with parliamentary elections in 2009 and 2013. 
Figure 17: Parliamentary questions on EU affairs (asked, in total), Chamber of Deputies, 
2002-2015 
 
Source: Own calculations based on the annual analytical tables provided by the Chamber of Deputies, 
http://www.chd.lu/wps/portal/public/Accueil/TravailALaChambre/SeancesPubliques/ComptesRendusSeances 
(last accessed 05.07.2019) 
The proportion of questions on EU affairs compared to the total number of parliamentary 
questions remains low, as shown in the graph below (figure 18).  
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Figure 18: Number of PQs on EU affairs compared to total number of PQs (in total), 
Chamber of Deputies, 2002-2015 
 
Source: Own calculations based on the annual analytical tables provided by the Chamber of Deputies, 
http://www.chd.lu/wps/portal/public/Accueil/TravailALaChambre/SeancesPubliques/ComptesRendusSeances 
(last accessed 05.07.2019) 
Indeed, only the years 2005-2006 and 2006-2007 saw an increase of the proportion of 
EU questions. Again, this might have corresponded to Luxembourg’s EU Presidency and the 
negotiations on both the Constitutional and the Lisbon Treaty. We observe a slight increase 
during the economic crisis in 2011-2012. On average, only 4.07% of asked parliamentary 
questions were linked to EU topics between 2002 and 201575.  
Figure 19: Percentage of PQs on EU affairs (asked), Chamber of Deputies, 2002-2015 
 
Source: Own calculations based on the annual analytical tables provided by the Chamber of Deputies, 
http://www.chd.lu/wps/portal/public/Accueil/TravailALaChambre/SeancesPubliques/ComptesRendusSeances 
(last accessed 05.07.2019) 
The evolution of the number of question hours on EU affairs also shows to what extent 
MPs use parliamentary instruments to scrutinise their government’s EU policy. The total 
number of question hours is fluctuant. While in 2002-2003, 11 question hours were organised, 
they dropped to 3 in 2003-2004 and increased to 18 in 2006-2007. Another drop in the total 
 
75 Calculation of the average percentage of parliamentary questions on EU topics for the period running from the 
legislative period 2002-2003 until 2014-2015. 
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number of question hours can be observed after 2013. Question hours on EU affairs were not 
systematically organised in every parliamentary session. The context of the economic crisis 
fuelled more debates in parliament, as shown in the graph below (figure 20). Overall, opposition 
groups used the most question hours during negotiations on the treaties. Reasons could be their 
lack of resources, which prevented a good access to information. The lack of information 
obliged them to use other channels to interact directly with ministers. 
Figure 20: Proportion of question hours on EU affairs compared to total number of 
question hours (in total), Chamber of Deputies, 2002-2015 
 
Source: Own calculations based on the annual analytical tables provided by the Chamber of Deputies, 
http://www.chd.lu/wps/portal/public/Accueil/TravailALaChambre/SeancesPubliques/ComptesRendusSeances 
(last accessed 05.07.2019) 
The analysis of the use of diverse parliamentary instruments over the period running 
from 2002 to 2015 showed that effective parliamentary involvement in EU affairs was fluctuant. 
Instruments to scrutinise the Government’s EU policy are not used frequently. Apart from the 
increasing number of EAC meetings, parliamentary work in the Chamber of Deputies focuses 
more on domestic issues rather than on EU affairs. As the graphs themselves do not provide 
any explanation on motivations underpinning MPs’ involvement in EU affairs, we will give 
some possible reasons in the next section.  
 
5.3.2.2 Reasons for MPs’ (non) involvement in EU affairs 
 
If we cross interviews with the statistics obtained from the Chamber of Deputies, we 
find that the trends observed in the previous section can be found in the arguments of 
interviewees. Firstly, if we come back to the institutional factors, we observe that the Chamber’s 
formal capacities as well as MPs’ status within parliament seem to affect the latter’s 
involvement in EU affairs. Indeed, all interviews mention the small size of the Chamber and 
consequently the lack of resources of the parliamentary administration and the political groups 
as reasons for MPs’ lacking involvement in EU affairs. For example, the lack of collaborators 
in the parliamentary groups represents a hurdle for the preparation of EU dossiers and the 
acquisition of knowledge on EU matters. MPs seem to be obliged to make more efforts in order 
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to prepare themselves, which implies for them a higher workload, less specialisation 
opportunities and less expert knowledge on EU dossiers (Interview 2, 2017). The overwhelming 
quantity of EU documents received by the Chamber of Deputies represents a challenge for MPs 
and decreases their enthusiasm for EU topics (Interview 10, 16, 2017). Moreover, multiple 
committee memberships and overlapping mandates reduce the time spent on EU dossiers. 
Indeed, the type of committee seems to influence MPs’ involvement in EU affairs. 
Parliamentarians from sectoral committees admit that despite the decentralised scrutiny 
infrastructure, some of them either do not deal at all with EU issues, or handle them only 
partially depending on the topic on the agenda (Interview 15, 17, 20, 2017). An MP was member 
of the EAC during her last mandate, but does not belong to the committee anymore. She admits 
that once she switched to sectoral committees only, her time dedicated to EU affairs shrank 
drastically (Interview 15, 2017).  
Lack of time affects clearly MPs’ activities. The EU bulletin, edited by the permanent 
representative of the Chamber in Brussels, is rarely taken into account by MPs from sectoral 
committees (Interview 14, 20, 2017). The bulletin is distributed among all parliamentarians and 
parliamentary staff, but interviews showed that only MPs dealing more frequently with EU 
issues read the newsletter, mostly EAC members. Even then, they tend to read only the sections 
either that concern a topic on their political agenda, their field of competence or their interests. 
The reason could be the low impact that the EU bulletin tends to have on parliamentary work 
and MPs’ lack of time due to the small size of their scrutiny infrastructure (Interview 8, 2017).  
In general, MPs’ ex-ante involvement is still underdeveloped according to a collaborator 
from the LSAP parliamentary group (Interview 13, 2017). MPs do not take position on a 
European matter before it arrives in the Chamber and tend to wait until the legislative act needs 
to be transposed in the national legislation. This reactive behaviour depends mostly on their 
political will that determines the moment and degree of involvement. Often, the political will 
to engage in EU affairs is absent. According to an interviewee, the reason lies in the fact that 
MPs are conscious about their limited influence on both national and European decision-
making. The Government remains the predominant player in EU politics in Luxembourg. 
Scrutiny tools as fixed in the parliamentary procedures and the agreement between the Chamber 
and the Government are seen as inefficient. Indeed, the annual debates in the Chamber on the 
Government’s foreign and EU policy do not lead to concrete decisions. Debates are seen as 
nothing more than window-dressing, where parties’ reactions to the discourse of the Minister 
for Foreign and European affairs can be anticipated (Interview 8, 2017). In fact, the lacking use 
of parliamentary instruments can be explained by MPs’ awareness that decisions on EU matters 
might be already settled at ministerial level before documents enter the Chamber of Deputies 
(Interview 15, 2017). Parliamentarians know that their lever of action is reduced and tend to 
remain on the sideline, which diminishes their critical thinking and the overall discussion 
culture within the Chamber of Deputies. The chamber’s small size and its lack of resources 
enhance this feeling of powerlessness. 
Moreover, this situation is reinforced by the tendency for most MPs, be it from the 
majority or the opposition, to support their Government’s EU policy. Indeed, the consensual 
political system gives little space to conflicts between majority and opposition (Interview 3, 10, 
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17, 2017). The Chamber of Deputies usually supports the Government’s position on the 
European level. EU affairs in Luxembourg tend to be less controversial than in other countries. 
The absence of political divergence on EU affairs can be explained by the country’s small size 
and geographical position. The European Union represents an essential arena where 
Luxembourg can exert its influence, which explains why Parliament and Government focus on 
seeking compromises in order to project the image of a coherent national EU policy on the 
European level. This translates for instance into the attribution of parliamentary reports on EU 
issues to opposition MPs whenever the latter possess the required expertise (Interview 10, 
2017).  
On the contrary, this situation would never happen in the Austrian National Council, 
where the majority usually keeps the control over reports. However, the consensual practices in 
the Chamber of Deputies remain limited to the level of expertise, which means that 
compromises are sought whenever the competences of an opposition MP are useful for the 
majority and whenever there is certainty that the MP’s group will support the majority vote. 
Generally, consensual practices within the Chamber of Deputies happen in areas of common 
interests or general guidelines and less on hot topics such as financial matters for instance. 
Political competition is less oriented towards EU politics than towards domestic and local 
issues. During EU and intergovernmental treaty negotiations, political affiliation passes behind 
national interests. Thus, the absence of conflicts on EU matters decreases MPs’ incentives to 
use scrutiny instruments, because compromises are reached ex-ante. Overall, the absence of 
competition limits parliamentary involvement. The consensual culture between parliament and 
government is particularly strong whenever Luxembourg holds the EU Presidency. According 
to a former MP, the Chamber of Deputies tended to slow down its scrutiny procedure during 
Luxembourg’s EU Presidencies in order for the Government to mobilise its resources without 
being hindered by parliament (Interview 10, 2017).  
More than the awareness of their limited role in EU affairs, it is the awareness about the 
significance of EU issues that might also affect MPs’ involvement. In general, MPs’ 
engagement in EU affairs depends on their perception about national parliaments’ role in the 
EU, about European integration and its impact on the national level. In Luxembourg, there is a 
consensus that European integration represents an added-value for the country. The general 
perception about European integration is positive and the support for federalisation and deeper 
integration is strong. There is also a general idea that the European Parliament should play an 
important role. Luxembourg as one of the founding countries of the EU has no real Eurosceptic 
party, its population has one of the strongest pro-European opinion in the EU and political 
consensus on EU affairs is strong. Most MPs, either EAC or sectoral committee members,  
generally agree that awareness about EU affairs rose over the last decades, especially since the 
Convention on the Future of Europe and the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe 
(Interview 10, 20, 2017). MPs seem to make more efforts to include EU affairs in their daily 
parliamentary work (Interview 14, 2017).  
Awareness among Luxembourgish MPs about European integration seem to follow two 
different trends. On the one hand, we observe that awareness about EU affairs seems to stay 
rather low on the long-term. On the other hand, we notice that punctually, peaks of awareness 
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emerge within the Chamber, each time related to specific events on the European level (EU and 
intergovernmental treaties). MPs are generally conscious that EU politics become more and 
more intertwined with domestic politics. This punctual awareness might explain the fluctuation 
of parliamentary activity over the period running from 2002-2003 to 2014-2015. Awareness 
about EU issues might be triggered significantly by events external to the Chamber of Deputies 
that impact directly MPs’ interests (Interview 3, 10, 2017). According to an EAC member, the 
challenge is to identify the political stakes that emerge from a complex EU matter, which does 
not require to specialise, but rather to keep a general overview and to focus on crucial issues 
(Interview 8, 2017). Awareness about EU affairs is also generation-dependent according to 
another MP (Interview 3, 2017). Whether MPs stayed for a long time in parliament or not, and 
whether they are personally interested in EU affairs influences their degree of involvement. 
MPs with long-lasting mandates perpetuate practices of EU scrutiny that become part of the 
parliamentary culture. Whenever senior MPs leave parliament, this heritage of routinisation of 
EU scrutiny gets lost.  
EU affairs are perceived as requiring specialised knowledge due to their increasing 
complexity (Interview 3, 6, 15, 2017). Specialised knowledge is required whenever technical 
issues appear on the agenda. While EAC members are not able to deal with technical directives 
due to their generalist profile and lack of knowledge on specific public policies, members from 
sectoral committees struggle to understand EU matters due to their lack of knowledge on EU 
policies. Due to the latter’s complexity, MPs often rely on the support of the parliamentary 
administration and collaborators of parliamentary groups to draft reports on EU documents. The 
subsidiarity monitoring represents a particular challenge for sectoral committees, which are 
usually overwhelmed by the technicity of EU matters due to their lack of expertise and resources 
(Interview 6, 2017). Both MPs from sectoral committees and the EAC admit that EU affairs are 
not attractive, neither to MPs nor to citizens, because they are hardly understandable and have 
almost no media impact (Interview 6, 15, 2017). For MPs, the absence of mediatisation and 
publicisation of EU affairs represents a limit to their involvement, because they cannot gain 
their voters’ support. Thus, on the short-term, EU affairs seem far away from most MPs’ 
priorities, which are still focused on domestic matters and re-election prospects. Individual 
strategies and the use of EU affairs for their own domestic interests seem to be prevalent for 
most MPs belonging to sectoral committees. Despite regular discussions on EU issues within 
the Chamber of Deputies, a lack of enthusiasm is present.  
For those MPs that do not belong to the “Europeanised” group but are still involved in 
EU affairs, the reasons of involvement are eclectic: some focus on national issues, but deal with 
EU affairs whenever they are directly related to their topics of interest or competence (Interview 
11, 15, 2017); some others rely on their personal experiences and justify their involvement with 
their personal interest for EU affairs (Interview 2, 2017); another MP admits that his 
involvement in EU affairs bases on his curiosity about meeting personalities such as the 
Minister for Foreign and European Affairs (Interview 11, 2017). Overall, these MPs are not 
genuinely interested in EU affairs, but get involved for rational and strategical reasons. On the 
contrary, MPs with “Europeanised” profiles justify their involvement in EU affairs with their 
deep-rooted interest for these matters, which prevails over domestic interests (Interview 3, 4, 
2017). “Europeanised” MPs have generally regular contacts with actors dealing with EU affairs, 
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for instance privileged networks on the EU level. The automaticity of exchanges with EU 
institutions, International Organisations, colleagues from other parliaments, the Permanent 
Representation of Luxembourg in Brussels or MEPs allows to be constantly in touch with EU 
matters and to maintain the level of awareness about EU issues. EAC members benefit from 
informal meetings and ex-ante information coming directly from the EU level. For majority 
MPs, access to information might be even easier, because they can benefit from contacts with 
government civil servants from the Luxembourg Permanent Representation. For instance, the 
current EAC Chair has regular contacts with the representative of the European Commission in 
Luxembourg (Interview 4, 2017). The EAC Chair also admits that contact is easy with the 
Permanent Representation of Luxembourg in Brussels. However, this is because the EAC Chair 
belongs to the majority, hence the possibility to maintain regular exchanges. The EAC Chair 
also built an extensive network of personal contacts with MPs from other national parliaments, 
as well as civil servants from the European Parliament. Those MPs maintaining contacts with 
other MPs from the same political family within International Organisations (Council of 
Europe) are usually current or former EAC members. MEPs come mainly to EAC meetings 
rather than sectoral committees, which confirms the fact that a minority of MPs has privileged 
access to information using non-institutionalised means. 
 
5.3.3 Discussion and conclusions 
 
The third part of this chapter analysed MPs’ political and sociological profile, focusing 
especially on those identified as key players and dealing more often with EU affairs. Socio-
demographic indicators gave insight into opportunities and constraints of MPs’ parliamentary 
activity. We observe that both MPs’ motivations and their institutional environment affect 
parliamentary involvement. The use of parliamentary instruments is dependent on MPs’ 
institutional framework, on their sociological background and on their perception of EU affairs 
and the role of their parliament. The Chamber’s formal capacities, the resources of 
parliamentary groups, MPs’ positions within parliament, the constellation and relationship of 
political forces on the national level are institutional factors that lay the foundation of 
parliamentary involvement in EU affairs. Whether an MP is in the majority or the opposition, 
he/she benefits from different resources and access to information. Moreover, the consensual 
political system limits competition between parties, which tend to support the Government’s 
EU policy. Relations with national unions seem to affect MPs’ behaviour via consociationalist 
and neocorporatist practices.  
On top of these elements, MP’s profiles, awareness and opinion about EU affairs form 
their personal motivations that influence their political will to get involved. Both motivations 
and institutional framework evolve depending on national and European events. For example, 
on the national level, peaks in the use of parliamentary instruments can be explained by the 
salience of EU treaties and legislative elections. Indeed, an increase in the number of EAC 
meetings, parliamentary questions and motions on EU affairs is observable during the periods 
2003-2004, 2009-2010 and 2013-2014. These dates correspond each time to negotiations on 
EU treaties and intergovernmental treaties on the EMU that led to procedural reforms within 
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the Chamber of Deputies76, but also to legislative elections77. On the European level, these dates 
correspond to discussions on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe between 2002 
and 2004, the Treaty of Lisbon between 2006 and 2009, the ESM and the TSCG between 2011 
and 2012.  
The general trend in parliamentary activity according to interviewees speaks in favour 
of a mainstreaming of EU affairs within the Chamber of Deputies. Sectoral committees seem 
to receive more EU documents. However, if we observe who uses mostly parliamentary 
instruments linked to EU matters, we see that involvement is restrained to a specific category 
of MPs, especially during these peaks of activity. The most “Europeanised” parliamentarians 
tend to become even more active during these periods. The rest still focuses on domestic issues, 
aiming re-election on the national level. Effective involvement in EU affairs shows different 
trends. Most interviewees agree that EU issues are still reserved to a minority in parliament 
(Interview 3, 17, 2017). This assumption speaks in favour of sub-hypothesis H2.1. Some civil 
servants from the parliamentary administration point out that involvement in EU affairs depends 
mostly on individual charisma and initiatives (Interview 1, 2017). For instance, during the 
legislative period 2009-2013, MPs tended to deal more often with EU affairs because the EAC 
Chair encouraged them to do so, through constant dialogue with the chairs of the sectoral 
committees. The charisma of the MP holding the EAC Chair thus influenced the creation of 
alliances with other committee chairs, which triggered more awareness about EU issues. The 
new EAC Chair that took over the position during the legislative period 2013-2018 actively 
promoted EU affairs within Parliament, but had to face a lack of political union and coordination 
between committee chairs (Interview 1, 2018). Involvement, even though triggered by 
individual MPs, depends on personal willingness.  
Sociological Institutionalism, more specifically the motivational approach, permitted to 
identify an ideal-typical “Europeanised” MP. We observed through this approach that MPs with 
“Europeanised” profiles are the most active both in EU affairs and during negotiations on the 
studied treaties. On top of being leaders in parliamentary activity, they also endorse the role of 
“political entrepreneurs” of change, as defined by the Theory of Endogenous Institutional 
Change. “Political entrepreneurs” typically take initiatives towards more involvement in EU 
affairs within the Chamber of Deputies. Generally, they were senior MPs with extensive 
knowledge on parliamentary procedures, belonged to the majority, were EAC members, EU 
speakers and/or chairs of sectoral committees, participated in numerous interparliamentary 
cooperation formats such as COSAC, had regular contacts with MEPs and their collaborators 
and were the main spokespersons of their group for EU affairs. Overall, EAC members are more 
involved in EU affairs because these issues remain centralised in the EAC and are only rarely 
delegated entirely to sectoral committees. The predominance of EAC members over 
parliamentary activity in EU affairs is shown in the graph below (figure 21). 
 
 
 
76 Reforms of the RoP within the Chamber of Deputies happened in 2003, 2009 and 2014. 
77 Legislative elections in Luxembourg were organised in 2004, 2009 and 2013. 
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Figure 21: Number of PQs on EU affairs submitted by EAC members (in total), Chamber 
of Deputies, 2002-2015 
 
Source: Own calculations78 
Whether an MP belongs to the EAC or a sectoral committee, whether an MP chairs a 
committee or not, holds the presidency of a parliamentary group or has a long-term mandate 
determines his/her level of involvement in EU affairs. The longer the mandate and the longer 
the membership in the EAC, the more likely MPs are keen to perpetuate higher activity with 
regard to EU affairs. Those MPs that were identified as less involved in EU affairs, usually 
those belonging to sectoral committees and/or the opposition, tend to focus more on re-election 
prospects, which confirms the rational calculation argument present in the Theory of 
Endogenous Institutional Change. Political competition does not seem to play a big role in the 
Chamber of Deputies, mostly because of the consensual political system. These elements show 
that parliamentary involvement depends to a large extent on individual motivations and 
strategies, and less on aggregated interests. Personal profiling in Parliament seems to be more 
determinant in MPs’ involvement than political competition between opposition and majority.  
While Sociological Institutionalism permitted to detect the reasons underpinning 
parliamentary involvement, the Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change helped explaining 
the role of individual strategies in parliamentary activity. Through statistical data, parliamentary 
documents and interviews, we were able to show that a gap exists between formal procedures, 
MPs’ motivations and effective parliamentary activity. The gap between formal rules and their 
implementation observed in the previous section (5.3.2) might push “political entrepreneurs” to 
trigger reforms. The question is then to know if these reforms were triggered because of 
 
78 The proportion of parliamentary questions on EU affairs submitted by EAC members was calculated individually 
for each parliamentary session between 2002-2003 and 2014-2015 on the basis of the parliament’s website: 
http://www.chd.lu/wps/portal/public/Accueil/TravailALaChambre/Recherche/RoleDesAffaires/!ut/p/z1/lZFNbsJ
ADIXPwgEqO56QhOWQFHcIoSVRBjIbNKUBjRR-hFIq9fQlqIu2i7T1ztb3nvxsMLACc7AXt7OtOx5sc-
0rE6wJJ1pPiGVeEqHkoS5yFQhMPVjeAPxWEsc5jQUiPxKY_-
u_Ov1N3wOYfvslmBuSUKJz5RNG8YhQ8WKWxt4QuRA_AQ4XPtL0fhqWxVzwKPgE-
m7w2xbVNUW4fvKy6CGOMGNWCUqRpiHzTCD5UHQebn9q3Ma12fGlbqBqz691N7ab7llQbV3T1mft6jc47
ctyhU7d2ed3KQeDD4A2HII!/p0/IZ7_P1M8HC80MGGID0A3KK7GGL3024=CZ6_20FVVF2GARU220AG5
VSRI630K1=LA0=Ejavax.portlet.action!filter==/?reInitFilter=4&filter=7&filterStatus=1&filterPeriod=2&filter
Author=1&filterAddressee=1&sortType=2&sortReversed=true#Z7_P1M8HC80MGGID0A3KK7GGL3024 (last 
accessed 28.02.2018). 
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discrepant value perception according to Sociological Institutionalism, or because of divergent 
interests according to the Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change. European treaties might 
represent opportunities for such changes. The following parts will focus on the relationship 
between MPs’ motivations, parliamentary activity and institutional change within the Chamber 
of Deputies during EU and intergovernmental treaty negotiations.  
 
5.4 Evolution of parliamentary involvement in the context of negotiations on the Treaty 
establishing a Constitution for Europe (2002-2006) 
 
Basing on the previous sections, we will check in this part how the Treaty establishing 
a Constitution for Europe triggered parliamentary activity and institutional change within the 
Chamber of Deputies. The first section will analyse parliamentary activity in the framework of 
negotiations on the Constitutional Treaty. By measuring the level of parliamentary activity and 
the reasons underpinning it, we will test elements from the two first hypotheses. Firstly, the 
polarisation level between the parties on the treaty might have affected MPs’ level of activity 
(H1). We assume as well that the salience of the treaty might have encouraged mainstreaming 
trends (H2). The second section will then focus on the Constitutional Treaty as an opportunity 
to trigger institutional change within the Chamber of Deputies (H3).  
 
5.4.1 Parliamentary involvement in the framework of the negotiations on the Constitutional 
Treaty 
 
General context 
The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe marked a turning point in 
parliamentary involvement in EU affairs within the Chamber of Deputies. Indeed, since the 
debates in the Convention on the future of Europe, EU affairs started to be handled more 
systematically by MPs (Interview 20, 2017). The political context in Luxembourg contributed 
somewhat to the increased attention on EU issues, both from the side of parliamentarians and 
the population. On 13th June 2004, legislative elections were organised, during which the CSV 
party massively gained popularity for the first time since 1984, while the sovereignist party 
ADR lost voices (Dumont/Poirier, 2005). The CSV obtained 24 seats in parliament. The LSAP 
came back to majority after five years of being in the opposition, gaining 14 seats in parliament. 
The party Déi Lénk lost its mandates in parliament.  
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Table 11: Parties’ representation in the Chamber of Deputies (2004-2009) 
Party Number of seats in parliament (2004) 
CSV 24 
LSAP 14 
DP 10 
Déi Gréng 7 
ADR 5 
Source: Own calculations79 
Following these results, a coalition government was formed between the CSV and the 
LSAP, Jean-Claude Juncker becoming the Prime Minister and Jean Asselborn Vice-Prime 
Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. On 10th September 2004, Jean-Claude Juncker was 
nominated President of the Eurogroup. On top of this, Luxembourg held the EU Presidency in 
the first semester of 2005. The EU enlargement of May 2004 accelerated discussions on reforms 
of the European institutional architecture. The negotiations on the Constitutional Treaty 
represented at that time a major challenge for Luxembourg, as the ratification of the Treaty 
would mean a confirmation of the country’s firm support to the European integration process80. 
The organisation of a referendum in 2005 in Luxembourg on the Constitutional Treaty can be 
seen as a means to reinforce the pro-European feeling in the country and trigger higher 
involvement in EU affairs. 
The follow-up of the treaty within the Chamber of Deputies started in 2003, when the 
prior governmental coalition CSV-DP decided on the 27th June 2003, after the European 
Council of Thessaloniki (IGC) on 19th and 21st June 2003, to submit the treaty to a national 
referendum. The decision to organise a referendum aimed to finalise Luxembourg’s future EU 
Presidency in 2005 with a proof that the country is a model in terms of support to European 
integration. At that time, the public opinion was very positive about the EU. Luxembourg’s 
leaders wanted to encourage deeper integration and obtain at the same time a higher legitimacy 
from the population to support the European project. The freshly elected coalition CSV-LSAP 
decided in its governmental declaration on 4th August 2004 to maintain the referendum on the 
Constitutional Treaty after the first vote of the Chamber of Deputies. On the 5th August 2004, 
the Chamber adopted a motion submitted by a DP MP supporting the government’s decision to 
organise a political debate and a referendum on the Constitutional Treaty81. The motion 
explicitly aimed to place Luxembourg in the lead group of countries that ratified the treaty. The 
motion requested from the Government to fix a date for the referendum. At that time, during 
summer 2004, 88% of the Luxembourgish population supported the ratification of the 
 
79 On the basis of the election results, see http://www.elections.public.lu/content/dam/elections/fr/elections-
legislatives/2004/resultats-officiels/Resultats_LEG_2004.pdf (last accessed 01.03.2018). 
80 See the governmental declaration by Jean-Claude Juncker,  
“Déclaration du Premier ministre Jean-Claude Juncker portant sur le programme gouvernemental (4 août 2004) », 
http://www.sante.public.lu/fr/publications/d/declaration-gouvernementale-2004-fr-lb/index.html (last accessed 
01.03.2018). 
81 See the motion “Organisation d'un débat politique et d'un référendum sur la Constitution européenne », 
Grethen Henri, 05.08.2004, 
http://www.chd.lu/wps/PA_RoleDesAffaires/FTSByteServingServletImpl?path=/export/exped/sexpdata/Mag/08
4/587/058836.pdf (last accessed 01.03.2018). 
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Constitutional Treaty according to the Eurobarometer82. However, the support dropped in 
October 2004 to 60% according to a survey led by TNS-ILRES (Dumont/Fehlen/Kies/Poirier, 
2007).   
On 10th November 2004, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs alongside with the Conference 
of Presidents of the Chamber of Deputies decided about the date of the referendum on 10th July 
2005. Tensions emerged between the political parties from the majority and the opposition on 
the date of the referendum. While the Prime Minister suggested organising it during the 
Luxembourgish EU Presidency in order to sensitise the population on these issues, the final 
decision of the Foreign Affairs Minister and the presidents of the parliamentary groups fell on 
a date right after the termination of the EU Presidency. On 20th January 2005, the Chamber of 
Deputies voted by unanimity a framework law on the organisation of national referenda83. On 
09th February 2005, the Prime Minister transferred to the Council of State both draft bills on the 
ratification of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe and on the organisation of a 
national referendum on the Constitutional Treaty. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs and 
Immigration then submitted the latter draft bill to the Chamber of Deputies on the 18th February 
2005.  
Within Parliament, the Committee on Institutions and Constitutional Revision examined 
the draft bill on the national referendum on 02nd March 2005, sending amendments to the 
Council of State. The EAC examined the draft bill ratifying the Constitutional Treaty on 07th 
March 2005. The Chamber received the positive opinion of the Council of State on the 22nd 
March and the Committee on Institutions and Constitutional Revision approved it on 24th March 
2005. Moreover, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs submitted the draft bill ratifying the 
Constitutional Treaty to the Chamber of Employees and the Workers’ Chamber on 31st March 
2005. Both chambers expressed their support for the treaty. Finally, the Chamber adopted 
unanimously the special law on the organisation of a referendum on the Constitutional Treaty 
on 12th April 2005 during a plenary session84. On 28th June 2005, the Chamber of Deputies 
proceeded with the first vote on the draft bill ratifying the Constitutional Treaty. The Business 
Chamber gave a favourable opinion on the Constitutional Treaty on 09th May 2005. The EAC 
produced a report on the draft bill ratifying the Constitutional Treaty on 06th June 2005, which 
was then debated and adopted in plenary session on 28th June 2005. A resolution submitted by 
an LSAP MP and requesting a second parliamentary vote on the treaty only in case of a positive 
result in the referendum was unanimously adopted in the Chamber on 8th June 200585. The 
conditionality of the second parliamentary vote linked to the results of the referendum 
 
82 See Eurobarometer 159 p. 30, June 2004, « The future European Constitution (Wave 2)”, 
http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/yearFrom/1974/yearTo/20
04/surveyKy/395 (last accessed 01.03.2018). 
83 See « Loi du 4 février 2005 relative au référendum au niveau national », 
http://legilux.public.lu/eli/etat/leg/loi/2005/02/04/n1/jo (last accessed 01.03.2018).  
84 See « Loi du 14 avril 2005 portant organisation d'un référendum national sur le Traité établissant une 
Constitution pour l'Europe, signé à Rome, le 29 octobre 2004 », 
http://legilux.public.lu/eli/etat/leg/loi/2005/04/14/n1/jo (last accessed 01.03.2018). 
85 « Résolution de M. Ben Fayot sur la décision de ne procéder à un second vote constitutionnel qu'en cas 
d'approbation populaire du Traité établissant une Constitution pour l'Europe », 08.06.2005. 
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represented a novelty for the Parliament86. After the first vote of the Chamber at the end of June, 
the referendum was finally organised on the 10th July. The results were debated in plenary on 
12th July and the Chamber proceeded with a second vote on 25th October 2005. 
The national referendum on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe 
Overall, the Constitutional Treaty was widely supported by most political parties in 
Luxembourg. Before the referendum in 2005, all parties represented in Parliament and Déi Lénk 
agreed on most aspects of the treaty. Positions on the treaty were thus rather consensual and the 
polarisation level quite minimal (Eschke/Thomas Malick, 2006). However, even though 
consensual practices prevailed, the situation changed during the referendum campaign in 2005. 
Two camps formed: pro-Europeans and treaty opponents defending their national interests. 
Major topics discussed by MPs were institutional questions, such as the issue of national 
sovereignty, the subsidiarity monitoring, the cooperation mechanisms between Member States 
in the field of Justice and Home Affairs, the EU’s democratic nature and social issues.  
Most Luxembourgish MPs agreed that the European Parliament should obtain more 
competences and that Luxembourg should preserve its European Commissioner and its six 
members in the European Parliament87. Voting rules (unanimity versus qualified majority) in 
European Institutions were also at the centre of debates, as well as the transparency of the 
European decision-making process. Voting rules in taxation and social security were for 
example an important topic for Luxembourg. Luxembourg requested for instance during the 
Intergovernmental Conference on the Constitutional Treaty to come back to the unanimity rule 
in the fields of administrative cooperation and the fight against tax fraud, while big Member 
States defended qualified majority88. The role of national parliaments, especially the 
strengthening of their formal capacities in the framework of the subsidiarity monitoring, was an 
important element pointed out in the report produced by the EAC in June 200589. The 
Luxembourgish delegation to the IGC also refused strict criteria with regard to the strengthened 
cooperation in the CFSP90. The democratic and social questions were especially relevant for the 
LSAP, DP and Déi Lénk. The nature itself of the treaty was also a subject of discussion, as the 
ADR and Déi Lénk refused to qualify it as a Constitution (Interview 14, 2017). The Council of 
State itself stated that the Constitutional Treaty should be considered as a simple treaty and not 
as a classical constitution in light of its authors and origin91. 
The Chamber of Deputies decided to launch the official referendum campaign on 22nd 
March 2005. Luxembourg organise few referenda in the past, hence the significance of the event 
 
86 See the report produced by the EAC, « Projet de loi portant approbation du Traité établissant une Constitution 
pour l’Europe, des Protocoles annexés au Traité établissant une Constitution pour l’Europe, des Annexes I et II et 
de l’Acte final, signés à Rome, le 29 octobre 2004 ; Rapport de la Commission des Affaires Etrangères et 
Européennes, de la Défense, de la Coopération et de l’Immigration », 06.06.2005. 
87 See the report produced by the EAC, « Projet de loi portant approbation du Traité établissant une Constitution 
pour l’Europe, des Protocoles annexés au Traité établissant une Constitution pour l’Europe, des Annexes I et II et 
de l’Acte final, signés à Rome, le 29 octobre 2004 ; Rapport de la Commission des Affaires Etrangères et 
Européennes, de la Défense, de la Coopération et de l’Immigration », 06.06.2005. 
88 Ibid. ; EAC meeting 30.01.2004 (A-CHD-P-2004-O-AEED-6). 
89 Ibid. 
90 EAC meeting 04.02.2004 (A-CHD-P-2004-O-AEED-7). 
91 Ibid. 
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for the Parliament, with crucial stakes for Luxembourg’s image as a pro-European country. At 
the beginning of the referendum campaign, a collective movement for the “No” was established, 
the “Committee for the No”, that was predominantly composed of radical-left movements. 
Promoters of this movement were mostly NGOs that reproached the treaty to constitutionalise 
neo-liberalism in the EU, to encourage social, fiscal and environmental dumping and to result 
from non-democratic decision-making procedures (Dumont/Fehlen/Kies/Poirier, 2007). Even 
though the left-wing parties in Luxembourg criticised some aspects of the Constitutional Treaty, 
they had only a limited impact, as none of them was represented in Parliament apart from the 
ADR. In general, contestants, but also promoters of the Constitutional Treaty, were not 
homogeneously organised. Indeed, diverging interests could be found between and within 
parties, for instance within the Déi Gréng party. The “Committee for the No” grouped 
contestants with different political backgrounds, some coming from left, social-democrat or 
sovereignist movements (Interview 14, 2017). Some contestants from this committee joined the 
ADR later on. 
Before the launch of the Parliament’s campaign, the EAC discussed organisational 
matters92. EAC members planned information meetings on the new treaty with citizens. 
Parliament sought to publicise the referendum. Discussions with experts made the treaty 
understandable to the Luxembourgish population. According to a CSV MP, Luxembourg 
should have an interest to become one of the first countries to launch national discussions on 
the Constitutional Treaty93. The idea was also to use the Chamber’s TV channel in order to 
touch more citizens. The nature itself of the referendum was a controversial topic within the 
EAC, as ADR members wished to organise a decisional referendum, while the majority of MPs 
was in favour of a consultative referendum94. Suggestions concerning the campaign were also 
oriented towards the organisation of three public hearings in Parliament in March and April 
2005, before the first vote on the draft bill95. An ADR EAC member proposed to distribute the 
treaty text to the population, while an MP from Déi Gréng pleaded for the establishment of a 
website dedicated to the referendum campaign96. An internet forum was established on 5th May 
2005 that allowed discussions on the treaty after each hearing on topics such as the ideological 
orientation of the treaty, citizenship, economy, social affairs and labour97.  
The first hearing on the Constitutional Treaty organised by the Chamber of Deputies 
took place on the 22nd April 2005 and dealt with “Democracy in the EU”98. Civil society, MPs 
from different political affiliations and MEPs participated in the hearing. Further hearings were 
organised as planned by the EAC on 29th April on the “Social and ecological Europe” and on 
 
92 See EAC meeting 11.10.2004 (A-CHD-P-2004-O-AEEDC-06 ), 29.11.2004 (A-CHD-P-2004-O-AEEDC-12, 
A-CHD-P-2004-O-COSAC-01), 28.02.2005 (A-CHD-P-2005-O-AEDCI-31) and 07.03.2005 (A-CHD-P-2005-O-
AEDCI-33).  
93 See EAC meeting 11.10.2004 (A-CHD-P-2004-O-AEEDC-06 ). 
94 See EAC meeting 29.11.2004 (A-CHD-P-2004-O-AEEDC-12, A-CHD-P-2004-O-COSAC-01); 12.04.2005, 
29th plenary session, TOP 6: 5443- Projet de loi portant organisation d’un referendum national sur le Traité 
établissant une Constitution pour l’Europe, signé à Rome, le 29 octobre 2004. 
95 See EAC meeting 07.03.2005 (A-CHD-P-2005-O-AEDCI-33). 
96 See EAC meeting 28.02.2005 (A-CHD-P-2005-O-AEDCI-31). 
97 See Compte-rendu des séances publiques N°8, session ordinaire 2004-2005, Chambre des Députés du 
Luxembourg 
98 See EAC meeting 22.04.2005 (A-CHD-P-2005-O-AEDCI-40). 
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06th May 2005 on “The EU’s engagement for peace”99. In these hearings, the civil society 
composed of trade unionists, members of the “Committee of the No”, members of industrial 
federations, foundations, public and private persons were present and exposed their opinion on 
the treaty. The results of these hearings were then incorporated in the EAC’s report on the 
Constitutional Treaty, which was adopted in June 2005. Apart from the hearings in Parliament, 
individual MPs were also participating in public meetings across the country to explain the 
treaty to citizens, as well as in television and radio shows. The Chamber’s TV broadcasted for 
instance debates at the end of June and beginning of July 2005 between MPs from the CSV, DP 
and LSAP groups100. Hearings and public meetings organised by Parliament were respecting a 
balanced representation of opinions according to some interviewees (Interview 14, 2017). 
Overall, the whole parliament got actively involved in the referendum campaign (Interview 4, 
10, 2017). 
During the whole campaign, the opinion of the civil society and the population played a 
significant role in MPs’ activism. Professional chambers (Business Chamber), trade unions 
(LCGB, OGBL), NGO’s (ATTAC) and other interest groups (FEDIL, UNEL, Mouvement 
Ecologique) contributed to the debates on the referendum by publicising their opinion101. The 
enthusiasm of the beginning started to waver as opinion polls became less positive in the course 
of 2005, dropping to 46% of citizens supporting the treaty in May 2005 according to a poll of 
TNS-ILRES. The pressure exerted on the parliament increased. The Chamber promised to 
respect the voters’ decision and made a second parliamentary vote conditional on the results of 
the referendum during an EAC meeting on 06th June 2005, as well as through the adoption of a 
resolution on 8th June and a press conference102. Debates emerged within Parliament about 
maintaining or not the date of the referendum. The negative results of the French and Dutch 
referenda represented significant challenges for Luxembourg and gave a highly symbolic value 
to the national referendum in July.  
Overall, political positions became more chaotic in the course of the campaign. While 
most MPs were defending a political line supporting the European treaty, the campaign 
resembled more an electoral campaign where parties started to promote domestic issues rather 
than the Constitutional Treaty itself. Several factors can be the reason for this. Firstly, the 
decreasing support of the population, the widening gap between the opinion of the civil society 
and the political elites, and the decision to maintain the date of the referendum, pushed CSV 
MPs to orient their discourses towards national topics in order to convince citizens to approve 
the treaty (Dumont/Fehlen/Kies/Poirier, 2007). Jean-Claude Juncker even threatened to 
withdraw from his position as Prime Minister if the results of the referendum were negative. 
This decision was criticised by the DP and Déi Gréng parties, which disagreed with the strategy 
to mix European and national issues. Within the CSV party, the Prime Minister was the leader 
and the main representative of the campaign. CSV MPs relied mainly on him. The campaign 
became an opportunity for growing dramatization and personalisation of the national debate on 
 
99 See EAC meeting 29.04.2005 (A-CHD-P-2005-O-AEDCI-43) and 06.05.2005 (A-CHD-P-2005-O-AEDCI-45). 
100 See Compte-rendu des séances publiques N°10, session ordinaire 2004-2005, Chambre des Députés du 
Luxembourg. 
101 See https://www.forum.lu/referendum/rubrique238d.html?id_rubrique=7 (last accessed 28.05.2019) 
102 See EAC meeting 06.06.2005 (A-CHD-P-2005-O-AEDCI-53). 
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the Constitutional Treaty. MPs were using national topics to reassure their voters, keep their 
popularity and promote at the same time the benefits of European integration.  
Trade unions were particularly influential in this setback through their strong activism. 
While most of them supported the treaty at the beginning of the campaign, the low support for 
social rights in the treaty left them disillusioned later on (Interview 14, 2017). They stopped 
supporting the treaty, but did not plead in favour of the “No”. Their apathy pushed some parts 
of the population to reject the treaty, especially in the southern part of Luxembourg, old mining 
area with higher rates of unemployment. The ADR also changed its opinion on the treaty. After 
its congress in April 2005, a majority of ADR members insisted that the party supported the 
“No” camp during the campaign (Dumont/Fehlen/Kies/Poirier, 2007). The pressure from their 
electorate probably pushed the ADR to modify its position. Overall, the consensus within the 
Chamber of Deputies on the Constitutional Treaty crumbled. The first parliamentary vote in the 
Chamber on 28th June 2005 illustrated this trend. We observed discrepant opinions within the 
Déi Gréng party, where single MPs rejected the treaty but had to comply with the party line that 
largely welcomed it. Dissensions appeared also between parties, with the ADR rejecting 
unanimously the treaty during the vote in Parliament. Finally, the Constitutional Treaty was 
adopted during the first vote with 55 voices out of 60, and during the second vote with 57 
voices103.  
The chaotic campaign and the inconsistent positions of the political parties might have 
influenced the referendum results (Interview 10, 2017). In the end, 56,52% of the population 
voted in favour of the treaty and 43,48% against it. The results were rather destabilising for 
MPs (Interview 10, 14, 2017). It showed the fracture between the population and political 
representatives. The gap between the elites’ visions and the public opinion were rather 
surprising in a country renowned for its pro-European culture. The south of Luxembourg 
rejected massively the treaty. Voters from this area were particularly influenced by trade unions 
and nationalist positions. MP’s attention shifted from European to national topics and illustrated 
the significance of ideological positions during the campaign.  
Debates tended to separate two kinds of actors: pro-European treaty proponents and 
sovereignist treaty opponents (Interview 14, 2017). Political ideologies played indeed a role in 
MPs’ involvement in the referendum campaign and the support of the treaty. While MPs 
labelled as “pro-European” belonging to the CSV, DP and LSAP supported the treaty, ADR 
members returned to their sovereignist position in the course of the campaign, influenced by 
their voters. Positions were more mitigated among Déi Gréng MPs. During the last weeks of 
the campaign, the growing polarisation on EU matters between the ADR and the rest of the 
parties gave MPs a renewed impetus to defend their positions. However, even the ADR was 
 
103 See 28.06.2005, 42nd plenary session, TOP 4: 5442 - Projet de loi portant approbation du Traité établissant une 
Constitution pour l'Europe, des Protocoles annexés au Traité établissant une Constitution pour l'Europe, des 
Annexes I et II et de l'Acte final, signés à Rome, le 29 octobre 2004, 
http://www.chd.lu/wps/wcm/connect/public/6627092c-4b68-4cc9-aa40-
d4366b2167c8/CR011.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CONVERT_TO=url&CACHEID=ROOTWORKSPACE.Z18_K
HCC1240NODGE0AJHT6HU41083-6627092c-4b68-4cc9-aa40-d4366b2167c8-jbyxTT3 (last accessed 
02.03.2018). 
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divided internally. Most MPs adopted a national-centred discourse, defending their own 
interests to maintain their electoral popularity. It can best be illustrated by the fact that the 
“national union” that was established earlier in 2005 to support the government’s actions during 
the EU Presidency broke apart during the referendum campaign due to domestic dissensions. 
To summarise, the absence of clear polarisation patterns on the Constitutional Treaty and the 
referendum does not permit to validate hypothesis H1. Indeed, the growing tensions in the 
political landscape do not mean that polarisation tendencies emerged, as the consensual culture 
was still predominant. 
Analysis of parliamentary activity 
The Chamber of Deputies was particularly active during the follow-up of the 
negotiations on the Constitutional Treaty, especially during the referendum campaign in 2005. 
However, the two most involved actors in the discussions were MPs from the EAC and from 
the Committee on Institutions and Constitutional Revision. Between 2003 and 2005, the EAC 
met 20 times to discuss the Constitutional Treaty and Luxembourg’s EU Presidency. The 
Committee on Institutions and Constitutional Revision met 7 times to discuss the procedures to 
organise the national referendum on the treaty. During the same period, the Chamber met 6 
times in plenary to debate on the Constitutional Treaty. The table A (see appendix 1) sums up 
all the meetings. 
If we observe again the number of EAC meetings by taking the graph of section 6.3.2.1, 
we observe a drastic increase between 2003-2004 and 2004-2005, during the time where the 
Constitutional Treaty was up-to-date. Even though most meetings were not linked to the treaty, 
the European context might be at the origin of this surge of activity. Moreover, the increase 
could be also the result of the aftermath of the 2004 parliamentary elections, which boosted 
parliamentary activity. Moreover, EAC members might have met more often to prepare 
Luxembourg’s EU Presidency in 2005. 
Figure 22: Number of EAC meetings in the context of the Constitutional Treaty (in total), 
Chamber of Deputies 
 
Source: Own calculations based on the annual analytical tables provided by the Chamber of Deputies, 
http://www.chd.lu/wps/portal/public/Accueil/TravailALaChambre/SeancesPubliques/ComptesRendusSeances 
(last accessed 08.07.2019) 
The same applies to parliamentary instruments on EU affairs. Between 2003-2004 and 
2005-2006, the number of parliamentary questions, motions, interpellations and resolutions on 
EU affairs increased. A possible explanation could be that the Constitutional Treaty and the 
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referendum triggered higher attention on EU issues and pushed to more involvement in this 
field. The evolution of the number of parliamentary questions on EU affairs illustrates this trend. 
We observe a peak of activity between 2003 and 2005 (see figure 17). Half of the parliamentary 
questions on EU issues were submitted in 2004, while parliamentary activity diminished during 
Luxembourg’s EU Presidency in the first semester of 2005. Specifically on the Constitutional 
Treaty itself, MPs issued 3 resolutions (all were adopted), 5 motions (2 were adopted and 3 
rejected) and 10 parliamentary questions104. The table B (see appendix 1) sums up all the 
parliamentary instruments used between 2003 and 2005, whether MPs accepted or rejected 
them. 
Positioning on the political spectrum played a rather marginal role in MPs’ involvement. 
Both majority and opposition agreed consensually on the need to organise a referendum. Even 
majority MPs scrutinised their own government on the referendum issue and the Constitutional 
Treaty. Rather than criticising the government, the involvement of majority MPs might show 
that individual actions prevailed over collective involvement. For instance, the LSAP MP Ben 
Fayot occupied the function of EAC Chair and was particularly active in Parliament, driven by 
his personal convictions rather than his political affiliation. Therefore, we can indirectly validate 
sub-hypothesis H1.3, because group discipline was loose among majority MPs in a highly 
consensual context. In this case, the sub-hypothesis would rather be: “The lower the ideological 
polarisation between political parties on EU treaties, the looser the group discipline within 
parliament”. Moreover, even though opposition ADR MPs started to promote national interests 
during the referendum campaign, consensus prevailed between the rest of the parties. 
Parliamentary debates and instruments did not reflect any sharp tensions between the groups, 
neither between pro-Europeans and sovereignists, nor between opposition and majority. MPs’ 
positioning on the political spectrum barely influenced their involvement. Indeed, both majority 
and opposition were almost equally active in scrutinising their government. In that sense, we 
can confirm sub-hypothesis H1.1 and partially confirm sub-hypothesis H1.2. Even though 
consensus reigned over the treaty, ideologies still seemed to play a bigger role in MPs’ 
involvement.  
If we observe now the profiles of active key players, we observe that individual EAC 
members submitted all 3 resolutions, 1 out of 5 motions105 and 5 out of 10 parliamentary 
questions106. In this case, committee membership within Parliament seemed to influence 
parliamentary activity with regard to the follow-up of the Constitutional Treaty. Indeed, we 
noticed two types of MPs active in debates and the use of parliamentary tools: EAC members 
and sectoral committee members with leadership positions in their group or committee. Group 
presidents were especially active within the ADR, LSAP, Déi Gréng and DP. In general, the 
complexity of the treaty did not trigger MPs’ enthusiasm to discuss these matters, leaving it to 
their more competent colleagues (Interview 11, 2017). These elements seem to be in favour of 
sub-hypothesis H2.1. Depending on their political activities within Parliament (committee 
membership, leadership positions), MPs’ involvement with regard to the Constitutional Treaty 
 
104 According to own calculations based on the online archives of the Chamber of Deputies and the analytical tables 
per legislative sessions. 
105 The motion counted among the two motions that were accepted. 
106 Own calculations based on the Chamber’s analytical tables and its online archives. 
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varied. MPs with “Europeanised” profiles tended to be the main scrutinisers of the 
Constitutional Treaty. While EAC members tended to focus on the European level, members 
from the sectoral committees promoted national topics or stayed out of the debates. EAC 
members submitted the most parliamentary instruments and were the main competent 
interlocutors during IGCs on the Constitutional Treaty.  
Apart from EAC members, the rest of MPs that participated in the referendum campaign 
might have been pushed by rational considerations such as re-election prospects. Indeed, the 
complexity of the treaty discouraged the public opinion. The translation of complex aspects of 
the treaty into comprehensible national stakes tended to be considered as a strategy that would 
ensure both the ratification of the treaty and voters’ support to their MPs. However, we cannot 
say that polarisation encouraged sectoral committee members’ use of scrutiny instruments, 
which does not confirm sub-hypothesis H2.2. Indeed, sectoral committee members became 
active within a consensual atmosphere, even though tensions arose during the referendum 
campaign. Some CSV MPs explained that the expertise and leading role of the Prime Minister 
as CSV member convinced them to stay away from these issues, as they trusted their 
representative and did not see the need to either acquire more information or become more 
active in the debate on the new treaty (Interview 15, 17, 2017). Only those dealing directly with 
EU affairs on a daily basis, be it EAC members or the president of the parliamentary group, 
were among the most active CSV MPs. This trend is reflected in the use of parliamentary 
instruments between 2003 and 2005. Overall, CSV MPs used the less the parliamentary tools 
to scrutinise their Government on the Constitutional Treaty. The main explanation lies probably 
in the fact that they belonged to the majority and focused on providing support to governmental 
decisions. The same can be said about DP MPs. Until 2004, MPs from the then coalition partner 
DP were also absent from the scrutiny of the Constitutional Treaty. On the other hand, once the 
LSAP came to Government in 2004, its parliamentary group used scrutiny tools to the same 
extent as before 2004. An explanation could be the personality of the initiator, who was leader 
of the LSAP group from 2004 onwards. The MP had an extensive experience in EU affairs and 
might have acted according to personal rather than political convictions, even if this meant to 
scrutinise more often his own government members. 
 A large proportion of key players had a high seniority in Parliament, be they member 
of the EAC or sectoral committees. Some MPs followed previous treaty negotiations and 
accumulated knowledge on parliamentary practices, which gave them the legitimacy to 
represent their group during the discussions. EAC members participated in several European 
parliamentary conferences. These MPs had a European experience that sensitised them to EU 
affairs. They also benefitted from direct contacts and networks on the EU level, which provided 
them with ex-ante information and made them more independent from sole governmental 
sources. For instance, among the active users of parliamentary scrutiny tools, we found 
members of the Convention on the Future of Europe. The most typical example of an actively 
engaged MP with a “Europeanised” profile is a former LSAP MP that exerted a long-lasting 
mandate (four legislative periods)107. The MP occupied the position of EAC Chair for two 
consecutive legislative periods, i.e. for ten years, as well as the position of President of the 
 
107 See Interview 3, 2017. 
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LSAP group between 2004 and 2009. At the time of the Constitutional Treaty, the MP had 
already experience as former member of the delegation to the Convention on the Future of 
Europe and became rapporteur on the new treaty and the national laws implementing it in 2004. 
Engaged in local politics for several years, the MP also had an experience as MEP for ten years 
(Interview 4, 2017).  
Experience in Government did not seem to be prevalent in MPs’ involvement. Some 
MPs from the majority (CSV/LSAP), but also from the DP, had prior functions in ministries. 
Majority MPs with experience in Government belonged mainly to the EAC. This could mean 
that they chose the EAC as a renowned committee for political profiling with the objective to 
return to Government. This argument is consolidated by the fact that several LSAP EAC 
members became government members in 2004 after the elections. For majority MPs, prior 
experience in Government might have affected their parliamentary work, because they might 
have benefitted from privileged contacts with former ministry colleagues that made them more 
inclined to support their Government’s policy. While MPs’ profiles might be somewhat 
indicative of governmental influence on parliamentary work, the fact that the rapporteur on the 
Constitutional Treaty belonged to the LSAP surely indicates that the majority monitored closely 
the discussions on the treaty. 
While membership in national unions was quite common among EAC members, we 
observed that only few key players from the ADR and LSAP belonged to an interest group. 
Indeed, these two parties are represented in the trade unions OGBL and NGL. However, their 
direct influence on MPs’ parliamentary work was quite limited. Considering only MPs’ 
sociological profiles, we could not find clear evidence that civil society influenced their 
behaviour in Parliament. Only ADR MPs might have used their trade union affiliation to shape 
their opinion on the Constitutional Treaty and the referendum. For instance, the then president 
of the ADR was also president of the NGL trade union representing workers and employees 
and affiliated to the ADR party. Another ADR member was former member of the Free 
Luxembourg Federation of Farmers (FLB) from 1979 to 1998 and became vice-president of the 
agricultural association PROCOLA until 2008. Membership in these interest groups might have 
encouraged ADR members to defend national interests. Proof could be their request to organise 
a national referendum on the Constitutional Treaty (Motion, 13.02.2003; Written question, 
14.06.2005). Overall, national unions’ influence was rather external through opinions, their 
participation in the referendum campaign and in parliamentary hearings. For instance, ADR 
MPs operated an ideological turnaround after the party’s congress in 2005, following pressure 
from organisations to reject the treaty. During the first vote in Parliament, the whole group was 
absent from the debate. During the second vote in October 2005, confusion reigned among ADR 
MPs. Only one ADR member, who left the party in 2006 because of internal disagreements, 
voted against the treaty.  
To conclude, the Constitutional Treaty pushed to regular debates on the need to integrate 
EU matters in Parliament. The large consensus reigning over the treaty gave considerable power 
to the Government over the negotiations. The referendum campaign seemed to have raised the 
awareness of all MPs about the importance of EU affairs. This awareness was turned either 
towards domestic issues derived from aspects in the treaty, or directly towards the content of 
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the treaty. National unions contributed to raise this awareness by participating actively in the 
referendum campaign. However, their opinion affected only the ADR’s position. 
 
5.4.2 The Constitutional Treaty: an opportunity for institutional change within the Chamber of 
Deputies? 
 
Discussions on institutional improvements within the Chamber of Deputies in the field 
of EU affairs started already during the Convention on the Future of Europe. On 13th February 
2003, during a plenary debate on the Convention, most opposition MPs from LSAP, ADR and 
Déi Gréng called for more parliamentary participation rights108. LSAP MPs underlined for 
instance the importance to communicate developments of the Convention to citizens through 
the parliament TV channel. Déi Gréng MPs suggested amending the Chamber’s RoP to allow 
the establishment of a permanent EAC, MEPs’ participation rights as observers in all committee 
meetings and a better cooperation between Parliament and Government. During another 
parliamentary debate in July 2003 on the Convention, Déi Gréng MPs reiterated their wish to 
strengthen parliamentary rights in EU affairs109. According to them, the Chamber of Deputies 
needs to make efforts to increase its resources, reform its structures and bring EU affairs closer 
to Luxembourgish citizens.  
The Chapter 10 on European Affairs was created from scratch in the RoP in 2003 and 
contained a single Article 156 on parliamentary participation rights in EU affairs. The 
parliamentary administration got also involved in reflexions over scrutiny reforms. In 
November 2003, an internal note written by a civil servant from the EAC secretariat mentioned 
several institutional and procedural improvements that were under discussion. The suggestion 
to establish a permanent EAC was rapidly abandoned in favour of the decentralisation of EU 
affairs. It was also suggested to increase the frequency of committee meetings and to place 
European legislative proposals at the beginning of the EAC’s agenda accompanied by the 
Government’s impact assessments. The system of document classification within the Chamber 
was also modified in 2003. Finally, the note mentioned the probable change in the functions of 
the EAC secretariat. Thoughts were about changing the secretariat’s tasks of EU documents 
classification into research tasks, including the writing of opinions. An increase in personnel 
specialised in EU affairs was also foreseen.  
On the 8th March 2004, the Chamber’s Bureau decided to introduce a European 
dimension in the committees’ work. Following this decision, a series of discussions followed 
in the EAC from the end of 2004 onwards, when the new Government decided to organise a 
referendum on the Constitutional Treaty. The fact that the role of national parliaments was on 
the agenda of the Convention on the Future of Europe and integrated into the new treaty 
probably triggered higher awareness among MPs about the need to improve their institutional 
 
108 See 13.02.2003, 31st plenary session, TOP 2 « Débat d’orientation relatif à la Convention sur l’avenir de 
l’Europe ». 
109 See 01.07.2003, 64th plenary session, TOP 5 « Débat d'orientation relatif au document final retenu par la 
Convention sur l'avenir de l'Europe », « Résolution du groupe LSAP relative à la tenue d'un référendum sur un 
futur Traité instituant une Constitution européenne ». 
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framework. Moreover, the referendum campaign triggered revisions of the Chamber’s scrutiny 
system. Discourses about improving the role of the Luxembourg Chamber multiplied and ideas 
emerged about the way to improve parliamentary participation. Between September 2004 and 
February 2006, the EAC met 9 times to discuss, sometimes exclusively, the Chamber’s internal 
scrutiny procedures in EU affairs (see appendix 1, table C). 
Even though most MPs tended to be aware that EU affairs would play a bigger role in 
their daily parliamentary work, only a limited number took initiatives towards institutional 
reforms. Most initiatives originated from few individual MPs with strong personal motivations 
to improve their institutional framework. Most “political entrepreneurs” of change were the 
same MPs that led the debates on the Constitutional Treaty and the referendum. While EAC 
members were actively encouraging revisions and triggering the debates110, members of the 
RoP committee and the committee on Institutions and Constitutional Revision discussed the 
implementation of change within Parliament. The then EAC chair (LSAP) and vice-chair (DP) 
were particularly active in promoting the Chamber’s scrutiny rights. Overall, the seniority rate 
among the main initiators of change was high. Only the most experienced MPs got interested 
and legitimised to trigger reforms. In addition to that, the profiles of “political entrepreneurs” 
were also characterised by a high proportion of leadership positions, be it in parliamentary 
groups or committees. MPs who got involved in reform discussions represented either their 
group’s position or were spokespersons of their whole committee as chair or vice-chair. Even 
though consensus reigned over the debates to redefine the chamber’s scrutiny procedures, each 
group had its own position on the matter. This might explain why political leaders were at the 
heart of the discussions, because revisions touched upon each group’s scrutiny rights in 
Parliament. Overall, majority group and committee leaders had the upper hand in the debates, 
especially the LSAP. The latter demanded substantial revisions in Parliament, while CSV MPs’ 
proposals seemed to be more timid. The DP backed the proposals of the LSAP EAC Chair. 
Alongside leadership positions, few MPs from the LSAP, CSV and DP also had a prior 
experience in Government. For them, getting involved in discussions on scrutiny revisions 
might have meant a boost in their political career for future positions in Government. Moreover, 
most key players participated in interparliamentary conferences and got sensitised to EU issues 
through them. Almost all Luxembourgish COSAC members led the discussions on internal 
parliamentary reforms. The COSAC releases a report every six months on EU practices and 
procedures, evaluating structural and procedural scrutiny methods and improvements in 
national parliaments. We assume that MPs who were COSAC members might have been more 
sensitised to change their parliament’s scrutiny methods. Membership in national unions did 
not affect MPs’ involvement in discussions on institutional change. Indeed, only few ADR and 
CSV MPs were at the same time affiliated to trade unions. The latter were more interested in 
the debates on the referendum than on institutional change within the Chamber of Deputies. 
Between 2004 and 2006, discussions multiplied on procedural revisions within the 
Chamber of Deputies. On the 20th September 2004, the EAC discussed the follow-up of EU 
 
110 See for instance the plenary debates on 01.07.2003 or 25.10.2005, where most speakers were either EAC 
members or (former) members of the Convention on the Future of Europe. 
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documents in the Chamber of Deputies111. The then EAC Chair, member of the LSAP group 
and of the COSAC delegation, insisted on increasing the participation of the Chamber in EU 
affairs through a strengthening of its HR resources. A civil servant was hired to be represented 
in the COSAC secretariat and the idea was mentioned to invite the person in an EAC meeting. 
The Chair also pointed out that the Chamber still did not have a representative in Brussels at 
that time. A DP MP, Vice-Chair of the EAC, believed that regular exchanges with the Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs would boost the follow-up of EU documents. The MP also requested from 
the Government to prepare explanatory notes on EU documents whenever national interests are 
concerned. A CSV MP proposed the creation of an intranet permitting the exchange of 
information between Parliament and Government.  
Even government members reflected on ways to improve parliamentary scrutiny of EU 
affairs. The then deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs and Immigration suggested keeping the 
EAC informed on important meetings of the Council and the European Council. The deputy 
minister also suggested a closer cooperation and the establishment of such explanatory notes 
during the subsidiarity monitoring process. On 11th October 2004, discussions on parliamentary 
involvement in EU affairs continued in the EAC112. A CSV MP pointed out that committee 
chairs should get sensitised to EU affairs. To encourage this, the EAC Chair suggested 
establishing a conference of committee chairs based on the model of the existing conference 
within the European Parliament. An ADR MP argued that the cooperation with other national 
parliaments should be strengthened. The Vice-Chair of the EAC suggested an earlier 
participation in Council negotiations through the drafting of opinion for the Government. The 
DP MP also suggested inviting European Commissioners to EAC meetings. Moreover, the idea 
to let MEPs participate in meetings of sectoral committees emerged again during an EAC 
meeting on 03rd October 2005113. Other EAC members from LSAP, Déi Gréng and ADR 
repeated the need to increase the Chamber’s resources in personnel.  
The EAC discussed again procedures in EU affairs on 24th October 2005114 in the 
context of implementation delays of European directives in Luxembourg. The Vice-Chair of 
the EAC reiterated the necessity to obtain explanatory notes from the Government on EU 
documents to reinforce the Parliament-Government cooperation. Additionally, the 
parliamentary administration suggested new solutions to improve the scrutiny of EU affairs. 
The Secretary General of Parliament suggested creating a common table between the 
Government, the Council of State and the Chamber of Deputies ensuring the follow-up of EU 
matters at the earliest possible stage. He participated several times in EAC meetings in the 
course of 2004-2005, contributing to the debate on procedural changes.  
Luxembourg’s EU Presidency and especially the referendum on the Constitutional 
Treaty represented opportunities for the Parliament to undertake reforms. On 25th October 2005, 
a CSV EAC member argued during the second parliamentary vote on the Constitutional treaty 
 
111 See EAC meeting 20.09.2004 (A-CHD-P-2004-O-AEEDC-02). 
112 See EAC meeting 11.10.2004 (A-CHD-P-2004-O-AEEDC-06). 
113 See EAC meeting 03.10.2005 (A-CHD-P-2005-O-AEDCI-63). 
114 See EAC meeting 24.10.2005 (A-CHD-P-2005-O-AEDCI-05). 
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that the referendum illustrated the need for a strengthened debating culture about EU affairs115. 
This debating culture should be encouraged by single MPs. Only their political will to engage 
in EU affairs could ensure parliament’s effective ex-ante involvement.  
The EAC meeting on 28th November 2005 discussed the Parliament’s weak ex-ante 
involvement and political groups’ lack of specialised personnel116. The suggestions of EAC 
members to strengthen the Chamber’s participation rights in EU affairs led to the establishment 
of the “European Strategy of the Chamber of Deputies” at the beginning of 2006117. The 
European Strategy consisted in a series of procedural revisions: the creation of a permanent 
representative of the Parliament in Brussels on 1st January 2006; the revision of the selection 
procedure of EU documents, with the addition of short summary notes to MPs; the development 
of new communication tools, such as the establishment of a “Europe” section to the Chamber’s 
webpage and a more regular broadcast of EU matters on the Chamber’s TV channel118. 
Suggestions such as the possibility to invite European Commissioners or MEPs in sectoral 
committees were mentioned explicitly in the European Strategy of the Chamber. Each 
committee chair was invited to include on their committee’s agenda a point on EU matters.  
To conclude, the Constitutional Treaty clearly increased MPs’ awareness about the need 
to include systematically EU affairs in their work. In that case, the salience of the new treaty 
within Parliament seemed to have triggered institutional change in the form of procedural 
revisions. This observation validates sub-hypothesis H 3.1 according to which the weaker a 
parliament’s scrutiny system (see ranking made in the Europeanisation literature about 
Luxembourg), the more MPs engage in institutional change. Personal convictions rather than 
political affiliation and competition seemed to have motivated “political entrepreneurs” to 
trigger change within the Chamber of Deputies. It validates sub-hypothesis H3.2, because the 
consensual atmosphere within the chamber encouraged MPs with “Europeanised” profiles to 
take the lead of amendments. Indeed, consensus between opposition and majority was high on 
the direction of change within the Chamber of Deputies. MPs’ high seniority level, their 
European experience and their leadership position in Parliament constituted driving 
motivations. However, effective institutional change in the wake of the Constitutional Treaty 
turned out to be limited. 
 
5.4.3 Conclusion 
 
This part analysed parliamentary involvement and institutional change in the Chamber 
of Deputies in the context of the Constitutional Treaty. We observed that the level of 
parliamentary involvement increased during the period 2003-2005, proof that the European 
context affected MPs’ work. Firstly, we saw that MPs’ sociological profiles played a crucial 
 
115 See 25.10.2005, 5th plenary session, TOP 6: 5442- « Projet de loi portant approbation du Traité établissant une 
Constitution pour l’Europe, des Protocoles annexes au Traité établissant une Constitution pour l’Europe, des 
Annexes I et II et de l’Acte final, signés à Rome, le 29 octobre 2004 – Second vote constitutionnel » 
116 See EAC meeting 28.11.2005 (A-CHD-P-2005-O-AEDCI-11). 
117 See EAC meeting 23.01.2006 (A-CHD-P-2006-O-AEDCI-18). 
118 See « La stratégie européenne de la Chambre des députés », 2006. 
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role in parliamentary involvement. Indeed, the most “Europeanised” MPs, which were mainly 
EAC members and COSAC delegates, were the main scrutinisers of the treaty and “political 
entrepreneurs” of change. Probably partly inspired by COSAC discussions on the role of 
national parliaments, they were at the origin of the “European Strategy” of the Chamber that 
marked a significant step towards a strengthened involvement in EU affairs. Group leaders, 
whether EAC members or not, were also actively using the scrutiny instruments.  
Membership in national unions, although quite common among EAC members and MPs 
in general, did not seem to influence directly MPs’ involvement in the follow-up of the 
Constitutional Treaty. However, interest groups exerted their influence through other channels, 
by participating in the public hearings organised by the Chamber of Deputies, or by publishing 
opinions and organising campaigns. Therefore, MPs must have been indirectly pressured by the 
civil society in their referendum campaign. In that same line of thought, MPs’ ideological 
positions on the treaty seem to have determined their activities. Before 2005, all MPs were in 
favour of the treaty, no matter their positioning on the political spectrum (whether opposition 
or majority). This consensus started to crumble during the referendum campaign, when more 
and more ADR party members joined the “No” movement. Interest groups also pressured the 
party to change its position. Finally, ADR MPs were confused and divided over the treaty. 
Group discipline crumbled during the second parliamentary vote when one ADR MP voted 
against the Constitutional Treaty, while the rest voted in favour. These observations prove that 
the pressure of civil society influenced to a great extent parliamentary activity. The same cannot 
be said in the case of the Council of State, which merely gave its opinion on the Government’s 
draft bill before it entered Parliament. Apart from this statement, the Chamber of Deputies did 
not interact with the Council of State.  
While ideological considerations dictated parliamentary activity, institutional change 
within the Chamber was implemented in a consensual environment, all key players agreeing on 
the revisions. Compromises might have been easier on reforms, because they touched upon 
necessary improvements in terms of participation rights without ideological implications. 
Nevertheless, coalition partners kept control over the direction of change. The parliamentary 
administration also played a significant role of influencer in the revisions, endorsing the role of 
coordinator of institutional change. However, scrutiny reinforcement within the Chamber 
between 2003 and 2006 remained limited. EAC members made multiple suggestions, but only 
a few were retained in the “European Strategy”. Even though discourses were oriented towards 
a mainstreaming of EU affairs, the reality showed a different situation. Mainstreaming remained 
at the stage of rhetorical promises. MPs’ awareness about EU affairs certainly grew during that 
period, but effective involvement remained limited to the most competent MPs. 
 
5.5 Evolution of parliamentary involvement in the context of negotiations on the Lisbon 
Treaty (2006-2009) 
 
This part will analyse parliamentary involvement and institutional change in the wake 
of negotiations on the Treaty of Lisbon. Just as the previous section on the Constitutional 
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Treaty, we aim to explain how MPs’ motivations and institutional environment influenced their 
involvement in the follow-up of the Lisbon Treaty. The first part aims to test to what extent 
polarisation within Parliament and the treaty’s salience determined parliamentary activity (H1). 
We will also check how polarisation between parties affected mainstreaming trends within 
parliaments (H2). The second part focuses on scrutiny reinforcement in the context of the 
Lisbon Treaty (H3). 
 
5.5.1 Parliamentary involvement in the framework of the negotiations on the Lisbon Treaty 
General context 
After the failure of the Constitutional Treaty, a period of reflexion on the European level 
was established. During the German EU Presidency that started in January 2007, Luxembourg 
organised with Spain a meeting of the “Friends of the Constitution” in Madrid on 26th January 
2007, as a sign of support to the German strategy to revive discussions on a European treaty.  
While Luxembourgish elites, in particular those dealing directly with EU affairs, remained 
enthusiastic about a new European treaty, the public opinion became more sceptical about the 
EU in the course of the year 2006. 54% of the population thought that the EU had a positive 
image in spring 2006, compared to 57% in autumn 2005, showing an opposite trend to the 
European Union in general119. Trust in national institutions also wavered after the referendum, 
even though the rates stayed above the European average. Government lost 3% of trust between 
autumn 2005 and spring 2006, passing from 68% to 65% of people trusting it120. The Chamber 
of Deputies and political parties lost even more trust from the population, passing respectively 
from 64% to 58% (-6 points) and 46% to 41% (-5 points) of Luxembourgians trusting these 
institutions. However, in autumn 2005, 53% of the population agreed that the Constitutional 
Treaty needed to be renegotiated and 25% thought that Member States should continue the 
ratification process121.  
The Chamber of Deputies started to discuss the next steps towards a new European 
Treaty in March 2007. Several EAC meetings focused on the future of the Constitutional Treaty 
between May and June 2007122. On 13th June 2007, an orientation debate in plenary was 
organised in the Chamber on the IGC of 21st-22nd June 2007 that marked the beginning of the 
drafting of a new treaty. During the plenary debate, a coalition of LSAP, Déi Gréng, DP and 
CSV MPs submitted a motion, adopted by a majority of 55 votes, asking the Government to 
negotiate the new treaty on the basis of the Constitutional Treaty123. A topical debate requested 
by the EAC on the European Council meeting in Lisbon on 18th-19th October 2007 was 
 
119 See Eurobarometer 65, report on Luxembourg, 
http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/archives/eb/eb65/eb65_lu_nat.pdf (last accessed 06.03.2018). 
120 Ibid. 
121 See Eurobarometer 64, report on Luxembourg, 
http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/archives/eb/eb64/eb64_lu_nat.pdf (last accessed 06.03.2018). 
122 See EAC meeting 07.05.2007 (A-CHD-P-2007-O-AEDCI-41), 18.05.2007 (A-CHD-P-2007-O-AEDCI-43) 
and 18.06.2007 (A-CHD-P-2007-O-AEDCI-49).  
123 See 13.06.2007, 36th plenary session, TOP4 « Débat d’orientation en vue du Conseil européen des 21 et 22 
juin 2007 sur le mandat d’une Conférence intergouvernementale relative au Traité Constitutionnel ». 
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organised in the Chamber of Deputies on the 23rd October124. A resolution submitted by an 
LSAP MP and supported by Déi Gréng, DP and CSV MPs requested a parliamentary ratification 
of the new treaty in the course of 2008 and was adopted by a majority of 55 votes (rejected by 
four ADR MPs and one independent MP). The Council of Government approved the draft bill 
ratifying the Treaty of Lisbon on 21st December 2007, after the Member States signed the treaty 
on 13th December 2007 in Lisbon. The Minister for Foreign Affairs and Immigration submitted 
the draft bill ratifying the Treaty of Lisbon to the Chamber of Deputies on 25th January 2008. 
The EAC was designated as competent for the examination of the draft bill. It nominated a 
rapporteur during its meeting on 11th February 2008125. The State Secretary for Relations with 
Parliament transferred amendments to the Treaty of Lisbon to Parliament on 18th April 2008. 
The Council of Government discussed the modalities of the ratification process and the 
implementation of the Treaty of Lisbon in Luxembourg on 2nd May 2008. In the meantime, the 
Council of State submitted its positive opinion on the Treaty of Lisbon on 6th May, which was 
examined in the EAC on 19th May. The EAC’s final report on the draft bill ratifying the new 
treaty was adopted in committee on 21st May 2008. The ratification in Parliament happened on 
29th May, where 47 MPs voted in favour of the treaty, one independent MP voted against it and 
the 3 ADR MPs abstained126. The Council of State exempted the Chamber of Deputies of a 
second constitutional vote on the Treaty of Lisbon on 17th June 2008.  
Negotiations on the Treaty of Lisbon led to a growing fracture between parties. On the 
one side, MPs from CSV, LSAP, DP and Déi Gréng supported the European integration process 
and the new treaty, and on the other side, the sovereignist party ADR defended increasingly 
protectionist positions. The majority of MPs, apart from the ADR group, agreed with the 
Government on several aspects of the treaty. According to the Government, the Constitutional 
Treaty should represent the basis of negotiations on the Treaty of Lisbon and its substance 
should be preserved in the new treaty127. Most groups in the Chamber also supported the 
creation of a European Minister for Foreign Affairs and the legally binding nature of the Charter 
on Fundamental Rights. All parties agreed on the need to strengthen national parliaments’ 
participation rights. The majority supported the transparency of the decision-making process, 
as well as the subsidiarity principle. According to an LSAP MP, the Early Warning Mechanism 
should not be used to block decisions, but rather to complement the reinforcement of 
parliamentary participation rights128. However, some aspects of the treaty triggered dissensions 
 
124 See « Heure d’actualité à la Chambre des députés sur le sommet de Lisbonne : le gouvernement et les députés 
saluent avec des nuances le traité réformateur », 24-10-2007, 
http://www.europaforum.public.lu/fr/actualites/2007/10/debat-chambre-lisbonne/index.html (last accessed 
06.03.2018). 
125 See EAC meeting 11.02.2008 (A-CHD-P-2008-O-AEDCI-30). 
126 See 29.05.2008, 43rd plenary session, 5833 – « Projet de loi portant approbation du Traité de Lisbonne 
modifiant le Traité sur l'Union européenne et le Traité instituant la Communauté européenne, des Protocoles, de 
l'Annexe et de l'Acte final de la Conférence intergouvernementale, 
signés à Lisbonne, le 13 décembre 2007 ».  
127 « La Chambre et le gouvernement luxembourgeois veulent un traité basé sur les acquis du traité constitutionnel 
que le Luxembourg a ratifié par référendum » , 13-06-2007 , 
http://www.europaforum.public.lu/fr/actualites/2007/06/chd_traite/index.html (last accessed 06.03.2018). 
128 « La Chambre des députés du Luxembourg a ratifié le traité de Lisbonne  
Ben Fayot: "L'intégration européenne est la matrice du Luxembourg moderne », 29-05-2008 
http://www.europaforum.public.lu/fr/actualites/2008/05/ratification-luxembourg/index.html (last accessed 
06.03.2018). 
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between parliamentary groups. The LSAP, DP and Déi Gréng supported the institutional 
equilibrium and the double-majority voting rule in the Council, while the CSV rejected them. 
CSV MPs were also against the enlargement of the European Union (Poirier/Dumont et al., 
2010). ADR MPs argued that the Treaty of Nice and not the Constitutional Treaty should serve 
as basis for the Treaty of Lisbon129. While most MPs were in favour of a short ratification 
process130, ADR members opposed this idea. ADR MPs also favoured the safeguard of the 
national sovereignty, the organisation of a referendum on the treaty and the anchoring in the 
Luxembourg Constitution of the right to initiate referenda whenever European treaties are 
reformed. The LSAP group rejected the latter idea.  
We observed that the support for the Treaty of Lisbon became more mitigated, the ADR 
opposing it from the beginning. As said before, even within the CSV, aspects such as Turkey’s 
accession to the EU were seen differently both by MPs and government members131. However, 
we cannot speak of a strong polarisation in the political landscape, as a majority still supported 
the treaty. Therefore, it does not seem to validate hypothesis H1, because parliamentary activity 
did not depend on the polarisation level within Parliament. Contrary to the Constitutional 
Treaty, MPs had no incentives to use European issues during negotiations on the Treaty of 
Lisbon to trigger their voters’ attention. The information campaign on the Treaty of Lisbon was 
not comparable to the one organised during the Constitutional Treaty. MPs and the public 
opinion lost their interest and enthusiasm. The reasons are twofold: the negative experience of 
the referendum in 2005, which showed that part of the population was not supportive of the EU; 
and the fact that the Treaty of Lisbon was the heritage of the previously failed Constitutional 
Treaty, which did not bring anything new to the debates already organised in 2005 (Interview 
14, 15, 2017). On top of this, MPs focused primarily on the upcoming legislative and European 
elections in June 2009, the tackling of the economic crisis that started in 2008 and national 
constitutional and ethical issues132 (Poirier/Dumont et al., 2010).  
 
129 L’ADR et le traité constitutionnel : un plaidoyer pour la souveraineté nationale, la subsidiarité, une économie 
sociale et écologique de marché et contre la Turquie  
11-06-2007 http://www.europaforum.public.lu/fr/actualites/2007/06/conference-adr/index.html (last accessed 
06.03.2018). 
130 Un article du député socialiste Ben Fayot : "Dans quelle Europe sommes-nous?"  
11-06-2007 http://www.europaforum.public.lu/fr/actualites/2007/06/fayot-quelle_europe/index.html (last 
accessed 06.03.2018); « Le DP veut préserver l’essentiel du traité constitutionnel, la Charte européenne des droits 
fondamentaux ainsi qu’une intégration de la dimension sociale, environnementale et énergétique dans le nouveau 
traité »,  
12-06-2007, http://www.europaforum.public.lu/fr/actualites/2007/06/conference-constitution-dp/index.html (last 
accessed 06.03.2018) ; « Midis de l’Europe : "La Chambre des députés et le Parlement européen - Mieux 
communiquer, mieux coopérer » , 09-12-2009, http://www.europaforum.public.lu/fr/actualites/2009/12/midis-
europe/ (last accessed 06.03.2018). 
131 « La Chambre des députés du Luxembourg a ratifié le traité de Lisbonne , Ben Fayot: "L'intégration européenne 
est la matrice du Luxembourg moderne », 29-05-2008 
http://www.europaforum.public.lu/fr/actualites/2008/05/ratification-luxembourg/index.html (last accessed 
06.03.2018). 
132 The powers of the Grand-Duke were at the centre of the national debate in 2008 following his refusal to sign a 
euthanasia law. In December 2008, the Chamber of Deputies decides to amend Article 34 of the Constitution and 
requests a revision of the Grand-Duke’s prerogatives to sanction laws 
(http://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2008/12/02/retif-a-legaliser-l-euthanasie-le-grand-duc-du-luxembourg-va-
perdre-du-pouvoir_1126146_3214.html , last accessed 12.03.2018).  
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Analysis of parliamentary activity 
As mentioned in the previous section, the Treaty of Lisbon did not trigger as much 
attention among political players as the Constitutional Treaty. The only action taken by the 
Chamber of Deputies, more specifically by the EAC, was the organisation of public hearings 
on the treaty. Parliament focused more on communication than on scrutiny. Indeed, reflexions 
about an information campaign towards citizens started in October 2007. While an LSAP MP 
suggested targeting the youth, a DP MP proposed to use the Chamber’s TV channel to broadcast 
information133. Hearings at the Parliament were mentioned for the first time during an EAC 
meeting on 17th October 2007134. On 22nd October 2007, the EAC discussed the organisation of 
a hearing on Europe on 9th November 2007 in the framework of the communication strategy set 
by the “European Strategy of the Chamber of Deputies” 135. The first hearing with high school 
students on “Europe’s challenges in the 21st century” took place as planned in the EAC on 09th 
November 2007136. A second hearing was then organised in the EAC on 18th January 2008 with 
the presence of four MEPs137. Discussions also turned around the fact that both Government 
and Parliament decided not to organise any referendum on the Treaty of Lisbon, following the 
experience made with the national referendum in 2005. Finally, the last public hearing in the 
EAC took place on 22nd February 2008 with students from the University of Luxembourg138.  
In total, three hearings were organised in Parliament, all targeting young people. Thus, 
the most active player within Parliament during the follow-up of the Treaty of Lisbon was the 
EAC, just as the previous time. Between June 2006 and December 2008, the EAC met 22 times 
to discuss the future of the Constitutional Treaty and in the end the Treaty of Lisbon. On top of 
this, 3 plenary debates were organised during this period. We can already notice that plenary 
debates, which included all MPs in the debates, were halved compared to the debates on the 
Constitutional Treaty. This could be a sign of general disinterest for the matter. Most 
discussions on the treaty took place in the EAC arena and remained limited to specialised MPs. 
The table D (see appendix 1) sums up the EAC meetings and plenary debates on the Treaty of 
Lisbon. 
As with the Constitutional Treaty, we saw a peak of EAC meetings between 2006 and 
2008, when the Treaty of Lisbon was being negotiated on the European level. Meetings then 
dropped in 2008-2009, which could be explained by the campaigns for the legislative and 
European elections in 2009, where MPs tended to prioritise domestic issues. The table below 
shows the trend in EAC meetings. 
 
 
 
 
133 See EAC meeting 08.10.2007 (A-CHD-P-2007-O-AEDCI-64). 
134 See EAC meeting 17.10.2007 (A-CHD-P-2007-O-AEDCI-02). 
135 See EAC meeting 22.10.2007 (A-CHD-P-2007-O-AEDCI-03). 
136 See EAC meeting 09.11.2007 (A-CHD-P-2007-O-AEDCI-09). 
137 See EAC meeting 18.01.2008 (A-CHD-P-2008-O-AEDCI-27). 
138 See EAC meeting 22.02.2008 (A-CHD-P-2008-O-AEDCI-34). 
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Figure 23: Number of EAC meetings in the context of the Lisbon Treaty (in total), 
Chamber of Deputies 
 
Source: Own calculations based on the annual analytical tables provided by the Chamber of Deputies, 
http://www.chd.lu/wps/portal/public/Accueil/TravailALaChambre/SeancesPubliques/ComptesRendusSeances 
(last accessed 12.03.2018). 
Contrary to trends observed during the referendum campaign on the Constitutional 
Treaty, which showed also an increase in the use of parliamentary tools, the proportion of 
parliamentary questions dedicated to EU affairs diminished drastically between 2006 and 2009 
(see figure 17). This could illustrate a trend, already mentioned before, of a growing disinterest 
for EU affairs among MPs, which translated into a decreasing use of parliamentary tools to 
scrutinise these matters. The lowest point during the legislative session 2008-2009 represented 
the year of legislative elections, where MPs tended to be more occupied with the electoral 
campaign and their personal profiling. 
The decreasing scrutiny of EU affairs is also reflected in the use of parliamentary 
instruments on issues related to the Treaty of Lisbon. Between 2006 and 2009, MPs submitted 
8 questions, 2 motions, 1 resolution and 1 request for a topical debate on the Treaty of Lisbon, 
less than during the Constitutional Treaty. The low salience of the Lisbon Treaty affected 
negatively parliamentary activity. The table E (see appendix 1) sums up all the used instruments 
in the framework of treaty discussions within the Chamber of Deputies. 
Political ideologies seemed to play a more important role in MPs’ involvement in the 
case of the Lisbon Treaty. Most treaty proponents were pro-Europeans, while the sovereignist 
group ADR rejected most aspects of the treaty. Generally and independently from their political 
positioning on the majority-opposition scale, pro-European opposition MPs used the most 
parliamentary instruments to encourage the integration process139. The few majority MPs that 
scrutinised the Government did it because of personal convictions and not political affiliation. 
Sub-hypothesis H1.1 seems to be confirmed, as political orientation affected the interest for EU 
affairs and thus the support for the treaty. MPs’ positioning on the political spectrum did not 
 
139 The ADR group represented in the EAC by two MPs submitted one motion and one question on the treaty 
between 2006 and 2009 (see table). 
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seem to affect their involvement, as opposition MPs submitted 6 out of 12 parliamentary 
instruments, while majority MPs submitted the rest. The fact that opposition and majority MPs 
used equally parliamentary tools proves that political affiliation mattered, but was less 
determinant in their involvement than their personal motivations. This observation partially 
confirms sub-hypothesis H1.2. However, even though equally active, the majority kept 
somewhat the control over the discussions, notably through the nomination of an LSAP 
rapporteur on the Lisbon Treaty. Overall, the traditional consensual system limited political 
tensions140. This time, even though majority MPs scrutinised their Government, group 
discipline remained strong within majority and opposition, even in the absence of polarisation 
trends. Therefore, we cannot validate sub-hypothesis H1.3. Moreover, the ADR as the only 
group rejecting the treaty did not represent such a substantial amount of voices so that political 
dynamics would be affected. Clearly, the absence of competition and polarisation, coupled with 
the low salience of the treaty, did not lead to substantial activity within the Chamber of 
Deputies. 
The Treaty of Lisbon did not appear as salient in the eyes of most MPs, with the 
exception of EAC members. According to a DP MP, “[…] among sixty MPs, only a dozen is 
ready to discuss European questions”, and that this reduced group needs to become more 
visible141. This seems to confirm again sub-hypothesis H2.1, according to which a profile linked 
to EU affairs might influence MPs’ involvement. As with the Constitutional Treaty, we can 
observe a gap between the “Europeanised” MPs, mostly EAC members, particularly involved 
in the follow-up of the treaty, and the rest of MPs staying away from the discussions. Therefore, 
in the same line of thought, we cannot validate sub-hypothesis H2.2, according to which sectoral 
committee members became more active in a polarised environment. The Treaty of Lisbon 
clearly showed that European affairs lost their attractiveness and fuelled minimal tensions 
between MPs, leaving these questions to those dealing directly with these issues. 
Sectoral committee members were totally absent from the debates, contrary to what we 
acknowledged during the referendum campaign in 2005. One reason could be the focus on 
national issues due to the upcoming elections in 2009. In light of these arguments, we can 
relativize mainstreaming. EAC members monopolised the discussions on the Lisbon Treaty. 
Two reasons can explain the predominance of EAC members on the parliamentary debates: the 
absence of mediatisation of the Lisbon Treaty, due to the general tiredness originating from the 
2005 referendum campaign, which did not provide MPs with electoral incentives to get 
involved; and the fact that EAC members remained the EU experts in parliament due to a lack 
of decentralisation towards sectoral committees. Among the most active EAC members during 
the follow-up of the Treaty of Lisbon, we find the same key players as during the follow-up of 
the Constitutional Treaty, at least in the biggest groups CSV, LSAP and DP. Most MPs exerted 
long-term mandates. Once again, key players’ profiles were almost identical to those who 
handled the Constitutional Treaty, simply because most MPs were already active during the 
previous treaty. Their seniority in Parliament gave them experience and knowledge of 
parliamentary practices and EU issues, letting them appear more legitimate to debate about the 
 
140 The ADR submitted for example a motion on 23rd October 2007 on the organization of a referendum on the 
new treaty, which was never considered by the other groups and was lapsed. 
141 http://www.europaforum.public.lu/fr/actualites/2009/12/midis-europe/ (last accessed 12.03.2018). 
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Lisbon Treaty. These EAC members had also a stronger interest for EU affairs through their 
regular participation in European interparliamentary conferences. Direct interactions with EU 
officials, MEPs and MPs from other parliaments gave them the necessary information to handle 
the Lisbon Treaty within the national parliamentary arena. Almost no MP had a prior experience 
in Government and affiliation to national unions did not play a role either, due to the lack of 
issue mediatisation. This time, ADR MPs could not mobilise trade unions on the Lisbon Treaty 
to the same extent as during the 2005 referendum campaign, because the stakes were not the 
same. Rather, key players’ motivations originated from personal experiences and beliefs and 
less from political strategies or pressure from the civil society. 
For instance, within the LSAP, the former member of the delegation to the Convention 
on the Future of Europe continued to deal actively with the Treaty of Lisbon. The MP was still 
a COSAC member (Interview 4, 2017). As EAC Chair and President of the LSAP, the MP 
animated the EAC meetings, endorsed the role of rapporteur on the treaty142 and pushed 
regularly to a strengthened dialogue on Europe between the Chamber and the citizens. He took 
the initiative to organise a public meeting with the Minister for Foreign Affairs on 19th 
September 2007143. Moreover, the MP triggered structural changes in the LSAP group by 
engaging a collaborator specialised in EU affairs and by pushing the activities of the “Europe” 
working group. The MP also shared the wish that the Chamber should encourage political 
debates on Europe144. His profile confirms what had been said in the previous part: participation 
in EU affairs was guided by the MP’s personal convictions and his duties as EAC Chair. If we 
examine the profiles of the other key players, we notice that all of them were already actively 
involved in EU affairs prior to the follow-up of the treaty. A DP MP active in the discussions 
on the treaty had exerted two MEP mandates and the fourth national parliamentary mandate as 
of 2006-2009, participated in numerous interparliamentary cooperation formats such as 
COSAC and was Minister for Cooperation, Humanitarian Action and Defence between 1999 
and 2004 (Interview 21, 2017). Another DP MP was also member of the delegation to the 
Convention on the Future of Europe and had exerted a long-lasting membership in the EAC.  
To sum up, MPs’ awareness about EU affairs seemed to have dropped due to upcoming 
national events (elections) and issues that touched upon national interests (the economic crisis). 
The lack of enthusiasm and awareness about the Treaty of Lisbon might have led MPs to 
underuse scrutiny instruments. The Treaty of Lisbon did not trigger substantial parliamentary 
activity due to its low salience. Indeed, EAC members considered the cooperation with the 
Government during treaty negotiations as insufficient145. The main reason seemed to lie in the 
fact that sectoral committees did not take initiatives to obtain the needed information from the 
responsible ministers146. Overall, the lack of involvement in Parliament, the low influence of 
 
142 See EAC meeting 11.02.2008 (A-CHD-P-2008-O-AEDCI-30). 
143 Ben Fayot et le LSAP veulent relancer un débat "ouvert et vivant" sur l’Europe à l’heure de la négociation du 
traité modificatif, 11-09-2007,http://www.europaforum.public.lu/fr/actualites/2007/09/fayot-cig/index.html (last 
accessed 12.03.2018). 
144 La délégation luxembourgeoise à la COSAC a expliqué de quelle manière la Chambre des députés s’impliquera 
plus dans le processus de décision européen, 07-10-2009 
http://www.europaforum.public.lu/fr/actualites/2009/10/cosac/index.html (last accessed 12.03.2018). 
145 See EAC meeting 10.09.2007 (A-CHD-P-2007-O-AEDCI-56). 
146 See EAC meeting 27.10.2008 (A-CHD-P-2008-O-AEDCI-03). 
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the ADR as the main treaty opponent and the large support of the other parties to the 
Government’s position limited the Chamber’s role in the negotiations. Indeed, the large 
consensus and the absence of a clear opposition provided the coalition partners with a strong 
control over parliamentary discussions, backed by most pro-European opposition groups. 
5.5.2 The Lisbon Treaty: an opportunity for institutional change within the Chamber of 
Deputies? 
 
After the establishment of the Chamber’s “European Strategy” in January 2006, 
discussions multiplied within the EAC about the need to amend Parliament’s scrutiny 
procedures in EU affairs. Reflection upon the amendment of internal scrutiny procedures was 
engaged before, during and after the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon, on a period running 
from mid-2006 to mid-2010. The pressure emanating from discourses on the European level 
and the corpus itself of the treaty giving an ever-growing role to national parliaments might 
have pushed individual actors within the Chamber of Deputies to accelerate reform processes. 
A document produced by the then EAC Chair on 08th June 2006147 and discussed in the EAC 
on 12th June 2006148 laid the main objective of the Chamber in the framework of debates on the 
future of the European Union. In this document, the MP encouraged the Chamber to get 
involved at the earliest possible stage in the European decision-making process, both in the 
committees and plenary sessions. The objective would consist in encouraging mainstreaming 
of EU affairs in sectoral committees and raising awareness among all MPs. According to the 
EAC Chair, “[o]ne year after the referendum on 10th July 2005, the Chamber of Deputies is 
itself more than ever aware of its political responsibility in the life of the European Union. […] 
For this purpose, the Chamber will systematically develop its means of action, use its 
communication tools and search for an ever closer contact to the citizens”149. While the treaty 
itself did not trigger high activity, discussions on procedural revisions were numerous. Between 
2006 and 2010, the EAC met 25 times, the Committee on Institutions and Constitutional 
Revision one time and the Committee on Rules of Procedures 3 times to discuss the revision of 
internal scrutiny procedures (see appendix 1, table F). 
”Political entrepreneurs” of change were both members of the EAC and the RoP 
committee. Both committees were competent to discuss procedural revisions. For instance, the 
proposal to amend the RoP in 2009 was co-initiated by an LSAP MP from the EAC and a CSV 
MP from the RoP committee. We observed that majority MPs were once again the main drivers 
of the discussions, but that consensus reigned between opposition and majority on the direction 
of change. All agreed to reinforce the chamber’s participation rights in EU affairs. Within the 
EAC, the EAC Chair (LSAP), a CSV MP and a DP MP, who were already very active during 
the Convention on the Future of Europe and the Constitutional Treaty, took the lead to initiate 
reforms (Interview 3, 6 and 19, 2017). Without surprise, most “political entrepreneurs” of 
change also triggered revisions in the wake of the Constitutional Treaty and had thus a high 
 
147 « Document de travail pour la Commission des Affaires étrangères et européennes », Intitulé « Le référendum 
du 10 juillet 2005, le Traité Constitutionnel et l’avenir de l’Union européenne », 08.06.2006.  
148 See EAC meeting 12.06.2006 (A-CHD-P-2006-O-AEDCI-36). 
149 « Document de travail pour la Commission des Affaires étrangères et européennes », Intitulé « Le référendum 
du 10 juillet 2005, le Traité Constitutionnel et l’avenir de l’Union européenne », 08.06.2006, p.2. 
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seniority level in Parliament. Leadership positions in committees (chair or vice-chair) played a 
more significant role in MPs’ involvement than prior experience in Government, which was 
non-existent among key players. Once again, initiators of change were also COSAC members. 
Again, just as in the case of revisions undertaken in the wake of the Constitutional Treaty, we 
assume that these key players might have been influenced by COSAC deliberations. For 
instance, the two COSAC meetings in 2007 dealt with the role of national parliaments in the 
Barroso initiative, while the biannual reports in 2008 focused on parliaments’ participation in 
the ratification process of the Lisbon Treaty and the subsidiarity monitoring150. 
The CSV rapporteur on the proposal modifying the RoP to include the memorandum 
between the Government and the Parliament was member of the delegation to the Convention 
on the Future of Europe (Interview 17, 2017). An additional sociological feature was 
particularly noticeable in most key players’ profiles: compared to previous “political 
entrepreneurs” of change, the proportion of lawyers or MPs having studied law was higher in 
the present case. Prior professional experience motivated them to get involved in procedural 
revisions. As explained previously, personal convictions, experiences and positions within 
parliament seemed to have affected more significantly MPs’ involvement than their political 
affiliation. Rather, their high level of professionalisation shaped their motivations and 
transformed them into legitimate EU experts. The absence of political conflicts between the 
groups enabled technicians to take over the role of “political entrepreneurs” of change. Thus, 
we can validate sub-hypothesis H3.2 in the sense that once again, the highly consensual nature 
of the Luxembourgish political system encouraged MPs with “Europeanised” profiles to be 
legitimate enough to trigger change. 
Additionally, the parliamentary administration played an influential role in the 
establishment of new scrutiny rules, in close cooperation with the then very active EAC Chair. 
The Secretary General and civil servants from the International Relations department drafted 
proposals. The Secretary General intervened in numerous EAC meetings. He announced the 
creation of EU collaborators’ positions within parliamentary groups, encouraged common 
meetings between MEPs and MPs and suggested the establishment of an interinstitutional 
agreement between Parliament and Government on EU affairs.  
Discussions within the EAC revolved around the cooperation between the Chamber and 
the European Parliament, especially Luxembourgish MEPs151. MEPs expressed their wish to be 
invited in sectoral committees to discuss EU issues. In September 2008, discussions were led 
about communicating committee minutes to MEPs152. Committee secretaries should transfer 
these minutes to MEPs, whenever EU issues were debated, in order to ensure coordination 
between positions on the national and European levels. In general, cooperation with European 
Institutions needed to be developed, among others with the European Commission. On 16th 
 
150 See COSAC, Seventh bi-annual report: Developments in European Union Procedures and Practices Relevant 
to Parliamentary Scrutiny, May 2007; COSAC, Eighth bi-annual report: Developments in European Union 
Procedures and Practices Relevant to Parliamentary Scrutiny, October 2007; COSAC, Ninth bi-annual report: 
Developments in European Union Procedures and Practices Relevant to Parliamentary Scrutiny, May 2008. 
151 See EAC meeting 17.07.2006 (A-CHD-P-2006-O-AEDCI- 42), 09.11.2009 (A-CHD-P-2009-O-AEDCI-06). 
152 See EAC meeting 15.09.2008 (A-CHD-P-2008-O-AEDCI-68). 
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October 2006, the EAC received for the first time a European Commissioner153. The then Vice-
Chair of the EAC, a CSV MP, suggested to establish exchanges with the Committee of the 
Regions and the EESC. The goal of encouraging contacts with multiple actors was to diversify 
the Chamber’s sources of information. In line with Luxembourg’s support for a federalised EU, 
parliamentary groups requested better direct exchanges with European Institutions. A DP MP 
mentioned the idea of “contradictory notes” coming from different institutions and giving the 
possibility to the Parliament to select information from different sources154. These initiatives 
were all the more relevant for the Chamber as its scrutiny system relies exclusively on 
document-based control.  
Cooperation with the Government was also on the agenda, especially the information 
exchange that was still seen at that time as insufficient155. The Chamber did not have access to 
any position from the Permanent Representation of Luxembourg in Brussels. The then EAC 
Vice-Chair reiterated his wish to obtain explanatory notes from the Government, already 
mentioned during the debates on the Constitutional Treaty, but apparently not implemented as 
of February 2007156. Moreover, a suggestion was made to invite systematically in sectoral 
committees ministers and civil servants competent on specific EU dossiers before each Council 
meeting. 
The Chamber also made communication efforts. A bilateral meeting between MEPs and 
civil servants from the parliamentary administration on 14th July 2006 addressed the issue of 
communication on EU affairs. MEPs suggested the improvement of the Chamber’s TV channel, 
with ideas such as the broadcasting of debates of the European Parliament. They proposed to 
insert a European section in the annual parliamentary reports and to reflect about a national 
debate on Europe in the near future. In October 2006, the Secretary General met the team 
responsible for the website “Europaforum.lu” designed for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The 
idea was to communicate regularly on EU activities of the Chamber, MEPs and the 
Government, to organise common conferences and to guarantee Parliament’s visibility on the 
website157. The EAC needed to make efforts to communicate about its work to the citizens158. 
The then EAC Chair suggested to include more EU dossiers in plenary debates through the 
organisation of European question hours. 
The Chamber also discussed the delays in the implementation of directives. The EAC 
addressed the issue several times with the then Minister delegated for Foreign Affairs and 
Immigration159. Suggestions were made about an ex-ante involvement of the Chamber and an 
annual evaluation of the selection procedures of EU documents. The EAC Chair pointed out 
that the International Relations department of the parliamentary administration should transfer 
 
153 See EAC meeting 16.10.2006 (A-CHD-P-2006-O-AEDCI-01). 
154 See EAC meeting 18.02.2008 (A-CHD-P-2008-O-AEDCI-32). 
155 See EAC meeting 07.05.2007 (A-CHD-P-2007-O-AEDCI-41), 10.09.2007 (A-CHD-P-2007-O-AEDCI-56), 
21.01.2008 (A-CHD-P-2008-O-AEDCI-28). 
156 See EAC meeting 12.02.2007 (A-CHD-P-2007-O-AEDCI-22, A-CHD-P-2007-O-CPCP-01). 
157 See 24.10.2006, Gérard Philipps, « Note à l’attention de Monsieur le Ministre délégué, ministère des affaires 
étrangères, europaforum.lu » – réunion avec Mr Frieseisen, Secrétaire Général de la Chambre des Députés. 
158 See EAC meeting 16.04.2007 (A-CHD-P-2007-O-AEDCI-35). 
159 See EAC meeting 09.10.2006 (A-CHD-P-2006-O-AEDCI-50). 
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EU documents firstly to the EAC160. A CSV EAC member, as well as the then EAC Chair 
belonging to the LSAP, were particularly insisting on the need for sectoral committees to get 
more involved in EU affairs161. As of 2007, several MPs from the CSV, LSAP and DP were 
pointing out that some sectoral committees still did not have any fixed rules on the examination 
of EU documents, even after the establishment of the European Strategy of the Chamber earlier 
in 2006162. The then EAC Chair repeated the need to sensitise chairs of permanent committees 
to EU issues. In order to become active at the earliest possible stage, sectoral committees should 
not only examine consultation documents from the European Commission, but also legislative 
proposals163. Moreover, the new treaty should encourage further discussions on the issue of 
double mandates. LSAP and CSV MPs actively involved in EU affairs revived the debate about 
the need to professionalise the MP position, so that EU affairs can be handled more 
efficiently164. The establishment of a permanent EAC was also part of the discussions, but the 
idea proposed by a CSV MP was seen as difficult to implement by the EAC Chair belonging to 
the LSAP, because of the Chamber’s small size and MPs’ overlapping mandates that limit time 
spent in Parliament165. The issue of lacking personnel resources in the administration and 
parliamentary groups was mentioned several times as one cause of insufficient scrutiny of EU 
affairs166. The Secretary General announced in July 2006 that political groups would get the 
possibility to engage a collaborator responsible for EU affairs. While the Secretary General was 
in favour of establishing a Research Department within the parliamentary administration 
helping with the analysis of EU documents, the then EAC Vice-Chair preferred relying on 
external experts167. 
Even though EAC members multiplied suggestions and initiatives to improve the 
Chamber’s participation rights, pressured by the institutional evolutions brought by the Treaty 
of Lisbon, effective implementation of these initiatives remained circumscribed. Indeed, EAC 
meetings on 04th May, 14th September and 08th October 2009 evaluated the European Strategy 
of the Chamber and showed that most measures mentioned since 2006 have been left at the 
stage of ideas. For instance, a project submitted by the ADR to amend the Constitution by 
introducing a chapter on EU affairs was finally withdrawn from the Parliament’s agenda. All 
EAC members agreed that efforts have been made in the course of the past years. However, the 
involvement of sectoral committees was seen as insufficient. MEPs were still underrepresented 
in committee meetings. Information from the Government was not systematic and 
communication and cooperation with the European Parliament remained underdeveloped. 
 
160 See EAC meeting 16.11.2006 (A-CHD-P-2006-O-AEDCI-08). 
161 See EAC meeting 17.07.2006 (A-CHD-P-2006-O-AEDCI- 42), 29.01.2007 (A-CHD-P-2007-O-AEDCI-21), 
12.02.2007 (A-CHD-P-2007-O-AEDCI-22, A-CHD-P-2007-O-CPCP-01), 09.02.2009 (A-CHD-P-2009-O-
AEDCI-22). 
162 See EAC meeting 29.01.2007 (A-CHD-P-2007-O-AEDCI-21). 
163 See EAC meeting 16.04.2007 (A-CHD-P-2007-O-AEDCI-35). 
164 La Chambre des Députes à l’heure du traité réformateur – De retour de la réunion de la COSAC, les députés 
Mosar et Fayot exposent le nouvel agenda européen du pouvoir législatif, 17-10-2007 / 
http://www.europaforum.public.lu/fr/actualites/2007/10/cosac-071017/index.html (last accessed 12.03.2018). 
165 See EAC meeting 02.07.2007 (A-CHD-P-2007-O-AEDCI-52). 
166 See EAC meeting 09.10.2006 (A-CHD-P-2006-O-AEDCI-50), 07.07.2008 (A-CHD-P-2008-O-AEDCI-61). 
167 See EAC meeting 16.04.2007 (A-CHD-P-2007-O-AEDCI-35). 
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Interparliamentary cooperation needed to be improved168. An ADR MP pointed out that 
information from the ministries stayed fluctuant and needed to be improved, especially before 
Council meetings. A DP MP estimated that the presence of MEPs in committees was still 
irregular and requested the establishment of a permanent rapporteur who would follow EU 
dossiers since the beginning. The issue of double mandates was put again on the agenda, some 
MPs from LSAP and Déi Gréng calling for the end of overlapping political functions. 
Despite the limited implementation of all the above-listed initiatives to improve 
parliamentary participation in EU affairs, we observed some concrete improvements in the 
wake of the Treaty of Lisbon. Firstly, the RoP was once again amended in 2007 and Article 156 
became Article 168 in Chapter 15 on European Affairs. Moreover, the Government started to 
produce annual reports on its European policy and to present them in the EAC. The first report 
was discussed in the EAC on 02nd July 2007 with the presence of the Minister delegated for 
Foreign Affairs and Immigration169. The following years, the Government kept submitting these 
reports. The challenge for MPs was then to determine the way to handle and to follow-up these 
reports. On top of this, an agreement was established in 2008 between the Government and the 
Parliament on cooperation in EU affairs. Such an institutional agreement between the Chamber 
and the Government was first mentioned during the EAC meeting on 16th April 2007. On 08th 
January 2009, the Committee on Rules of Procedures decided to put the memorandum between 
the Government and Parliament in the annex of the Chamber’s RoP170. The proposal to modify 
the RoP was adopted unanimously in plenary on 7th May 2009.  
Reflexion on further cooperation with the Government was obviously based on the 
German model of parliamentary participation rights in EU affairs. Indeed, the “Lisbon ruling” 
of the German Constitutional Court in June 2009 had a substantial resonance in the Chamber 
of Deputies, especially for the then EAC Chair, who was particularly engaged in procedural 
revisions. According to the MP, the Chamber of Deputies needed to follow the example of the 
new provisions reinforcing the participation rights of the German Bundestag171. He argued that 
efforts have been made in Parliament to strengthen the cooperation with the Government on EU 
affairs, but that these improvements needed to be continued in order to bring the EU closer to 
the citizens. The memorandum fixed better information exchange on EU affairs between the 
Government and the Parliament. The RoP was amended a second time in 2010, after the Treaty 
of Lisbon, to incorporate the procedure of reasoned opinions in the framework of the Early 
Warning Mechanism (EWM). Amendments to article 168 in Chapter 16 of the RoP were 
accepted unanimously172, showing once again that consensus could be easily found when it 
came to improve Parliament’s role in EU affairs.  
 
168 See EAC meeting 04.05.2009 (A-CHD-P-2009-O-AEDCI-42), 14.09.2009 (A-CHD-P-2009-O-AEDCI-02), 
08.10.2009 (A-CHD-P-2009-O-AEDCI-05). 
169 See EAC meeting 02.07.2007 (A-CHD-P-2007-O-AEDCI-52). 
170 See EAC meeting 08.01.2009 (A-CHD-P-2009-REGL-02 ). 
171 03.07.2009, Ben Fayot commente largement l’arrêt de la Cour constitutionnelle allemande sur le traité de 
Lisbonne du 30 juin 2009, see http://www.europaforum.public.lu/fr/actualites/2009/07/fayot-traite-
karlsruhe/index.html  (accessed 02.10.2018). 
172 See 14.07.2010, 44th plenary session, TOP 8. 6143 – « Proposition de modification du Règlement de la 
Chambre des Députés relative aux incidences du Traité de Lisbonne sur les parlements nationaux ». 
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In light of these elements, we observed that scrutiny procedures were reformed because 
a specific aspect in the Treaty of Lisbon, the role of national parliaments, put direct pressure on 
MPs to initiate change. For a limited number of MPs, the salience of the Treaty of Lisbon and 
the need to strengthen the Chamber’s scrutiny rights were reasons justifying scrutiny 
reinforcement. This seems to confirm sub-hypothesis H3.1. Institutional change happened in a 
highly consensual atmosphere and was based on MPs’ normative reinterpretation of their 
parliament’s role in the EU, rather than on political competition. External factors such as the 
Lisbon Treaty and the German Constitutional Court’s ruling, as well as MPs’ personal 
convictions that the Chamber needed stronger scrutiny procedures, were both determining in 
the revision process.  
 
5.5.3 Conclusion 
 
This part examined parliamentary involvement in the context of the Treaty of Lisbon. 
Contrary to the Constitutional Treaty, we observed that parliamentary activity on EU affairs 
fluctuated considerably and did not translate into a rising tendency. In fact, general trends in 
parliamentary activity showed a decrease in the use of parliamentary instruments between 2006 
and 2009. The lack of enthusiasm after the referendum in 2005, the absence of novelty in the 
new treaty, the start of the financial crisis in 2008 and the upcoming legislative elections in 
2009 might explain why most MPs did not perceive the Treaty of Lisbon as a salient matter in 
their parliamentary work. National interests seem to have played again a significant role in MPs’ 
(non-) involvement in EU affairs. Apart from the small group of (mostly) senior MPs that 
followed the previous treaties, the rest did not deal with these matters.  
Contrary to the Constitutional Treaty, ideological positions on the Treaty of Lisbon were 
clearly identifiable between the parties, even though minor internal divergences appeared 
within some of them. The whole ADR rejected the treaty from the beginning and maintained 
their group discipline during the ratification vote. The other parliamentary groups welcomed 
the treaty. As only few opposition MPs expressed negative thoughts about the treaty, the 
Government could count on most MPs to pass the ratification draft bill. Overall, resistance was 
very low in Parliament due to low polarisation between the parties, the prevalence of consensual 
practices, the dominance of pro-European positions and generally the lack of interest for matters 
that had no big domestic impact. The absence of sharp conflictual lines affected negatively 
parliamentary activity. Scrutiny instruments were not used to the same extent as in the context 
of the 2005 referendum campaign. Pro-European opposition and majority MPs supportive of 
their Government’s EU policy were the most active in Parliament. Their participation share was 
balanced. Parliamentary instruments were not used to criticise the Government, but rather to 
obtain information and make suggestions on the content of the treaty and parliamentary 
procedures. 
 This time, civil society exerted less influence on parliamentary work due to the lower 
salience of the treaty on the national level. Indeed, the fear of renewing the referendum 
experience of 2005 discouraged the Government and Parliament to resort to citizens’ votes. The 
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Treaty of Lisbon remained strictly between the hands of national institutions and was not 
transformed into a national priority. Contrary to the Constitutional Treaty, professional 
chambers did not deliver any opinion on the Treaty of Lisbon. The Council of State gave its 
opinion on the Government draft bill ratifying the treaty, but did not affect substantially 
parliamentary work. However, it decided to exempt the Chamber from a second vote in June 
2008. Its role was thus only circumscribed to procedural rules in the final stage of the 
discussions, and not to the content of parliamentary activity. 
EAC members and members of the RoP committee were the main key players that 
followed actively the treaty. We observed that most MPs had already been active in the context 
of the Constitutional Treaty. Their sociological features corresponded to those observed last 
time: most were senior MPs with so-called “Europeanised” profile, with extensive experience 
in EU matters and regular participation in European parliamentary conferences. Their high level 
of professionalisation, long-term experience with EU affairs and subsequent interest for these 
matters made them the most competent players to deal with the Treaty of Lisbon. These same 
MPs counted also among the “political entrepreneurs” of change. The EAC Chair was especially 
active in this area, encouraging relentlessly the strengthening of the Chamber’s participation 
rights in EU affairs. The German model was taken as an example in the drafting of new 
provisions. The ruling of the German Federal Constitutional Court in 2009 inspired the EAC 
Chair. Efforts to encourage the decentralisation and mainstreaming of EU affairs were 
numerous in the wake of the Lisbon Treaty, but were triggered by a limited circle of actors 
within Parliament. To conclude, parliamentary involvement was circumscribed because the 
Treaty of Lisbon was not seen as salient. The matter was delegated to EU experts, because 
sectoral committee members did not perceive the treaty as a useful instrument to boost their 
domestic political career. 
 
5.6 Evolution of parliamentary involvement in the context of negotiations on the ESM 
and the TSCG (2010-2013) 
 
This part will focus on parliamentary involvement and institutional change during the 
economic crisis. Founding on the same sub-hypotheses as for the parts on the Constitutional 
Treaty and the Treaty of Lisbon, the aim is to explain how parliamentarians handled EU affairs 
in the wake of an exceptional event. The first section will outline the evolution of parliamentary 
involvement in the framework of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and the Fiscal 
Compact (TSCG). The second section will explain how the economic crisis pushed MPs to 
reform their institutional framework. 
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5.6.1 Parliamentary involvement in the framework of the negotiations on the ESM and the 
TSCG 
General context 
The economic and financial crisis affected Luxembourg as financial place and country 
giving priority to social rights. The unemployment rate grew from around 4% in 2008 to 7% in 
2013-2014173. The gap between the civil society, especially trade unions, and the political elite 
grew bigger over the period running from 2010 to 2014 as a direct consequence of the crisis. 
While 66% of the population thought that the European Union had a positive image in autumn 
2009, the proportion dropped to 53% in 2010 and 37% in 2013174. The 2009 legislative elections 
gave significant power back to the CSV, while the DP lost votes and the ADR slipped down 
electoral support. The political landscape changed in the course of the legislative period 2009-
2013. Political crises within the coalition parties LSAP and CSV, especially the decreasing 
popularity of the Prime Minister, due to revealed political scandals, led to early elections in 
October 2013. These elections represented a political earthquake in Luxembourg, as the CSV 
found itself shifting from the majority to the opposition for the second time in history. A three-
party coalition was formed between the LSAP, DP and Déi Gréng. 
ESM 
After the agreement on the creation of the ESM during the European Council of 16-17th 
December 2010 and the signature of the treaty during the Eurogroup meeting on 11-12th July 
2011, the first out of three laws implementing the ESM in Luxembourg was introduced in 
Parliament. On 27th September 2011, the Government transferred a draft bill to the Chamber 
approving the decision of the European Council of 25th March 2011 to modify Article 136 of 
the TFUE175. The draft bill was sent to the Finance and Budget Committee on 06th October 2011 
as it was designated by the Chamber’s Conference of Presidents as the competent body to 
examine the treaty176. The Prime Minister seized the Council of State on 21st September 2011 
and the latter approved the draft bill on 07th March 2012. In the meantime, the other two draft 
bills on the ESM ratification and the participation of the State in the ESM were introduced in 
Parliament on 5th March 2012177. On 20th March 2012, the Finance and Budget Committee met 
to discuss the draft bill on the modification of Article 136 TFUE and the draft bill ratifying the 
 
173 http://www.statistiques.public.lu/stat/TableViewer/tableView.aspx (last accessed 15.03.2018). 
174 See Eurobarometer 72 , Autumn 2009, 
http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/instruments/STANDARD
/surveyKy/831 (last accessed 15.03.2018); Eurobarometer 76 , Autumn 2010, 
http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/instruments/STANDARD
/surveyKy/1020 (last accessed 15.03.2018) and Eurobarometer 80, Autumn 2013, 
http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/instruments/STANDARD
/surveyKy/1123 (last accessed 15.03.2018). 
175 « Projet de loi portant approbation de la décision du Conseil européen du 25 mars 2011 modifiant l'article 136 
du traité sur le fonctionnement de l'Union européenne en ce qui concerne un mécanisme de stabilité pour les Etats 
membres dont la monnaie est l'euro ». 
176 Both ESM and TSCG were debated in the Finance and Budget Committee. The EAC dealt more thoroughly 
with the TSCG, probably because the ESM was focused primarily on the financial sector, while the TSCG brought 
institutional reforms with it that fell partially into the competences of the EAC (Interview 23, 2018, additional 
information obtained via email on 19.03.2018).   
177 « Projet de loi portant approbation du traité instituant le mécanisme européen de stabilité, signé le 2 février 
2012 à Bruxelles », « Projet de loi relative à la participation de l'Etat au mécanisme européen de stabilité ». 
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ESM. A rapporteur from the CSV group was designated to produce a report on all three draft 
bills. The Government amended the third draft bill on 14th May 2012. On 22nd May 2012, the 
Council of State delivered its opinion without observations on the draft bill ratifying the ESM 
and the one regulating the State’s participation in the mechanism. The latter required a second 
opinion on 12th June 2012 following the Government’s amendments, which did not contain any 
specific observations on the bill. The rapporteur on the draft bills presented its reports in the 
Finance and Budget Committee on 22nd June 2012, which was then adopted in plenary on 26th 
June 2012 by 49 votes against 5178. The ADR and Déi Lénk rejected the treaty. 
TSCG 
The draft bill ratifying the TSCG179 was approved in the Luxembourg Council of 
Government on 16th May 2012 and introduced in the Chamber of Deputies on 10th July 2012. 
The Government seized the Council of State for an opinion on the draft bill on 27th July 2012. 
The Finance and Budget Committee received the draft bill on 04th October 2012. Both the 
Chamber of Employees and the Council of State submitted opinions on the draft bill, the first 
on its own initiative on 22nd October and the latter on 21st December 2012. The Chamber of 
Employees expressed a negative opinion on the TSCG, arguing that it would threaten the 
European social model, deepen the economic crisis and restrict parliamentary competences in 
public budget decisions. In its opinion, the Council of State reflected about the incidence of the 
new measures contained in the TSCG on the Luxembourg Constitution and about the need for 
constitutional revisions. The Council of State stated that the draft bill had to be adopted in 
Parliament with a two-thirds majority according to Article 114 of the Luxembourg Constitution 
regulating constitutional revisions, because the control of budgetary discipline fixed by the 
TSCG implied a transfer of competences to new national institutions, to the European 
Commission and to the European Court of Justice.  
On 08th January 2013, the Finance and Budget Committee nominated the same CSV 
rapporteur that followed the draft bills on the ESM. The report was presented in the committee 
on 19th February 2013 and adopted in plenary on 27th February 2013 by 46 votes against 10180. 
Déi Gréng, ADR and Déi Lénk rejected the treaty. The bill entered into force on 04th April 
2013. The “golden rule” fixed in the TSCG, which sets the threshold of public administrations’ 
annual structural deficit to 0,5% of the nominal GDP, was implemented in Luxembourg through 
 
178 26.06.2012, 34th plenary session, TOP 5 « 6334 - Projet de loi portant approbation de la décision du Conseil 
européen du 25 mars 2011 modifiant l’article 136 du traité sur le fonctionnement de l’Union européenne en ce qui 
concerne un mécanisme de stabilité pour les États membres dont la monnaie est l’euro ; 6405 - Projet de loi portant 
approbation du traité instituant le mécanisme européen de stabilité, signé le 2 février 2012 à Bruxelles ; 6406 - 
Projet de loi relative (1) à la participation de l’État au mécanisme européen de stabilité; (2) à certaines immunités 
du mécanisme européen de stabilité et de la banque européenne d’investissement et (3) modifiant la loi modifiée 
du 9 juillet 2010 relative à l’octroi de la garantie de l’État dans le cadre de l’instrument européen de stabilisation 
de la zone euro » 
179 « 6449 - Projet de loi portant approbation du traité sur la stabilité, la coordination et la gouvernance au sein de 
l'Union économique et monétaire, signé à Bruxelles, le 2 mars 2012 »  
180 27.02.2013, 23rd plenary session, TOP 2 « 6449 - Projet de loi portant approbation du traité sur la stabilité, la 
coordination et la gouvernance au sein de l’Union économique et monétaire, signé à Bruxelles, le 2 mars 2012 ». 
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a bill introduced in Parliament by the Finance minister on 22nd July 2013181. The Finance and 
Budget Committee received the draft bill on 01st October 2013 and nominated a rapporteur from 
the coalition party DP on 20th May 2014. The draft bill was amended once by the Government 
on 20th March 2014 and by the Luxembourg Central Bank on 24th April 2014. It was subject to 
numerous opinions submitted by the Chamber of Civil Servants and Public Employees on 10th 
October 2013, the Chamber of Trades on 05th November 2013, the Business Chamber on 11th 
November 2013 and 22nd April 2014, the Chamber of Employees on 12th November 2013, the 
Council of State on 10th December 2013, 20th May and 03rd June 2014 and the Union of 
Luxembourg Cities and Communes (SYVICOL) on 28th May 2014. According to the Chamber 
of Civil Servants and Public Employees, the democratic legitimacy of the treaty would not be 
guaranteed and social partners should be involved in budgetary negotiations. All chambers 
pointed out that parliaments’ budgetary powers should be strengthened. After several meetings 
of the Finance and Budget Committee on 27th May, 03rd June and 19th June 2014, the bill was 
adopted in plenary on 09th July 2014 by 55 votes against 5182. 
The economic crisis seemed to have triggered increasing tensions between and within 
political parties, but also within civil society. Positions started to crystallise in 2010-2011 during 
discussions on the future of Luxembourg’s financial place and negotiations on the ESM, 
reaching a peak of discontent especially from the side of the opposition in 2012 during 
negotiations on the Fiscal Compact. Despite growing dissent between MPs on the way that the 
economic crisis needed to be handled, all agreed that solidarity and democracy in the EU were 
two essential elements that needed to be preserved. In 2010, most MPs agreed on the need to 
safeguard the financial place, to establish strict control mechanisms in financial and economic 
policies on the European level and to enhance cooperation between Member States by avoiding 
centralisation of decision-making183. While the ADR and Déi Lénk criticised sharply the 
European Union and the financial measures taken from 2011 onwards, the other parties’ more 
had mitigated positions. Positions of ADR MPs could be explained by the fact that the party 
changed its president in 2012, who adopted an increasingly sovereignist and conservative 
stance. Following the nomination of the new president, several members left the party and 
forced the president to resign. The group lost some MPs within the Chamber of Deputies, who 
switched to “independent” MPs. ADR MPs pointed out regularly the risk of financial and 
political sovereignty loss for the Parliament and Luxembourg, as well as the democratic deficit 
of the EU, as a consequence of the financial measures taken on the European level184.  
 
181 « 6597 - Projet de loi relatif à la coordination et à la gouvernance des finances publiques et modifiant: 
a) la loi modifiée du 8 juin 1999 sur le budget, la comptabilité et la trésorerie de l'Etat 
b) la loi modifiée du 10 mars 1969 portant institution d'une inspection générale des finances » 
182 09.07.2014, TOP 2 « 6597 - Projet de loi relatif à la coordination et à la gouvernance des finances publiques et 
modifiant: a) la loi modifiée du 8 juin 1999 sur le budget, la comptabilité et la trésorerie de l’État, b) la loi modifiée 
du 10 mars 1969 portant institution d’une inspection générale des finances ». 
183 See 01.06.2010, 31st plenary session, TOP 7 « Interpellation de M. Claude Meisch au sujet de l’avenir de notre 
place financière ; Heure d’actualité demandée par le groupe LSAP sur la régulation des marchés financiers et 
l’introduction d’une taxe sur les transactions financières ; Heure d’actualité demandée par le groupe CSV sur le 
contrôle des politiques budgétaires nationales par la soumission des projets de budgets des pays européens à un 
contrôle ou une concertation ex ante au niveau européen ». 
184 08.03.2011, 25th plenary session, TOP 13 Débat d’orientation sur la gouvernance économique au sein de I’UE 
et sur le pacte de convergence et de compétitivité projeté » ; 14.12.2011, 12th plenary session, TOP1 « Déclaration 
de M. Jean-Claude Juncker, Premier Ministre, Ministre d’Etat, relative aux conclusions du Conseil européen des 
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In the same line as the ADR, Déi Lénk MPs insisted several times on the need to preserve 
the social rights in Luxembourg and criticised the lack of democracy on the European level185. 
During a press conference organised on the Fiscal Compact on 06th February 2012, a Déi Lénk 
MP qualified the treaty as a “legal monster” that would permit a predominance of industrial and 
financial sectors over public expenditure and pointed out that it was no surprise that trade unions 
would reject the treaty. MPs from both parties voted systematically against the ESM and the 
Fiscal Compact. MPs from the majority supported both treaties, but were not entirely satisfied 
with their content. CSV and LSAP MPs argued that the Fiscal Compact needed clarification 
and additional measures in the near future186. The President of the LSAP group criticised the 
TSCG for its lack of democratic legitimacy and its numerous deficiencies187. While the CSV 
party pleaded for budgetary consolidation and fiscal measures through structural reforms to 
strengthen the economy, the LSAP dampened the CSV’s austerity plans by insisting on social 
cohesion and solidarity. However, not all MPs from the majority welcomed the measures 
implemented by the coalition. In 2012, an LSAP MP resigned from Parliament, contesting the 
party’s support to the coalition’s decision to reform the pension system and limit the wage 
indexation. The MP also protested against the budget voted in Parliament for the year 2013 and 
rejected the party’s decision to adopt both treaties (Dumont/Kies/Poirier, 2013). The gap 
widened between the LSAP’s position on the treaties, its electorate and the socialist trade union 
OGBL, putting the party in a situation never experienced since the referendum on the 
Constitutional treaty in 2005.  
The coalition’s economic policy also became a major subject of criticism for DP and 
Déi Gréng MPs. Through a motion that was rejected in Parliament in 2011, a Déi Gréng MP 
argued that budgetary consolidation would be essential, but only if social justice, growth and 
the durability of measures would be secured188. During a topical hour requested by the group in 
March 2012 on the Greek sovereign debt crisis, Déi Gréng MPs criticised the lack of 
cooperation and information from the Government’s side in the same line of argument as the 
ADR. They also reproached the Government to misrepresent Luxembourg’s positions on the 
treaties and the economic crisis during negotiations in the Eurogroup189. A Déi Gréng MP raised 
doubts about the Government’s credibility towards the Chamber and the country during 
negotiations on the EU level, criticising the lack of coordinated positions between the Finance 
 
8 et 9 décembre 2011, suivie d’un débat » ; « 27.02.2013, 23rd plenary session, TOP2 6449- Projet de loi portant 
approbation du traité sur la stabilité, la coordination et la gouvernance au sein de l’Union économique et monétaire, 
signé à Bruxelles, le 2 mars 2012 ». 
185 14.07.2011, 46th plenary session, TOP 1 « Interpellation de M Claude Meisch sur la crise de la dette européenne 
(DP) » ;http://www.europaforum.public.lu/fr/actualites/2011/11/chd-debat-declaration-politique-
etrangere/index.html (last accessed 16.03.2018). 
186 26.01.2012, 14th plenary session, TOP9 « Déclaration sur la position du Gouvernement luxembourgeois à 
l’égard du Traité international sur la stabilité, la coordination et la gouvernance dans l’Union économique et 
monétaire ». 
187 27.02.2013, 23rd plenary session, TOP2 « 6449- Projet de loi portant approbation du traité sur la stabilité, la 
coordination et la gouvernance au sein de l’Union économique et monétaire, signé à Bruxelles, le 2 mars 2012 ». 
188 14.12.2011, 12th plenary session, TOP1 « Déclaration de M. Jean-Claude Juncker, Premier Ministre, Ministre 
d’Etat, relative aux conclusions du Conseil européen des 8 et 9 décembre 2011, suivie d’un débat ». 
189 06.03.2012, 18th plenary session, TOP14 « Heure d’actualité du groupe déi gréng sur les décisions du Sommet 
de l’Union Européenne du 20 février par rapport à la crise de la dette souveraine grecque » 
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Minister and the Prime Minister190. DP MPs were aligned with the other groups on topics such 
as the transparency of decision-making, solidarity in the EU and the consolidation of budgetary 
policies. However, a DP MP regretted that the Government did not insist more on the EU level 
to defend the inclusion of the growth component in the TSCG’s crisis measures191. In light of 
the growing unemployment rates and the deindustrialisation of the country, the DP party was 
more in favour of a middle ground between fiscal consolidation and economic growth. 
However, the group was dissatisfied with the insufficient reforms undertaken by the 
Government.  
Parliamentary votes on each treaty did not entirely reflect the critical positions of both 
groups. Even though DP MPs were increasingly sceptical about the ESM and the Fiscal 
Compact, they voted in favour of both, but without enthusiasm. A DP MP justified the votes by 
the need to show solidarity with the rest of the Member States192. The votes of the DP group on 
both treaties provided the Government with the required support of the two-thirds constitutional 
majority within Parliament. Déi Gréng MPs approved the ESM treaty despite their scepticism 
and discontent about the low level of transparency and democratic participation. However, the 
group rejected the TSCG by voting against it, pointing out in Parliament and in a press 
conference on 25th February 2013 that the treaty represented a brake for national investments, 
would destroy the welfare state by encouraging social regression and would reduce democratic 
legitimacy of the decision-making in budgetary policy by leaving national parliaments aside193. 
According to them, the Fiscal Compact would not clarify the role of the European Court of 
Justice, weakening the European Parliament and national parliaments. On 24th March 2012, 
during their national congress, the party criticised the austerity measures that threatened the 
European social model. Déi Gréng reproached the Government to be divided on European 
issues. According to them, part of the Government would push towards more cooperation and 
a deepening of the EU, while the rest would prefer bilateral agreements. The absence of 
coordination would weaken Luxembourg’s position during negotiations on the European level. 
 
190 09.05.2012, Discours sur l’état de la nation 2012 : Les groupes politiques à la Chambre cherchent leurs marques 
dans un cadre décisionnel européen, http://www.europaforum.public.lu/fr/actualites/2012/05/chd-etat-nation-
debat/index.html (last accessed 16.03.2018). 
191 26.01.2012, 14th plenary session, TOP9 « Déclaration sur la position du Gouvernement luxembourgeois à 
l’égard du Traité international sur la stabilité, la coordination et la gouvernance dans l’Union économique et 
monétaire » ; 09.05.2012, Discours sur l’état de la nation 2012 : Les groupes politiques à la Chambre cherchent 
leurs marques dans un cadre décisionnel européen, http://www.europaforum.public.lu/fr/actualites/2012/05/chd-
etat-nation-debat/index.html (last accessed 16.03.2018). 
192 26.06.2012, 34th plenary session, TOP 5 « 6334 - Projet de loi portant approbation de la décision du Conseil 
européen du 25 mars 2011 modifiant l’article 136 du traité sur le fonctionnement de l’Union européenne en ce qui 
concerne un mécanisme de stabilité pour les États membres dont la monnaie est l’euro ; 6405 - Projet de loi portant 
approbation du traité instituant le mécanisme européen de stabilité, signé le 2 février 2012 à Bruxelles ; 6406 - 
Projet de loi relative (1) à la participation de l’État au mécanisme européen de stabilité; (2) à certaines immunités 
du mécanisme européen de stabilité et de la banque européenne d’investissement et (3) modifiant la loi modifiée 
du 9 juillet 2010 relative à l’octroi de la garantie de l’État dans le cadre de l’instrument européen de stabilisation 
de la zone euro » ; 27.02.2013, 23rd plenary session, TOP2 « 6449- Projet de loi portant approbation du traité sur 
la stabilité, la coordination et la gouvernance au sein de l’Union économique et monétaire, signé à Bruxelles, le 2 
mars 2012 ». 
193 27.02.2013, 23rd plenary session, TOP2 « 6449- Projet de loi portant approbation du traité sur la stabilité, la 
coordination et la gouvernance au sein de l’Union économique et monétaire, signé à Bruxelles, le 2 mars 2012 ». 
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While the ESM did not trigger much reaction from the civil society, the Fiscal Compact 
was criticised because of its direct impact on the financial policy of the country. The 
professional chambers and trade unions produced opinions denouncing the consequences of 
austerity measures on Luxembourg’s social and democratic system194. The fragmentation of 
positions was clearly visible between the LSAP and its affiliated trade union OGBL. The latter 
tended to welcome the political decisions of Déi Lénk and Déi Gréng to reject the TSCG, 
counteracting the coalition’s policy and moving away from the LSAP position. The 
mediatisation level of political positions increased on the Fiscal Compact through the 
multiplication of press conferences and declarations. The TSCG was seen as a threat for 
Luxembourg as a financial place. While MPs from the majority supported the treaty with less 
enthusiasm than the ESM, opposition MPs expressed overtly their scepticism. Votes in 
Parliament showed that the majority backed by the DP managed to impose its vision in front of 
the other opposition groups. In the end, we observed growing tensions and ideological 
divergences on these issues. On the Fiscal Compact, premises of polarisation appeared. 
However, while the CSV-LSAP coalition supported the treaty and the ADR, Déi Lénk and Déi 
Gréng rejected it, the DP had an ambiguous and intermediary position. In addition, both 
majority and opposition MPs supported some aspects of the treaties, such as the rejection of 
federalist solutions and the need for European solidarity. Thus, polarisation was only issue-
related and confirms partially hypothesis H1. 
Analysis of parliamentary activity 
The financial and economic crisis triggered more attention from MPs’ side, but activity 
related to the ESM and the TSCG was rather limited between 2010 and 2014. While the ESM 
was mainly handled within the Finance and Budget Committee, the EAC barely discussed the 
draft bills linked to the treaty. The EAC met only once in 2010 and the Finance and Budget 
Committee met four times in 2012 to discuss ESM matters. The institutional aspects of the 
Fiscal Compact were handled more often in the EAC, while the financial aspects of the treaty 
were discussed in the Finance and Budget Committee. The latter met once and the EAC four 
times in 2012-2013. The EAC examined primarily the role of national parliaments in the TSCG. 
Article 13 of the Fiscal Compact foresees the creation of an interparliamentary conference. MPs 
discussed the organisation of such a conference on 17th December 2012 and 04th March 2013. 
Moreover, several plenary sessions were dedicated to the financial crisis, but only 6 handled 
directly the ESM and the TSCG. The multiplication of plenary discussions shows that MPs 
wanted to publicise the issue to attract voters’ attention. In general, the number of committee 
meetings on both treaties was lower than in the context of previous treaties (see appendix 1, 
table G). One possible explanation for low activity trends might be the fact that the Government 
had no express obligation to inform the Chamber on intergovernmental treaties outside of the 
EU legal framework. Indeed, the RoP mentions only the founding treaties of the EU. As we will 
see in the next section, the Government’s predominance on the discussions restrained 
parliamentary activity.  
 
194 http://www.europaforum.public.lu/fr/actualites/2012/10/csl-traite-gouvernance/index.html  
http://www.europaforum.public.lu/fr/actualites/2012/05/ogbl-reding-aktuell-pacte/index.html (last accessed 
19.03.2018). 
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In general, if we observe the number of EAC meetings over the period 2011-2013, we 
observe an activity decline as shown in the graph below. 
Figure 24: Number of EAC meetings in the context of the ESM and TSCG (in total), 
Chamber of Deputies 
 
Source: Own calculations based on the annual analytical tables provided by the Chamber of Deputies, 
http://www.chd.lu/wps/portal/public/Accueil/TravailALaChambre/SeancesPubliques/ComptesRendusSeances 
(last accessed 19.03.2018). 
Firstly, the decline could be explained by the fact that issues related to the financial crisis 
were addressed by the Finance and Budget Committee, removing EU matters from the EAC’s 
agenda. Secondly, the anticipated legislative elections in 2013 might have affected MPs’ 
priorities and pushed them to focus more on national/local issues. The same trends can be 
observed in the use of parliamentary questions on EU affairs (see figure 17). MPs asked 26 
questions on EU issues in 2010-2011, 24 questions in 2011-2012 and 17 in 2012-2013.  
Parliamentary instruments were not used frequently on the ESM and the TSCG, but rather on 
general issues related to the financial and economic crisis. Among the nine parliamentary 
questions submitted on the financial crisis, 4 were on the ESM and the TSCG. MPs submitted 
4 requests for topical debates, but none were on the treaties (see appendix 1, table H). 
Between 2009 and 2013, we observed that the proportion of parliamentary instruments 
submitted by MPs with a sceptical position towards anti-crisis measures rose, which seems to 
confirm sub-hypothesis H1.1. Political ideologies affected parliamentary involvement in the 
sense that political positions became more nuanced between the parties. Contrary to the 
previous treaties, supporters and opponents became more visible. In the case of the financial 
crisis, we observe that MPs with sceptical positions became more active. The ADR and Déi 
Lénk rejected the treaties. Within the pro-European camp, Déi Gréng became increasingly 
sceptical towards the TSCG. Coalition partners also started to disagree on the help packages. 
Even though all parties were fundamentally in favour of European integration, specific aspects 
of the European crisis management triggered consternation among MPs.  
The same seems to apply for sub-hypothesis H1.2. MPs from the opposition used more 
often parliamentary instruments to criticise the Government or obtain missing information195. 
Contestation of the European anti-crisis measures and the coalition’s financial and economic 
policy tended to be the main drivers of parliamentary activity. Coalition MPs abstained from 
 
195 19 out of 24 submitted parliamentary instruments emanated from the opposition (see table). 
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scrutinising their Government in a context of growing political tensions. They needed to show 
their support and to defend a unanimous opinion in front of a more scattered opposition. The 
few LSAP MPs that submitted parliamentary tools (one resolution and one motion) did it rather 
because of personal convictions, as noticed already in the previous sections. Overall, 
polarisation did not emerge as such despite growing disagreements between the parties. 
Persistent consociational practices nuance sub-hypothesis H1.3.  
We distinguished two categories of active MPs during negotiations on the ESM and the 
TSCG. Members of the EAC and the Finance Committee were both equally involved. Some 
EAC members were at the same time Finance Committee members. The shift of competence 
from the EAC to the Finance and Budget Committee explains why EU affairs might have been 
split between two types of actors. Decentralisation of EU affairs worked towards a specialised 
committee that was the most competent to deal with technical matters related to financial 
policies. Experts in economic and financial issues were as much involved as MPs with 
“Europeanised” profiles. Therefore, sub-hypothesis H2.1 is partially verified, because key 
players’ profiles were more diverse. For instance, the then president of the DP group was 
member of the Finance committee from 2009 to 2013, obtained his degree in Economics in 
1998 and worked for the Luxembourg Bank from 1999 until 2013. Another CSV member of 
the Finance Committee became Minister within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2013. An 
ADR MP member of the Finance Committee was previously a long-term EAC member and 
participated in the Convention on the Future of Europe. MPs with double memberships in the 
EAC and the Finance Committee had a privileged position and used their expertise in both 
domains to scrutinise the treaties. Just as during the previous treaties, most key players were 
senior MPs that followed the Constitutional Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty. Their knowledge on 
the negotiation processes and their extensive experience in EU affairs made them legitimate 
spokespersons of their group or committee. Most of them participated in interparliamentary 
conferences and were sensitised to EU issues independently from their committee membership.  
On top of that, most key players occupied leading political positions, such as president 
of a parliamentary group, member of the parliament’s Bureau or committee (vice) chair. Almost 
all group leaders were involved in the discussions. For instance, the presidents of the DP, LSAP, 
ADR and Déi Gréng groups scrutinised the Government’s EU policy and participated actively 
in the debates. More specifically, the leader of the Green parliamentary group was very active 
in discussions on both the ESM and the TSCG. Political leadership was especially predominant 
in the Finance and Budget committee. Indeed, whenever a key player belonged to the Finance 
Committee, the MP was also the president of his/her parliamentary group. For instance, one MP 
was cumulating the position of group president and vice-chair of the Finance and Budget 
Committee. We could not find this trend among EAC members, except for one LSAP member 
who was also EAC Chair. The fact that political leaders were the main key players in the debates 
proves that the financial crisis was a particularly salient matter for parties and their affiliated 
parliamentary groups. Leaders had thus the political obligation to monitor closely the 
discussions and represent their party’s interests in Parliament. Just as in the case of the 
Constitutional Treaty and the 2005 referendum campaign, the mediatisation and politicisation 
of a European topic, i.e the financial crisis in the present situation, motivated group and party 
representatives to become active and defend their own political positions. We could not observe 
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this trend during discussions on the Lisbon Treaty, because its low salience did not fuel political 
tensions and did not force political leaders to leave a mark in the public sphere. Therefore, MPs’ 
profiling strategies happened mainly through the parliamentary or party channel. These 
arguments permit to validate partially sub-hypothesis H2.2. Indeed, even though polarisation 
was non-existent within Parliament, political tensions and the technicity of the treaties 
encouraged sectoral committee members to become active scrutinisers alongside EAC 
members.  
Prior experience in Government did not play any role in their involvement, just as 
observed during the previous treaties. Thus, the Government tried to influence parliamentary 
discussions through other means, for instance through its CSV rapporteur on the ESM and the 
TSCG, its LSAP group leader who was at the same time EAC Chair, as well as its CSV group 
leader who was Chair of the Finance Committee. We found that MPs from the majority 
occupied the most important positions in Parliament and were able to keep a hand over the 
negotiation processes.  
However, the analysis of key players’ profiles does not confirm any impact of national 
interest groups on MPs’ positions. Indeed, among all active MPs, only one ADR MP belonged 
to an affiliated trade union (NGL). As expected, the MP defended a critical stance on the Fiscal 
Compact. There is also no clear evidence that civil society might have played a significant role 
in parliamentary work through the publicisation of opinion. Indeed, the OGBL’s position on the 
TSCG did not seem to affect the work of LSAP MPs196. The same can be said for the critical 
opinion of the Chamber of Employees. The quasi absence of interactions with trade unions is 
even more surprising as the crisis was a particularly salient matter on the domestic level. 
Even though the economic and financial crisis was a significant issue for Luxembourg, 
parliamentary activity remained rather circumscribed, which seems to call hypothesis H1 into 
question. The ESM and the Fiscal Compact were both salient matters in Luxembourg, but this 
salience was not reflected in parliamentary activity. A Déi Gréng MP criticised for instance the 
lack of concertation between majority and opposition, as well as the lack of debates within the 
Chamber197. According to the MP, Parliament did not take into account the professional 
chambers’ opinions. On top of this, the Government tended to minimise discussions with the 
opposition on the Fiscal Compact, knowing that the DP party would back the ratification, 
fulfilling the required two-thirds majority in the Chamber of Deputies.  
 
5.6.2 The ESM and the TSCG: an opportunity for institutional change within the Chamber of 
Deputies? 
 
Arguments in favour of reinforcing the Chamber’s formal capacities reappeared in the 
wake of the economic crisis. In November 2008, a DP MP submitted a resolution requesting 
 
196 LSAP MPs barely used scrutiny instruments and voted in favour of the ESM and the TSCG. 
197 http://www.europaforum.public.lu/fr/actualites/2013/02/tscg-greng-cdp/index.html , 
http://www.greng.lu/actualites/fiskalpakt-sabotiert-soziales-europa-auch-luxemburg (last accessed 19.03.2018). 
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the establishment of a temporary special committee on the economic and financial crisis198. The 
special committee was set up on 19th December 2008 and met 16 times between the end of 2008 
and March 2009. The aim of this newly established structure was to examine the impact of the 
crisis on the financial and economic sectors. The committee organised 12 hearings with trade 
unions, banking and insurance associations, professional chambers and federations, ministers 
and representatives from European institutions. A report was produced at the end of the hearings 
and addressed recommendations to the Government on the type of measures needed to solve 
the crisis. An orientation debate was organised in March 2009 to discuss the committee 
report199. The DP MP that initiated the creation of the structure called for a permanent 
instrument to follow the financial crisis, arguing that political pluralism and polarisation needed 
to be preserved on these issues to obtain a fruitful debate. However, majority MPs rejected the 
extension of the committee’s mandate. The LSAP pointed out that legislative work should stay 
within the competences of permanent committees. The special committee did not suggest new 
solutions. Debates between 2010 and 2012 in the EAC, the Finance and Budget Committee, as 
well as in plenary, came back regularly on the issue of parliamentary participation in budgetary 
policy. Discussions on procedural revisions were more publicised through plenary discussions 
than previous reform debates (see appendix 1, table I). 
Initiators of institutional change were both EAC members and members of the RoP 
Committee. While members of the Finance Committee were very active in the scrutiny process 
of the treaties themselves, they abstained from participating in discussions on institutional 
change. Both members of the EAC and the RoP committee can be considered as the main 
“political entrepreneurs” of change, because they focused on the institutional implications 
arising from the treaties. Consensus on reforms was broad once again. MPs with 
“Europeanised” profiles were the main actors of change, which validates sub-hypothesis H3.2. 
Their profiles were almost identical to those observed in the previous sections. Once again, 
most players were already active in prior discussions on institutional revisions and had 
experience in this field. Both members of the EAC and of the RoP committee were senior MPs 
with extensive political experience within the Chamber of Deputies. Majority MPs from the 
LSAP and CSV were again the most engaged. In particular, the LSAP pushed to a further 
strengthening of parliamentary scrutiny powers. The then EAC Chair and LSAP member made 
it a personal priority to insist on procedural revisions, as he did it since the Constitutional Treaty 
(Interview 4, 2017).  
Leadership positions within Parliament or political groups also affected MPs’ 
involvement in debates on institutional change. The main reason lies in the fact that these 
discussions happened mostly in plenary alongside discussions on the financial crisis. Therefore, 
political leaders probably aimed to leave a political mark. The DP, LSAP and Déi Gréng group 
leaders were contributing to the discussions, while the rest of the “political entrepreneurs” of 
change were committee (vice) chairs. Most MPs also participated in interparliamentary 
conferences and almost all COSAC members counted among the initiators of change. These 
 
198 11.11.2008, 7th plenary session, TOP4 Dépôt d’une résolution par M. Charles Goerens relative à l'instauration 
d'une commission spéciale pour le suivi de tous les aspects liés à la crise financière et au ralentissement 
économique. 
199 26.03.2009, 39th plenary session, « Débat d’orientation N°5977 au sujet de la crise économique et financière ». 
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sociological features prove again that the profiles were very similar from one treaty to the other 
and that debates were reserved mostly to professionalised expert MPs.  
Contrary to the previous treaties, the parliamentary administration did not play a 
substantial role in procedural revisions. The Secretary General participated in a meeting of the 
Finance and Budget committee and suggested to create a memorandum between Parliament and 
the Ministry of Finance on the basis of the memorandum on EU affairs200. Overall, discussions 
on procedural changes happened in the public space of plenaries, which indicates that MPs 
aimed to publicise and politicise the issue of their parliament’s participation rights in EU affairs.  
In June 2010, the CSV requested and led a topical debate on parliamentary participation 
rights concerning the monitoring of budgetary policies201. A DP MP wished that the Chamber 
of Deputies had ex-ante control competences that would allow it to receive information on the 
budgetary situation in other Member States. During a plenary debate in December 2010202, the 
LSAP rapporteur on the State budget from the Finance and Budget Committee argued that 
budgetary procedures in Luxembourg needed to be reformed. The MP submitted a motion 
requesting an improved involvement of the Parliament in the European semester. Cooperation 
with the Government was also addressed several times in plenary. In July, September and 
December 2011203, during plenary debates on the financial crisis, the LSAP reproached the 
Government to inform the Chamber after Council meetings. The MP expressed the wish that 
government members consult parliamentary committees ex-ante. The Chamber of Deputies 
should be informed at the earliest possible stage of any decisions in economic and financial 
policies that could have a direct impact on the country. The same day, the President of the 
Chamber discussed the evolution of working practices in EU affairs and regretted that delays 
still occurred whenever the Government transferred impact assessments from European 
Institutions. These arguments were reiterated in March 2012204, when the group Déi Gréng 
requested a topical debate on the Greek sovereign debt.  
At the end of 2011, discussions on the 2012 budget brought up the issue of the growing 
link between national and European budgetary control and the potential impact on the 
Chamber’s scrutiny procedures. An LSAP MP pleaded during the plenary debates of December 
2011 and January 2012 for Parliament’s earliest possible involvement in the national budgetary 
 
200 See in the table above : 25.04.2013, Meeting of COMFI 
201 01.06.2010, 31st plenary session, TOP 7 « Interpellation de M. Claude Meisch au sujet de l’avenir de notre 
place financière » ; « Heure d’actualité demandée par le groupe LSAP sur la régulation des marchés financiers et 
l’introduction d’une taxe sur les transactions financières » ; « Heure d’actualité demandée par le groupe CSV sur 
le contrôle des politiques budgétaires nationales par la soumission des projets de budgets des pays européens à un 
contrôle ou une concertation ex ante au niveau européen ». 
202 07.12.2010, 12th and 13th plenary sessions, TOP 6200 – « Projet de loi concernant le budget des recettes et des 
dépenses de l’État pour l’exercice 2011 ». 
203 14.07.2011, 46 the plenary session, TOP 1 « Interpellation de M Claude Meisch sur la crise de la dette 
européenne (DP) » ; 15.09.2011, TOP 6 and 8 :  « 6314 Projet de loi modifiant la loi du 9 juillet 2010 relative à 
l’octroi de la garantie de l’Etat dans le cadre de l’instrument européen de stabilisation de la zone euro » ; 
06.12.2011, « Un budget 2012 placé sous le signe du semestre européen a été débattu à la Chambre avant d’être 
adopté », 08-12-2011, http://www.europaforum.public.lu/fr/actualites/2011/12/chd-budget2012/ 
204 06.03.2012, 18th plenary session, TOP14 « Heure d’actualité du groupe déi gréng sur les décisions du Sommet 
de l’Union Européenne du 20 février par rapport à la crise de la dette souveraine grecque ». 
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procedures205. At that time, the president of the LSAP group expressed the wish to include the 
Chamber in procedures related to the European Semester monitored by the European 
Commission206. During the debates on the ESM in June 2012, the LSAP group regretted that 
the treaty did not mention parliaments’ role and highlighted the fact that the Chamber needed 
to strengthen its resources to be able to monitor the financial crisis and to better communicate 
with citizens through plenary debates207. The Déi Gréng group even submitted a motion asking 
the Government to inform systematically the Finance and Budget Committee on decisions taken 
on the European level linked to the ESM208. The request submitted by the Greens was already 
discussed during a meeting of the Finance and Budget Committee on 20th March 2012209. 
Committee members had already asked the then Finance minister to inform the Chamber prior 
to granting financial assistance to a Member State in the ESM framework. The Finance Minister 
approved the request, but warned that the Chamber would not receive any right of approval.  
Negotiations on the TSCG also triggered discussions within the EAC and the plenary 
on the role of the Chamber in light of Article 13 of the treaty210. MPs underlined the necessity 
to hold minimum twice per year a debate on the monetary and economic policy. Sectoral 
committees should also get more involved in EU affairs. In the EAC meeting on 17th December 
2012, an LSAP MP submitted a resolution on the role of national parliaments in the future 
budgetary, financial and economic union. The MP requested an orientation debate that would 
tackle the role of parliaments in the democratic control of the measures included in the TSCG, 
an improvement of the Chamber’s resources and the development of the cooperation with the 
European Parliament. A debate in plenary on this resolution was organised on 19th December 
2012211. Initiatives were also taken by the Chamber to communicate about its role in the 
budgetary policy. In February 2013, the Chamber organised a debate on its TV channel about 
 
205 14.12.2011, 12th plenary session, TOP1 « Déclaration de M. Jean-Claude Juncker, Premier Ministre, Ministre 
d’Etat, relative aux conclusions du Conseil européen des 8 et 9 décembre 2011, suivie d’un débat »; 26.01.2012, 
14th plenary session, TOP9 « Déclaration sur la position du Gouvernement luxembourgeois à l’égard du Traité 
international sur la stabilité, la coordination et la gouvernance dans l’Union économique et monétaire ». 
206 In the framework of the European Semester created in 2010, Member States have to submit each year their 
“country’s plans for budget, macroeconomic and structural reforms” (called National Reform Programmes). The 
European Commission analyses these plans and submits recommendations to the governments ( see 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/economic-and-fiscal-policy-coordination/eu-economic-
governance-monitoring-prevention-correction/european-semester_en , last accessed 20.03.2018). 
207 26.06.2012, 34th plenary session, TOP 5 6334 - Projet de loi portant approbation de la décision du Conseil 
européen du 25 mars 2011 modifiant l’article 136 du traité sur le fonctionnement de l’Union européenne en ce qui 
concerne un mécanisme de stabilité pour les États membres dont la monnaie est l’euro ; 6405 - Projet de loi portant 
approbation du traité instituant le mécanisme européen de stabilité, signé le 2 février 2012 à Bruxelles ; 6406 - 
Projet de loi relative (1) à la participation de l’État au mécanisme européen de stabilité; (2) à certaines immunités 
du mécanisme européen de stabilité et de la banque européenne d’investissement et (3) modifiant la loi modifiée 
du 9 juillet 2010 relative à l’octroi de la garantie de l’État dans le cadre de l’instrument européen de stabilisation 
de la zone euro 
208 Ibid., motion 1, François Bausch, groupe parlementaire Déi Gréng, « Veiller à la transparence de la gouvernance 
du Mécanisme Européen de Stabilité vis-à-vis de la Chambre des Député-e-s ». 
209 See meeting COMFI 20.03.2012 (A-CHD-P-2012-O-FI-25). 
210 See EAC meeting 17.12.2012 (A-CHD-P-2012-O-AEDCI-16), 04.03.2013 (A-CHD-P-2013-O-AEDCI-31); 
27.02.2013, 23rd plenary session, TOP2 « 6449- Projet de loi portant approbation du traité sur la stabilité, la 
coordination et la gouvernance au sein de l’Union économique et monétaire, signé à Bruxelles, le 2 mars 2012 ». 
211 19.12.2012, 19th plenary session, TOP2 Résolution de M. Ben Fayot relative au role des parlements nationaux 
dans la future union budgétaire, financière et économique 
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the role of parliaments in budgetary policy212. Both ADR and LSAP MPs regretted during the 
TV debate that the Chamber lost its budgetary power and that it should be endowed with the 
needed resources to influence decisions. An interviewee argued that the lacking parliamentary 
culture to handle systematically EU affairs and financial questions would persist nowadays and 
would limit the Chamber’s powers in these fields (Interview 21, 2017). The conference foreseen 
by Article 13 TSCG is perceived as inefficient by most MPs (Interview 6, 8, 2017). Results of 
these conferences are rarely incorporated in the work of the Chamber, apart if they are perceived 
as a national priority. 
The improvement of the Chamber’s participation rights in EU affairs, specifically in the 
European budgetary procedures, became a national electoral issue in 2013. All parties 
encouraged the development of the Parliament’s scrutiny power in their electoral programmes. 
The LSAP programme mentioned the most extensively the role of national parliaments213. Déi 
Gréng made suggestions for a better involvement of the Chamber, such as reforming the double 
mandate system, establishing scientific competences supporting MPs’ work, creating a 
permanent EAC, increasing the personnel handling EU affairs or publicising committee 
meetings214. The role of the Chamber of Deputies in the wake of the financial and economic 
crisis became a national issue and a relevant argument for re-election prospects. Even though 
several calls for procedural changes were issued between 2010 and 2013, concrete amendments 
to the Chamber’s RoP happened only in 2013-2014, in the context of the electoral campaign 
and after the election of a new three-party coalition in October 2013. The trigger for these 
changes were not the ESM and the TSCG, but rather the European Semester. In April 2013215, 
the Finance and Budget Committee discussed the adaptation of the Chamber’s procedures to 
those of the European Semester. The then president of the committee presented the suggestions 
made to improve the Parliament’s role in the budgetary procedure. The MP proposed to 
establish a glossary for the committee members containing the terminology related to the 
economic governance. During the Government’s discourse on the State of the Nation, a section 
should be reserved to the Stability and Growth Pact, as well as the National Reform Programme. 
The Finance and Budget Committee also suggested organising every year in June a debate on 
the European Commission’s recommendations on both programmes. A memorandum between 
the Government and the Parliament on financial policies could be envisaged on the model of 
the memorandum adopted on EU affairs.  
The suggestions were translated into a law proposal amending the Chamber’s RoP that 
was examined by the Committee on the Rules of Procedure on 20th November 2014 and adopted 
unanimously in plenary on 27th November 2014. Changes to the RoP were implemented, but 
did not correspond to the changes requested by the members of the Finance and Budget 
Committee, which can be seen here as the “political entrepreneurs” of the parliamentary 
 
212 04.02.2013, Jean-Claude Juncker, invité de Chamber aktuell, répond à ceux qui dénoncent le déficit 
démocratique de la coordination des politiques budgétaires que "c’est l’affaire des parlements nationaux que 
d’utiliser les droits que leur donnent les traités" 06-02-2013, 
http://www.europaforum.public.lu/fr/actualites/2013/02/chd-chamber-aktuell-jcj/index.html (last accessed 
20.03.2018). 
213 LSAP-WAHLPROGRAMM 2013 LOSCHT OP MUER ! 
214 Déi Gréng, Programme 2013, Plus Vert. Plus Responsable. 
215 See COMFI meeting 25.04.2013 (A-CHD-P-2013-O-FI-29).  
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reforms. Indeed, while the committee requested better information exchange and coordination 
with the government and the European Commission in the framework of the European 
Semester, the final changes made to the RoP regulated solely internal committee procedures 
without reference to coordination mechanisms with the Government216. 
These elements speak indirectly against sub-hypothesis H3.1. Indeed, even though the 
salience of EU affairs increased in the context of the financial crisis, amendments to the existing 
scrutiny procedures were barely revolutionary. Institutional change remained at the stadium of 
ideas and requests, even though the Chamber’s scrutiny system needed further revisions. MPs 
repeated their wish to strengthen the information flow with the Government, but it translated 
merely in few communication actions and stayed on the rhetorical agendas. Even though the 
Chamber of Deputies’ formal rights in EU affairs remained circumscribed, we could not observe 
substantial institutional change.  
 
5.6.3 Conclusion 
 
In this part, we observed that the salience of the financial and economic crisis in 
Luxembourg did not lead to enhanced parliamentary activity. Polarisation premises appeared 
during discussions on the TSCG. Déi Gréng supported the ESM, but joined the critical camp 
alongside Déi Lénk and ADR on the TSCG. Dissenting opinions also appeared within coalition 
parties. The LSAP viewed critically the CSV’s position on the Fiscal Compact. However, 
discrepancies within parties were not mirrored in Parliament. Indeed, the analysis of MPs’ 
voting behaviour showed that group discipline prevailed. MPs from the same parliamentary 
group voted unanimously on the treaties according to their party’s position. However, the votes 
did not automatically reflect discourses during plenary debates. Indeed, while the DP criticised 
the Government’s ratification bill on the TSCG, it voted in favour of it in the name of solidarity 
in the EU. Moreover, the two-thirds majority requirements might have forced the DP to support 
the TSCG in the name of European solidarity. As the DP’s voice was needed for the ratification 
of the treaty, we can say that the Government’s EU policy relied on artificial and pseudo-
consensual practices.  
Pressure from external actors on parliamentary activity was rather circumscribed. For 
instance, in the context of the ESM, Parliament did not receive any opinion from professional 
chambers. The latter became active during negotiations on the TSCG, but not to the extent of 
affecting parliamentary work. However, after the ratification of the Fiscal Compact, the 
Government’s bill on the implementation of the “golden rule” fuelled numerous reactions from 
professional chambers, associations and banks. The direct impact of the measures on the 
national financial and budgetary system prompted interest groups to draft opinions. Once again, 
domestic priorities seemed to be the main driver for involvement in EU matters. On the other 
hand, the Council of State merely decided that the ratification should proceed according to a 
two-thirds majority in the Chamber of Deputies. It also decided that a second vote was needed 
 
216 Règlement de la Chambre des Députés (Texte coordonné à jour au 1er juin 2015), 
http://legilux.public.lu/eli/etat/leg/tc/2015/06/09/n1/jo (last accessed 20.03.2018). 
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for the ratification of the ESM. In that sense, the Council of State influenced parliamentary 
work through procedural requirements. However, its opinions on the ESM had no substantial 
impact. The establishment of the ESM and Luxembourg’s participation in the mechanism did 
not lead to any observation from the Council of State.  
Within Parliament, the complexity of the treaties might explain why only EAC members 
and experts from the Finance and Budget committee became involved. The requirement of 
specific knowledge to understand the financial measures meant that EU affairs were not 
reserved to EU experts, but also to other specialist MPs. The key players that stayed active in 
the context of the ESM and TSCG were without surprise the same actors that followed the 
Constitutional Treaty and the Treaty of Lisbon. Their long-term experience in EU affairs made 
them privileged actors in the examination of the treaties. The role of “political entrepreneurs” 
of change was shared between EAC members and members of the RoP Committee. Contrary 
to the revisions undertaken in the wake of the previous examined treaties, the parliamentary 
administration did not play an important role in the present discussions. Most debates on 
procedural modifications were led in plenary. Subsequently, most suggestions remained at the 
stadium of rhetorical ideas. The “ESM ruling” of the German Constitutional Court did not seem 
either to affect institutional change in the Chamber of Deputies, contrary to the “Lisbon ruling”. 
Overall, the Chamber merely promoted communication on EU affairs, but substantial 
institutional reforms were left out.  
In light of these elements, we cannot speak here of a trend towards the mainstreaming 
of EU affairs in the Chamber of Deputies. General awareness certainly grew due to the direct 
impact of the treaties on national interests, but the general political will driving parliamentary 
involvement was still missing. 
 
5.7 Summary and conclusion 
 
This chapter investigated parliamentary involvement in Luxembourg in the context of 
the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, the Treaty of Lisbon, the ESM and the TSCG. 
The aim was to explain the evolution of parliamentary activity and parliamentary reforms in 
light of MPs’ motivations and their institutional framework. Relying on three main hypotheses, 
we observed that EU and intergovernmental treaties had an influence on parliamentary 
involvement, to various degrees depending on the treaty. We analysed to what extent 
parliamentary activity was dependent on polarisation between parliamentary groups (H1), if it 
translated into a mainstreaming of EU affairs within Parliament (H2) and to what extent EU 
and intergovernmental treaties triggered institutional change (H3).  
Based on the motivational approach, we saw that political ideologies played a role in 
MPs’ activity level in EU affairs in the context of all treaties (H1.1). While pro-European 
parliamentarians were actively involved in the follow-up of the Constitutional Treaty and the 
Treaty of Lisbon, the trend started to reverse during the economic crisis, where MPs with 
sceptical positions tried to counteract actively those with pro-European positions. Positioning 
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on the political spectrum played a nuanced role during treaties (H1.2). Usually, pro-European 
MPs were majoritarian and belonged to the coalition or to the biggest opposition parties, while 
the sovereignists represented a minimal number of opposition MPs. As Luxembourg is relying 
on a consociational system of decision-making, we could not identify sharp lines of conflict for 
all treaties between the majority and the opposition. Both the majority and the opposition 
supported the Constitutional Treaty. The Treaty of Lisbon was supported by all parties, except 
the ADR. The consensual culture started to crumble during negotiations on the ESM and the 
TSCG. However, although some MPs from the opposition rejected the ESM, they still voted 
for it. These political dynamics enabled the Government to control the negotiation process 
through its majority in Parliament and the absence of strong opposition. In summary, the soft 
political competition in Luxembourg undermined parliamentary activity. MPs got involved in 
EU affairs not because of political considerations, but rather because of personal convictions. 
While both majority and opposition MPs used parliamentary scrutiny instruments on a 
rather identical proportion for the first two treaties, the opposition became even more active 
during the economic crisis. Overall, sharp ideological gaps were not evident within Parliament. 
Group discipline evolved independently from polarisation trends, even though increased 
political tensions forced MPs to stick to their party’s line (H1.3). While the referendum 
campaign on the Constitutional Treaty triggered some conflictual lines among parties, the 
majority was still supporting the treaty. The Treaty of Lisbon did not lead to any conflicts, as 
barely any MP got interested in it. Finally, the financial crisis and specifically the TSCG pushed 
to some degree of polarisation between opposition and majority MPs, but only on specific 
aspects of the treaty. Moreover, we spotted that the salience of EU affairs did not always lead 
to a higher use of parliamentary instruments. Indeed, while it was the case for the Constitutional 
Treaty, scrutiny tools were barely used for the ESM and the TSCG. While parliamentary activity 
was quite balanced between majority and opposition MPs on the Constitutional Treaty and the 
Treaty of Lisbon, the balance tipped towards opposition MPs when it came to the scrutiny of 
the ESM and the TSCG. Opposition MPs became more involved during the economic crisis to 
defend domestic interests. The salience of the crisis led to a growing dissent between the 
majority and the opposition. Thus, contrary to what the Theory of Endogenous Institutional 
Change supposes, political competition played only a limited role in parliamentary involvement 
during EU and intergovernmental treaty negotiations. Overall, we can only partially confirm 
hypothesis H1 in the case of some treaties, as consociationalism limited polarisation between 
parties.  
Historical and Sociological Institutionalism permitted to test to what extent EU treaties 
and intergovernmental treaties on the EMU affected or not the mainstreaming of EU affairs 
within the Chamber of Deputies, by looking at trends stretched out over two decades (H2). We 
observed that MPs’ awareness about EU affairs fluctuated from one treaty to the other and 
depended on the importance they attributed to EU affairs as well as the degree of political 
conflict that emerged in the context of the treaties. Indeed, the salience of EU affairs and the 
ideological gap between MPs increased in the context of the referendum on the Constitutional 
Treaty in 2005 and the financial crisis, leading to a wider awareness among parliamentarians. 
Pressure from the civil society affected parliamentary activity in the context of the 
Constitutional Treaty and the Fiscal Compact. These two events drew attention on domestic 
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priorities and prompted interest groups to express their opinion. However, interest groups 
affected parliamentary work through external channels rather than through their affiliated MPs. 
Within Parliament, few key players were at the same time member of a national union.  
In the end, only a limited circle of MPs got actively involved in the follow-up of the 
treaties. Most of them had a “Europeanised” profile, with the exception of those that dealt with 
the ESM and the TSCG (H2.1). The latter came from the Finance and Budget Committee and 
their involvement was rather topic-related in a context of growing political tensions (H2.2). The 
role of the sectoral expert replaced partially the role of EU experts in the context of the economic 
crisis. However, the level of professionalisation grew steadily. Especially those EAC members 
that were active since the Constitutional Treaty appeared to have gained extensive experience 
throughout the years, which could explain why they were probably seen as most competent to 
deal with institutional issues deriving from the treaties. Within Parliament, EU affairs are still 
not perceived as appealing. Therefore, we could not observe any trend towards a mainstreaming 
of EU affairs within the Chamber of Deputies, even though institutional revisions aimed to 
move in that direction. In addition to the lack of generalised interest for EU affairs, the small 
size of the Chamber could also be at the origin of the absence of mainstreaming. The lack of 
personnel and financial resources, MPs’ multiple committee memberships, their double-
mandates and sometimes parallel jobs do not give them enough time to deal with EU matters 
that won’t allow them to be re-elected in their constituency. Therefore, hypothesis H2 is only 
partially validated. 
Moreover, even though a limited circle of MPs were aware that the Chamber of 
Deputies’ participation rights needed to be reformed (H3), it did not systematically lead to 
effective implementation. Indeed, parliamentary strength in EU affairs and processes of 
institutional change were not always correlated (H3.1). Luxembourgish MPs were conscious 
about the need to improve their scrutiny rights, but efforts to reform the procedures and 
structures were quite moderate. Consensus between parliamentary groups was present during 
the whole process of procedural and structural reforms. Parliamentary culture was a significant 
determiner of institutional change within the chamber (H3.2). Contrary to ideological 
divergences on the treaties and a rather conflictual environment in the wake of the ESM, all 
groups agreed unanimously on the direction and extent of institutional change within the 
Chamber. Independently from ideological considerations, revisions were tackled in a constant 
consensual atmosphere. Majority MPs led the discussions and drafted all the reports on RoP 
amendments, proof that coalition partners controlled closely the direction of change within the 
Chamber of Deputies. One main observation is that the salience of treaties does not always 
correlate with the scope of institutional change. All parties thought that the Constitutional 
Treaty was salient and subsequently triggered institutional reforms within the Chamber of 
Deputies. On the contrary, most MPs ignored the Treaty of Lisbon, but discussions continued 
among a limited circle of MPs about the need to pursue the strengthening of scrutiny rights. The 
then EAC Chair particularly insisted on the need to develop better cooperation with the 
government and to strengthen the information flow. In that respect, the “Lisbon ruling” of the 
German Constitutional Court played a crucial role in the motivation and efforts of the “political 
entrepreneurs” to promote parliamentary participation in EU affairs. Based on the German 
model, the Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies was encouraged by both the EAC Chair and the 
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Secretary General to improve the scrutiny system. Finally, the ESM and especially the TSCG 
did not lead to substantial amendments, even though both treaties had a special importance in 
Luxembourg.  
In light of all these elements, it is possible to assess the direction of institutional change 
in EU affairs within the Chamber of Deputies (H3.3). Considering that institutional change 
happened punctually and parallel to each treaty and that it took mostly the form of amendments 
to the RoP, we can conclude that the transformative process within the Chamber happened 
through two processes: “layering” and “drift”. Therefore, we can partially validate sub-
hypothesis H3.3. Institutional change through “layering” happened incrementally within the 
Chamber, as new rules were added gradually in response to institutional developments on the 
European level. This type of institutional change happened in the context of the Constitutional 
Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty. The latter required also the creation of new rules concerning the 
subsidiarity mechanism, as well as a new information policy. Amendments completed existing 
rules and new institutional arrangements were created in response to missing ones. Finally, the 
absence of revisions during negotiations on the ESM and the TSCG, despite multiple debates 
on the need to reinforce parliamentary prerogatives, led us to the conclusion that rules were 
deliberately not adapted to Parliament’s changing environment. “Drift” can thus best explain 
the absence of revisions in the context of the economic crisis. 
The graph below (figure 28) shows the number of discussions led within the Chamber 
on procedural reforms. We observe that the Constitutional Treaty and the Treaty of Lisbon 
triggered more debates on the change of scrutiny procedures than the ESM and the TSCG. 
Figure 25: Number of discussions on procedural reforms including committee and plenary 
debates (in total), Chamber of Deputies, 2004-2014 
 
Source: Own calculations based on statistics from the Chamber’s website. 
According to the Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change, layering means the 
replacement of existing rules by new ones through amendments or revisions. Contrary to the 
assumption of the Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change that transformation is caused by 
conflicting interests and competition between rule makers and rule takers, change within the 
Chamber of Deputies emerged within a consensual framework where all actors agreed on the 
direction of change. All parliamentary groups supported the successive amendments to the 
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scrutiny system. So-called “political entrepreneurs” initiated these changes. Parliamentary 
reforms in the context of the Constitutional Treaty and the Treaty of Lisbon were exclusively 
pushed by “Europeanised” MPs, while MPs from the Finance and Budget Committee can be 
considered as the “political entrepreneurs” of change during the economic and financial crisis. 
“Political entrepreneurs” did not become active because of competing interests over the nature 
and functions of the Parliament, but rather because they reinterpreted normatively the role of 
the Chamber. In the context of the Constitutional Treaty, a common understanding emerged 
among MPs that Parliament needed to be more involvement in the European decision-making 
process. On top of this, MPs were backed by the parliamentary administration, who exerted a 
considerable influence on revisions that took place in the wake of the Constitutional Treaty and 
the Treaty of Lisbon. As all parliamentary groups agreed on the need to strengthen the 
Chamber’s scrutiny rights, despite their diverging opinions on the treaties themselves, we can 
say that the normative causes of change speak in favour of arguments from Sociological 
Institutionalism. 
After each treaty, the same discussions on the Chamber’s participation rights in EU 
affairs came back, proof that measures were barely implemented. Despite a multitude of reform 
suggestions from EAC members, most of them remained at the stage of rhetorical promises. 
The last burst of conscience on the need to reform parliamentary procedures happened in March 
2015, when several MPs from the Finance and Budget Committee expressed their wish during 
an informal meeting to improve scrutiny procedures in the framework of the SGP and the NRP. 
Like the previous times, proposals were not implemented and re-emerged punctually (Interview 
23, 2018). In the end, parliamentary involvement in EU affairs depended highly on individual 
motivation and the political culture. Considering both the Chamber’s formal capacities and 
MPs’ motivations, we observe that “institutional Europeanisation” remained partial, while 
“emotional Europeanisation” seemed to be at a more advanced stage.  
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Chapter 6. Parliamentary involvement in EU affairs in the Austrian 
National Council 
 
The second empirical chapter focuses on the Austrian National Council’s involvement 
in EU affairs. The first part outlines the institutional framework in which the lower chamber is 
rooted. We will explain which actors play a significant role in the Austrian legislative process, 
before outlining the different decision-making steps. The second section deals more specifically 
with the current status quo of the National Council’s participation rights in EU affairs, including 
an analysis of its legal basis, its parliamentary administration, but also the role of parliamentary 
groups and committees, as well as the relation with the Government. The understanding of the 
institutional context and the status quo of the chamber’s scrutiny rights in EU affairs will then 
permit to assess more precisely effective parliamentary involvement in EU affairs in the section 
6.3, as well as in the wake of EU treaties and intergovernmental treaties on the EMU in the 
sections 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6. 
 
6.1 Austria: general institutional framework 
 
Austria is a small federal state with a multi-level governance, where political actors from 
the local, regional and federal levels closely cooperate with each other. The competences are 
distributed between the Federal State and 9 regions called “Länder”. While the main 
competences remain between the hands of the Federal State, the “Länder” can participate in the 
legislative process through the upper chamber of parliament, the Federal Council (Bundesrat). 
Since 1929, the political regime of Austria is constitutionally and de jure semi-presidential, but 
de facto a parliamentary democracy, because the Austrian President’s powers are weak in 
practice (Hefftler/Neuhold/Rozenberg/Smith, 2015; Miklin, 2012). Just as Luxembourg, many 
authors describe Austria as a proportional and consociational democracy with neocorporatist 
features (Stromberger et al., 2005). In the framework of Austrian corporatism, civil society and 
political parties play a crucial role in the decision-making process. Consociationalism and neo-
corporatism emerged in Austrian society to preserve the country’s small economy highly 
dependent on international trade (Schultz, 1992). The accession to the EU was thus 
controversial for a country that wished to preserve its well-established cooperation patterns, but 
at the same time saw the EU as an opportunity to secure further economic development. Before 
the 1980s, some political parties such as the SPÖ were critical towards the European 
Communities, because European integration would represent a threat for both Austrian markets’ 
competitiveness and the country’s neutrality. Austria’s membership to EFTA in 1960 was thus 
one step closer to an envisaged accession and aimed to prove to the EC its will to develop further 
collaboration and to strengthen its position in future membership negotiations. Only in 1987, 
when the SPÖ and the ÖVP formed a new coalition government and Austrian SME’s 
competitiveness decreased, did political elites’ awareness evolve in favour of European 
integration. Membership was then seen as a trigger for internal structural reforms and as 
necessary with regard to the country’s historical past, geographical position and 
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cosmopolitanism (Luif, In: Hanf/Soetendrop, 1998; Maurer/Neisser/Pollak, 2015). Austria’s 
accession to the EU in 1995 obliged the country to adapt abruptly to the “acquis 
communautaire”. In the wake of this event, constitutional revisions had to be undertaken and 
Parliament’s rights in EU affairs established. Alongside Austria’s membership to the EU and 
the growing Euroscepticism of the population, the Austro-corporatist and consociational model 
crumbled continuously. The first section presents the main actors of the legislative process. The 
second section deals with the legislative process itself, in particular how EU affairs are being 
handled step by step on the national level.  
 
6.1.1 Actors of the legislative process 
 
The first section outlines the distribution of competences between the main actors in the 
Austrian legislative process. The executive and the Parliament lead the process, closely 
monitored by interest groups and social partners. Political parties play a predominant role and 
transform government-parliament relations into majority-opposition dynamics. The Federal 
Constitutional Court serves as the guardian of the Constitution.  
 
6.1.1.1 The executive: the Federal Chancellor and the Government 
 
The executive power in Austria is distributed unevenly between two actors: the Federal 
President and the Federal Chancellor. The Federal President of Austria has significant 
constitutional competences fixed in the Constitution in 1929, but most Presidents have used the 
latter in a restrictive way (Helms/Wineroither, In: Helms/Wineroither, 2017). Due to their 
renouncement of the full exercise of their competences, the Austrian political regime appears 
to be formally a “presidential-parliamentary” regime where the typical features of such a regime 
disappear in the constitutional practice (Helms/Wineroither, 2017). Formally, the Federal 
President is the Head of State directly elected by the citizens for a period of six years. He/she 
appoints and leads the Government. The President “convokes the National Council each year 
for an ordinary session” and declares them closed (Article 28 B-VG). He/she can dissolve the 
National Council (Article 29 B-VG), but is also accountable to it in the framework of his 
functions (Article 68 § 1 B-VG). He/she authenticates the enactment of federal laws (Article 47 
§1 B-VG) with the countersignature of the Federal Chancellor and appoints federal civil 
servants (Article 65 §2 B-VG). On top of his domestic competences, the Federal President also 
represents Austria internationally and can conclude state treaties (Article 65 §1 B-VG). In 
specific cases, this competence can be delegated to the Federal Government (Article 66 § 2 B-
VG) or to a Land Government (Article 66 § 3 B-VG).  
 Austrian governments are characterised by two-party coalitions between the SPÖ and 
the ÖVP, with few exceptions in the past, where coalitions were formed between the SPÖ and 
the FPÖ in 1983-1987 and between the ÖVP and the FPÖ/BZÖ in 2000-2007. Between 2007 
and 2016, the SPÖ and the ÖVP formed again a Grand Coalition for nearly ten years. The table 
hereafter sums up the coalition formations since 2000.  
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Table 12: Coalition governments in Austria, 2000-2019 
 
Government formation reflects clientelist practices, because the choice of ministers 
serves foremost to maintain a certain network of contacts among social partners supportive of 
the coalition’s policies. The SPÖ and ÖVP maintain the commonly accepted practice of 
ministry “reservation”. As the two biggest parties of Austria, their deep-rooted influence into 
society through their presence in civil society organisations makes them powerful actors of the 
decision-making process (Wineroither/Kitschelt, In: Helms/Wineroither, 2017). Thus, political 
power is mostly concentrated between their hands, and the initiative to form a coalition 
alternates between the two parties. However, the ÖVP remains the predominant coalition 
partner until now. The close ties between government parties and social partners is especially 
visible in ministers’ profiles. The latter endorse the role of policy experts and come mostly from 
the ranks of social partners, the latter playing a significant role in the choice of minister 
positions in specific policy fields (Helms/Wineroither, In: Helms/Wineroither, 2017). Due to 
these grand coalition constellations and the strong influence of civil society organisations on 
the Government’s policies, the Prime Minister’s scope of action remains quite limited. 
Compared to the Federal President, the constitutional powers of the Prime Minister are 
moderate. Just as the Federal President, the Prime Minister leads the Government (Article 69 
B-VG). However, the latter exerts the predominant influence in this diarchy. The Prime Minister 
can suggest nominations of ministers (Article 70 B-VG), but he can neither organise, distribute 
nor give instructions to ministries, as this prerogative belongs to the Federal President (Article 
70 § 1 B-VG). Once the Federal President has appointed the cabinet, it has to present itself to 
the National Council within one week (Article 70 B-VG). Ministers chosen among parliament 
members can keep their MP position within the National Council. As the highest administrative 
body, the Government manages the State administration. The Government is accountable only 
to the National Council, which can pass a vote of no confidence (Article 74 B-VG). Individual 
government members are responsible to the National Council according to article 76 B-VG. 
Government can also be held accountable by the lower chamber through the Federal 
Constitutional Court if a minister contravenes the law. 
 Within Government, decisions follow the unanimity principle. Each minister has a veto 
right in the meetings of the national Council of ministers. However, the efficiency of decisions 
taken in this body is limited due to its big size, the low meeting frequency and the shift of power 
to other bodies such as political parties or unions and associations (Talos/Kittel, 2001). As 
decision-making within Government bases on the unanimity rule, divergences between 
coalition partners might represent a challenge. To reduce conflictual situations, government 
members meet informally with their respective parties. On top of this, different dialogue formats 
between ministers aim to encourage discussions: minister committees can be established ad hoc 
Period Coalition government 
2000-2003 ÖVP-FPÖ 
2003-2007 ÖVP-FPÖ, BZÖ 
2007-2008 SPÖ-ÖVP 
2008-2013 SPÖ-ÖVP 
2013-2017 SPÖ-ÖVP 
2017-2019 ÖVP-FPÖ 
Source: Own calculations. 
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or permanently through ministerial decision; bi- or multilateral contacts can be established 
between government members and once per year, governmental meetings 
(Regierungsklausuren) are organised. In case of persistent conflictual opinions between 
coalition partners, the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister can meet in a coordination 
committee. 
 
6.1.1.2 The parliament: National Council and Federal Council 
 
The Austrian Parliament is bicameral and composed of the National Council 
(Nationalrat) as the lower chamber and the Federal Council (Bundesrat) as the upper chamber. 
Although separate legislative bodies, both chambers form on the federal level the Federal 
Assembly, which is among others in charge of inaugurating or prosecuting the Federal President 
or declaring war217. While each Land has its own regional parliament (Landtag), representatives 
from regional executives are represented in the Federal Council on the Federal level. The 
Federal Council is composed of 61 members delegated by their Provincial Diets to represent 
the latter’s interests. Contrary to the National Council’s members, representatives of the Federal 
Council are not directly elected on the Federal level, but in their Provincial Diets218. The number 
of members sent to the Federal Council depends on the size of the Land population. The number 
of seats can change if the population size evolves. Reallocation of seats happens every ten years. 
The Federal Council shares the legislative power with the National Council according to Article 
24 of the Federal Constitution. It has a “suspensive” veto power with regard to bills adopted by 
the National Council. However, most authors agree that the Federal Council’s veto function is 
weak, as the National Council can overrule it (Helms/Wineroither, In: Helms/Wineroither, 
2017; Miklin, 2012). Through its veto power, the Federal Council is reduced to a passive actor 
giving its opinion on National Council enactments. The Federal Council was even labelled as 
an “impotent institution” by Pollak (2003). The Austrian two-chamber system is thus 
asymmetrical due to the unbalanced competences between the chambers (Müller, In: 
Strøm/Müller/Bergman, 2006). The Federal Council has no competences in fields such as 
federal finances or the federal budget (Article 42 § 5 B-VG). The upper chamber can submit 
legislative initiatives to the National Council, which pass if accepted through the regular steps 
of the legislative process. Federal Council members elect their president and vice-presidents, 
which are among others responsible to represent the institution and to convene its sittings219. 
The president, vice-presidents and chairs of each parliamentary group form the President’s 
Conference, which coordinates work within the upper chamber and supports the president’s 
office. 
 The National Council as the lower chamber is composed of 183 members elected for 
five years. Alongside the Government and the Federal Council, the lower chamber can initiate 
legislation either through individual MPs or through parliamentary committees. The National 
 
217 See https://www.parlament.gv.at/ENGL/PERK/NRBRBV/BV/ (last accessed 04.07.2018). 
218 See https://www.parlament.gv.at/ENGL/PERK/NRBRBV/BR/ (last accessed 04.07.2018). 
219 See https://www.parlament.gv.at/ENGL/PERK/NRBRBV/BR/PRAESBR/index.shtml (last accessed 
04.07.2018). 
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Council controls the Government through multiple parliamentary instruments and the vote of 
no confidence, proposes, discusses and enacts laws and approves the federal budget. Members 
of the National Council elect their President and vice-presidents at the beginning of each 
legislative period. Just as in the Federal Council, the presidents and chairpersons of 
parliamentary groups form the President’s Conference of the National Council responsible for 
the good functioning of parliamentary everyday work. The National Council can be situated at 
the intersection between a “talking” and a “working” parliament, with a predominance of the 
latter category’s features (Helms/Wineroither, In: Helms/Wineroither, 2017). Parliamentary 
committees follow usually ministries’ jurisdictions, but their number surpasses the resorts due 
to the existence of additional specialised committees. Indeed, apart from the permanent sectoral 
committees, the lower chamber can establish sub-committees or ad hoc enquiry committees. 
During the last legislative period, the National Council had 41 committees. While the number 
of members of the Main Committee are decided by the National Council (§30 RoP), 
parliamentary groups decide on the memberships of the other committees in proportion to their 
seats in Parliament (§32 RoP). MPs are usually member of multiple committees and can keep 
their mandate in Parliament whenever they switch to a government position. Minister and MP 
functions are thus compatible in Austria. 
Parties within Parliament are organised in parliamentary groups called “Klubs” composed of 
minimum five MPs. During the last legislative period of 2013-2017, the SPÖ had 52 seats, the 
ÖVP 47 seats, the FPÖ 40 seats, the Greens 24 seats, STRONACH 11 seats and NEOS 9 
seats220. 
Figure 26: Composition of the National Council (in total), 2013-2017 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
The particular feature of parliamentary groups in the Austrian parliament is that they are 
common to both chambers. Most of the time, majorities in both chambers are identical, which 
facilitates the coordination of political positions and the enactment of laws (Müller, In: 
Strøm/Müller/Bergman, 2006). Party discipline in Parliament, Government and even among 
 
220 See http://orf.at/wahlergebnisse/nr13/ergebnisse/#ergebnis (last accessed 04.07.2018). 
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social partners with political representatives is very strong and affects the overall cooperation 
mechanisms between the institutions. Whenever a political group wishes to put a controversial 
matter on the agenda or to evaluate the consequences of the use of certain parliamentary 
instruments, they use the Federal Council as a “political experimental arena” (Interview 7a, 
2017). Consensus is generally reached more easily in the Federal Council, especially in EU 
affairs, due to a different political culture encouraging compromises. While the low media 
attention on the Federal Council’s activities might be seen as detrimental, it plays a more 
significant role as a strategic arena for parties that want to discuss matters without mediatisation. 
According to an interviewee, monitoring over the upper chamber’s activities is less strict, which 
allows parliamentary groups to pass an issue more easily (Interview 3a, 2017). For instance, no 
rules exist within the Federal Council that regulate the presence of ministers or civil servants in 
the EAC (Interview 3a, 2017). Groups bypass political conflicts and the opposition within the 
National Council. Once the matter reaches the lower chamber, rejection is more difficult 
because of the need to preserve credibility and coherence in the decision-making process. Thus, 
the Federal Council permits to bring issues from the regional to the federal level.  
While the National Council is particularly active in domestic issues, the Federal Council 
regained popularity and legitimacy through its active involvement in the subsidiarity monitoring 
(Interview 17a, 2017). The latter is less conflictual than domestic issues and commonly 
accepted by the Länder, hence the higher proportion of reasoned opinions submitted by the 
Federal Council compared to the National Council (Interview 5a, 6a, 2017). Reasoned opinions 
are sent directly to the European Commission without being filtered by the lower chamber. In 
addition, whenever an EU matter cannot be discussed in the National Council’s EAC, it can be 
examined instead in the Federal Council. 
 Just as parliamentary groups, both chambers also share a common parliamentary 
administration (Article 30 B-VG). Parliament drastically increased the number of its civil 
servants over the past decades, passing from 150 staff in 1970 to nearly 400 in 2017. 
Figure 27: Evolution of parliamentary staff (in total), National Council 
 
Source: Own calculations, based on statistics from the parliament’s website. 
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the other for the Administrative Branch (A). The first branch comprises the National Council 
services, the Federal Council services, the Research services and Public Relations, The second 
branch is composed of the Central Administrative Services, the Infrastructural and Security 
Services and the EU and International Services221. Parliamentary committees within the 
National Council do not have their own committee secretariats, but are rather supported by a 
central unit called “Committee affairs and parliamentary sub-committees” part of the 
Legislative branch of the administration. 
 
6.1.1.3 The Federal Constitutional Court 
 
The Austrian Federal Constitutional Court (Verfassungsgerichtshof) was established in 
1920. It is composed of a president, a vice-president, 12 members and 6 substitute members 
exerting a part-time mandate. The Federal President nominates members and substitute 
members, while the Government nominates the president, vice-president, six constitutional 
judges and three substitute members. The National Council and the Federal Council can 
alternatively nominate the six other members and the three additional substitute members 
(Article 147 B-VG). With regard to the significant place of the Constitution in the Austrian 
legal system, the Court is the “guardian of the Constitution and of fundamental rights”. 
According to a civil servant from the parliamentary administration, the regulation level in 
Austria is very high and detailed (Interview 7a, 2017). Due to the multiplicity of laws that have 
obtained constitutional rank, the Constitution became complex, fragmented and unclear (Pürgy, 
2011). Therefore, the Court’s opinions are particularly important for parliamentary work. The 
Court controls the constitutionality of the federal and regional laws (Article 140 B-VG) and 
regulations (Article 139 B-VG). The Constitutional Court can revoke laws ex-post, pronounce 
itself on conflicts of competences or even initiate the legislative process (Talos et al., 2001). 
The control of the compliance of laws with the Constitution can only be conducted after the 
Court received an application, either from the Federal Government, a regional government, one-
third of the members of the National Council, the supreme Court, the Austrian Administrative 
High Court or individual citizens. Thus, the Court cannot seize itself on a case.  
The Austrian Constitutional Court maintains contacts to constitutional courts from other 
EU Member States, as well as to the European Court of Human Rights222. The Court cooperates 
regularly with German-speaking courts and representatives from the European Court of Justice. 
The growing constitutionalisation of EU law obliges the Constitutional Court to stay updated 
on the latest evolutions, particularly with regard to its functions as controller of the 
constitutional compliance of state and EU treaties (Article 140a B-VG). The Court has no 
specific department dedicated to EU affairs, but an International Affairs department under the 
supervision of the presidential directorate223. 
 
221 See https://www.parlament.gv.at/POOL/SWBRETT/90000/0005/1-2017_A_Organigramm_Englisch.pdf (last 
accessed 04.07.2018). 
222 See https://www.vfgh.gv.at/downloads/VfGH_Broschuere_E.pdf (last accessed 04.07.2018). 
223 See https://www.vfgh.gv.at/verfassungsgerichtshof/organisation/Management.en.html (last accessed 
04.07.2018). 
179 
 
 
6.1.1.4 Social partnership and Austro-corporatism 
 
The legislative process in Austria founds on a strong involvement of social partners, 
referred to as the “Austro-corporatist” model (Talos et al., 2001). Features of the latter are 
“stable and predictable relations through historically developed inter-organisational networks, 
coordination and control of collective relations through umbrella organisations, concentration 
of the system of associations to few organisations with representation monopoly, registration 
of all socio-economic groups in chambers with compulsory membership” (Sack, 2017, p.240). 
As Pelinka (2013) underlines it, “[t]he interconnection between political parties and 
socioeconomic interest groups is the precondition for Austria’s neocorporatist Social 
Partnership” (Pelinka, In: De Waele/Escalona/Vieira, 2013, p. 41). Interest groups in Austria 
are divided into associations and professional chambers. As of 2016, there are 16 professional 
chambers in Austria, but five main umbrella organisations are involved throughout the 
legislative process: associations such as the Austrian Trade Union Federation ÖGB and the 
Federation of Austrian Industries IV; professional chambers such as the Federal Chamber of 
Labour BAK, the Austrian Federal Chamber of Business WKÖ, the Austrian Chamber of 
Agriculture LKÖ (Armingeon, In: Helms/Wineroither, 2017; Falkner, 2001; Luther/Müller, In: 
Luther/Müller, 1992). The ÖGB and the BAK represent employees, while employers are 
represented in the WKÖ, LKÖ and IV. The organisational and decisional structure of interest 
groups is highly centralised on the federal level. For instance, the ÖGB is composed of single 
unions on the regional level without legal personality and financially dependent on the ÖGB 
federation. The WKÖ represents regional chambers, but the latter have each their own legal 
personality. 
Federal unions and professional chambers participate in political negotiations on the 
pre-parliamentary level through lobbying activities and exchanges with the Government. 
During the parliamentary process, civil society can participate in committee hearings as experts 
or indirectly in plenary sessions if they have overlapping functions as MP and member of an 
interest group. Finally, social partners are also involved in the implementation of the laws. 
During the legislative process, participation of civil society happens both horizontally (between 
federations and government) and vertically (between federations and parties), formally and 
informally. Social partnership in Austria was established at the beginning of the 1960s and 
follows three principles: concertation (Konzertierung), active participation (Mitgestaltung) and 
agreement (Akkordierung) (Stromberger/Talos, In: Talos/Karlhofer, 2005). These three 
features can be found either in bi-partite negotiations between umbrella organisations, or in tri-
partite negotiations between umbrella organisations and the Government.  
The specificity of the Austro-corporatist system is also the fact that the ties between 
political parties and civil society organisations are extremely strong. Political parties form 
groups within professional chambers, apply to chambers’ elections, and decide about their 
organisation. Members of these organisations are part of a political group and can apply for 
National Council elections or regional elections. While the SPÖ is predominantly represented 
in the Chamber of Labour and the ÖGB, the ÖVP has the majority of seats in the WKÖ (Sack, 
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2017). Within the Chamber of Labour, the biggest political group is the Group of the Social-
democratic Trade Unionists (FSG) with 57% of the votes during the elections in 2014, followed 
by the Christian Trade Unionists (ÖAAB), the Liberal Employees (FA) and the Alternative and 
Green Trade Unionists (AUGE)224. The Chamber of Labour is also a member of the ÖGB, 
which shows how deeply social partnership is interlinked and how deep the penetration of 
Austrian parties into the society is. Representatives from social partner organisations are invited 
regularly as experts in parliamentary committee hearings, or cooperate bilaterally with 
individual MPs. According to Armingeon (2017), the Austro-corporatist model lost some of its 
power since 1945, especially in the last decades after the establishment of the ÖVP-FPÖ 
coalition in 2002. Between 2002 and 2006, the Government became hostile towards social 
partners. The economic crisis revived Austrian corporatism, which shows that social partnership 
in Austria is largely dependent on the political context (Pernicka/Hefler, 2015). 
Before Austria’s accession to the EU, social partners were involved in negotiation 
rounds on the EFTA agreement and the European Economic Area. EU affairs were thus the 
object of a long-term discussion culture between political representatives and social partners. 
In the 1980s, social partners mainly backed EC membership, especially the Federation of 
Austrian Industries IV and the Chamber of Business WKÖ. The Chamber of Labour was less 
enthusiastic, but gave nonetheless its support to the accession (Schultz, 1992). Even though 
social partners were afraid of losing influence through the EU accession, they pushed political 
leaders to support accession prospects by organising mobilisation movements during the EU 
membership referendum campaign in 1994. The referendum’s positive outcome was the result 
of a cartel of elites from the two biggest parties SPÖ and ÖVP combined with the social 
partners’ action. EU accession meant a limitation of informal and formal sovereignty power, 
especially in economic affairs and social policies, where social partners were particularly active. 
It also meant modifications in the participation of social partners in the decision-making 
process. Therefore, before Austria’s accession to the EU, coalition parties established 
agreements to reassure social partners and secure their participation in EU affairs 
(Pollak/Puntscher Riekmann, In: Helms/Wineroither, 2017). On the Austrian level, a 
coordination body was created in 1989, the "Rat für Fragen der österreichischen Integrations- 
und Außenpolitik"225 (Council for questions linked to Austrian integration and foreign affairs 
policy) presided by the Chancellor. Nowadays, the Council is part of the Foreign Affairs 
Ministry. The Council is composed of the responsible ministry resorts, political parties 
represented in the Main Committee of the National Council, two representatives of the 
provincial governors’ conference and regional parliaments, social partner organisations226 and 
one representative from the Austrian Association of cities and Austrian Association of 
 
224 See https://www.arbeiterkammer.at/ueberuns/akwahl/AK_Wahl_2014.html (last accessed 30.05.2018). 
225 Bundesgesetz über die Errichtung eines Rates für Fragen der österreichischen Integrations- und Außenpolitik, 
StF: BGBl. Nr. 368/1989 (NR: GP XVII AB 1026 S. 110. BR: AB 3703 S. 518.) + Errichtung eines Rates für 
Fragen der österreichischen Integrations- und Außenpolitik, 11.01.2008, 
https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/NormDokument.wxe?Abfrage=Bundesnormen&Gesetzesnummer=10001007&Fassun
gVom=2016-09-02&Artikel=1&Paragraf=1&Anlage=&Uebergangsrecht= (last accessed 04.07.2018).  
226 WKÖ, Chamber of Labour, Speakers’ Conference of Chambers of Agriculture, Austrian Trade Union 
Federation 
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Municipalities. The Council still serves as a coordination body and information exchange on 
EU matters.  
A circular letter on “the legal and organisational questions linked to EU membership” 
written by the Chancellery and the Foreign Affairs Ministry created the legal basis of social 
partners’ involvement in EU affairs. The new rules obliged ministries to transfer comprehensive 
and early information to social partners. The latter had also access to Council documents. Social 
partners secured their participation additionally through their motion “Austria and the European 
integration” on 1st March 1989. On 22nd April 1994, SPÖ and ÖVP signed a Europe agreement 
(“Europa-Abkommen”) in which they anchored social partners’ participation rights in EU 
affairs. The agreement stipulated that all organisations that participated in the EEA committees 
would have the same rights in EU affairs and the possibility to be represented in EU institutions 
and foundations. Indeed, Austria’s Permanent Representation to the EU is the only 
representative body composed of government civil servants and representatives of civil society 
organisations. The closeness of civil society and politicians secures a constant coordination. All 
representatives on the EU level from Austrian institutions meet weekly during a “jour fixe”. 
The origin of such composition dates back to the accession negotiations and the significant role 
played by social partners during accession preparations (Sack, 2017).  
On the national level, several laws anchored professional chambers’ participation rights 
in EU affairs227. Some professional chambers established specialised structures to handle EU 
affairs. Within the WKÖ, EU matters were handled first in the department for integration and 
commerce policies ("Integrations- und Handelspolitische Abteilung"). Reforms in the chamber 
in 2001 redistributed competences. Trade matters were relocated in the financial policy 
department and the integration policy became the EU coordination department ("Stabsabteilung 
EU-Koordination"), which is responsible for the WKÖ’s EU office in Brussels. The WKÖ was 
one of the first Austrian social partners to establish such an office. The LKÖ has also an EU 
office in Brussels and focuses mainly on the European Agriculture Policy. The WKÖ EU office 
belongs to the “EU coordination” department within the WKÖ in Vienna. The EU office is also 
part of the Permanent Representation of Austria to the EU. Regular contacts are maintained 
between the WKÖ EU office and ministries represented in the permanent representation, other 
social partners, Länder EU offices, the Austrian Federation of Cities and Municipalities and the 
Austrian National bank. However, no exchanges take place between the WKÖ EU office and 
the National Council, as cooperation is only national-based.  
On the EU level, the WKÖ is also member of the “Eurochambres” federation. Since 
1989, the WKÖ started an EU-trainees programme aiming at training young professionals in 
EU matters. The WKÖ also established an information system between the European and 
 
227 Bundesgesetz über die Kammern der gewerblichen Wirtschaft (Wirtschaftskammergesetz 1998 - WKG), 
„Begutachtungsrecht §10 (2) Die Bundeskammer ist unverzüglich über alle Vorhaben betreffend die Rechtssetzung 
im Rahmen der Europäischen Union zu unterrichten und ihr insbesondere Gelegenheit zur Stellungnahme zu 
Entwürfen von Richtlinien, Verordnungen oder Empfehlungen der Europäischen Union binnen angemessener Frist 
zu geben.“ ; Bundesgesetz über die Kammern für Arbeiter und Angestellte und die Bundeskammer für Arbeiter 
und Angestellte (Arbeiterkammergesetz 1992 – AKG), „Verhältnis zu Behörden und Körperschaften, §93 (3) Die 
Bundesarbeitskammer ist unverzüglich über alle Vorhaben betreffend die Rechtssetzung im Rahmen der 
Europäischen Union zu unterrichten und ihr insbesondere Gelegenheit zur Stellungnahme zu Entwürfen von 
Richtlinien, Verordnungen oder Empfehlungen der Europäischen Union binnen angemessener Frist zu geben.“ 
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national level. The “EU Today” newsletter transfers EU news from Monday to Thursday to the 
WKÖ. The weekly “EU panorama” comments information and informs about future events 
organized by EU institutions and associations. In Vienna, the WKÖ writes from time to time 
dossiers on top EU issues (“EU top-Themen”), grouping detailed information on a specific 
topic. Over the past years, the WKÖ developed an extensive and regular information policy in 
order to stay informed as early and best as possible and to make the link between the European 
and national levels. Since 1994, the participation of the WKÖ in the European decision making 
process was legally secured. The Chamber of Commerce Act gives the WKÖ a legal right to 
issue assessments on EU proposals. Legal rules on the information policy and assessment right 
of the WKÖ are identical to those applying to the Parliament’s information policy. The National 
Council has to inform the WKÖ ex-ante on the agendas of the EU Main Committee and EU 
sub-committee, giving it the opportunity to issue its opinion on the agenda topics before the 
meetings. 
Social partners managed to secure their rights in EU affairs. Their influence on the national 
decision-making process with regard to EU affairs might thus be significant.  
 
6.1.1.5 Political Parties 
 
The number of political parties in Austria tends to be low compared to countries with 
consociational democracies such as the Netherlands or Belgium (Wineroither/Kitschelt, In: 
Helms/Wineroither, 2017). The current party system dates back to the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy. The two biggest parties ÖVP and SPÖ tend to dominate the political landscape and 
their influence reach deep into society. As Stelzer puts it, “[t]ogether with their affiliated 
associations, they did not only dominate the political sphere, but almost all parts of socialisation 
such as sports clubs, hiking associations and car driver clubs” (Stelzer, 2011). The social 
democratic movement was created in 1888 and reorganised in 1892. After being persecuted 
during the monarchy at the beginning of the 20th century and dissolved in 1933, partisans of the 
movement distanced themselves from the State (Stelzer, 2011). After the Second World War, 
the SPÖ re-emerged under its current name. The Christian Social Party was established in 1890 
as a result of the merge of several political organisations associated with Catholicism (Stelzer, 
2011). After the Second World War, the party changed its name into the Christian People’s 
Party. Until the 1960s, the ÖVP was the main partner in the coalition governments formed with 
the SPÖ. The situation reversed after the 1970s, with the exception of the 2002 elections. The 
Austrian party system was stable until the 1980s and dominated solely by the two big parties 
SPÖ and ÖVP. Political dynamics changed in 1986 with the creation of the Green party and the 
rise of the populist Freedom Party FPÖ. The latter gained considerable influence over the 
following years thanks to the electoral system based on proportional representation (Stelzer, 
2011). In 2005, some FPÖ members decided to leave the party due to internal dissensions and 
found the right-wing liberal BZÖ (Bündnis Zukunft Österreich).  
Austria can be classified as a “segmented pluralist” system characterised by “the 
organisation of social movements, educational and communication systems, voluntary 
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associations and political parties along the lines of religious and ideological cleavages” (Sartori, 
2005, p.160). In the 1980s, the nature of the political system changed. Austria transformed into 
a “post-consociational democracy” with increased competition within the parliamentary arena 
and a modification of opposition patterns (Andeweg/ De Winter and Müller, 2008). Until the 
2000s, the two-party format and moderate pluralism were predominant. Most coalition 
governments in Austria were surplus majority governments, with the exception of the SPÖ-
FPÖ coalition between 1983 and 1986, and the ÖVP-FPÖ coalition between 1999 and 2006, 
which were minimal-winning coalitions. Even though an exception in the SPÖ-ÖVP dominated 
political landscape, the formation of the ÖVP-FPÖ coalition government between 1999 and 
2006 did not bring significant changes to the party system in the following years. Majorities in 
the National Council were mostly stable and always backed the Government. Opposition parties 
never had a significant negotiation power on ordinary laws. However, constitutional laws 
require two-thirds majorities to be passed and government parties had to increasingly count on 
the support of opposition parties since the 1990s (Interview 16a, 2017). According to Sartori, 
Austria tends to move towards a bipolar political system, where two blocs of parties (left vs 
right), rather than two individual parties, oppose each other (Sartori, 2005). The distinction 
between government parties and opposition parties became more and more blurred, especially 
when coalition partners started to oppose each other’s’ initiatives. The SPÖ started to become 
more critical towards the ÖVP’s policies. This behaviour, qualified as “Bereichsopposition”, 
serves to show own positions for electoral goals through a critical assessment of the coalition 
partner’s initiatives (Andeweg/ De Winter and Müller, 2008). During minimal-winning 
coalitions, the “Bereichsopposition” was less pronounced, because the coalition partners had to 
face a strong opposition. Consensus was thus crucial to pass legislation (Andeweg / De Winter 
and Müller, 2008). 
 
While consociational practices can be found in negotiations with social partners, 
Austrian political parties’ positions on EU affairs tend to be polarised. Until the 1970s, the SPÖ 
embraced a Eurosceptic stance and defended the neutrality principle and protectionism. The 
party adopted a more moderate position in the 1980s by supporting membership to the EU 
(Fallend, In: Szczerbiak/Taggart, 2010). The ideological shift happened when the new Federal 
Chancellor Franz Vranitzky came to power and supported overtly international competitiveness 
by praising the advantages of EC membership for the Austrian industry (Schultz, 1992). While 
the SPÖ slowly opened up to the idea of joining the EU, its coalition partner struggled to defend 
a coherent position. Indeed, even though the ÖVP supported EC membership, its voters in the 
industry and agriculture sectors favoured protectionism. The Greens changed their position 
towards the European integration in the 2000s, militating against liberalism, the economic union 
and EU membership in the 1980s-1990s. Paradoxically, the only party that supported EC 
membership from the beginning until the 1990s was the FPÖ. The party changed its position 
before the accession, mainly to differentiate itself from the mainstream parties and to catch the 
vote of a growing proportion of the Eurosceptic electorate (Fallend, In: Szczerbiak/Taggart, 
2010).  
Until the recent economic and financial crisis, the SPÖ, ÖVP and the Greens were 
considered as pro-European parties, while the FPÖ was described as a Eurosceptic party that 
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sees nevertheless EU affairs as part of its political strategy (Pelinka, In: De 
Waele/Escalona/Vieira, 2013). The ÖVP even described itself as the “European party” by 
essence, supporting an efficient European foreign policy and federalist projects (Interview 2a, 
18a, 19a, 2017). However, positions on European integration tend to waver even within pro-
European parties. The economic crisis might be one of the potential explanations. For instance, 
within the SPÖ, contradictory positions can be found ranging from populist Eurosceptic stances 
to euro-optimism (Pelinka, In: De Waele/Escalona/Vieira, 2013). While the ÖVP and the 
Greens were in favour of a federal and centralised EU before the economic crisis, their positions 
tended to change afterwards. Currently, the SPÖ and ÖVP support the idea of a competence 
transfer back to national levels. Contrary to the SPÖ’s claim for more solidarity in Europe, both 
in its last electoral programmes and in its 2017 party programme228, some SPÖ members 
publicly diverge from their party’s official EU stance. For instance, SPÖ-President Christian 
Kern requested higher EU financial means for border protection in May 2018, going against the 
solidarity principle that the party is advertising229. Since the 2017 legislative elections and the 
coalition building between the ÖVP and the FPÖ, the former tends to adopt more EU-critical 
positions, among others on migration issues230. In its 2017 election programme, the ÖVP 
pleaded for the reinforcement of national sovereignty through the transfer of competences back 
from the EU to the Member States231. The party also rejected any solidarity with indebted 
Eurozone countries. This stance went clearly against the party’s line during the last election 
periods. The self-proclaimed “European party” gave up its strictly pro-European position for a 
more nuanced and critical stance on specific aspects of European integration. 
The Greens position themselves in the middle, supporting either competence 
redistribution or centralisation of competences (Interview 11a and 18a, 2017). They became 
more critical towards the European integration, addressing general critics to the EU’s 
institutional system and insisting on the need to push structural reforms. However, unlike the 
ÖVP, they support the creation of a European social union, a sustainable EU migration policy 
and the reinforcement of the European Parliament’s budgetary competences232. According to 
some interviewees, political stances on European integration depend highly on the 
“performances” of the EU (Interview 4a and 16a, 2017). Parties tend to switch from one position 
to the other depending on their level of satisfaction with the European integration process. 
Therefore, the increased Euroscepticism of all Austrian parties since the economic crisis makes 
a clear differentiation between pro-Europeans and Eurosceptics more difficult. 
The FPÖ rejects the “ideological centralisation euphoria” carried out by European elites 
(Interview 11a, 2017). The party criticises the absence of legitimacy and accountability of the 
EU decision-making process. It defends an intergovernmentalist stance, where national 
governments lead the legislative process. Re-nationalisation of policy fields, neutrality, 
sovereignty and protectionism are at the heart of FPÖ’s political arguments. The BZÖ was a 
 
228 https://spoe.at/sites/default/files/das_spoe_parteiprogramm.pdf (last accessed 09.07.2019) 
229 https://diepresse.com/home/ausland/eu/5434437/EUBudget_SPOeChef-Kern-will-bei-Landwirtschaft-sparen 
230 https://kontrast.at/kurz-vertuscht-sinkenden-fluechtlings-zahlen-und-schuert-angst/ ; 
http://www.salzburg24.at/salzburger-oevp-eu-abgeordnete-claudia-schmidt-sorgt-fuer-rassismus-eklat-auf-
facebook/5328444 (last accessed 17.01.2019) 
231 https://res.oevp.at/Files/SK_Wahlprogramm_Teil3.pdf-gOMfoI.pdf (last accessed 17.01.2019) 
232 https://www.gruene.at/partei/programm/wahlprogramme (last accessed 06.06.2019) 
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pro-European party favouring a multi-speed Europe outside of a purely federal structure, but 
rejecting the “regulatory craze” of the EU (Interview 16a, 2017). In this framework, the idea 
would be to establish a core EU constituted of members with the highest levels of integration 
and additional partial members participating only in specific policy fields (Interview 16a, 2017).  
The table hereunder illustrates the evolution of political positions in parties’ electoral 
programmes since 2002. 
Table 13: Parties’ position on European integration, Austria 
 2002 2006 2008 2013 
ÖVP - “European party”  
- favours EU 
enlargement 
- closeness to citizens 
- favours investments 
and protect labour 
market 
- transit issue 
- reform of CAP 
- nuclear safety, 
reform of 
EURATOM treaty 
- guarantee equal 
representation of 
states in EU 
institutions  
- clarity about EU/MS 
competence 
distribution 
- against centralised 
EU state 
- favours CSDP 
- subsidiarity principle 
- solidarity in EU 
- “European party” 
- referendum on 
Turkey's accession to 
EU  
- Neutrality principle 
- favours CSDP and 
Europeanisation of 
national army  
- favours new EU 
treaty to increase 
efficiency of EU 
decision making 
- development of 
social friendly 
economy in EU 
- clarity about EU/MS 
competence 
distribution 
- subsidiarity principle 
- solidarity in EU 
- favours EU wide 
referenda 
- enlargement only 
if EU can handle it 
- referendum on 
Turkey's accession 
to EU  
- improve link 
EU/citizens  
- EU enlargement to 
Balkan area 
- special partnership 
with Turkey 
- neutrality 
principle 
- development of 
CSDP 
- democratisation of 
EU  
- favours EU 
Convention in 
case of new EU 
treaty reforms  
- promotes active 
role of NPs 
- subsidiarity 
principle 
- tax on financial 
transactions 
SPÖ - European social 
model 
- EU enlargement 
needs good 
preparation 
- sustainable CAP  
- withdrawal from 
nuclear energy 
- neutrality principle 
- promotion peace and 
democracy 
- develop CSDP and 
peace keeping 
missions 
- European social 
model 
- active neutrality 
policy 
- deepening of political 
union before any 
further enlargement 
- withdrawal from 
nuclear energy 
- development of 
CSDP, civilian crisis 
management and 
peace keeping 
operations 
- strengthen EP within 
CSDP 
- strengthening of EU 
budget 
- European social 
model 
- neutrality 
principle 
- referendum on 
Turkey's accession 
to EU  
- political union 
- bring EU closer to 
citizens  
- referendum on 
future EU treaty 
reforms 
- democratisation of 
EU  
- peace keeping 
policy 
- solidarity 
principle in 
foreign affairs 
- neutrality 
principle 
- EU economic 
policy needs 
socially 
acceptable budget 
policy and EU 
wide social 
standards  
- reform of stability 
and growth pact 
- solidarity in EU 
- development of 
CSDP but in 
conflict 
prevention and 
peace keeping 
operations 
FPÖ - EU enlargement only 
if all criteria 
respected develop 
- border controls, 
European border 
police 
- CSDP towards a 
defence Union 
- against Turkey's EU 
accession  
- against migration 
flows 
- neutrality principle 
- State sovereignty 
- EU of nations  
- against further 
enlargement  
- neutrality 
principle 
- EU of free and 
independent 
nations: "Europa 
der Vaterländer" 
- neutrality 
principle  
- binding 
referendum on 
new EU treaty 
- subsidiarity 
principle  
- favours 
withdrawal of MS 
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- European Social 
model 
- reform of CAP 
- against nuclear 
energy, reform of 
EURATOM treaty 
- against liberalisation 
of Austrian water 
resources 
- renationalisation of 
CAP 
- in favour of EU 
treaty, but national 
constitutions 
should be 
predominant 
- against Lisbon 
treaty 
- referendum on 
new EU treaty 
- against European 
army 
- lower contribution 
to EU budget 
with budgetary 
problems from 
Eurozone 
- establishment of 
"Euro north" 
- European 
solidarity 
 
 
 
 
GRÜNE - European Social 
model 
- favours EU 
enlargement  
- withdrawal from 
nuclear energy and 
dissolution of 
EURATOM treaty 
- neutrality principle 
- supports new EU 
treaty, especially 
catalogue of 
fundamental rights 
- participation of 
citizens on EU level 
- promote ecologically 
friendly economy and 
investments 
- European Social 
model 
- withdrawal from 
nuclear energy 
- neutrality principle 
- development of 
CSDP with peace 
keeping objectives  
- closer link 
EU/citizens 
- strengthen EU 
democracy 
- strengthen role of 
NPs 
- in favour of new EU 
constitutional treaty 
- environmental 
protection 
 
 
- European Social 
model 
- withdrawal from 
EURATOM treaty 
- CSDP, peace 
keeping objectives  
- European wide 
referenda 
- strengthening of 
NPs' participation 
rights in EU 
affairs 
- transparency of 
council meetings 
 
- European Social 
model 
- development of 
CSDP 
- solidarity in EU 
Green new deal: 
European 
investment 
program 
- better involvement 
and cooperation 
between 
Government and 
National Council 
on EU affairs 
- strengthen EP 
- European 
Convention on EU 
reforms 
- sustainable energy 
- increase EU 
budget 
- favours tax on 
financial 
transactions 
- implementation of 
banking union 
- solidarity in EU 
migration 
management 
 
BZÖ / - against turkey's EU 
accession  
- preservation of 
Austria's sovereignty  
- EU as confederation  
- referendum on new 
constitutional treaty  
- establishment of exit 
clause in EU treaties 
- renationalisation of  
- policy fields  
- direct democracy  
- subsidiarity principle 
- European solidarity 
- Stronger border 
control 
- Systematic 
referenda on EU 
treaty reforms 
- Against European 
nuclear power and 
GMOs 
- Preservation of 
State sovereignty  
- against 
centralisation in 
EU 
NEOS / / / - increase 
transparency in 
EU institutions 
- development of 
CSDP  
- European 
Convention on EU 
treaty reforms 
- EU as Federation 
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- EU two-chamber 
system  
- direct election of 
EU COM 
president by 
citizens 
- European 
citizenship 
- against fiscal 
union and fiscal 
compact 
STRON
ACH 
/ / / - no mention of EU 
affairs 
Sources: Das Österreich-Programm der Volkspartei, 2002; ÖVP, Kursbuch Zukunft, Wahlprogramm 2006; ÖVP, 
Neustart statt Stillstand, Wahlprogramm 2008; Österreich 2018: Das Programm der ÖVP, 2013; SPÖ, Faire 
Chancen für alle! Programm der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Österreichs für die Jahre 2003 bis 2006; Den 
Wohlstand gerecht verteilen. 20 Projekte für mehr Fairness in Österreich. Wahlmanifest der Sozialdemokratischen 
Partei Österreichs, 2006; Wahlmanifest der sozialdemokratischen Partei Österreichs, nationalratswahl 2008; 111 
Projekte für Österreich SPÖ-Wahlprogramm 2013; FPÖ, Programm 2002, Wir gestalten Österreich mit Sicherheit; 
Wahlprogramm der Freiheitlichen Partei Österreichs FPÖ, Nationalratswahl 2006; FPÖ, Österreich im Wort, 
Wahlprogramm 2008; Leitantrag zum Sonderparteitag der Freiheitlichen Partei Österreichs, 2013; Party 
Programme of the Freedom Party of Austria, 2011; Grüne, Österreich braucht jetzt die Grünen.Das 
Wahlprogramm, 2002; Grüne, Zeit für Grün, Das Grüne Programm, 2006; saubere umwelt. saubere politik. 
Wahlprogramm der GRÜNEN, Nationalratswahl 2013; BZÖ, Wahlprogramm, 2006; BZÖ, Die moderne Mitte, 
Das BZÖ-Wirtschafts- und Sozialprogramm, 2013; Grüne, neu beginnen! das grüne programm für einen 
neubeginn, 2008; NEOS, Pläne für ein neues Österreich, Wahlprogramm 2013; 
http://orf.at/stories/2199179/2198981/ (last accessed 04.07.2018). 
 
6.1.2 The legislative process: rules and procedures 
 
The present section outlines the legislative process in Austria, both as a general process 
and more specifically in EU matters. As explained in the previous sections, consociationalism 
prevails mostly in the relations between social partners and political institutions, while party 
competition became more visible within Parliament between majority and opposition. The 
National Council has more power in the legislative process compared to the Federal Council. 
However, government parties as the main key players in Government and Parliament tend to 
have the upper hand in the decision-making process. 
 
6.1.2.1 The legislative process step by step 
 
The legislative process is regulated in the Constitution and in the Parliament’s internal 
RoP. As mentioned in the section 7.1.1.3, the Austrian Constitution is very dense and 
unstructured. The Constitution mentions the hierarchy of laws, which is composed of 
fundamental principles on the highest level, followed by constitutional laws and ordinary laws 
(Öhlinger, In: Helms/Wineroither, 2017). As a federal State, competences are redistributed 
between the federal and the regional levels. The legislative and executive competences are thus 
divided between the Federation and the states (Länder). The Federal Parliament can regulate 
the distribution of competences and has thus the “Kompetenz-Kompetenz” (Stelzer, 2011). In 
the Federal Constitution, there is a distinction between different fields of law, which are 
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allocated either to the Federation or to the states. Four types of competences exist: the 
Federation has full legislative and executive competences (Article 10 B-VG); the Federation 
has only legislative competences (Article 11 B-VG); the Federation is only competent for 
legislative principles, which have to be implemented by the states (Article 12 B-VG). 
Competences that are not mentioned in the Constitution as belonging to the Federation remain 
part of the states’ competences (Article 15 B-VG). The Federation obtained significantly more 
competences than the Länder.  
The focus in this section is on the legislative process on the federal level. The legislative 
initiative belongs to the National Council or at least five MPs, the Federal Council or one third 
of its members, the Federal Cabinet with the approval of the ministerial council or part of the 
electorate as a “popular initiative” (Article 41 B-VG). Once a law proposal has been drafted, it 
must be sent to the National Council. Most initiatives emanate from the government in form of 
draft bills. Ministries have an advantage in terms of legislative expertise, information and 
resources to draft law proposals (Stelzer, 2011). Once the competent ministry has drafted a bill, 
social partner organisations can submit their opinion to the Government. In case the legislative 
proposal emanates from MPs or a parliamentary committee, the initiator has to justify the 
proposal during a first reading in plenary. The plenary decides on the responsible committee 
that will examine the proposal. Government draft bills are sent to the Speaker’s office of the 
National Council, which is responsible to redistribute it to the competent committee. A 
rapporteur is then nominated within the committee that will present a report in plenary during 
a second reading. Any opposition MP that does not agree with the rapporteur’s or the majority’s 
position on a law can submit a minority report (“Minderheitsbericht”) supported by at least 
three committee members. MPs can submit additional amendments to the law proposal.  
The third and last reading serves to vote on the law. While ordinary laws require a simple 
majority of the votes, constitutional laws require a two-thirds majority (Stelzer, 2011). After 
the vote in plenary, the law is transferred to the Federal Council. At this stage of the legislative 
process, the upper chamber can either approve or reject the proposal. The Federal Council’s 
veto power manifests itself through its “reasoned objections” which have to be submitted within 
eight weeks. If the upper chamber opposes a law proposal, it is sent back to the National 
Council, which proceeds with a second vote. However, the lower chamber is not obliged to 
amend the proposal. MPs can decide with a simple majority to stick to the initial law through a 
resolution (“Beharrungsbeschluss”, § 77 RoP). The latter is transferred to the Federal 
Chancellor, who informs the Federal Council about the decision taken in the National Council. 
Usually, the upper chamber rarely uses its veto powers, because political majorities in both 
chambers tend to be similar (Stelzer, 2011). The following graphs sum up the different 
procedures for draft bills and legislative proposals. 
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Figure 28: Legislative process in Austria (draft bills and law proposals) 
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LAW PROPOSALS 
 
Party dynamics play a significant role throughout the legislative process, which puts 
significant constraints on parliamentary power. Indeed, party logics prevail in the relations 
between social partners and the Government, but also between the Government and its majority 
in Parliament. Whenever the Government initiates a law, the majority in Parliament tends to 
back it. Parliamentary power might be even more reduced if majorities are similar in both 
chambers.  
 
6.1.2.2 The handling of EU affairs on the national level 
 
European integration tended to reinforce the Federal Cabinet’s prerogatives in EU 
affairs at the expense of the Parliament (Stelzer, 2011). International Treaties, among others EU 
treaties, are signed by the Federal President, but have to be submitted to Parliament for 
ratification. The Länder are also included in the process. Whenever a treaty touches upon 
matters falling into the “autonomous sphere of the states” (Stelzer, 2011), the Federal Council 
also needs to approve it. Moreover, a state representative can be exceptionally nominated to 
participate in the Council’s meetings if EU matters concern directly state legislation. Treaties 
that modify existing law or amend EU treaties can only be concluded with the Parliament’s 
approval (Article 50 B-VG). Since 2008, EU treaties require a two-thirds majority within the 
National Council to be ratified. 
The Ministry for Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs (BMEIA) is the main body on 
the executive level coordinating Austria’s EU policy. The Federal Chancellery is mainly 
responsible for matters related to the CSDP. Within the Chancellery, the department on security 
matters drafts Austrian positions on CSDP issues in coordination with the BMEIA and the 
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Ministry of Defence. From 2018 onwards, the Federal Chancellery plans to take over some 
prerogatives that belonged until now to the BMEIA233. Within the Ministry, EU affairs are 
distributed among several departments. For instance, EU law falls under the competence of a 
“European law” sub-department, which is part of the “Central Affairs” department (“Zentrale 
Angelegenheiten”). The “Bilateral affairs” department handles the CSDP and bilateral relations 
with individual Member States. The third department within the BMEIA deals specifically with 
EU and multilateral affairs. Every year, the BMEIA publishes a report on European and Foreign 
affairs policy. Apart from the BMEIA, technical ministries also handle specific aspects of EU 
policies. The Finance Ministry handles for instance all matters linked to the EU budget. Within 
the department “Economic Policy, Financial Markets and Customs”, an international and 
European affairs sub-department deals with the coordination of EU policy and the European 
Stability Mechanism234. Each ministry has an EU coordination department, which is responsible 
to prepare topical European ministerial meetings and to represent the ministries in EU 
institutions (Pollak/Puntscher Riekmann, In: Helms/Wineroither, 2017). Within a ministry, 
inter-ministerial agendas are decided between the EU coordination department and other 
departments. The first are also responsible to seek cooperation with departments from other 
ministries, Länder and the Permanent Representation of Austria to the EU. Every week before 
Council meetings on the EU level, so-called “inter-ministerial coordination meetings” are 
organised within the ministries, where representatives from social partner organisations and 
representatives from other ministries can participate. The Federal Chancellor and the BMEIA 
lead the overall inter-ministerial cooperation in EU affairs. The BMEIA is also heading the 
weekly meetings in the Permanent Representation in Brussels to prepare the COREPER. In 
these meetings, representatives from the technical ministries, social partners, the Austrian 
National Bank, the Association of Austrian Industries and representatives from the Länder and 
municipalities coordinate their positions. The Permanent Representation informs regularly the 
Federal Government through reports on current negotiation results on the EU level.  
 
6.1.3 Conclusions 
 
The present section outlined the main actors of the legislative process in Austria. We 
observed that social partners and political parties play a significant role in the decision-making 
process. Cooperation between Austrian actors is highly decentralised. Political parties have a 
deep anchorage into society and can resort to resources from civil society organisations to weigh 
on decisions. Party dynamics turn out to be predominant throughout the legislative process, 
determining the behaviour of actors within the Government and the Parliament. Formally, 
parliamentary groups are supposed to be able to influence the work of their government 
members. However, informally, government members exert a strong power within their 
respective parties and groups and limit dissident actions (Talos/Kittel, 2001).  
 
233 https://www.bundeskanzleramt.gv.at/europapolitik (last accessed 04.07.2018). 
234 https://www.bmf.gv.at/ministerium/aufgaben-organisation/Gesamt_deutsch_01052018.pdf?6fljeh (last 
accessed 04.07.2018). 
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The Austrian political landscape transformed into a post-consociational system with 
increasing competition and polarisation between and within the parties. Consensus democracy 
eroded gradually, between both political actors and social partners, and evolved towards a 
majority and competition democracy (Stromberger/Talos, In: Talos/Karlhofer, 2005). One 
reason for the erosion of consensual strategies could be the establishment of majority votes 
within Parliament in the 1990s, which boosted political conflicts and party competition. This 
trend is also noticeable in EU affairs, where pro-European and Eurosceptic stances can be 
clearly identified, even though ideological positions tend to diverge increasingly within parties. 
Indeed, recent developments on the EU level, such as the economic crisis, revealed growing 
tensions and disapproval within pro-European parties. The strong influence of parties on state 
institutions might weaken the National Council’s influence capacities. Indeed, majority MPs 
within the Parliament might tend to support passively their Government’s policies due to strong 
party discipline. Overall, authors agree that the Austrian Parliament has a rather limited role in 
the legislative process compared to the Government (Stromberger/Talos, In: Talos/Karlhofer, 
2005). Indeed, corporatism and consociationalist practices between social partners and political 
actors tend to shift decision-making to the pre-parliamentary arena (Pollak/Slominski, 2003). 
 
6.2 Parliamentary participation rights in EU affairs: current status quo 
 
In this section, we aim to outline the current participation rights of the National Council 
in EU affairs. In the Europeanisation research, the Austrian Parliament is described as a strong 
parliament with regard to its formal capacities (Kiiver, 2006). Indeed, since Austria’s accession 
to the European Union in 1995, the National Council underwent a series of legal reforms to 
strengthen its scrutiny rights in EU affairs. Based on a powerful mandating system, the lower 
chamber could be considered as a serious counterweight to the Government. The EAC has 
particularly strong prerogatives. Information policy and cooperation with the Government have 
been improved substantially over the past decades. Parliamentary administrative resources and 
personnel support within parliamentary groups seem to be well developed. In light of these 
arguments, we seek to give first insights into hypothesis H2 by arguing that the National 
Council’s strong formal capacities in EU affairs might have encouraged mainstreaming trends 
within Parliament, providing MPs with the necessary instruments to scrutinise EU affairs. Like 
the Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies, we used interviews with MPs, former MPs, civil 
servants from the parliamentary administration and group collaborators. Additionally, we 
analysed primary documents such as the Federal Constitution, the National Council’s internal 
RoP and information laws to check for the different legal bases mentioning EU scrutiny rights. 
While the Federal Council has also established structures and procedures dedicated to EU 
affairs, the focus of this section will be solely on the lower chamber’s participation rights. 
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6.2.1 The legal basis of parliamentary participation in EU affairs 
 
Reflexions on the role of the National Council in EU affairs started already in 1994 
before Austria’s accession to the EU. The rights of the Parliament are mentioned broadly in the 
Federal Constitution, in both chambers’ RoPs and in several information laws. Inspired by the 
Danish and German model, scrutiny rights of the National Council are anchored in the Federal 
Constitution. However, contrary to Austria, Germany anchored detailed participation rights in 
ordinary laws. The density of constitutional law in Austria gives significant rights to the 
minority through the two-thirds majority rule requirement for each constitutional amendment. 
Compromises are thus essential to conduct revisions. Indeed, opposition parties were 
particularly influential during negotiations on the EU treaties, when their support was needed 
to amend parliamentary scrutiny rights in the Constitution. The Green parliamentary group was 
the main supporter of the coalitions’ amendment proposals throughout the years (Interview 6a, 
2017). Moreover, the parliamentary administration can also push to internal reforms, notably 
with regard to structural changes and administrative competences, but the final decision belongs 
usually to political groups.  
The Austrian Federal Constitution was amended in 1994 to incorporate the new 
participation rights in EU affairs of both chambers235. Several paragraphs were added to Article 
23 B-VG. Amendments aimed at providing Parliament with immediate and extensive 
information rights. In 1995, the Parliament established an EU database, which was amended in 
2012 through an EU-information law (EU-InfoG)236. Amendments to the RoP in 1996 anchored 
the competences in EU matters of the Main Committee and created the EU sub-committee. In 
the course of the last decades, both the Federal Constitution and the National Council’s RoP 
were amended several times to adapt to the developments on the EU level.  
The National Council developed numerous parliamentary instruments to scrutinise EU 
affairs, either directly through the control of the Government’s EU policy, or indirectly through 
the political dialogue with the European Commission. In the wake of the Treaty of Lisbon, 
Article 23 B-VG and the National Council’s RoP were amended in 2010 to incorporate the 
procedure on the Early Warning Mechanism237. Article 23 B-VG gives substantial 
 
235 Bundesverfassungsgesetz, mit dem das Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz in der Fassung von 1929 geändert wird 
sowie das EWR-Bundesverfassungsgesetz und das EGKS-Abkommen-Durchführungsgesetz aufgehoben werden 
(Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz-Novelle 1994 - B-VGN 1994), BGBl. Nr. 1013/1994, 21.12.1994, 
https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokument.wxe?Abfrage=BgblPdf&Dokumentnummer=1994_1013_0&ResultFunctio
nToken=1468d830-67b6-4934-9001-
1a2a9c1f22bf&Titel=&Bgblnummer=1013%2F1994&SucheNachGesetzen=False&SucheNachKundmachungen
=False&SucheNachVerordnungen=False&SucheNachSonstiges=False&SucheNachTeil1=True&SucheNachTeil
2=False&SucheNachTeil3=False&SucheNachTeilAlt=True&VonDatum=01.05.1945&BisDatum=31.12.2003&I
mRisSeit=Undefined&ResultPageSize=50&Suchworte= (last accessed 04.07.2018). 
236 Bundesgesetz über Information in EU-Angelegenheiten (EU-Informationsgesetz – EU-InfoG) 
StF: BGBl. I Nr. 113/2011 (NR: GP XXIV IA 1624/A AB 1444 S. 130. BR: AB 8606 S. 802.), 
https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/GeltendeFassung.wxe?Abfrage=Bundesnormen&Gesetzesnummer=20007573  
237 27.07.2010, BGBl. I Nr. 57/2010 , Lissabon-Begleitnovelle, Bundesverfassungsgesetz, mit dem zur 
Durchführung des Vertrags von Lissabon das Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz und das Bundesverfassungsgesetz, mit 
dem besondere Bestimmungen für die Neuermittlung der Verteilung von nach der Wahl der Mitglieder des 
Europäischen Parlaments 2009 zu vergebenden Mandaten durch die Bundeswahlbehörde erlassen werden, 
geändert werden (Lissabon-Begleitnovelle) 
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parliamentary participation rights in EU affairs to the lower chamber. The Government has to 
inform the National Council on every nomination proposal of representatives to the European 
Commission, the European Court of Justice, the European Court of Auditors, the administrative 
board of the European Investment Bank, etc (Article 23c B-VG). Additionally, the responsible 
minister has to inform the National Council on all EU proposals and to give the chamber the 
opportunity to submit its opinion (Article 23e B-VG). The minister has also to inform the 
chamber expressly and as early as possible on forthcoming decisions within the European 
Council or the Council, either on the modification of voting rules from unanimity to qualified 
majority, or on the shift from a special legislative procedure to the ordinary legislative 
procedure. The National Council can bind the responsible minister through a mandate before 
negotiations in the European Council and the Council. Any deviation from the chamber’s 
position has to be justified in parliament and can only happen because of integration and foreign 
policy reasons. Each minister must report to the National Council at the beginning of each year 
on forthcoming proposals from the Council and the European Commission, as well as on the 
Austrian position on these proposals (Article 23f B-VG).  
Both chambers can also submit notifications to the EU institutions on any EU legislative 
proposals. In the framework of the subsidiarity monitoring, the National Council can submit a 
reasoned opinion on an EU legislative proposal (Article 23g B-VG), as well as subsidiarity 
complaints ex-ante (“Subsidiaritätsrüge”) and ex-post (“Subsidiaritätsklage”) (Article 23h B-
VG). Treaty amendments and EU budget modifications require the National Council’s approval 
before the Austrian representative in the European Council can take a decision (Article 23i B-
VG). The lower chamber created a new instrument in 2010 through an amendment of its RoP: 
the EU topical debates, organised four times per year to discuss EU proposals (§74b, GOG-
NR). In 2011, several amendments to the RoP added further parliamentary prerogatives in EU 
affairs238. The subsidiarity monitoring procedure established in the Treaty of Lisbon was added 
to the RoP. According to it, individual MPs can request a complaint against a European legal 
act (§26a GOG-NR). The request has to be submitted to the President of the chamber, who 
transfers it to the EU- Main Committee. Moreover, five MPs have the possibility to submit a 
short written question to a government member during a meeting to ask information on further 
details on an EU legislative proposal received by a minister (§31f GOG-NR).  
The EU-information law came into force in January 2012239, but merely codified what 
had been done already in practice (Miklin, In: Wessels/Rozenberg et al., 2013). The law 
mentions the Parliament’s EU-database and rules on information exchange between the 
National Council and the Government. Additionally, the Federal Constitution and the National 
Council’s RoP were amended in 2012 through the so-called “ESM-Begleitnovelle” to extend 
 
https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokument.wxe?Abfrage=BgblAuth&Dokumentnummer=BGBLA_2010_I_57 (last 
accessed 04.07.2018). 
238 12.12.2011, BGBl. I Nr. 114/2011, Bundesgesetz, mit dem das Bundesgesetz über die Geschäftsordnung des 
Nationalrates (Geschäftsordnungsgesetz 1975) geändert wird, https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/eli/bgbl/I/2011/114 (last 
accessed 04.07.2018). 
239 12.12.2011, BGBl. I Nr. 113/2011, Bundesgesetz über Information in EU-Angelegenheiten (EU-
Informationsgesetz - EU-InfoG), https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/eli/bgbl/I/2011/113 (last accessed 04.07.2018). 
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Parliament’s participation rights in the framework of the European Stability Mechanism240. 
Article 50 B-VG regulates Parliament’s scrutiny and information rights on ESM-related 
matters241. Within the RoP, several paragraphs were added, mentioning the chamber’s 
information rights on ESM matters, the creation of an ESM sub-committee and its 
competences242. Information policy on matters related to the ESM were further anchored in an 
ESM-information law in 2014. The management of classified EU and ESM documents was also 
mentioned in two additional laws in 2014 and 2015, the “Informationsordnungsgesetz” 
(InfOG)243 and the “Informationsverordnung” (InfoV)244. Finally, recent amendments to the 
RoP were made in 2015 to provide MEPs and European personalities with the right to speak in 
committees for the first and in plenaries for the latter245. The President of the National Council 
can invite European and international personalities to make a declaration during a plenary 
session followed by a debate (§19a GOG-NR). Twice per year, government members must 
make EU declarations in plenary followed by a debate before European Council or Council 
meetings (§74b GOG-NR). In this framework, parliamentary groups can invite one affiliated 
MEP to participate in EU debates with a consultative voice. Participation of MEPs in plenary 
debates was a considerable change in the internal procedures, as they were merely allowed to 
participate in the EU-Main Committee meetings until recently. 
The repetitive changes over the last years provided the lower chamber with formally 
strong powers in EU affairs. Scrutiny within the National Council happens mostly ex-ante and 
is centralised between the hands of the EU- Main Committee (“EU-Hauptausschuss”) and its 
EU sub-committee (“EU-Unterausschuss”). The centralised procedure is used especially for the 
subsidiarity monitoring, where the tests are conducted within the EU sub-committee. According 
to a civil servant, even though the National Council obtained extensive information rights in 
EU affairs, their use remains limited in practice (Interview 7a, 2017). Both majority and 
opposition MPs think that their scrutiny rights are well developed, in particular the instrument 
of the binding mandate anchored in the Federal Constitution since Austria’s accession to the 
EU. However, the practice showed that MPs barely use binding mandates. The latter turn out 
to be inefficient. Indeed, according to several MPs, binding mandates give ministers minimal 
decisional power during negotiations on the EU level, which might lead to results below 
Austria’s expectations or even to the failure of the negotiations (Interview 1a, 2a, 8a, 11a and 
 
240 25.07.2012, BGBl. I Nr. 65/2012 , Bundesgesetz, mit dem das Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz und das 
Zahlungsbilanzstabilisierungsgesetz geändert werden (ESM-Begleitnovelle), 
https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokument.wxe?Abfrage=BgblAuth&Dokumentnummer=BGBLA_2012_I_65 (last 
accessed 04.07.2018). 
241 25.07.2012, BGBl. I Nr. 65/2012 , Bundesgesetz, mit dem das Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz und das 
Zahlungsbilanzstabilisierungsgesetz geändert werden (ESM-Begleitnovelle), 
https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokument.wxe?Abfrage=BgblAuth&Dokumentnummer=BGBLA_2012_I_65 (last 
accessed 04.07.2018). 
242 25.07.2012, BGBl. I Nr. 66/2012, Bundesgesetz, mit dem das Bundesgesetz über die Geschäftsordnung des 
Nationalrates (Geschäftsordnungsgesetz 1975) geändert wird, https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/eli/bgbl/I/2012/66 (last 
accessed 04.07.2018). 
243 29.12.2014, BGBl. I Nr. 102/2014, https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/eli/bgbl/I/2014/102 (last accessed 04.07.2018). 
244 24.03.2015, BGBl. II Nr. 58/2015, 
https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokument.wxe?Abfrage=BgblAuth&Dokumentnummer=BGBLA_2015_II_58 (last 
accessed 04.07.2018). 
245 29.05.2015, BGBl. I Nr. 62/2015, Bundesgesetz, mit dem das Geschäftsordnungsgesetz 1975 geändert wird, 
https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/eli/bgbl/I/2015/62 (last accessed 04.07.2018). 
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14a, 2017). Some opposition parties argue that European Commissioners should have the right 
to come to Parliament to undergo a hearing before their nomination in the European 
Commission (Interview 6a, 2017). On the whole, the National Council obtained significant 
formal rights since 1995, but their effective implementation remains circumscribed. 
 
6.2.2 Parliamentary administration and EU affairs: composition and tasks 
 
As mentioned previously, the National and the Federal Council share the same 
parliamentary administration. EU affairs are handled in the “EU and international department” 
as part of the “Administration” branch within the Parliamentary Directorate. Within the 
department, two sub-units assist parliamentarians’ work on EU matters: the “EU information 
and EU-database” unit and the “European relations” unit246.  Before 2005, the “European 
relations” unit was divided into an “EU internal affairs” unit (“EU Innendienst”) and an “EU 
external affairs” unit (“EU Aussendienst”) responsible for foreign and European affairs. The 
Constitutional Treaty and Austria’s EU Presidency in 2006 justified the structural changes 
within the administration. The aim was to create a unique department entirely dedicated to EU 
affairs, with particular emphasis on EU policies. This department was first called “EU 
coordination” before being renamed „European relations“ (“EU-Mitwirkung und Europäische 
Beziehungen”). Following modifications to the EU database in 2012 after the entry into force 
of the Treaty of Lisbon, the competences of the “EU database” unit were widened in 2013, 
incorporating EU information. The aim was to create a unified department that would strengthen 
information access through the EU database, but also through the Parliament’s website. Only 
three civil servants within the “European relations” department are responsible for the 
preparation of the EU Main Committee and EU subcommittee meetings. Additionally, in the 
“Legislative” branch of the Parliamentary Directorate, the “Legal, Legislative and Research 
department” provides MPs with analytical information on EU matters. 
Civil servants working within the EU departments have studied either European Law or 
matters linked to international affairs. Most have had international experience through their 
studies. For instance, one civil servant studied in three countries (Interview 6a, 2017). EU or 
European affairs were also part of their professional experience, even though they also exerted 
activities unrelated to the EU during their previous employments. For instance, one civil servant 
worked in the European Commission before entering Parliament (Interview 6a, 2017). Some 
civil servants were responsible for the work preparation of other sectoral committees before 
joining the “European relations” department. Most civil servants have long-term experience 
within the parliamentary administration. The Head of the “EU information and EU database” 
unit worked previously in the office of the Second President of the National Council and dealt 
among others with Council meetings. At that time, the Second President was also chair of the 
EU Main Committee, so the civil servant participated in the preparation of the committee work. 
She also contributed to the preparation of Austria’s EU presidency, but focused only on the 
cultural component (Interview 9a, 2017). Thus, the civil servant has been dealing with EU 
 
246 See https://www.parlament.gv.at/WWER/PDION/A/A3/index.shtml (last accessed 04.07.2018). 
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affairs for 8 years. The Head of the “European relations” department is in the parliamentary 
administration since 1993 and had an extensive experience in foreign affairs and EU affairs, 
due to his previous functions in the “EU External affairs” unit (Interview 6a, 2017). He 
participated in the preparation of the country’s accession to the EU. Since 2001, he exerts his 
current functions and is responsible for the EU Main committee and sub-committee since 2007. 
The Head of the “Parlamentswissenschaftliche Grundsatzarbeit” unit within the “Legal, 
Legislative and Research department” was involved in the RoP revisions due to his extensive 
legal experience, even though he never directly handled EU issues (Interview 10a, 2017). Civil 
servants from these units became sensitised to EU issues through their personal experience. 
Overall, few civil servants handle EU affairs. One civil servant estimates the number to 20 
within the whole Parliamentary Directorate, which makes specialisation in EU affairs difficult 
(Interview 6a, 2017). Just as in the Luxembourg Chamber, civil servants consider themselves 
as generalists due to their lack of expertise on specific EU matters and the lacking personnel 
resources of the administration. 
While the Federal Council has a small administration dealing with the management of 
committee meetings, the common parliamentary administration handles the technical matters 
for both chambers. The “European relations” unit has a double function: it deals with legislative 
and organisational matters. It is competent for the preliminary examination of EU documents 
on the basis of which political groups draft their arguments and place topics on their agenda. 
The unit is also preparing and managing meetings of the EU Main and sub-committee, 
supporting the committee Chair. Civil servants check for instance MPs’ speaking time or voting 
behaviour. During the preparation of the National Council’s EU Main and Sub-Committee 
meetings, civil servants have a consultative function. They inform MPs on EU documents and 
matters that could be of political interest. They centralise all information coming from the 
Government, but do not prioritise documents, as the decision lies between the hands of political 
groups. The “European relations” unit can request information from the ministries. During the 
classification of EU documents, they rarely analyse their content but proceed with a 
chronological structuring. Only documents falling within the subsidiarity monitoring are 
subjected to a thorough legal analysis by the two civil servants specifically responsible for 
subsidiarity matters within the unit. Whenever a matter requires particular attention, civil 
servants inform the MPs. The flow of EU documents is important because the Government is 
constitutionally obliged to transfer all EU documents to the Parliament. On top of that, since 
the Treaty of Lisbon, EU institutions transfer directly their documents to national parliaments. 
The “EU database” unit receives the EU documents and structures them in the electronic 
database. Documents are made accessible and publicised in electronic format, with the 
exception of classified or secret documents. The EU database also includes documents coming 
from the Foreign Affairs Ministry. Civil servants have access to its “32 Verteiler”. The civil 
servant managing the EU database has also access to the extranet of the Council to obtain 
information. 
Based on the EU database, the “European relations” unit chooses topics from this 
information pool that could be of interest for political groups, especially in the framework of 
the subsidiarity mechanism. Civil servants check for instance all legislative proposals 
emanating from the European Commission requiring a reasoned opinion. After a legal analysis, 
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they prepare electronic lists and tables presenting the information and the legal 
recommendations for a “pre-subsidiarity check” (Mastenbroek/Zwaan et al., 2014). The 
politically non-binding recommendations are then transmitted to the political level, which 
decides what topics to examine. The “European relations” unit collaborates closely with group 
secretaries or group presidents. Every Tuesdays, during the so-called “jour fixe”, group 
speakers and civil servants from the “European relations” unit sit together with experts and 
group collaborators responsible for EU affairs to decide on the EACs’ agendas. The final 
decision on the agenda belongs to the groups, but civil servants have a consultative voice.  
Parliamentary groups decide consensually on future agendas. Accordingly, civil 
servants invite the responsible ministers in the EU Main or Sub-Committee meetings. However, 
a civil servant admits that the difficult coordination between ministers’ and EACs’ schedules 
forces them to choose ministers before putting topics on the agenda (Interview 6a, 2017). Civil 
servants would then contact a minister and decide afterwards which EU documents to put on 
the list depending on the minister’s competences. The risk of such practices might be the wilful 
ignorance of important topics and the examination of potentially outdated topics with minor 
relevance. The “European relations” unit has frequent exchanges with the Foreign Affairs 
Ministry, the Finance Ministry and the Ministry of Justice (Interview 6a, 2017). The frequency 
of contacts with ministries depends highly on the salience of EU topics or documents. However, 
the choice of responsible ministers becomes increasingly difficult due to the transversality of 
EU affairs. 
Additionally to the preparation of committee meetings, civil servants help MPs with 
legal matters whenever they have individual requests or questions. The “European relations” 
unit is also responsible for preparing and managing meetings in the National Council with 
representatives from EU institutions or for MPs’ trips to Brussels. The “European relations” 
unit prepares interparliamentary conferences. Within the “Legal, Legislative and Research 
Department”, civil servants receive general requests from MPs that imply legal and political 
research on various topics. EU affairs represent only a small proportion of the submitted legal 
questions. 
The Austrian Parliament established a representation in Brussels in 2005 for both 
chambers, within the premises of the European Parliament. The representative of the Parliament 
in Brussels belongs to the “European relations” unit within the parliamentary administration, 
but is part of the Foreign Affairs Ministry during his/her functions in Brussels. From an 
organisational point of view, the representative belongs to the Foreign Affairs Ministry, but his 
tasks are entirely dedicated to the Parliament. His/her double hat and membership in the 
Permanent Representation of Austria ensure regular and direct contact with representatives 
from the Government and social partners, notably through regular informal meetings within the 
Permanent Representation (Interview 17a, 2017). Within the Permanent Representation, two 
colleagues are responsible for matters linked to the European Parliament and represent his main 
interlocutors. The liaison officer participates sometimes in meetings within the EU offices of 
the Länder. Exchanges with EU offices of Austrian professional chambers are infrequent and 
depend on the interests of the Main Committee Chairs. Contacts with Austrian MEP 
collaborators or civil servants from other national parliaments are rare. Exchanges happen only 
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whenever a question arises punctually, especially in the framework of the subsidiarity 
monitoring. Previously, meetings between officials happened once per year on the EU level, 
but the establishment of offices in Brussels put a halt to this in 2012-2013. Contacts between 
the “European relations” unit and the liaison officer are also frequent and informal, through 
either phone calls or emails (Interview 17a, 2017). The liaison officer has different 
competences. His main task is to guarantee the constant link between Brussels and the Austrian 
Parliament, mostly through regular contacts, reports to the Parliament and screening of current 
EU topics. The liaison officer reports after each Monday Morning Meeting to the “European 
relations” unit. Subsequently, on Tuesday morning, the civil servants within the parliamentary 
administration inform the political groups about current evolutions on the EU level. Political 
groups communicate their positions on the matters and the civil servants transfer this 
information back to the EU representative. 
The parliamentary representative is also responsible for the organisation of MPs’ and 
MEPs’ trips and visits to and from Brussels. He prepares and manages appointments between 
Austrian officials or politicians on the EU level. He writes discourses, classifies documents and 
background information and transfers information to the Austrian Parliament. He accompanies 
the delegations. The representative participates in the interparliamentary meetings in the 
European Parliament and sends background information to MPs before the meetings. 
Sometimes, the EU representative fulfils transversal tasks, whenever a department of the 
Parliamentary Directorate needs his assistance on the EU level. The liaison officer works in the 
Parliamentary Directorate since 2001 and was always involved in the EU and Foreign Affairs 
departments. He switched to Brussels in 2014 (Interview 20a, 2018). 
Overall, MPs are satisfied with the support of the parliamentary administration. Efforts 
have been made to improve information access and transfer within and outside the Parliament. 
The Parliament’s online website added background information on current EU topics, such as 
Brexit, EU treaties etc, but also news on parliamentary activities in EU affairs (Interview 7a, 
2017). Overall, officials’ workload and working methods changed in the course of the past 
years, especially since the Treaty of Lisbon and the subsidiarity monitoring procedure. The 
number of received EU documents in the EU database grew steadily and exponentially over the 
last years. For instance, according to the Head of the “EU information and EU database” unit, 
the number of EU documents before the end of the last legislative period (2013-2017) was 
already higher than the entire five years of the previous legislative period (2008-2013).  
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Figure 29: Total number of EU-documents from the 20th to the 25th legislative period, 
Austria 
 
Source: National Council, Parliamentary Directorate, “A3.1 - EU-Informations- und –Datenbankmanagement”, 
Katharina Stourzh, Head of department, February 2017. 
The overflow of EU information renders the on-time preparation, management and 
examination of EU documents difficult. According to a civil servant, the generalist profile and 
functions of the “European relations” unit guarantees a controlled and systematic supervision 
of EU documents, as long as the information flow stays the same (Interview 6a, 2017). 
However, the lack of personnel resources might be a problem in the future if the proportion of 
received EU documents grows further. 
 
6.2.3 Parliamentary group staff: composition and tasks 
 
The particularity in the Austrian Parliament is that parliamentary groups or “Klubs” are 
common to both the National Council and the Federal Council. On top of the pool of group 
personnel recruited by each parliamentary group, individual MPs can recruit their parliamentary 
assistants. The number of collaborators depends on the size and the financial resources of the 
groups. Only few collaborators are specialised on EU affairs, even in bigger parliamentary 
groups such as the ÖVP and the SPÖ. Within the SPÖ group, only two collaborators deal with 
EU affairs. The Green group has one person dedicated to these matters. With regard to the large 
scope and volume of EU matters, the small personnel resources might be a problem for the 
collaborators. Compared to other political groups, the SPÖ has the most EU-collaborators. The 
SPÖ has also a secretary in charge of international affairs, responsible for networking and 
ensuring coordination between the Parliament, the Länder and the SPÖ party. Moreover, the 
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group also has an SPÖ delegation coordinator in Brussels who comes every three to five weeks 
to Vienna. Within the FPÖ group, staff handling constitutional affairs tend to deal more often 
with EU matters.  
Group collaborators working on EU matters have divergent profiles. The collaborator 
within the Green group had an extensive professional experience in the political group and 
studied security and defence issues (Interview 5a, 2017). He started in 1995 as a collaborator 
on security, peace and foreign affairs, and became EU coordinator in 1999. Before entering the 
group, he was already actively engaged in peace movements. He exerted the function of 
secretary in the Austrian Peace Movement. He was actively engaged in the follow-up of EU 
treaties and worked in the past for the Green delegation member representing the European 
Parliament in the Convention on the Future of Europe. The collaborator from the SPÖ was 
recruited after submitting an application. Her main motivation was to work for an MP, but the 
absence of available assistant positions motivated her choice to apply by default for the EU 
section (Interview 3a, 2017).  
Group collaborators have both analytical and organisational functions. EU collaborators 
are in charge of advising MPs on EU topics. Their familiarity with the dossiers allows them to 
emphasise the groups’ political priorities. For instance, the Green EU coordinator is responsible 
for matters linked to primary law, treaty amendments, the neutrality principle and the CSDP. 
As a political function, he needs to coordinate positions between Green MEPs in Brussels, the 
political group in the National Council and the Austrian Green party. He endorses a hub function 
by being the main addressee of EU information, of requests from MPs to MEPs or MEP requests 
to the Green group in the National Council. He receives reports from the Green group in the 
European Parliament, as well as information from the ministries in the framework of the EU-
information law. Ministries have to send assessments to the groups on EU proposals containing 
the time schedule, the existence or not of Council working groups, a short explanation on the 
content and an assessment from the responsible ministry. Assessments can be either very 
detailed, or on the contrary quite vague. Sometimes, the lack of time obliges ministries to send 
empty assessment reports with a justification to the Parliament. Depending on their interests 
and priorities, collaborators use selectively the EU database of the parliamentary administration. 
Sometimes, information even arrives earlier in the National Council than in the European 
Parliament, which forces political groups to position themselves on an EU matter before MEPs. 
Once the collaborator receives these documents, he drafts his own assessments on the 
EU matters and sends them to the MPs. Assessments help modelling MPs’ final positions before 
EAC meetings. EU collaborators or advisers prepare EAC meetings, but their functions in this 
regard differ from one group to the other. Indeed, while the collaborator of the SPÖ group 
prepares the content of the meetings (Interview 3a, 2017), the collaborator from the Greens 
focuses more on media issues linked to the EACs’ agenda, leaving the content analysis to a 
subject specialist (Interview 5a, 2017). Both are in charge of selecting the matters that might be 
of interest for the group. The wide scope and transversality of EU issues obliges them to base 
on their colleagues’ specialised knowledge. Whenever an EU dossier involves several policy 
fields, collaborators coordinate their work and consult each other. Even though the EU 
collaborator is primarily competent for EU affairs, each collaborator within the Green group 
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has to follow EU politics. This distribution of tasks might be explained by the group’s small 
size combined with the ever-growing relevance of EU matters in all policy fields. 
Collaborators participate in the weekly “jours fixes” aiming to prepare the EACs’ 
agenda, to coordinate appointments with ministries and to prepare EU documents. These “jours 
fixes” are organised just before committee meetings and last one hour. Officials from the 
parliamentary administration are also present. Opposition groups can submit requests during 
these sessions that are only subject to discussion and no votes. Despite regular common 
meetings where consensual decisions are the rule, collaborators do not cooperate with their 
colleagues from other groups (Interview 3a, 2017). Group meetings serve mostly as ex-ante 
positioning arenas, for instance in the framework of the subsidiarity monitoring, when the 
responsible ministries lack the required expertise to handle an EU issue. Common group 
meetings serve also to set the EACs’ agendas, which are theoretically between the hands of the 
committee chairs, but are in practice agreed consensually on the group level (Interview 3a and 
6a, 2017). On top of the common meetings between all political groups, including social 
partners and group collaborators, internal group meetings are scheduled once per week within 
each group. During these meetings, EU collaborators inform the EU Speaker of the 
parliamentary group about developments in specific EU policies and positions of the civil 
society and the media. Their upstream work consists in screening permanently the media and 
the positions of the trade unions, professional chambers and other parliamentary groups. They 
provide the EU speaker with background information on current key issues, so that the MP can 
prepare the EAC meetings and orientate the group discussions. Groups can also organise expert 
hearings to obtain specific information. 
Apart from preparatory tasks, EU collaborators deal with everyday tasks, such as the 
drafting of press releases, briefings and discourses, the organisation of events or the scheduling 
of group appointments. For instance, they prepare bilateral debates between European 
Commissioners and MPs. The Green EU coordinator is also responsible for the political 
management and coordination of the Greens’ European elections campaigns in Austria. 
MEPs and their collaborators are an additional source of information for the groups. 
Austrian MEPs are parliamentary group members. Contacts depend on the agendas of the 
European parliament and the National Council. Austrian MEPs from the same political party 
can be invited to attend “EU topical debates” and meet ex-ante with the respective group 
speakers to exchange information and coordinate positions. MEPs participate in the weekly 
internal group meetings before EAC sessions and come twice per year to the “club enclosures”. 
They can also be invited to general internal group meetings before plenary sessions. Since 2015, 
they have a speaking right in the EAC. According to the SPÖ EU collaborator, MEPs take these 
appointments seriously and show up. However, committee meetings are not well attended 
because of overlapping schedules.  
Beyond the sole group membership, MEPs are additionally member of party bodies and 
parties’extended federal boards, which ensures a tight interconnection between the different 
decision-making levels. Collaborators maintain contacts with MEP collaborators through a 
weekly skype meeting where they exchange information on future schedules and key issues. 
The Green group can rely for instance on approximately 10 MEP collaborators with specialised 
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knowledge, who represent the most important information source for the group (Interview 5a, 
2017). Within the SPÖ group, MEP collaborators have also a permanent office in Vienna, with 
one permanent collaborator managing Austrian appointments (Interview 3a, 2017). However, 
information might be insufficient in specific policy fields, as the low number of MEPs does not 
allow covering all EU matters (Interview 3a, 2017). According to several interviewees, MEPs 
are marginalised on the national level, even within their own parliamentary group (Interview 4a 
and 13a, 2017). The different schedules and the diverging positions between MEPs and their 
party’s line causes a lack of trust among MPs. A former EU speaker in the SPÖ group even 
admits that the close cooperation with MEPs caused mistrust and affected his reputation within 
the group (Interview 13a, 2017). One reason could be that political groups seek to stay the 
leaders in the national decision-making and refuse any interference from the EU level. Indeed, 
MEPs tend to detach themselves from the domestic party line and assign more importance to 
EU topics. 
On the EU level, the SPÖ collaborator has regular contacts with the delegation 
coordinator in Brussels, who sends reports on the S&D group meetings in Brussels. Contacts 
happen mostly through phone calls. Group collaborators in Vienna discuss these reports. The 
SPÖ EU collaborator and the delegation coordinator organise common events or prepare future 
EAC meetings (Interview 3a, 2017). Group collaborators have no contact with the Parliament’s 
representative in Brussels. If they need information, they pass through the Parliamentary 
Directorate, which contacts the liaison officer. In specific cases, collaborators can call directly 
the representative and request information. MPs participate also in meetings on the European 
level with colleagues from the same political family, either through multilateral or bilateral 
contacts. The Austrian Green Party maintains regular contacts with the German and 
Luxembourgish Green parties (Interview 12a, 2017). Closeness to Germany can be explained 
by the linguistic similarities and the geographical proximity. The FPÖ exchanges regularly with 
political groups or MPs from other national parliaments with similar ideological positions 
(Interview 11a, 2017). 
MPs can also rely on party formats to deal more informally with EU affairs. Most parties 
have established working groups, which are composed of both MPs and party members. Within 
the ÖVP, a forum called “European and Foreign policies” is composed of party members, 
experts and representatives from the Foreign Affairs Ministry (Interview 4a and 9a, 2017). 
While there is a working group on EU affairs in the Green party, the SPÖ did not create any. 
The Greens establish working groups whenever a topic becomes salient. Either these groups 
can exist within the party or a common group between Brussels and Vienna focuses on specific 
topics. Groups have been established on migration policy, the ESM and fiscal compact or CETA 
and TTIP. 
6.2.4 Parliamentary committees and EU affairs 
 
The Austrian Parliament is described in the literature as a “working parliament” rather 
than a “debating parliament” (Blümel/Neuhold, In: Maurer/Wessels, 2001). The particularity 
of the National Council’s EU Main Committee is its ability to act on behalf of the plenary 
(Article 23k B-VG). Within the lower chamber, the EU Main Committee (EU-Hauptausschuss) 
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and the EU Sub-Committee both centralise the scrutiny of EU affairs (Article 23k B-VG; §29, 
§31 GOG-NR). Committees within the National Council do not have their own committee 
secretariats and rely on the support of the Parliamentary Directorate. In the EACs’ case, the 
“European relations” and the “EU information and EU database” units help with the preparation 
and examination of EU documents. The EU Main Committee is responsible for EU affairs since 
Austria’s accession and existed prior to the country’s EU membership without its current EU 
functions. The EU Main Committee is competent for institutional and fundamental EU matters 
such as EU treaty modifications, European Council or Eurogroup meetings, while the EU Sub-
Committee handles specific EU policies and matters falling within the subsidiarity monitoring 
mechanism, the so-called “daily business”. The Main Committee delegates tasks to the standing 
sub-committee at the beginning of each legislative period through a delegation resolution. It 
can take it back at any moment, either individually or collectively (§31e GOG-NR).  
Sectoral committees work on EU affairs only on an ad-hoc and informal basis 
(Mastenbroek/Zwaan et al., 2014). EU documents remain usually between the sole hands of the 
EACs and are not sent to specialised committees (Blümel/Neuhold, In: Maurer/Wessels, 2001). 
The EU Main Committee is composed of 24 members and the EU Sub-Committee of 18 
members nominated by the first. MEPs have a consultative voice in both committees (§31c 
GOG-NR). Members in both committees are interchangeable through re-registration, which 
means that whenever specific competences are needed on a matter, MPs from sectoral 
committees who are deputy-members of the EAC replace the regular committee members. 
Usually, parliamentary groups take the opportunity to place their speakers in EAC meetings so 
that they can bring in their policy expertise from sectoral committees and widen the discussion 
scope. 
The EACs are the only competent bodies that adopt reasoned opinions. In the framework 
of the political dialogue initiated by the European Commission, they can also submit 
notifications to EU institutions, transferred by the President of parliament to the corresponding 
addressees (§31d GOG-NR). The Main Committee decides whether an EU matter needs to be 
put on the agenda of the plenary. Whenever the committee produces a report, it can send it to a 
specialised committee for prior consultation. The latter rule was added to the RoP in 2015247, 
in an effort to involve sectoral committees into the EU decision-making process. However, their 
contribution depends on the EAC’s decision to consult them. The examination of EU affairs 
follows the same working methods as domestic affairs. EACs are free to decide on their own 
agenda, as the latter do not depend on plenary sessions. However, as outlined above, the final 
decision on the committees’ agendas belong to political groups, who decide unanimously during 
their common group meetings. EACs examine EU-documents sent either by the Government in 
the framework of the EU-information law, or by EU institutions. Ministries must accompany 
the EU documents put on the EACs’ agendas with written explanatory notes. The latter contain 
the ministers’ positions, indications on potential implications for parliamentary scrutiny rights 
and effects on the subsidiarity principle. EACs can submit statements to the responsible minister 
on EU legislative proposals.  
 
247 29.05.2015, BGBl. I Nr. 62/2015, Bundesgesetz, mit dem das Geschäftsordnungsgesetz 1975 geändert wird, 
https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/eli/bgbl/I/2015/62 (last accessed 04.07.2018). 
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The EU Main Committee has also the power to bind legally a minister before 
negotiations on the EU level. Before European Council meetings, the Federal Chancellor and 
the Foreign Affairs Minister come to the EU Main committee to explain the government’s 
position. EAC meetings are public (§31c GOG-NR). The EAC either supports or rejects the 
Chancellor’s position. During these ex-ante meetings, MPs have the possibility to ask questions 
to the Government, linked or not to the European Council meeting. After each negotiation round 
on the EU level, government members and the Chancellor are not obliged to report ex-post. In 
the case of EU treaty negotiations, the EAC deals with the Intergovernmental Conferences 
(IGC), while the Constitutional Affairs Committee handles the legal aspects of the ratification 
process. Before European Council meetings, the EU Main Committee can decide to establish a 
“Fire-Fighting committee” (Feuerwehrkomitee) depending on the salience of the current EU 
topics (§31e GOG-NR). This consultative body is composed of the EU Main Committee Chair 
and nominated representatives from each parliamentary group. The “firefighter committee” 
follows closely European Council meetings and is in permanent contact with the Federal 
Chancellor during negotiations on the EU level. After each EAC meeting, EU speakers from 
each political group report to their group’s general meeting. As an intermediary between the 
group and the committee, the EU speaker must coordinate the group’s positions and ensure a 
coherent voting behaviour among group members in the EAC. 
Apart from the exceptions listed above, sectoral committees can also organise “current 
debates on EU topics”. Questions might be asked to the responsible minister during such a 
session. Since the RoP amendments made in 2015, MEPs can also participate in sectoral 
committee meetings with a consultative voice, but only if the parliamentary group decides to 
invite them. At the beginning of each year, ministers have to submit to the National Council a 
report on expected EU legislative proposals before the 31st January. The reports encompass 
information on the yearly programmes of the ministerial departments dependent on the 
European Commission’s programme, as well as envisaged future activities in EU affairs. Each 
sectoral committee discusses these reports, with the possibility to invite MEPs to the debates. 
Everything considered, parliamentary activity in EU affairs remains highly centralised 
within the National Council. Sectoral committees deal only punctually with EU affairs 
whenever a topic falls into their field of competence, which does not speak in favour of a 
mainstreaming of EU affairs. EACs do not consult sectoral committees very often since the 
establishment of the new procedure in 2015. Moreover, some sectoral committees tend to deal 
more often with EU topics than others. For instance, the Finance committee handles a higher 
proportion of EU directives than the Budget committee, which focuses mainly on national 
budget matters. Interest for EU affairs remains circumscribed in the EACs, because EU affairs 
were not debated in plenary for a long time (Interview 14a, 2017). Even if the subsidiarity 
monitoring procedure improved committees’ participation in EU affairs, the latter are still 
limited horizontally to the EACs (Interview 6a, 2017). Even EAC meetings turn out to be 
infrequent. In 2007 and 2009, the EU Main Committee met only four times each year (Interview 
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6a, 2017)248 and six times in 2015-2016249. The EU Sub-Committee met only six times in 2007, 
five times in 2009, eight times in 2015 and seven times in 2016250. No common meetings are 
usually organised between EACs and sectoral committees. Additionally, proposals are 
examined only once in committees, which could represent a problem in the context of the highly 
dynamic subsidiarity monitoring (Interview 7a, 2017). Depending on the reactions of other 
national parliaments, it would be more efficient if a matter could be re-examined in parliament 
at a later stage. 
Finally, some interviewees perceive cooperation with MEPs as insufficient (Interview 
1a, 2a and 15a, 2017). A member of the Finance committee admits that exchanges with MEPs 
are rare (Interview 15a, 2017). MEPs’ rights within parliamentary committees have been the 
object of long-lasting discussions over the past years, until recent changes in 2015. According 
to a former MP, sectoral committees should be able to invite or to discuss via skype with MEPs 
or rapporteur MEPs from other countries, just as in the Dutch Tweede Kammer (Interview 1a, 
2017). Through this channel, MEPs could provide Parliament with useful additional 
information on the content and context of EU legislative proposals.  
 
6.2.5 Cooperation between Parliament and Government on EU affairs 
 
The Federal Constitution anchored Parliament’s information rights when Austria joined 
the EU in 1995. Securing the information flow between Parliament and Government was 
already a priority before Austria’s accession (Pollak/Puntscher Riekmann, In: 
Helms/Wineroither, 2017). The objective of such well-developed information policy was to 
reach consensus at the earliest possible stage of the legislative process, in order to elaborate a 
coordinated and coherent position on the EU level. The National Council’s EU information 
policy became very comprehensive. The EU-database contains reports from Council and 
European Council meetings. Opposition parties were especially supportive of enlarging 
information access (Interview 7a, 2017). Government-Parliament relations are not the only 
sources of information. Indeed, depending on their position on the majority-opposition scale 
and their parliamentary functions, MPs get informed through their colleagues in Parliament, 
civil servants from ministry administrations, MEPs, interparliamentary conferences, meetings 
with MPs and MEPs from the same political family on the EU level, weekly group meetings in 
parliament, etc. Despite the numerous possibilities to obtain information, the Government-
Parliament channel remains the most important source. Article 23e and 23f B-VG regulate the 
Government’s obligation to inform the National Council as early as possible on all EU 
legislative proposals. Whenever voting rules or the type of legislative procedure changes on the 
 
248 See https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXIII/A-HA/A-HA_00001_00228/index.shtml#tab-
Sitzungsueberblick (last accessed 04.07.2018). 
249 See https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXV/A-HA/A-HA_00001_00344/index.shtml#tab-
Sitzungsueberblick (last accessed 04.07.2018). 
250 See https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXIII/SA-EU/SA-EU_00001_00233/index.shtml#tab-
Sitzungsueberblick (last accessed 04.07.2018) and  https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXV/SA-EU/SA-
EU_00001_00351/index.shtml#tab-Sitzungsueberblick (last accessed 04.07.2018). 
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EU level, the National Council benefits from special information rights before any decision 
from government members.  
Since 2003, the Government provides explanatory memoranda on issues on the EAC’s 
agenda (Miklin, In: Hefftler/Neuhold/Rozenberg/Smith, 2015). Even before the establishment 
of such a procedure, the Government committed itself to provide the needed information to 
Parliament (Interview 6a, 2017). Further improvements were undergone in 2004, obliging 
individual ministries to transfer yearly reports to the Parliament on the European Commission’s 
annual programme and the planned EU legislative proposals. The new rules aimed at securing 
MPs’ early involvement in the domestic and European decision-making process. More recently, 
the EU-information law that entered into force in 2012 institutionalised even further the lower 
chamber’s information rights251. The main criticism addressed to the law concerns its focus on 
documents originating from the EU level. Indeed, the EU-information law does not mention 
documents produced by the ministries or labelled as “classified”, which means that they are not 
included in the Parliament’s EU database. 
According to paragraph 5 of the above-mentioned law, the Federal Minister for Europe, 
Integration and Foreign Affairs has to report every six months to Parliament on EU proposals 
that will be discussed in the Council. If EU proposals imply the revisions of EU treaties or 
concern CFSP matters, an ex-ante information is also compulsory. Whenever a subsidiarity 
complaint has been submitted to the ECJ, the Federal Chancellor must inform the National 
Council on the oral negotiations (§8, EU-InfoG). Moreover, members of the EU Main 
Committee can ask the President of the National Council to request written information from 
government members on EU documents. The written information can be handled outside of the 
regular parliamentary agenda (§31c GOG-NR). The establishment of “Fire-fighting” 
committees also permits to establish a permanent contact to the Federal Chancellor during 
European Council meetings. Formal information rights have thus been substantially developed 
during two revision waves, the first during Austria’s accession to the EU and the second in 2012 
in the wake of the Treaty of Lisbon. Through an early ex-ante information policy, the National 
Council has the possibility to intervene at an early stage in the legislative process. The National 
Council can give its opinion during the formulation of governmental draft bills.  
Political groups play a significant role in ex-ante discussions and the draft of 
Government and Parliament positions. Indeed, as explained in the section on parliamentary 
groups, the latter use mostly informal channels to coordinate their position. Informal discussion 
formats were established between MPs from different political groups after Austria’s accession 
to the EU (Interview 2a, 2017). Majority groups in the National Council benefit from direct 
contacts with their ministers, during group meetings or on a regular basis whenever information 
is needed. MPs from the coalition rarely attempt to contradict their Government. Coalition 
partners tend to coordinate their positions before the weekly group meetings. This coordination 
founds on the coalition agreement established after the elections and the coalition formation. 
Both partners should use every instrument in Parliament such as the submission of requests, 
proposals or motions in a consensual way. Whenever a coalition partner does not agree with a 
 
251 12.12.2011, BGBl. I Nr. 113/2011, Bundesgesetz über Information in EU-Angelegenheiten (EU-
Informationsgesetz - EU-InfoG), https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/eli/bgbl/I/2011/113 (last accessed 04.07.2018). 
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parliamentary instrument, the other party abstains from using it, at the risk of leading to the 
dissolution of the coalition agreement.  
Group speakers have a privileged access to ministerial sources. Usually, contacts 
between governmental parties and their parliamentary groups are informal. For instance, budget 
speakers and the responsible ministers met informally to discuss the economic and financial 
crisis outside parliamentary committees’ framework (Interview 15a, 2017). During the last 
legislative period (2013-2017), the SPÖ organised ad hoc meetings with EU advisors from 
ministries. The group was also deciding about minister appointments (Interview 3a, 2017). This 
decision was taken before common group meetings, which left little leeway to opposition parties 
to contradict the choice. On the contrary, relations between the opposition and the Government 
are institutionalised and formal. Access to information is thus more difficult and supervised. 
While “lines are short” between MPs from governing parties and the Government, opposition 
MPs think that “the two big parties make “deals in EU affairs”” (Mastenbroek/Zwaan et al., 
2014, p.77), which limit their influence on decision-making (Interview 1a, 12a and 16a, 2017).  
To conclude, the information flow between Government and Parliament is perceived as 
satisfying (Interview 2a and 11a, 2017). However, the problem does not lie anymore in the 
quantity of received documents, but rather in the management and prioritisation of such 
information. Opposition parties do not have the required resources to access information and 
identify all relevant issues. This is even truer as most elements of the EU’s decision-making 
process are unwritten and informal. According to an FPÖ MP, even the availability of 
information does not guarantee influence (Interview 11a, 2017). Within Parliament, the EAC 
remains the only body with privileged access to EU information. On top of this, MPs still use 
insufficiently some parliamentary instruments to scrutinise the Government. For instance, there 
are no institutionalised ex-post discussions in Parliament on European Council meetings. 
Moreover, MPs do not use the document request tool, which gives them the possibility to ask a 
ministry to provide them with documents on a specific dossier received over the course of the 
last three months. Furthermore, binding mandates are rarely implemented in practice since 
Austria’s accession to the EU. A dramatic event in the first years following membership 
discouraged MPs to bind their ministers. Indeed, in the early 2000s, the National Council bound 
the then federal agriculture minister to its position on a European directive on animal transport. 
The binding mandate forced the minister to vote against the new regulation, while the rest of 
the Member States voted in favour. Austria obtained a result that was inferior to its expectations. 
In addition to that, even if a minister deviates from the National Council’s mandate, the blurred 
definition of “compelling integration policy reasons” justifying such a deviation limits the 
effectiveness of binding mandates. Diverging interpretation of the definition makes it difficult 
to contradict the minister’s decision. 
 
6.2.6 Discussion 
 
This section presented the development and current status quo of parliamentary 
participation rights in EU affairs. We observed that the National Council obtained substantial 
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scrutiny rights since Austria’s accession to the EU. The Federal Constitution and the internal 
RoP were amended several times to include new rules deriving from EU treaties. Several laws 
completed the revisions to strengthen the National Council’s information policy. Despite efforts 
to improve the chamber’s formal capacities, its influence on the EU decision-making remains 
circumscribed. The strong constitutional rights do not reflect the practice. According to Pollak 
(2009), the question of de- or re-parliamentarisation trends in the case of Austria can be 
conceived with ambiguity. The National Council’s formal rights speak in favour of an 
improvement of its legislative function. However, authors and interviewees observe the 
contrary in practice.  
Within Parliament, we can distinguish between two camps: on the one hand, opposition 
MPs and civil servants who are not satisfied with their current participation rights and on the 
other hand, majority MPs who express their overall satisfaction because they benefit from 
additional governmental sources. FPÖ MPs argue that national parliaments do not have 
effective participation rights in EU affairs (Interview 11a and 19a, 2017). An FPÖ MP 
differentiates between the constitutional theory and the reality on the ground. According to him, 
the National Council is deprived of its participation rights in the constitutional reality (Interview 
11a, 2017). Ministries tend to dominate the legislative process. The subsidiarity monitoring 
would be only an illusionary competence. The binding mandate instrument would be a 
“placebo”, because most competences have been transferred to the EU level (Interview 19a, 
2017). Plenary and committee debates would be a “façade”, because ministries take decisions 
on EU matters in the pre-parliamentary arena. Opposition MPs are not satisfied with the 
cooperation mechanisms with the Government. Information arrives too late in Parliament or is 
not sufficiently detailed. It does not give enough time to MPs to draft the agenda or to examine 
documents. Debates on EU matters turn out to be vague because of the lack of time to process 
the information. A Green MP is particularly critical when it comes to information linked to the 
European Semester, where Government bypasses Parliament by taking decisions without the 
National Council’s opinion (Interview 15a, 2017). The latter receives the final decision ex-post. 
The same applies to minister hearings. The Finance Minister would only rarely appear in 
Parliament to provide explanation on the European Semester. According to interviewees, 
ECOFIN meetings would be subjected to ex-post reports only if the Finance committee 
schedules a meeting accordingly. Moreover, majority MPs argue that coordination with the 
Finance Minister is close within the group between the finance and budget speakers (Interview 
2a, 12a and 18a, 2017). According to a Green MP, both Government and Parliament are 
responsible for the disappointing implementation of the information policy (Interview 15a, 
2017).  
Opposition and majority MPs agree to say that the National Council has a resource 
disadvantage compared to the Government, even though they are satisfied with the current 
support of the Parliamentary Directorate (Interview 1a and 2a, 2017). The latter possesses a 
large administration with the needed knowledge and expertise. Sometimes, due to time 
constraints, ministries give only vague information on EU matters, which hinders committees 
from handling thoroughly EU topics or even putting a matter on their agenda. Even though 
majority MPs are satisfied with the current information policy, they agree that the scrutiny 
infrastructure needs improvements. According to an ÖVP MP, the National Council has mostly 
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consultative competences, because the final decisions belong to the executive (Interview 2a, 
2017). The latter wishes to keep the monopoly on decision-making, both on the national and 
European level. 
Within the National Council, the decentralisation of EU scrutiny proves to be timid. The 
EACs still concentrate most EU activity. Only sectoral committees particularly concerned with 
EU issues tend to become punctually involved. Overall, the number of committee meetings are 
low and highly dependent on ministries’ agenda. MEPs’ participation in committee and plenary 
meetings remains insufficient, mainly because of schedule problems. “European days” 
established in 2005 and consisting in full-day plenary debates dedicated to EU topics were 
rarely used as such, but rather as opportunities to discuss national issues (Dossi, In: 
Maurer/Neisser/Pollak, 2015). Instead, they were replaced in 2010 by “European topical 
debates”. According to a former BZÖ MP, the establishment of the latter was an inefficient 
“optical and cosmetic improvement”, because it did not lead to concrete decisions (Interview 
19a, 2017). According to a civil servant, the National Council lacks a discussion culture on EU 
affairs (Interview 7a, 2017). Some instruments do not yet exist to cope with specific rules 
created on the EU level, such as passerelle clauses (Interview 6a, 2017). 
Opposition parties have repeatedly pleaded for further RoP amendments: NEOS 
requested changes in June 2014 and the Greens in July 2014. A former BZÖ MP argues that 
more than Parliament’s competences in EU affairs, it is the whole competence distribution 
between the Federation and the states that needs to be reformed (Interview 19a, 2017). The 
redistribution of competences back to the national level would provide Parliament with 
strengthened participation rights in EU affairs. Within the ÖVP, initiatives have been taken to 
improve the group’s information policy. Party members requested from government members 
to inform them earlier on important issues through phone calls (Interview 4a, 2017). A former 
ÖVP MP also suggested nominating an EU speaker from each political group to be represented 
in sectoral committees. These EU speakers would exert their functions in parallel to the main 
EU speaker of each group and could be responsible to follow and report on EU issues linked to 
their specialised committee (Interview 2a, 2017). A former SPÖ MP proposed to invite EU 
representatives from the European Commission or the European Parliament to the National 
Council’s plenary sessions (Interview 17a, 2017). 
Overall, MPs are reluctant to use parliamentary instruments, such as binding mandates. 
When the latter are used, then mainly by majority MPs to back their Government’s position on 
the EU level (Miklin, In: Wessels/Rozenberg et al., 2013). For instance, the use of binding 
mandates by the opposition depends on the support of the majority, as they are decided by 
unanimity in committees (Neisser, In: Neisser/Puntscher Riekmann, 2002). The weak influence 
of the National Council in practice is mainly due to the predominance of party politics over 
Parliament-Government relations. The personalised proportional electoral system makes MPs 
highly dependent on their respective parties. The strong party discipline forces them to stick to 
the party’s line. This is especially visible for majority MPs, who abstain from criticising openly 
their Government (Mastenbroek/Zwaan et al., 2014). According to Puntscher Riekmann and 
Wydra, “[…] informal agreements and a strong party-discipline in EU-matters have thwarted 
formal powers […]” (2013, p.572).  
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The automaticity of governmental majorities, until recently shared between the SPÖ and 
the ÖVP, led to informal “pre-cooking” of legislation in the pre-parliamentary arena between 
Government and affiliated parliamentary groups and gave little influence to opposition parties 
(Dossi, In: Maurer/Neisser/Pollak, 2015). The absence of confrontation between majorities in 
government and parliament leads to lower involvement and scrutiny of the Government’s EU 
policy. Majority groups within the National Council tend to determine parliamentary work and 
the topics on the agenda (Interview 11a, 2017). This might bias the decision-making process, 
because topics promoted by the Government might crowd out opposition’s suggestions from 
the agenda. A green MP even describes the National Council as an “executive parliament” 
(Interview 15a, 2017). Government would lead the legislative process and Parliament would 
abstain from amending draft bills because of partisan strategies. Opposition has thus no power 
over decisions leaving Parliament. The majority is even reluctant to revise the RoP, because of 
the two-thirds majority requirement and the potential threat to the Government’s influence on 
EU policies through a strengthening of minority rights (Interview 15a, 2017). 
To sum up, despite significant amendments to its legal basis and scrutiny infrastructure, 
we cannot observe trends towards a mainstreaming of EU affairs by looking at the National 
Council’s formal capacities. The next section will focus on effective parliamentary activity in 
EU affairs and the sociological factors influencing MPs’ involvement in the National Council.  
 
6.3 EU affairs in parliamentary work: opportunities and constraints 
 
The present section aims to outline MPs’ personal and political profiles and to explain 
their influence on parliamentary involvement in EU affairs. First, we will present the National 
Council’s socio-demographic characteristics. We think that the more an MP has a 
“Europeanised” profile252, the more he/she will be keen to engage in EU affairs (H2.1). As 
Austria became a member of the EU only in 1995, it might be highly probable that most MPs 
started to deal with EU affairs during their political mandate. We also assume that MPs who 
followed the accession to the EU might be those dealing the most with EU affairs nowadays. 
The second part of this section will then focus on the evolution of parliamentary activity in EU 
affairs, assessing the impact of MPs’ sociological profiles and motivations on their 
involvement. We base our arguments on qualitative data retrieved from interviews with MPs 
and civil servants from the National Council. On top of this, we use statistical and biographical 
information available on the Parliament’s website. 
 
 
 
 
 
252 See the definition given in the Chapter on Luxembourg, section 6.3. 
212 
 
6.3.1 General socio-demographic characteristics of the National Council 
 
This section focuses on the motivational factors that might drive Austrian MPs to get 
involved in EU affairs. After a general description of the lower chamber’s composition, we 
focus on identified key players. 
 
6.3.1.1 Composition of the National Council: MPs’ profiles 
 
A large proportion of MPs (64%) exerted 3 or more parliamentary mandates during the 
last legislative period 2013-2017. 26% had exerted exactly 3 parliamentary mandates and 38% 
had exerted more than 3 consecutive mandates. Overall, more than half of the National 
Council’s MPs had a long-term political experience within Parliament, as shown by the graph 
below.  
Figure 30: Number of exerted parliamentary mandates per MP (in %), National Council, 
2013-2017 
 
Source: Own calculations, https://www.parlament.gv.at/WWER/NR/AKT/ (last accessed 04.07.2018). 
Seniority among MPs seems to be a major feature of the National Council, probably 
because of the long-lasting SPÖ-ÖVP coalitions that guaranteed re-election of a large 
proportion of MPs. The fact that renewal among majority MPs from the SPÖ and ÖVP is low 
gives to the Government a high influence on the decision-making through these senior MPs. 
The Government can rely on a long-term support on the parliamentary level. On the contrary, 
opposition MPs tend to switch more often mandates, which provides them with less influence 
on the decision-making process. The high seniority rate among majority MPs is also indicative 
of a tradition of professionalised parliamentarians, who might be very familiar with 
parliamentary working procedures. Indeed, these MPs might have deeper knowledge on 
parliamentary practices and might be socialised into parliamentary norms, ensuring the 
continuity of the institution. 
Among the 183 MPs, only 21 had an experience in the Government during the legislative 
period 2013-2017. Unlike Luxembourg, the National Council does not seem to act as a 
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springboard for ministerial positions, with some exceptions in the biggest mainstream parties 
(SPÖ and ÖVP).  
Figure 31: Number of MPs with experience in the executive (in total), National Council, 
2013-2017 
 
Source: Own calculations, https://www.parlament.gv.at/WWER/NR/AKT/ (last accessed 04.07.2018). 
We observed that MPs with previous political mandates in Government were exclusively from 
both coalition parties SPÖ and ÖVP. Even though the FPÖ formed a coalition with the ÖVP 
between 1999 and 2007, no FPÖ MP from the then coalition government was represented in 
Parliament between 2013-2017. Among the 21 MPs with an experience in Government, 12 
belonged to the SPÖ and 9 to the ÖVP, as illustrated by the graph below. 
Figure 32: Distribution of MPs with experience in the executive (in total), National 
Council, 2013-2017 
  
Source: Own calculations, https://www.parlament.gv.at/WWER/NR/AKT/ (last accessed 04.07.2018). 
For majority MPs, it might be easier to switch from Parliament to Government and vice-
versa. Through the practice of “ministry reservation”, they have the possibility to access 
ministerial positions. Switching from the MP position to ministerial functions seems to be quite 
common in Austria for a small circle of politicians. The line between the legislative and the 
executive levels is thin, especially for SPÖ and ÖVP MPs. The particularity of the Austrian 
political system is the theoretical possibility to keep one’s parliamentary mandate once 
nominated in the Government. However, ministers give up all their parliamentary functions 
during this period. Even though not anchored in the Constitution, incompatibility between the 
two positions is commonly accepted and applied in practice (Interview 2a, 2017). MPs with 
government experience might bring with them knowledge and practices from the ministries and 
be better informed on government-parliament relations through privileged information access. 
21
183
0 50 100 150 200
Experience in government
Total number of National Council MPs
9
12 ÖVP
SPÖ
214 
 
Experience in the executive might thus bias MPs’ opinion and working methods in Parliament. 
It could even reinforce the non-conflictual culture and passivity on the side of MPs that 
occupied governmental positions, because their experience in the executive encourages them to 
support the government in place. Government members might also benefit from contacts with 
former government members by gaining insights into their parliamentary work. This is even 
truer as former government members still benefit from privileged contacts with the government 
and are usually the first chosen if a minister resigns.  
Within the National Council, most MPs exert functions within federal/regional/local 
political entities in parallel to their mandate in Parliament. For a majority, their federal mandate 
is thus part-time. MPs cannot be member of another regional parliament, but they can cumulate 
functions in municipality councils, as the latter are regarded as self-governing bodies being part 
of the administration. Collaborators in the local constituencies support MPs’ work and can 
accompany them to sessions in Vienna. 
Figure 33: Distribution of representative functions among MPs (in total), National 
Council, 2013-2017 
  
Source: Own calculations, https://www.parlament.gv.at/WWER/NR/AKT/ (last accessed 04.07.2018). 
MPs seem to be particularly active in local political parties (42%), as well as in national 
unions253 (38%). This can be explained both by the significant role played by political parties 
and the well-developed corporatist culture that encourages close ties with social partners on all 
decisional levels. The Austro-corporatist system encourages close ties with national unions, 
such as professional chambers. MPs belonging to national unions might tend to defend domestic 
priorities close to the unions’ positions in their parliamentary work. Thus, we assume that the 
influence of national unions on MPs’ activities is important. Membership in a local political 
party is often the first step for Austrian MPs to start a national political career. Indeed, just as 
in Luxembourg and Finland, the electoral system based on personalised campaigns obliges MPs 
to distinguish themselves politically and count on the support of their party. Party affiliation 
and local ties are strong determinants in MPs’ political careers. This explains why a large 
proportion still has functions on the local level. The federal system also encourages MPs to 
 
253 National unions are understood here as membership in professional Chambers, syndicates, political 
associations, networks, federations, academies/think tanks, NGOs etc. 
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maintain close contacts with their electorates. In general, the proportion of MPs member of 
European associations or networks is low. Local and regional politics play a more important 
role.  
Apart from the Speaker and Deputy Speakers of the National Council, all MPs have 
multiple committee memberships. Most committees do not meet on a frequent basis. Over 77% 
of MPs belonged to 5 or more committees between 2013-2017.  
Figure 34:  Number of committee memberships per MP (in %), National Council, 2013-
2017 
 
Source: Own calculations, https://www.parlament.gv.at/WWER/NR/AKT/ (last accessed 04.07.2018). 
As there is no clear rule in the RoP regulating the maximum number of committee 
memberships, it explains why most MPs belong to more than 5 committees. Consequently, 
multiple committee memberships affect the time spent in each committee, as well as MPs’ 
specialisation level. Indeed, they tend to have generalist profiles due to the lack of time to 
specialise on certain issues. The Government might benefit from the general lack of expertise, 
because MPs do not have the same knowledge level and the capacity to process information as 
ministry civil servants. Therefore, it could also explain why majority MPs rely and trust 
government information instead of relying on other sources.  
In closing, the graphs above show that the professionalization level of Austrian MPs is 
high due to their long-lasting parliamentary career, which could be synonym of a good 
knowledge of their institutional counterparts and their channels of influence. The latter can be 
former ministerial contacts if they happen to have an experience in the Government, or more 
frequently their link to national unions or local political parties. As we saw in an earlier section 
(6.1.1.4), the latter entities play a significant role in the formulation and implementation of 
decision-making. Therefore, due to Austria’s electoral system, political affiliation and activities 
on the local level are crucial elements forging MPs involvement in Parliament. The close 
relations to professional chambers, trade unions or membership in regional or local parties 
might constitute elements influencing the way parliamentarians perceive EU affairs. Indeed, the 
closeness with social partners and their political parties might push MPs to defend primarily 
domestic interests, because their career is deeply rooted in local bodies.  
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6.3.1.2 Profiles of parliamentary key players in EU affairs 
 
This part focuses on the key players that proved to be particularly active in EU affairs 
and the follow-up of EU treaties and intergovernmental treaties on the EMU. Like in the 
Luxembourgish case, we identified two types of actors: on the one hand EAC members and on 
the other hand sectoral committee members that deal punctually with EU affairs whenever their 
field of competence is concerned. 
 
EAC members 
 
Both the EU Main Committee and the EU Sub-Committee were composed of all 
political groups according to their proportional representation in 2013-2017. The EU Main 
Committee had 25 members and the sub-committee 19 members. Within the former, 16 were 
from the SPÖ-ÖVP majority (8 from each coalition party) and 9 from the opposition.  
 
Figure 35: Ideological distribution of EU HA membership (in total), National Council, 
2013-2017 
 
Source: Own calculations, https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXV/A-HA/A-
HA_00001_00344/index.shtml (last accessed 04.07.2018). 
 
Within the latter, majority MPs had 12 seats (6 each) and opposition MPs had 7 seats. 
 
Figure 36: Ideological distribution of EU-UA membership (in total), National Council, 
2013-2017 
 
Source: Own calculations, https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXV/SA-EU/SA-
EU_00001_00351/index.shtml (last accessed 04.07.2018). 
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The fact that the majority rules both committees might mean that the Government’s EU 
line is systematically backed by its MPs in Parliament. The absence of a strong opposition in 
these committees might also affect the use of parliamentary instruments, as majority MPs tend 
to be less active to show their support to their Government. The latter’s influence on both 
committees is also illustrated through the profiles of EAC Chairs. Since 2002, the SPÖ and 
ÖVP had the monopoly on the nomination of the EU-HA and EU-UA chairpersons. 
Additionally, 3 out of 4 EU-HA and 2 out of 4 EU-UA chairpersons were former government 
members254. This observation confirms the strong control that the Government might have on 
EU affairs due to the double constraint weighing on EAC Chairs: their affiliation to majority 
parties and their former government functions. 
Compared to the rest of MPs, the proportion of EAC members with multiple committee 
memberships is significantly higher. Within the EU Main Committee, 92% of MPs belong to 
more than 5 parliamentary committees. 
 
Figure 37: Number of committee memberships per EU-HA member (EU HA included, in 
%), National Council, 2013-2017 
 
Source: Own calculations, https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXV/A-HA/A-
HA_00001_00344/index.shtml (last accessed 04.07.2018). 
 
Within the EU sub-committees, 95% of MPs belong to more than 5 parliamentary committees. 
 
Figure 38: Number of committee memberships per EU-UA member (EU-UA included, in 
%), National Council, 2013-2017 
 
Source: Own calculations, https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXV/SA-EU/SA-
EU_00001_00351/index.shtml (last accessed 04.07.2018). 
 
 
254 Own calculations based on data from the National Council’s website, according to each legislative session from 
2002-2013. 
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Multiple committee membership can be an added-value for EAC members, especially 
whenever subsidiarity matters are being reviewed. On the one hand, MPs belonging to several 
sectoral committees can use their memberships to bring specialised knowledge into the EAC 
discussions. On the other hand, they can also use their knowledge on European issues whenever 
a sectoral matter contains a European perspective.  
Compared to the rest of parliament members, EAC members have slightly less functions 
in local parties and unions. Membership in European associations is however double the 
proportion observable in the whole parliament. Indeed, respectively 13% and 11% of EU Main 
Committee and EU Sub-Committee members are participating in European associations, 
federations, bodies and/or networks.  
 
Figure 39: Distribution of representative functions among EU-HA members and EU-UA 
members (in %), National Council, 2013-2017 
 
Source: Own calculations, https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXV/A-HA/A-
HA_00001_00344/index.shtml (last accessed 04.07.2018). 
 
Figure 40: Distribution of representative functions among EU-UA members and EU-UA 
members (in %), National Council, 2013-2017 
 
Source: Own calculations, https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXV/SA-EU/SA-
EU_00001_00351/index.shtml (last accessed 04.07.2018). 
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These rates prove that MPs from both committees are more engaged in EU activities 
and slightly less in local political functions. The percentage of MPs belonging to national unions 
is still high and indicates that the influence of the Austro-corporatist model is deeply anchored 
in MPs’ career paths. No matter their committee membership, parallel memberships in 
professional chambers or trade union organisations remain a particularity of the Austrian 
system. It also means that these organisations might try to influence EU affairs through their 
affiliated EAC members. Contrary to the rest of the Parliament, links to local and regional 
parties seem to be less predominant. It could mean that EAC members are less dependent on 
local party affiliations and got detached from the domestic political game by focusing on EU 
affairs. Therefore, they might be less interested in re-election, because they maintain less 
contact with their local electorates. Finally, as EAC members tend to be more sensitised to EU 
issues and detached from national issues, they tend to seek positions on the EU level. They use 
their memberships in European associations or networks as informal and personal means to 
obtain direct information from the EU level. In that sense, they can rely on other sources of 
information than the sole government documents. Being detached from the national level might 
have transformed some EAC members into lone rangers pursuing supranational goals.  
While only 11% of the total number of MPs had an experience in the Government (see 
previous part), the proportion is higher in the EU Main Committee (20%) and lower in the EU 
Sub-Committee (5%). As the EU Main Committee has considerable formal powers in EU 
affairs, MPs with previous government experience might be more attracted to EAC membership 
due to regular and privileged contacts with the Federal Chancellor and ministers (mostly the 
Foreign Affairs Minister). The EU-HA is the sole committee that can decide for the plenary and 
adopt binding mandates. Therefore, it has a good reputation within Parliament and might be 
attractive to former government members who wish to leave a political mark. EAC membership 
ensures former government members a prestigious position within the National Council and 
might give them more chances to be called back in government. 
Interparliamentary conferences do not seem to attract EAC members’ attention, as only 
20% of EU Main Committee members and 21% of EU Sub-Committee members are 
participating in these formats255. One reason could be the tight parliament schedule that 
discourages MPs from leaving their national duties. Another reason could be the general 
perception that interparliamentary conferences do not contribute substantially to parliamentary 
work, as the National Council has already well-developed formal capacities. In the end, only a 
limited number of EAC members participate regularly in these conferences. 
Finally, the proportion of EAC members with long-term mandates in Parliament turned 
out to be higher than the rest of MPs during the 2013-2017 period. Within the EU Main 
Committee, 52% of MPs exerted more than 3 consecutive mandates, as illustrated below. 
 
 
 
 
255 Calculations on the basis of biographical data found on each committee’s dedicated section on the National 
Council’s website. See https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXV/A-HA/A-
HA_00001_00344/MIT_00344.html and https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXV/SA-EU/SA-
EU_00001_00351/MIT_00351.html (last accessed 04.07.2018). 
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Figure 41: Number of exerted parliamentary mandates per EU-HA member (in%), 
National Council, 2013-2017 
 
Source: Own calculations, https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXV/A-HA/A-
HA_00001_00344/index.shtml (last accessed 04.07.2018). 
 
Within the EU Sub-Committee, the proportion is even higher, with 63% of members that kept 
their mandate for more than 3 legislative periods. 
 
Figure 42: Number of exerted parliamentary mandates per EU-UA member (in%), 
National Council, 2013-2017 
 
Source: Own calculations, https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXV/SA-EU/SA-
EU_00001_00351/index.shtml (last accessed 04.07.2018). 
 
The seniority rate is thus particularly high within both committees, which could mean 
either that EU affairs necessitate a certain political experience, or that they do not attract newly 
elected MPs because of the low re-election prospects. EAC members are chosen according to 
their knowledge on parliamentary procedures and on EU affairs, which requires a certain level 
of seniority and experience linked to the EU. This high seniority rate also means that 
membership renewal in both committees is low and that the majority keeps the same MPs in 
place between legislative periods. Just as in the Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies, we observe 
that the proportion of former government members is higher in the EAC than in the rest of the 
Parliament. Therefore, the Government keeps its hands on the European decision-making 
process thanks to senior MPs from the majority with prior government experience.   
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Key players in the follow-up of EU treaties and intergovernmental treaties on the EMU 
 
Interviewees identified as key players in the follow-up of EU and intergovernmental 
treaty negotiations have long political careers. Most MPs started their career on the local level, 
either in municipalities, unions, regional government bodies or their political party. The fact 
that MPs started with a local political career illustrates once again the importance of political 
affiliation as a condition to progress from a local career to an MP position. Moreover, it also 
means that these key players started their MP position with a higher sensitivity to local matters 
and were not automatically interested in EU affairs at the first place. Some MPs entered 
Parliament before Austria’s accession to the EU. At that time, EU issues were not systematically 
on the Parliament’s agenda. Even after the accession, MPs were progressively socialised into 
EU norms during the first years. Positions such as group or party president are common among 
interviewees. For instance, a former Secretary General of the ÖVP and current MP started his 
political career back in school by becoming the Federal school speaker (Interview 21a, 2017). 
Between 1993 and 2001, he was the Federal Chairman of the Young ÖVP. He entered 
Parliament in 1994 and became President of the ÖVP group between 2009 and 2014. A former 
Green MP and MEP was first politically involved on the regional level in the management of a 
networking project on the transport initiative in the Alpin area (Interview 1a, 2017). The former 
MP entered the Tirol regional parliament in 1989 for a five-year mandate before being elected 
in the National Council. Moreover, a former ÖVP MP started as Party chairman in his 
municipality in 1968 and became mayor in 1970 (Interview 18a, 2017). In 1992, he became 
district chairman of the ÖVP, before being elected in Parliament in 1994 until 2013 without 
interruption.  
 
Most interviewees had an experience in both Parliament and Government, as either 
minister or state secretary. As explained before, former government members tend to bring 
knowledge from their experience into parliamentary work. Therefore, their ministerial 
experience might influence their activities in Parliament. For instance, the former President of 
the ÖVP parliamentary group until 2017 and current EU speaker of the ÖVP group was state 
secretary in the Foreign Affairs Ministry between 2007 and 2013 (Interview 12a, 2017). 
Another former ÖVP MP was Foreign Affairs Minister for five years, as well as Finance 
Minister and Federal Vice-Chancellor (Interview 4a, 2017).  A former SPÖ MP, member of the 
delegation to the Convention on the Future of Europe, came in the executive in 1994 as state 
secretary in the Chancellery (Interview 17a, 2017). He became successively Federal Minister 
of the Interior and Federal Minister of Science and Transport. Moreover, a former Green MP 
was Minister for Environmental protection in the Tirol regional government (Interview 1a, 
2017). In 1999-2000, she switched to the National Council and handled issues related to 
Tourism, Transport, Defence and EU. An SPÖ member of the Finance committee was state 
secretary in the Finance Ministry between his mandates in Parliament (Interview 13a, 2017). 
Finally, another former ÖVP MP was Vice-Chancellor of Austria, as well as Finance minister 
between his mandates in Parliament (Interview 2a, 2017). He started in 1990 in the National 
Council, and then switched back and forth between Government and Parliament between 1994 
and 2011. We found that several key players, mostly from the majority, passed through the 
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Foreign Affairs Ministry, where they acquired the needed expertise to be accepted as EAC 
member. Some MPs switched regularly from Government to Parliament, which indicates that 
they probably returned to Parliament while waiting for future government positions. In the 
meantime, they might have had the opportunity for political profiling in the renowned EAC.  
 
Overall, key players exert(ed) long-lasting parliamentary mandates, interrupted either 
by more or less long periods of executive functions (minister or state secretary), regional 
functions (Länder government or Federal Council) or European functions (MEP).  
 
Figure 43: Interviewees’ average length of parliamentary mandates (in %), National 
Council 
 
Source: Own calculations based on interviews with MPs from the National Council. 
 
A former ÖVP MP started for instance in the Federal Council, then came to the National 
Council, before being elected in the European Parliament (Interview 4a, 2017). A former Green 
MP was also elected in the EP for ten years, providing her with an extensive experience on the 
EU level (Interview 1a, 2017). Finally, an SPÖ MP became member of the CoR between 2009 
and 2013 (Interview 13a, 2017). In light of key players’ seniority in Parliament, we can 
conclude that they have highly professionalised careers compared to the rest of the MPs. Some 
of them followed previous EU treaties and followed the evolution of EU policies, the EU’s 
institutional framework and parliament’s procedures over time. Moreover, some MPs also 
gained expertise in EU affairs through their MEP functions. For them, the EAC might represent 
the continuity of their positions on the EU level. Therefore, they might appear as legitimised 
EU experts fitted for an EAC membership. 
Within the National Council, we distinguished two categories of key players: EAC 
members regularly involved in EU affairs and sectoral committee members punctually involved 
in EU affairs depending on the topic on the agenda. The competence distribution between 
committees determines to a large extent MPs’ involvement. Despite decentralisation efforts, the 
EACs are still the main arenas of debate on EU affairs. Key players were either full-time or 
part-time members of the EU Main Committee or EU Sub-Committee, member of the Foreign 
Affairs Committee, or to a lesser extent sectoral committee members directly concerned with 
EU issues. Some MPs benefitted from the re-registration procedure in the EAC and participated 
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in meetings whenever their expertise was needed on an EU policy. For instance, an ÖVP MP 
handled mostly the financial crisis as a member of the Finance Committee, but participated 
from time to time to deliberations in the EAC as a substitute member (Interview 18a, 2017). 
Moreover, just as other interviewees, the MP occupied key or leading positions in Parliament. 
The ÖVP MP was for instance Chair of the Budget Committee and the ESM Sub-Committee 
during the last legislative period 2013-2017 (Interview 15a, 2017). Two key players were 
presidents of their parliamentary group (Interview 2a and 12a, 2017). Another former ÖVP MP 
was Vice-President of the National Council (Interview 4a, 2017). Majority MPs tended to be 
committee chairs, which means that they probably controlled committee discussions according 
to their Government’s positions. Both majority and opposition group presidents counted among 
the key players. As a group president’s role is to transpose the group or party position in 
Parliament, we can imagine that they became particularly active whenever they needed to 
defend their party’s line during treaty negotiations.  
On top of these leadership positions, we observed that several key players were group 
spokespersons, for either Foreign or EU Affairs. Those involved in the follow-up of the 
financial crisis were mainly finance or budget speakers. Group spokespersons are usually expert 
MPs who represent the group’s position in discussions on specific matters. In the case of the 
EU and intergovernmental treaties, group speakers became active to publicise their group’s 
opinion dependent on the general party line. Therefore, just as group presidents, group speakers 
remain largely dependent on their group and party position. The fact that leadership positions 
played a significant role in MPs’ involvement illustrates parties’ will to keep a hand on the 
negotiation processes.  
If we look at interviewees’ political and professional experiences, we notice that most 
of them started their political career without having dealt directly with EU affairs. Most MPs 
have not dealt with EU affairs before arriving in Parliament or Government. Particularly MPs 
that entered Parliament before or during Austria’s accession to the EU never handled EU affairs 
before their mandate. MPs dealt progressively with EU affairs, because the latter were not part 
of parliamentary work before 1995. Their interest for EU matters centred around economic 
issues at the beginning. MPs had first to adapt to European integration and incorporate new 
rules in their daily practices to handle EU affairs. Once in Parliament, the most active key 
players followed closely the membership negotiations, as well as the 2004 enlargement wave 
(Interview 2a, 17a, 19a, 2017). Their early involvement in EU affairs made them probably more 
sensitive to these issues. Through the interviews, we established an ideal-typical profile of a 
“Europeanised” MP involved in EU affairs, which resembles the profile outlined in the 
Luxembourg case. Austrian MPs actively involved in EU affairs and in the follow-up of treaty 
negotiations have extensive political experience, both in Government and Parliament, exert 
long-term mandates in Parliament, occupy important parliamentary functions (in committees or 
groups) and are mainly EAC members.  
While key players’ careers are deeply rooted in national bodies, their participation in 
interparliamentary conferences remains circumscribed. The most common attended formats are 
COSAC and Council of Europe meetings. For some interviewees, EU affairs became a personal 
commitment. For instance, a former Green MP and MEP became active in the Centre for 
European Policy Studies think tank after ending her mandate in the EP (Interview 1a, 2017). 
224 
 
However, these instances remain quite rare, as involvement in EU affairs turns out to be very 
limited as well. 
Summing up the observations, we discovered that key players’ profiles are very similar 
to those of Luxembourgish MPs, with the difference that political affiliation and ties to social 
partnership are much more significant. Political functions within Parliament show that MPs are 
highly dependent on their respective group or party line. In particular, majority MPs with 
leadership positions might be strictly tied to the Government’s position. Overall, EU affairs 
seem to be limited to MPs with “Europeanised” profiles, usually senior MPs with important 
prior (or current) functions within Parliament and Government. Some of them became 
sensitised to EU issues through their active involvement in the country’s accession to the EU. 
MPs who deal only punctually with EU affairs are members of parliamentary committees that 
receive on average more EU documents than other sectoral committees. For instance, some key 
players belong to the Finance and Budget committees, which shows that the salience of the 
financial crisis widened the attention among sectoral committees.  
 
6.3.2 Parliamentarians’ level of involvement in EU affairs 
 
After the analysis of key players’ profiles, this section aims to explain the evolution of 
parliamentary activity in light of the sociological elements presented above. The first part will 
centre on general observable activity trends in the National Council in EU affairs. The second 
part will try to explain parliamentary activity through motivational lenses. Indeed, MPs’ 
motivations to engage in EU affairs is highly dependent on their profile outlined in the previous 
section. 
 
6.3.2.1 General trends 
 
The Main Committee has a meeting dedicated to EU affairs approximately once per 
month and meets as the EU Main Committee. If we compare the number of meetings of the EU 
Main Committee with those of the EU Sub-Committee, we observe that the latter met more 
often between 2004 and 2015. The main reason may lie in the committees’ competences, as the 
EU Main Committee deals with institutional matters that come more rarely on the agenda than 
everyday EU policies handled by the sub-committee. We also observed that activity fluctuates 
considerably over the period 2002-2015. One main explanation could be the legislative 
elections in 2006, 2008 and 2013, which led to a decrease of committee meetings and general 
parliamentary activity. During these periods, the majority of MPs tend to focus on domestic 
issues in their electoral campaign, in order to fit to their voters’ interests and ensure their re-
election in their constituency. We also observe that the number of committee meetings, even 
though fluctuant, grew after 2008-2009 in the wake of the Treaty of Lisbon, with a decrease in 
2011-2012. The latter evolution could correspond to the negotiations on the European Stability 
Mechanism and the Fiscal Compact, which tended to be handled in the Finance committee. 
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Figure 44: Number of EAC meetings (in total), National Council, 2002-2015 
 
Source: Own calculations, based on parliamentary statistics on the National Council’s website256. 
EU Main Committee meetings are less numerous compared to the total number of 
meetings of the Main Committee. However, the latter meets more frequently than any other 
parliamentary committee257, as shown in the graph below. 
Figure 45: Comparative evolution of the number of committee meetings (in total), 
National Council, 2002-2015 
 
Source: Own calculations, based on parliamentary statistics on the National Council’s website. 
We notice again the same fluctuations around legislative elections. The Main 
Committee’s highest number of meetings was in 2005-2006 with 20 meetings, while the lowest 
number was in 2006-2007 after the legislative elections, with only 9 meetings. Two potential 
 
256 See https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/AUS/ (last accessed 04.07.2018). 
257 For more visibility and clarity, we did not include all sectoral committees in the graph. 
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factors could explain this fluctuation, as stated earlier. Firstly, the increase of the number of 
committee meetings in 2005-2006 could originate from Austria’s EU Presidency during the first 
semester of 2006. Indeed, the preparation and implementation of the Presidency would have 
requested more activities in Parliament. The Main Committee met twice or three times per 
month on average between October 2005 and July 2006, while usually meeting once or twice 
per month on average258. Moreover, EU affairs tended to be a major issue in the Main 
Committee over this period, even outside EU Main Committee meetings. Secondly, the drop of 
committee meetings in 2006-2007 could be explained by the legislative elections held on the 
1st October 2006 and the start of a new legislative period. The elections during the second 
semester of 2006 led to the establishment of a new coalition between the SPÖ and the ÖVP, 
evicting the BZÖ from the Government after its split from the FPÖ in 2005. The start of a new 
legislative period meant that in practice, parliamentary work had to be reorganised, which led 
to less activities in committees during the first months of 2006. We can apply the same 
explanation to the drop of committee meetings in 2008-2009. Discrepancies between the 
coalition partners SPÖ and ÖVP led to early elections on 28th September 2008, leading to the 
start of a new legislative period. From that moment on, the number of committee meetings grew 
more steadily with slight downward variations.  
  Overall, the number of Main Committee meetings did not change substantially and 
remained stable over the period 2002-2015. The Finance committee seems to be the second 
most active body in Parliament, with increased meetings during the economic and financial 
crisis. The fluctuation of committee meetings showed a trend in parliamentary activity, but not 
which MPs where the most engaged. However, considering the high number of Main 
Committee meetings, we can assume that EAC members might have been the most active in 
EU affairs. Moreover, we have seen earlier that EAC members tended to be the most 
professionalised in Parliament. Therefore, we can assume at this stage that active members of 
the EU-Main Committee and the EU Sub-Committee were mostly senior MPs detached from 
re-election prospects.  
The assessment of used parliamentary instruments over the same period will help us understand 
which MPs from which political camp (majority or opposition) were the most active. Firstly, 
the evolution of parliamentary questions in EU affairs follows slightly the same trend as EAC 
meetings259. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
258 See overview of meetings of the EU-HA: https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXII/A-HA/A-
HA_00001_00081/index.shtml#tab-Sitzungsueberblick (last accessed 17.01.2019) 
259 Parliamentary questions entail all types of questions to the government. Most are written questions. 
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Figure 46: Parliamentary questions on EU affairs (asked, in total), National Council, 2002-
2015 
 
Source: Own calculations, https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/ (last accessed 04.07.2018). 
Parliamentary activity dropped in 2006-2007 in the context of the legislative elections. 
We can observe peaks of activity during negotiations on the Lisbon Treaty between 2007 and 
2009, and again in 2013-2014, probably either in the context of the European Semester or the 
migration crisis. However, during the increase of activity between 2007 and 2009, no direct 
correlation could be observed between the negotiation of the Lisbon Treaty and parliamentary 
questions on EU affairs. Indeed, the observation of the subjects of the asked questions show 
that most of them concern matters falling into the competence of sectoral committees. We can 
conclude that even though the majority of questions did not concern directly the Treaty of 
Lisbon, the negotiation context of the treaty on the EU level might have triggered MPs’ attention 
on EU issues. Another explanation could be the drastic increase of received EU documents by 
the parliamentary administration, as shown in section 6.2.2, that led MPs to devote more time 
to EU matters in their parliamentary activity.  
Overall, if we compare the proportion of EU-related questions to the total number of 
parliamentary questions, we observe the same situation as in the Luxembourg Chamber of 
Deputies. The proportion of questions on EU topics remains very limited. 
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Figure 47: Number of PQs on EU affairs compared to total number of PQs (in total), 
National Council, 2002-2015 
 
Source: Own calculations, https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/ (last accessed 04.07.2018). 
Most activity is concentrated between 2002 and 2006, before dropping to its lowest in 2006-
2007. The next graph illustrates the percentage of questions on EU affairs per legislative 
session. 
Figure 48: Percentage of PQs on EU affairs (asked), National Council, 2002-2015 
 
Source: Own calculations, https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/ (last accessed 04.07.2018). 
On average, between 2002 and 2015, only 3,9% of the total number of parliamentary 
questions were dedicated to EU matters260. The frequent use of parliamentary questions between 
2002 and 2006 might be explained by the salience of EU topics, in particular in the context of 
the Convention on the Future of Europe, the Constitutional Treaty and Austria’s EU Presidency. 
The drop in 2006-2007 illustrates again the legislative elections and MPs’ priorities that shifted 
towards domestic issues. Even though the percentage of questions dropped after 2005-2006, it 
does not mean that the absolute number of questions dropped as well. Indeed, parliamentary 
 
260 Calculation of the average percentage of parliamentary questions between 2002 and 2015.  
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workload increased over the years, which means that both domestic and EU issues were handled 
more systematically.  
Moreover, parliamentary questions on EU affairs give information on which MPs were 
the most active. For instance, the following graph shows the most active categories of MPs in 
EU affairs according to their position on the political scale, whether they belonged to the 
opposition or the majority. 
Figure 49: Number of PQs on EU affairs (asked, in total), opposition vs majority, National 
Council, 2002-2015 
 
Source: Own calculations, https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/ (last accessed 04.07.2018). 
In terms of nominal value, we observe that the number of questions on EU affairs was 
the highest in 2008-2009 and 2013-2014, corresponding respectively to the negotiation period 
on the Treaty of Lisbon and the European Semester. Over the whole period, opposition MPs 
asked the most questions. In the light of the variations observed, opposition MPs might have 
reacted more actively to issues affecting directly their priorities. The opposition’s strategy is to 
criticise the Government’s EU policy and to obtain information using parliamentary 
instruments. As opposition MPs have a more difficult access to information due to a lack of 
resources and personnel, they need to ask ministers directly. Moreover, they use parliamentary 
questions to publicise their opinions and their discontent. For instance, Eurosceptic opposition 
MPs were particularly active during the Treaty of Lisbon and the financial crisis, because they 
disagreed with the Government’s policy and demanded that Austria’s sovereignty remained 
preserved. Majority MPs abstained usually from using parliamentary scrutiny instruments, 
showing support to their Government’s EU policy and maintaining a strong group discipline.  
Question hours on EU affairs (“Aktuelle Stunden”) were used punctually depending on 
the salience of agenda topics. On average, MPs did not use this instrument very frequently. 
Only the 2003-2004 session at the beginning of the negotiations on the Constitutional Treaty 
was the most active with 3 question hours on EU affairs.   
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Figure 50: Proportion of question hours on EU affairs compared to total number of 
question hours (in total), National Council, 2002-2015 
 
Source: Own calculations, https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/ (last accessed 04.07.2018). 
From 2009 onwards, the establishment of topical debates on EU issues did not trigger 
substantial change in parliamentary activity. Indeed, the number of topical debates per year 
remained low (between 2 debates in 2009 to maximum 4 debates in 2011-2012 and 2014-
2015)261. Variations observed in the graph seem to be very similar to those observed for other 
parliamentary instruments. The fluctuation of the number of EU question hours corresponds 
each time to national elections (2006, 2008, 2013), but also to EU and intergovernmental treaty 
negotiations. During each treaty negotiation period, MPs used EU question hours to publicise 
their position and trigger voters’ attention. On the Constitutional Treaty, majority MPs initiated 
the most question hours, whereas opposition MPs took the lead on the Lisbon Treaty and the 
economic crisis. Indeed, as polarisation and ideological tensions grew from the Lisbon Treaty 
onwards, opposition MPs tended to publicise even more their position to gain visibility and 
popular support. 
Before the establishment of EU question hours, the National Council created “Europe 
days”, where plenary debates were organised on EU topics. However, according to a civil 
servant from the parliamentary administration, parliamentary groups tended to use these 
“Europe days” to discuss domestic issues (Interview 6a, 2017). Therefore, EU question hours 
do not seem to encourage activity in EU affairs.  
In sum, parliamentary activity in EU affairs was fluctuant and low over the period 
running from 2002 to 2015. Compared to the overall use of parliamentary instruments, EU 
topics do not seem to push MPs to use the scrutiny tools at their disposal. The irregular use of 
instruments might depend on the salience of European topics, priorities linked to national 
elections and the political constellation in Government and Parliament. Periods of stagnation 
are common between two peaks of activity. Without surprise, opposition MPs use more often 
 
261 See 
https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/PLENAR/index.shtml?FBEZ=FP_007&NRBRBV=NR&R_SISTEI=ST&S
TATT=ASEU&LISTE=Anzeigen&listeId=1071&SUCH= (last accessed 04.07.2018). 
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the scrutiny tools to make their position visible and criticise the Government. The next section 
outlines the reasons behind the (non) involvement in EU affairs. 
 
6.3.2.2 Reasons for MPs’ (non) involvement in EU affairs 
 
Domestic priorities and political strategies seem to be the main explanatory factors for 
the low parliamentary activity in EU affairs. Indeed, according to an opposition MP, there is a 
clear lack of discussion culture on EU affairs within parliamentary committees (Interview 14a, 
2017). For instance, feedback from interparliamentary conferences in committees would be 
quasi non-existent (Interview 7a, 2017). Committee members would tend to rely mainly on the 
agenda of the ministries rather than on matters from the EU level or interparliamentary 
conferences. The Foreign Affairs Ministry and the Finance Ministry were both the main 
interlocutors in the case of the EU and intergovernmental treaties. As the National Council’s 
scrutiny system in EU affairs is mainly based on government control, it might explain why MPs 
prioritised information from the Government. Feedback on EU affairs within the National 
Council might then depend highly on partisan logics and priorities of political groups. Indeed, 
opposition MPs do not have the same access to information and influence possibilities as 
majority MPs who benefit from informal contacts with ministries inside their group. Decision-
making happens mainly in informal arenas, either at the pre-parliamentary stage or during group 
meetings before committee meetings. The lack of transparency on the side of the Government 
affects particularly opposition parties, but also parliamentary work in general.  
Another interviewee argues that ex-ante debates in the EU Main Committee with the 
Federal Chancellor or the Foreign Affairs Minister do not bring any added value to 
parliamentary work, as the content of the declarations remain vague (Interview 14a, 2017). 
Moreover, group collaborators admit that several instruments are insufficiently used (Interview 
3a, 5a, 2017). The main reason lies in MPs’ feeling that they have no effective influence on the 
legislative decision-making process, no matter how often they use scrutiny tools. The 
Government or European Institutions keep control over the legislative process. For instance, 
notifications to the European Commission do not have a substantial effect on the EU level. The 
Parliament issues a letter notifying the European Commission; the latter answers it, but no 
noticeable consequences ensue from this instrument. Austria pushed the creation of the 
notification procedure, because majority MPs wanted to find a softer alternative to the 
controversial binding mandates (Interview 5a, 2017). According to an FPÖ MP committee 
statements remain deliberately vague to give negotiation leeway to the Federal Chancellor or 
ministers (Interview 11a, 2017). Deadlines for the subsidiarity monitoring procedure turn out 
to be too tight and require expertise that is absent in the Parliamentary Directorate due to 
insufficient personnel specialised in EU affairs (Interview 3a, 2017).  
Further limitations are the infrequent committee meetings, MPs’ multiple committee 
memberships and their tight schedule, as well as the limited specialisation of committees highly 
dependent on ministry agendas. Depending on the selection of EU documents made by the 
parliamentary administration, sectoral committees will be involved differently. The 
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committees’ workload increased because EU matters became more and more interwoven with 
domestic issues. Especially the budget and finance committees are increasingly dealing with 
EU affairs. Even though most interviewees declared that EU affairs became a matter of fact 
within Parliament, due to their transcending nature (Interview 1a, 8a, 9a and 18a, 2017), most 
agree that they remain specialised and complex (Interview 1a, 2a and 18a, 2017). EU affairs 
require specific knowledge on EU policies, EU institutions and the functioning of the EU 
legislative process. The EU legislative process became slower and multifaceted, because it 
includes more and more stakeholders. According to an interviewee, the long decision-making 
process on the EU level causes disinterest from MPs’ side (Interview 3a, 2017). Between the 
moment the EP discusses a proposal and the moment it is transferred to national parliaments, 
up to two years can pass. MPs cannot follow all matters for such a long time and tend to forget 
about them. According to a Green MP, finance matters became increasingly complex, technical 
and diversified due to evolutions on the EU level (Interview 15a, 2017). In order to cope with 
EU issues, an MP would thus need technical competences, good networking skills and patience, 
which might discourage most newly elected MPs. 
Another factor that might explain low parliamentary activity in EU affairs is the lack of 
awareness about these matters. The EACs tend to monopolise the scrutiny of EU affairs, which 
limits awareness and interest among sectoral committee members that become active only 
whenever their competences are needed. This lack of awareness about the role they could play 
tends to empower the Government and the central administration (Interview 2a, 2017). In 
addition, awareness is not always synonym of higher interest for EU policies. For instance, even 
within the ÖVP considered as the “European Party”, the interest, willingness and enthusiasm to 
deal with these matters tend to be very limited (Interview 2a, 2017). Awareness and 
involvement are circumscribed to specific policy fields. Indeed, some MPs are more aware of 
EU issues because they fall directly into their field of competences. Political positions linked to 
EU affairs were not always popular among MPs. According to a former SPÖ MP, the position 
of EU speaker was not well renowned within the group a few years ago (Interview 17a, 2017). 
Due to internal party competition, the MP got the position to disqualify him from the 
competition for the party’s presidency. A majority of MPs are rather interested in the 
mediatisation of their work for re-election purposes. In that sense, EU affairs do not draw 
voters’ attention and MPs might be inclined to instrumentalise EU affairs to discuss domestic 
matters. According to an interviewee, discussions in plenary tend to switch quickly to domestic 
matters, even though EU affairs were on the agenda (Interview 7a, 2017). In practice, EU issues 
often tend to serve as a façade to debate domestic matters by referring to EU documents 
(Interview 19a, 2017). According to a former BZÖ MP, EU affairs are also used on the national 
level to justify unpopular measures (Interview 19a, 2017). In that case, MPs use the EU as a 
scapegoat to disengage themselves from a politically risky situation. 
Overall, EU affairs are neither relevant nor “sexy” for most MPs. According to a study 
conducted in 2002, only one third of MPs were particularly active in EU affairs within the 
National Council (Neisser, In: Neisser/Puntscher Riekmann, 2002).They are still reserved to a 
“dedicated minority” in Parliament (Interview 2a, 2017). This minority has a deep-rooted 
interest in EU politics, because of its personal experience, personal interests and political 
functions within Parliament or party/group. MPs have different reasons to get involved in EU 
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affairs. For some, their extensive political experience in Parliament and their important 
positions as group chairperson and/or speaker for Foreign or EU affairs justify their 
involvement. Majority MPs have privileged links to government members and can get access 
to information more easily thanks to their position in Parliament. For others, personal interests 
determine their engagement in EU affairs. For instance, the position of Committee Chair gives 
advantages in terms of information access. Minority MPs particularly active in EU affairs argue 
that their involvement allows them to express their opinion and mediatise their position. Group 
presidents and EU speakers remain the most active players identified through the interviews. 
They belong typically to the category of “Europeanised” MPs. For instance, a former ÖVP MP 
was Foreign Affairs speaker and had to maintain regular contacts with his colleagues on the 
national and European levels, especially during the negotiations on the Constitutional Treaty 
(Interview 4a, 2017).  
Apart from the “Europeanised” and predisposed MPs, a group of MPs deals with EU 
affairs only whenever their interest or field of competence is required or concerned. For 
instance, an MP became substitute member of the EU Sub-Committee because her expertise on 
budget and finance related topics was needed (Interview 18a, 2017). In that case, they become 
active following a request from their group to participate in the EAC. Within the Finance 
Committee, MPs become active whenever their affiliated minister receives the European 
Commission programme, or whenever the committee receives the ESM reports four times per 
year accompanied by a report from the Finance Ministry. Punctually, whenever a topic comes 
on the agenda, MPs from sectoral committees deal with EU affairs. Opposition MPs become 
active whenever a topic becomes salient and represents an opportunity to leave a political mark. 
MPs who are not involved in EU affairs are usually recently elected MPs overwhelmed by their 
parliamentary schedule. Those starting their mandate have first to adapt to the parliamentary 
culture and the working methods.  
All in all, interest and involvement in EU affairs depend mainly on MPs’ personal 
aspirations and political functions. Some MPs have the obligation to deal with EU matters due 
to their political functions (group chair, committee chair, spokesperson etc), even if they are not 
interested in the matters. Their reputation and their influence level are at stake, especially if 
they have to deal with salient matters that affect the interests of their group or party. Interest in 
EU affairs would also be generation-dependent (Interview 3a, 2017). Younger Austrian MPs 
tend to be more sensitive and interested than older MPs, because they arrived in Parliament 
after Austria’s accession to the EU.  
 
6.3.3 Discussion and conclusions 
 
We saw in this part that strong formal scrutiny capacities do not systematically mean 
effective parliamentary activity. Indeed, EU scrutiny in the National Council remains 
insufficiently implemented in practice, despite the various instruments anchored in the Federal 
Constitution and the internal RoP. This confirms arguments in Europeanisation research 
according to which the Austrian Parliament can be qualified as a “medium-strong” player and 
ranked among the “strong or moderate parliaments” (Kiiver, 2006). Information access does 
234 
 
not seem to be an issue, but the informality of certain stages in the decision-making process and 
the high number of received EU documents might constitute challenges to both majority and 
opposition MPs. The lack of analytical and legislative competences within the “EU relations” 
department disadvantages the lower chamber. 
Parliamentary activity depends not only on formal capacities, even though highly 
determined by it, but also on how MPs use these capacities. According to a Green MP, efforts 
have to be made from the Parliament and Government side, be it in terms of legal reforms or 
initiatives to increase parliamentary activity (Interview 15a, 2017). Parliament as a whole tends 
to be too passive when it comes to the scrutiny of EU affairs through a clear lack of 
parliamentary discussion culture on EU politics, as well as a lacking willingness to change 
working habits or formal procedures. Awareness among MPs, combined with an effective use 
of scrutiny instruments, would ensure a stronger participation in EU affairs.  
In this part, we outlined first assumptions about the impact of socio-demographic and 
institutional factors on MPs’ parliamentary activity in EU affairs. We can draw some 
preliminary conclusions on the evolution of parliamentary involvement. Firstly, external events 
such as negotiations of EU treaties or national legislative elections seemed to affect significantly 
parliamentary engagement in EU affairs. The use of parliamentary instruments showed clear 
variations that corresponded to either European or national events. Secondly, MPs’ socio-
demographic characteristics might also affect the way they handle EU affairs. In the light of 
section 6.3.1, we assume that the most active MPs exerted long-term mandates in Parliament, 
had a previous experience in the Government and had previous professional or political 
experience linked to EU affairs. Local party affiliation and ties to national unions tended to be 
loser for EAC members compared to sectoral committee members. It might indicate that EAC 
members are more independent from domestic pressures because less tied to local or national 
interest groups. Moreover, whether MPs belong to the opposition or the majority might also 
impact their activity. Opposition MPs might become particularly active whenever a topic can 
provide them with the needed publicity on the domestic level, for instance during the economic 
and financial crisis. On the contrary, majority MPs tend to support the coalition and do not use 
parliamentary instruments to control the Government.  
Observations from the first section led us to the conclusion that EU affairs tend to be 
the prerogative of MPs with “Europeanised” profiles. Thus, we can confirm sub-hypothesis 
H2.1. We will see that some of them can be also considered as “political entrepreneurs” of 
change in the wake of EU and intergovernmental treaty negotiations. MPs with prior 
experiences and political functions within Parliament linked to EU affairs, mostly EAC 
members, tend to be more sensitised to and active in EU politics. In the end, we cannot observe 
clear mainstreaming patterns within the National Council, even though institutional efforts have 
been made to push sectoral committees to include EU issues in their work.  
The next parts focus on the interrelation between MPs’ motivations and their 
institutional environment to explain their involvement in EU affairs in the wake of EU and 
intergovernmental treaties. 
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6.4 Evolution of parliamentary involvement in the context of negotiations on the Treaty 
establishing a Constitution for Europe (2002-2006) 
 
The presentation of MPs’ institutional framework and motivations gave us a broad 
picture of the opportunities and constraints weighing on parliamentary involvement in EU 
affairs. The present section aims to explain how these factors influenced the way 
parliamentarians scrutinised the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. The first part 
focuses on the general political context and the effective parliamentary activity during this 
period. We argue that involvement depended on MPs’ ideological positions (H1.1), their 
position on the political spectrum (H1.2) and the level of polarisation and competition between 
the parties (H1.3). Moreover, we will check to what extent we observe mainstreaming trends in 
Parliament (H2). The second part analyses institutional change within the National Council. 
Higher salience of EU affairs in the context of the Constitutional Treaty might have led to 
revisions of the lower chamber’s participation rights (H3). 
 
6.4.1 Parliamentary involvement in the framework of the negotiations on the Constitutional 
Treaty 
General context 
 
The political context between 2002 and 2006 was particularly stormy in Austria. The 
political constellation changed in 1999 when the FPÖ gained the same percentage of voices 
than the ÖVP. Both parties decided to form a coalition. The SPÖ landed in the opposition for 
the first time in history262. During the first legislative period 1999-2002, tensions between the 
ÖVP-FPÖ coalition and the SPÖ were high, because the latter refused to cooperate with the 
FPÖ and formed a strong alliance with the Greens (Fallend, 2003). In 2002, the FPÖ imploded, 
which led to new elections. The ÖVP decided to renew the coalition experience with the FPÖ. 
The SPÖ loosened its non-cooperation strategy during the second term, irritating the Greens 
who considered this sudden change of strategy as a betrayal and weakening of the opposition’s 
unified front. The Greens adopted an even more sceptical stance towards the ÖVP-FPÖ 
coalition and started to reject any coalition possibility between the SPÖ and the ÖVP in the near 
future. On top of the divided political landscape, tensions grew also stronger inside the FPÖ. 
The then President of the region Kärnten and FPÖ leader Jörg Haider harshly criticised the 
radicalisation of some FPÖ members from the right-wing camp, among others Heinz-Christian 
Strache. Contrary to Jörg Haider who supported European integration, Heinz-Christian Strache 
defended an Eurosceptic stance. Moreover, Jörg Haider also criticised the policy of its coalition 
partner, the ÖVP.  After several electoral defeats in Austrian regions and internal conflicts about 
the party’s ideological orientation, Jörg Haider decided to leave the party in 2005. Several high-
ranking FPÖ ministers and members followed him out and found a new party, the BZÖ, which 
replaced the FPÖ in Government until the next legislative elections in 2006, where the SPÖ 
came back to power. Heinz-Christian Strache was nominated as the new leader of the FPÖ and 
 
262 With the exception of 1966. 
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started a new strategy to become a powerful party opposing the coalition. The FPÖ’s EU 
position became overtly critical from 2005 onwards. 
 
Table 14: Legislative elections in Austria, 1999-2006 
Political parties 
Year of election GRÜNE SPÖ ÖVP FPÖ BZÖ NEOS STRONACH 
1999 7.4 33.2 26.9 26.9       
2002 9.5 36.5 42.3 10       
2006 11.1 35.3 34.3 11 4.1     
Note: Percentage of votes per party during legislative elections 
Source: Franz Fallend & Reinhard Heinisch (2016) Collaboration as successful strategy against right-wing 
populism? The case of the centre-right coalition in Austria, 2000–2007, Democratization, 23:2, 326; European 
Election Database, NSD 
http://eed.nsd.uib.no/webview/index.jsp?study=http://129.177.90.166:80/obj/fStudy/FIPA2003_Displa
y&node=0&mode=cube&v=2&cube=http://129.177.90.166:80/obj/fCube/FIPA2003_Display_C1&top
=yes (last accessed 04.07.2018). 
 
Additionally to the political tensions between and inside the parties, European events 
marked national debates. In June 2004, European elections were organised. Moreover, Austria 
held the EU Presidency during the first semester of 2006. The EU did not seem to trigger 
enthusiasm on the population’s side. While in November 2002, 46% of the population thought 
that the EU membership was a positive thing for Austria, only 35% thought so in October 
2003263, 46% in October 2004264 and 32% in October 2005265. In October 2004, 34% of the 
population thought that the EU had a positive image266, compared to 24% in October 2005267 
and 32% in March 2006268. Overall, the public opinion supported the Constitutional Treaty. In 
2004, 78% of the population supported the adoption of the Constitution by Austria269. Both 
internal and external constraints on Austrian politics might have increased party competition 
and polarisation. However, we will see that political conflicts tended to focus on domestic issues 
to please the electorate. 
 
The examination of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe in Austria started 
in September 2003 when the Government Council approved Austria’s position on 23rd 
 
263 October 2003, Standard Eurobarometer 60, 
http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/instruments/STANDARD
/yearFrom/2003/yearTo/2006/surveyKy/397 (last accessed 04.07.2018). 
264 October 2004, Standard Eurobarometer 62, 
http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/instruments/STANDARD
/yearFrom/2003/yearTo/2006/surveyKy/455 (last accessed 04.07.2018). 
265 October 2005, Standard Eurobarometer 64, 
http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/instruments/STANDARD
/yearFrom/2003/yearTo/2006/surveyKy/833 (last accessed 04.07.2018). 
266 See October 2004, Standard Eurobarometer 62. 
267 See October 2005, Standard Eurobarometer 64. 
268 March 2006, Standard Eurobarometer 65, 
http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/instruments/STANDARD
/yearFrom/2003/yearTo/2006/surveyKy/583 (last accessed 04.07.2018). 
269 July 2004, Eurobarometer, La future Constitution Européenne (Vague 2), 
http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/yearFrom/1974/yearTo/20
04/surveyKy/395 (last accessed 04.07.2018). 
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September 2003 with a view to the upcoming IGC negotiations. The approved position and the 
guidelines on the IGC preparation entered the EU Main Committee on 30th September 2003270. 
Majority MPs welcomed the Government’s position and agreed to proceed accordingly, 
requesting information about developments and negotiations results in the IGC. The EU Main 
Committee met several times at the end of 2003 and beginning of 2004 to discuss further 
evolutions related to the Constitutional Treaty. It met in October271, November272 and December 
2003273, as well as in March 2004274. On 15th June 2004, the EU Main Committee decided to 
establish a so-called “Firefighting committee” to follow closely the IGC talks275. Discussions 
continued on 11th August276, 18th October277 and 03rd November 2004278. On 22nd November 
2004, the Government started a pre-parliamentary procedure and transferred to the National 
Council a constitutional law setting the conditions for the ratification of the Treaty establishing 
a Constitution for Europe279.  The constitutional law set the conditions for the treaty ratification. 
The latter would be valid only with a two-thirds majority vote in the National Council. The 
government bill requested from Parliament and stakeholders that they give their opinion on the 
constitutional law until 04th January 2005. The official version of the constitutional law with 
amendments made in the pre-parliamentary arena entered the National Council on 20th January 
2005. On 17th February 2005, the Constitutional Affairs Committee produced a report on the 
constitutional law, requesting its approval by the National Council280. The latter approved the 
constitutional law on 02nd March 2005, stipulating that both chambers’ approval was obligatory 
for the ratification of the Constitutional treaty.  
 
270 30.09.2003: Vorbereitung der EU-Regierungskonferenz 2003, CONV 850/03 , Entwurf eines Vertrags über 
eine Verfassung für Europa (15428/EU XXII.GP)  und Regierungskonferenz 2003 , Österreichische 
Grundsatzposition (15427/EU XXII.GP), IV-4 der Beilagen zu den Stenographischen Protokollen des 
Nationalrates XXII. GP 
271 14.10.2003: TOP 1 Vorbereitung des Europäischen Rates in Brüssel , RAT 12940/03 Europäischer Rat am 
16./17. Oktober 2003 – Erläuterter Tagesordnungsentwurf  (15790/EU XXII.GP) , IV-5 der Beilagen zu den 
Stenographischen Protokollen des Nationalrates XXII. GP 
272 25.11.2003: CONV 850/03 , Entwurf eines Vertrags über eine Verfassung für Europa (15428/EU XXII. GP), 
IV-6 der Beilagen zu den Stenographischen Protokollen des Nationalrates XXII. GP 
273 09.12.2003: TOP 1 14450/03 , Europäischer Rat am 12./13. Dezember 2003, Erläuterter Tagesordnungsentwurf 
(19107/EU XXII.GP), IV-8 der Beilagen zu den Stenographischen Protokollen des Nationalrates XXII. GP, TOP 
2: CIG 4/03 , Regierungskonferenz 2003 , Redaktionelle und juristische Anmerkungen zu dem Entwurf eines 
Vertrages über eine Verfassung für Europa  (20176/EU XXII.GP) 
274 17.03.2004: TOP 2: Vorbereitung der Tagung des Europäischen Rates im Frühjahr 2004 –  
Österreichisches Positionspapier (25991/EU XXII.GP), IV-9 der Beilagen zu den Stenographischen Protokollen 
des Nationalrates XXII. GP 
275 15.06.2004: TOP1: RAT 9974/04, Europäischer Rat am 17./18. Juni 2004 - Erläuterter Tagesordnungsentwurf  
(30977/EU XXII.GP), IV-10 der Beilagen zu den Stenographischen Protokollen des Nationalrates XXII. GP 
276 11.08.2004; IV-11 der Beilagen zu den Stenographischen Protokollen des Nationalrates XXII. GP 
277 18.10.2004: IV-12 der Beilagen zu den Stenographischen Protokollen des Nationalrates XXII. GP 
278 03.11.2004: TOP 1 RAT 13239/04 , Europäischer Rat am 4./5. November 2004 – Erläuterter 
Tagesordnungsentwurf (38697/EU XXII.GP), IV-13 der Beilagen zu den Stenographischen Protokollen des 
Nationalrates XXII. GP 
279 Bundesverfassungsgesetz über den Abschluss des Vertrages über eine Verfassung für Europa (789 d.B.), 
https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXII/ME/ME_00232/fname_030845.pdf (last accessed 
04.07.2018). 
280 Bericht des Verfassungsausschusses über die Regierungsvorlage (789 der Beilagen): Bundesverfassungsgesetz 
über den Abschluss des Vertrages über eine Verfassung für Europa, 820 der Beilagen zu den Stenographischen 
Protokollen des Nationalrates XXII. GP, 
https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXII/I/I_00820/fname_035517.pdf (last accessed 04.07.2018). 
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The Federal Council received the law on 04th March and approved it on 17th March 
2005. Consequently, the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe entered the National 
Council on 01st April 2005 for ratification. The Constitutional Affairs Committee drafted a 
report on the treaty on 28th April 2005, recommending its ratification281. The report was adopted 
unanimously and put on the agenda of the plenary session on 11th May 2005. On that date, the 
National Council ratified the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe almost unanimously. 
One FPÖ MP voted against it. In general, consensus on the EU treaty was widespread, even 
among opposition parties. The treaty was then submitted for vote to the Federal Council on 17th 
May 2005. The Committee on Constitution and Federalism drafted a report on the treaty on 23rd 
May 2005. The upper chamber finally ratified it on 25th May 2005.  
 
Overall, political parties welcomed the Constitutional Treaty. However, positions 
started to diverge in 2005 between majority and opposition, as well as within the ÖVP-FPÖ 
coalition. Among others, salient topics during negotiations on the treaty were Austria’s 
sovereignty, its right to dispose on its water resources, the protection against GMOs, Alpine 
transit, the anchoring of fundamental rights in the treaty, the subsidiarity principle and 
institutional questions such as the size of the European Commission or transparency in the 
Council. The Constitutional Treaty was seen in Austria as a historical step for the EU bringing 
it closer to the citizens, increasing transparency and democracy, improving the social dimension 
and strengthening parliaments’ participation rights282. The most controversial issue turned out 
to be the organisation of a referendum on the Constitutional treaty. In 2004, all parties agreed 
on the need to organise an EU-wide referendum. Even though in different political camps, the 
SPÖ and the ÖVP both suggested organising a consultative referendum283. The Greens and the 
FPÖ backed the proposal. An explanation for the consensual atmosphere between the parties 
might have been the 2004 European elections that probably encouraged parties to 
instrumentalise the issue of the Constitutional treaty for their campaign. However, the 
referendum idea became soon unrealistic, as some Member States decided to organise national 
referenda. The ÖVP Chancellor and the FPÖ leader regretted that such a referendum would 
never see the light284. In the course of 2005, the FPÖ became more insistent on the need to 
organise a referendum. Internal divisions led to the split of the FPÖ in early 2005 and the 
creation of the new coalition partner BZÖ. The ÖVP continued first to cooperate with both the 
FPÖ and the BZÖ, until the former left definitely the Government in 2005. From that moment 
on, the FPÖ kept insisting on the referendum issue. Within the party, some MPs favoured an 
EU-wide referendum, while some others insisted on organising a national referendum. During 
the plenary debates in May 2005, the FPÖ differentiated itself from the other parties by sticking 
 
281 28.04.2005, Bericht des Verfassungsausschusses über die Regierungsvorlage (851 d.B.): Vertrag über eine 
Verfassung für Europa samt Protokolle, Anhänge und Schlussakte, 
https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXII/I/I_00919/fname_039668.pdf (last accessed 04.07.2018). 
282 See 11.05.2005, Parlamentskorrespondenz N°366, Österreichisches Parlament ratifiziert EU-Verfassung – 
Verfassungsvertrag mit einer Gegenstimme angenommen; 109. Sitzung des Nationalrates der Republik Österreich, 
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to the plan of a national referendum, while the SPÖ, ÖVP, Greens and BZÖ were in favour of 
an EU-wide referendum.  
 
This issue started to polarise significantly the debates after the ratification of the treaty. 
At the beginning of 2006, not only did the evicted FPÖ start a populist campaign against the 
EU by requesting the organisation of a national referendum, but also the SPÖ distanced itself 
from pro-European positions285. The latter used anti-EU arguments to attract frustrated 
voters286. The main reason for this ideological turnaround might have been the legislative 
elections in October 2006 and the preparation of both parties to use critical and nationalist 
arguments to gain votes287. The SPÖ and the FPÖ expressed increasing dissatisfaction with the 
EU policy of the ÖVP-BZÖ Government. The FPÖ’s critical campaign against the 
Government’s EU policy translated into the organisation of an anti-EU referendum “Austria, 
remain free!” (“Österreich bleib frei!”) in Spring 2006. The referendum aimed to support 
Austria’s neutrality principle, to reject the Constitutional Treaty as enhancing centralisation 
tendencies in the EU and to stop accession negotiations with Turkey288. The FPÖ changed its 
position on the Constitutional Treaty and rejected it by arguing that it would favour social abuse 
and curtail national sovereignty. The FPÖ stroke a new populist path after its eviction from the 
coalition and its internal split. With its new EU-critical strategy, the party aimed to position 
itself during Austria’s EU Presidency in the first semester of 2006 and to win the elections at 
the end of the year. In January 2006, the then FPÖ leader announced that the referendum would 
serve to disturb the Government’s “arrogance” and “EU fanaticism”289.   
 
On top of the growing polarisation between EU-sceptical and pro-European parties, 
ideological conflicts arose within the ÖVP-BZÖ coalition on the future of the Constitutional 
Treaty. At the beginning of Austria’s EU Presidency, both coalition partners had diverging point 
of views. While the BZÖ requested negotiations on a new treaty, the ÖVP stuck to the previous 
version of the text290. The SPÖ mocked the Chancellor’s incapacity to lead the Government and 
to preserve consensus within the coalition. Political disagreements affected Austria’s EU 
Presidency.  
 
To summarise, party politics seemed to play a crucial role in the support of the 
Constitutional Treaty. While polarisation was limited until the ratification of the treaty, the 
implosion of the FPÖ, its eviction from the Government and the upcoming national elections 
pushed the party to adopt an EU-critical position. The SPÖ followed the same critical strategy 
towards the coalition’s EU policy. Contrary to the FPÖ, the strategy was probably to express 
its discontent with the ÖVP’s choice to govern with a populist party. Party political strategies 
were also visible in Parliament. For instance, during a meeting of the EU Main committee in 
June 2005, the SPÖ submitted a request for opinion asking the Government to support the 
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establishment of a new Convention and to organise an IGC to examine the question of an EU-
wide referendum291. The request was rejected by the coalition and the Greens, despite both 
being in favour of such a referendum. The rejection through the coalition can be explained by 
majority-opposition dynamics. The Greens’ rejection can be explained by their disappointment 
towards the SPÖ when the latter decided to loosen up its non-cooperation policy towards the 
FPÖ. Ironically, the same day, the Greens submitted a request for opinion asking for the 
establishment of a new EU Convention, in the same line of thought as the SPÖ. The coalition 
and the SPÖ rejected the request. 
We observe that polarisation in the context of the Constitutional Treaty happened on 
different levels and pushed parties to become active in EU affairs. Ideological lines started to 
diverge between majority and opposition, between coalition partners, and within the opposition 
between the SPÖ and the Greens. 
 
Analysis of parliamentary activity 
 
During negotiations on the Constitutional Treaty, the EU Main Committee was the most 
active body in the National Council, followed by the Constitutional Affairs Committee. While 
the EAC discussed the treaty more often, the Constitutional Affairs Committee produced the 
main report on the treaty. The former met 12 times between 2003 and 2006 to discuss matters 
related to the treaty, while the latter met only 3 times. The EU Main Committee debated on the 
Constitutional Treaty 4 times in 2003, 5 times in 2004, 2 times in 2005 and 1 time in 2006. MPs 
met only five times in plenary. Overall, the number of meetings remained relatively low. The 
table J (see appendix 1) sums up the total number of meetings dedicated to the Constitutional 
Treaty. If we observe now the evolution of EAC meetings during the negotiations on the 
Constitutional Treaty, we see that the number of EU Main Committee meetings decreased 
between 2004 and 2005, while the number of EU Sub-Committee meetings grew. One reason 
could be that the EU Main Committee focuses on institutional questions that are more rarely 
debated than specific EU policies discussed in the EU Sub-Committee. 
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Figure 51: Number of EAC meetings in the context of the Constitutional Treaty (in total), 
National Council 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
On the contrary, the proportion of parliamentary questions on EU affairs grew steadily 
during the same period (see figure 46). Even though the increase of parliamentary questions is 
not directly related to the Constitutional Treaty, it illustrates a general trend. The evolution can 
be explained by the growing number of EU documents arriving in Parliament between 2002-
2006 (see 6.2.2), which prompted more activity. More precisely, opposition MPs asked the most 
parliamentary questions on EU issues during that period. However, parliamentary instruments 
scrutinising the government’s position on the Constitutional Treaty remained marginal. 
Between 2003 and 2005, we counted 1 committee opinion, 11 motions for a resolution, 3 urgent 
questions, 1 written question and 1 motion. The table K (appendix 1) sums up the total number 
of tools used. The table shows that opposition MPs used the most parliamentary instruments. 
Parliamentary discussions on the Constitutional Treaty were characterised by a congruence of 
positions between majority and opposition. Both majority and opposition MPs supported 
sometimes the same ideas, but majority MPs systematically rejected the opposition’s stance for 
the sake of partisan logics. These observations confirm sub-hypothesis H1.2 according to which 
MPs’ involvement would depend on their positioning on the political spectrum. Opposition MPs 
were more active than majority MPs, even though the latter were more successful in the 
adoption of positions. Overall, the Government’s position predominated thanks to the 
systematic backing of majority MPs. Additionally, the rapporteur on the treaty belonged to the 
ÖVP, which confirms again the coalition’s will to keep control over the discussions. 
 
Political ideologies did not seem to play an important role until 2005. In fact, all parties 
were supportive of the Constitutional Treaty, even though with some divergences between pro-
European opposition and majority MPs. Moreover, the FPÖ’s sceptical positions were tamed, 
because the party was part of the coalition and had to focus on its survival as it was confronted 
to internal conflicts until 2005. However, the political dynamics changed from the end of 2005 
onwards, when the FPÖ split and became increasingly Eurosceptic. In that case, ideologies 
played a crucial role in the party’s activities. Thus, sub-hypothesis H1.1 can be only partially 
confirmed. Overall, the examination of the use of parliamentary instruments on the 
Constitutional Treaty shows that polarisation was moderate until 2005. Indeed, the absence of 
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ideological competition between parties over the Constitutional Treaty did not trigger 
polarisation. After the FPÖ’s split in 2005, polarisation grew both between pro-European and 
Eurosceptics, but also between opposition and majority MPs. However, the ratification of the 
treaty was over and polarisation had thus no impact on treaty negotiations.  
 
The Constitutional Treaty was certainly salient for EAC members, but not for the rest 
of MPs. Awareness about EU affairs grew with the Constitutional Treaty, but was not 
widespread, which would partially confirm hypothesis H2. Indeed, only a limited group of MPs 
dealt with these matters. If we look at MPs individually, we cannot argue that MPs with the 
most “Europeanised” profiles were the most active. We identified two main types of players 
that scrutinised the Government’s EU policy: non-EAC members with leading positions in their 
parliamentary group and EAC members with leading positions in their parliamentary group. 
However, EAC members did not count among the most active scrutinisers, even though they 
dealt the most with the Constitutional Treaty in their meetings. Active non-EAC members 
belonged to the pro-European opposition, while EAC members came mainly from the majority. 
This could explain why EAC members from the majority did not use as much the scrutiny 
instruments to control their own Government.  
 
Almost all MPs who used the above-mentioned instruments were either chairperson or 
occupied another important position (Secretary General) in their parliamentary group. Two MPs 
were both chairpersons of their parliamentary group and at the same time EAC members. 
Another MP dealt with the Constitutional Treaty because she was Speaker for constitutional 
affairs. As said before, the fact that a high proportion of active key players occupied leadership 
positions indicates the importance of group and party cohesion. In fact, party linkage constitutes 
one of the most crucial determinants of parliamentary involvement. Group representatives have 
the duty to represent their party’s ideological position in Parliament. The Constitutional Treaty 
was a salient matter for all parties, therefore group leaders appeared the most legitimate and 
competent to publicise their party’s opinion in the parliamentary arena. 
 
The length of the mandates seemed also to play a role in MPs’ involvement, as more 
than half of the identified key players exerted a long-term mandate by the time of the 
negotiations on the Constitutional Treaty. It could mean that the most professionalised MPs 
were more invested and interested in the treaty because of their extensive political experience 
in Parliament and their detachment from re-election objectives. As some senior EAC members 
dealt already with Austria’s EU accession, the Constitutional Treaty represented a similar 
exercise for them. Moreover, several MPs were also former government members, which might 
have reinforced their legitimacy to follow the treaty. Indeed, the Government usually leads 
treaty negotiations. A former government member might know the other side of the coin and 
contribute to parliamentary work with prior knowledge from governmental practices. It could 
also mean that these MPs wished to distinguish themselves politically, in case they are called 
back into Government. In any case, their activities in Parliament might not have been entirely 
free from the Government’s influence. National-based experiences seemed to be more 
important in the context of the treaty negotiations, because only few key players participated in 
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European parliamentary conferences. It shows that European functions barely played any role 
in MPs’ level of involvement.  
 
Membership in a national union did not seem either to play a significant role in MPs’ 
EU engagement. Few MPs belonged to federations, associations or professional chambers. 
Those who did came from the SPÖ and the ÖVP. We identified only one MP from the FPÖ 
who belonged to a national union. This can be explained by the fact that relations with the civil 
society under the ÖVP-FPÖ coalition were quite limited due to the FPÖ’s reluctance to 
cooperate with national unions. However, MPs with a membership in a national union were 
more numerous than MPs with an experience in European organisations. Moreover, we 
observed that those MPs member of a professional chamber, a federation or an association 
defended mostly domestic interests. For instance, an SPÖ MP was member of the 
environmental-friendly association “Naturfreunde Österreich” since 2002 and requested the 
amendment of the EURATOM-Treaty (see motion for a resolution, 29.01.2004). Another FPÖ 
MP was vice-president of the Chamber of Agriculture of Kärnten since 2001 and pleaded for 
the anchorage in the Constitutional Treaty of the unanimity principle for measures on water 
resources (see motion for a resolution, 27.05.2004). In light of these elements, we assume that 
professional chambers tended to defend their own interests or Austria’s interests through their 
parliamentary representatives. Indeed, MPs belonging to a national union tended to defend 
domestic-centred positions revolving around their union’s interests. 
 
The Constitutional Treaty was certainly a salient matter within the National Council, 
but it was not reflected in the use of parliamentary scrutiny instruments. We can argue that 
treaty negotiations were moderately followed matters that did not lead to substantial activities 
within Parliament. Several reasons could be at the origin of such observations: the culture of 
informality and discussions outside of the parliamentary arena or the organisation of an 
“Austrian Convention” from the end of June 2003 until beginning of 2005 to amend the Federal 
Constitution. The “Austrian Convention” was composed among others of MPs and met several 
times in 2003 and 2004, either in plenary sessions or in working groups. This Convention was 
inspired by the Convention on the Future of Europe and the Constitutional Treaty, but 
concerned solely domestic constitutional revisions. We assume that the Convention on the 
national level attracted more attention from MPs than the Constitutional Treaty itself that was 
negotiated in parallel. Another explanation could be the issues that Austria had to face in 2005 
with the ECJ (Fallend, 2006). Firstly, the ECJ accused the country of discriminating foreign 
students by restricting their access to universities and invalidated the law regulating such 
discrimination. Secondly, the ECJ decided to lift the sectoral driving bans with regard to the 
transit of trucks in the Austrian Alpine region. For some MPs, regional elections in Styria and 
parliamentary elections might have cornered their schedule. The bad results of the ÖVP during 
the regional elections in Styria and the FPÖ’s loss of seats in the Federal Council changed the 
political constellation in both chambers, increasing the power of opposition parties. Apart from 
the EAC members, the rest of MPs might then have focused on these regional and national 
political campaigns rather than on the European treaty.  
Moreover, the Austrian EU Presidency in 2006 affected substantially the National 
Council’s EU activities. The chamber multiplied activities and reflexions on amendments 
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linked to EU affairs292. A COSAC meeting took place on 20th February 2006 in the Austrian 
Parliament. On the 30th March and 24th May 2006, the National Council organised plenary 
sessions dedicated to EU affairs. It also scheduled four conferences with specialised committees 
on 27th-28th March (joint meetings between Foreign Affairs Committees of national parliaments 
and EP), 10th April (joint meetings between Committees on Home Affairs), 29th May (joint 
meetings between Finance committees) and 16th June 2006 (joint meetings between 
Environment committees). On 18th-19th April 2006, the Austrian Parliament, the Federal 
Chancellery and the regional government of Lower Austria organised a subsidiarity conference 
in St Pölten. On 22nd-23rd May 2006, EU Affairs committees met in Vienna to discuss national 
parliaments’ involvement in European decision-making. To sum up, the National Council 
became very active during the first semester of 2006, in particular regarding the organisation of 
interparliamentary meetings. Contrary to the Constitutional Treaty, the EU Presidency 
monopolised Parliament’s attention, because Austria had the opportunity to position itself on 
the EU level.  
The next section analyses to what extent the Constitutional Treaty pushed to institutional 
changes in the National Council.  
 
6.4.2 The Constitutional Treaty: an opportunity for institutional change within the National 
Council? 
 
On the national level, the Constitutional Treaty inspired constitutional revisions in the 
form of an “Austrian Convention” from 2003 to 2005. This Convention aimed to reform 
Austrian institutions and to simplify the Constitution. However, discussions did not result in 
concrete implementations. Within the National Council, the Constitutional Treaty certainly 
triggered reflexions on further institutional improvements. Discussions on parliamentary 
revisions started in 2003 in the framework of the preparation of the IGC drafting the 
Constitutional Treaty. Between 2003 and 2005, the EU Main Committee met 5 times to discuss 
scrutiny rights in EU affairs. The Committee on Rules of Procedure met only once, but dealt 
more in detail with RoP amendments (see table L, appendix 1). 
 
While non-EAC members dominated parliamentary activity until 2005, EAC members 
animated particularly the debates on institutional change within the National Council. One 
reason might be that the EU-HA deals mainly with institutional questions such as parliamentary 
competences in EU affairs. Most MPs who initiated discussions on amendments had already 
extensive parliamentary experience in EU affairs. Most EAC members who participated in 
discussions on procedural reforms accompanied successive changes in Parliament prior to the 
treaty negotiations. Therefore, they followed closely the evolution of their institutional 
framework, which gave them the legitimacy to trigger further change because of their “expert” 
status. For instance, an MP was formerly member of the delegation to the Convention on the 
Future of Europe (Interview 17a, 2017). In 2005, he was also member of the COSAC delegation 
and participated in the discussions on procedural developments within parliaments. Another 
former ÖVP MP was an MEP when Austria joined the EU (Interview 4a, 2017). In these 
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profiles, we also observe that EU-level experiences seemed to be more prominent among key 
players and might have constituted an additional motivation to participate in debates on 
procedural revisions. Indeed, former MEPs or MPs who participated in COSAC meetings 
during discussions on procedural changes within the National Council tended to be more 
sensitised to EU norms and the role of national parliaments than the average MP. On the 
contrary, memberships in national unions were quasi non-existent, proof that the civil society 
had no impact on scrutiny reforms in Parliament. Key players’ profiles oriented towards EU-
level positions included them directly in discussions on the supranational level and made them 
more independent from domestic partisan logics. The other category of active MPs were non-
EAC members occupying leading positions in their parliamentary group. Their motivation was 
different from EAC members. Indeed, they did not have supranational convictions but aimed 
rather to represent their group or party opinion on institutional questions related to their scrutiny 
rights in Parliament. This was even more important for opposition MPs, who wished to increase 
their participation rights. 
This categorisation of actively engaged players resembles the previous observations 
made in the case of parliamentary activity. Thus, we conclude that two sociological features 
seemed to determine MPs’ role as “political entrepreneurs” of change: their membership in the 
EAC and their political position within their group or Parliament. Whenever MPs were actively 
promoting institutional change without being member of the EU Main Committee, we 
acknowledged that they usually endorsed functions such as group chairperson or group 
Secretary General. The crucial role of politically important players on procedural discussions 
confirms the arguments advanced in section 6.1.1.5 on the significant influence of party politics 
and, in the case of majority MPs, of the Government on institutional change in the National 
Council. 
 
Overall, discussions in the EAC on improvements of parliamentary participation were 
quite general and concerned mainly the Government’s information policy. The Constitutional 
Treaty did not affect substantially the evolution of parliamentary scrutiny rights within the 
National Council. As we saw earlier, the treaty seemed to have only a moderate salience in 
Parliament, which led to moderate change. The elements below do not permit to confirm 
hypothesis H3, because the failure of the Constitutional Treaty did not create an institutional 
“misfit” between the European and domestic legal systems. However, reflexions on potential 
change multiplied within the National Council in parallel to the treaty negotiation. MPs 
discussed the role of national parliaments and their participation in the subsidiarity mechanism 
during an EAC meeting on the 25th November 2003293. During a further EAC meeting, a Green 
MP suggested through a motion to discuss the results of the European Council in the plenary of 
the National Council294. However, both coalition partners rejected it. Another SPÖ MP, backed 
by the Federal Chancellor, proposed to invite European Commissioners in Parliament. In June 
2004, the opposition overtly criticised the lack of information from the Government on the 
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Constitutional Treaty and called for improvements295. The same critics were addressed to the 
Government in an EAC meeting in October 2005 preparing Austria’s EU Presidency296. On 18th 
October 2004, during another EAC meeting, the President of the National Council explained 
the chamber’s intention to organise a European week, to give MEPs the right to speak in plenary 
sessions and to invite European Commissioners in Parliament297.  
 
The Committee on Rules of Procedure dealt more thoroughly with institutional revisions 
within the National Council. Debates were quite consensual between the parties on procedural 
changes. Indeed, on 07th April 2005, MPs from the ÖVP, SPÖ, FPÖ and GRÜNE submitted a 
motion requesting a better parliamentary involvement in EU affairs, not only in the EAC, but 
also in plenary298. All parties agreed that the role of the National Council should be strengthened 
in EU politics. An explanation for this political consensus could be the general perception 
among MPs that the scrutiny of EU affairs should emphasise the national level. Therefore, both 
pro-European or Eurosceptic MPs defended the same institutional developments, despite 
observed divergences in the use of scrutiny instruments. Slight divergences in opinion between 
the parties concerned the opening of the parliamentary scrutiny to European representatives 
such as MEPs. 
 
The parties requested the establishment of plenary sessions dedicated to EU issues (so-
called “EU days”). Each parliamentary group would have the right to suggest topics before each 
plenary session. Because of the low participation rate during the last European elections in 2004, 
the aim of such measures was to bring the EU closer to Austrian citizens. It would also 
encourage sectoral committees to deal more with EU affairs. These plenary meetings would 
deal with the working programmes of the EU Presidency and reports drafted by the EU Main 
Committee. The four-party request was transferred to the Committee on Rules of Procedure, 
which examined and produced a report on the motion on 21st April 2005299. Even though all 
parties supported institutional change, this report illustrates that coalition partners wanted to 
control the direction of change by avoiding any strengthening of government scrutiny tools. 
Indeed, the author of this report belonged to the then coalition partner ÖVP. 
 
Amendments to the RoP included the addition of EU matters in the competence 
catalogue of the National Council, a completion of the negotiation competences of both EAC 
committees concerning the Constitutional Treaty, as well as the establishment of plenary 
sessions dedicated to EU matters. The committee members adopted the report unanimously. 
Even though the Greens counted among the parties that submitted the request, they regretted 
that the idea was abandoned to let MEPs participate in plenary sessions. They also criticised 
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that the Government comes unfrequently to EU Sub-Committee meetings. An SPÖ MP also 
wished that special parliamentary instruments, such as urgent questions, were applied to EU 
topics to strengthen the parliamentary efficiency of such tools. Urgent questions on EU matters 
could contribute to strengthen the publicity of such topics in Parliament and in Austria. 
However, an FPÖ MP argued that only MPs’ willingness to deal more often with EU affairs 
will determine how they use these instruments in the future. MPs discussed the report of the 
Committee on Rules of Procedure in plenary on the same day as the ratification of the 
Constitutional Treaty300. The amendments were incorporated in form of two new paragraphs 
§31c and §74b.  
Within the Parliamentary Directorate, the “EU relations” unit replaced the old “EU 
Coordination” unit in 2005. The National Council also established its permanent representation 
in Brussels in May 2005. These procedural changes were undergone independently from any 
political proposal. The administration decided autonomously to modify its structures, which 
proves that change happened also without MPs’ involvement. 
 
After the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty, discussions on Parliament’s scrutiny 
rights reappeared on the agenda at the beginning of 2006, during Austria’s EU Presidency. EAC 
members participated in the COSAC meeting organised in Vienna on 22nd May 2006. A Green 
MP member of the delegation argued that parliamentary groups needed more resources to be 
able to deal with EU documents301. In November 2006, a topical debate was organised on the 
information policy between the National Council and the Government302. An SPÖ MP, now 
part of the majority, pleaded in favour of strengthening the rights of opposition parties, of on-
time information and the publicity of committee meetings through further amendments to the 
RoP. A Green MP pointed out the lack of consensus between groups on parliamentary 
participation in EU affairs, accusing the majority to reject systematically suggestions from the 
opposition and thus any constructive dialogue towards a stronger control of the Government.  
In summary, institutional change in the context of the Constitutional Treaty was 
narrowly monitored by the successive coalitions and concerned mostly internal improvements 
rather than strengthened Parliament-Government cooperation. 
 
6.4.3 Conclusion 
 
In this section, we analysed parliamentary activity and institutional change within the 
National Council in the context of negotiations on the Constitutional Treaty. Observations were 
made on the trends in both cases. We discovered that MPs’ socio-demographic characteristics, 
as well as their position on the political scale (majority vs opposition) seemed to be the two 
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factors that affected the most parliamentary involvement in the follow-up of the Constitutional 
Treaty. 
Overall, MPs were more interested in domestic issues, most probably discussions in the 
framework of the “Austrian Convention”, leaving the scrutiny of EU affairs to EAC members 
and group leaders. The latter played a significant role in the use of parliamentary instruments, 
probably because their functions obliged them to speak in the name of the whole group for 
politically important matters. The fact that chairpersons and MPs with important positions in 
their party were the main key players could also indicate that there was an overall strong group 
discipline, which reinforced parties’ influence on parliamentary discussions. Among the few 
active MPs, most represented the position of their whole group on the Constitutional Treaty. 
Thus, committee membership seemed to play a less important role in parliamentary 
involvement than political functions within Parliament. 
The institutional context did not seem to have crucially influenced MPs’ involvement 
in EU affairs. During negotiations on the Constitutional Treaty, parliamentary involvement did 
not seem to be affected substantially by the civil society. As we saw earlier, membership in a 
national union was quite rare among key players. Those who had strong links to an organisation 
defended mainly domestic interests. Finally, parliamentary activity was not impacted by rulings 
of the Federal Constitutional Court, as the latter was not seized on the matter. The only external 
actor that seemed to have affected parliamentary work during negotiations on the Constitutional 
Treaty was the Government through the parties and affiliated parliamentary groups. Therefore, 
it was less the European experience of MPs that influenced their behaviour than their position 
on the political spectrum and their parties’ political strategies. Parties’ influence on the 
negotiation process in Parliament was visible through the analysis of key players’ profiles. 
Indeed, most active key players occupied political leadership positions in Parliament. Their 
functions might have enabled them to communicate more frequently with government 
representatives than regular MPs.  
Moreover, some key players, mainly from the ÖVP and FPÖ, even had a former 
experience in the Government, which might have provided them with the needed knowledge on 
government-parliament relations. Just as the parties, Government kept its hands on the 
negotiation process through its majority MPs in Parliament. We saw that until mid-2005, 
discipline reigned in the ÖVP-FPÖ coalition, both partners supporting each other’s EU position. 
Therefore, we cannot validate sub-hypothesis H1.3, because strong group discipline in 
Parliament prevailed even in the absence of political polarisation. Even opposition MPs tended 
to submit the same requests as majority MPs, even though the majority rejected them in the 
name of the political competition. Overall, majority MPs had privileged information access and 
influence possibilities on the treaty discussions. This was facilitated by the fact that consensus 
on the treaty and institutional change reigned among parties until 2005. As consensus reigned 
more or less between the parliamentary groups on the Constitutional Treaty, the use of 
parliamentary instruments to scrutinise the Government was rather limited. The Government’s 
EU policy was thus backed by most MPs in Parliament, even by the opposition. Consensus 
prevailed also in institutional revisions until May 2005, where all parliamentary groups 
formulated proposals to change the scrutiny procedures in EU affairs, even though political 
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divergences appeared between the majority and the opposition on the extent of such reforms. 
Therefore, we can validate sub-hypothesis H3.2, because the consensual atmosphere on 
procedural amendments encouraged MPs with a “Europeanised” profile to lead the discussions. 
Even though most procedural changes were initiated by MPs, the parliamentary administration 
undertook a structural reorganisation independently from the political sphere.  
However, from April 2005 on, after the FPÖ split, the party changed its position on the 
treaty. Losing its government channel to influence the outcome of the negotiations on the 
Constitutional Treaty, the FPÖ referred to its group in the Federal Council. FPÖ members in 
the Federal Council rejected the Constitutional Treaty in May 2005, even though they had 
welcomed it earlier in 2005. The then opposition party SPÖ also used the channel of the Federal 
Council back in 2004 to try to pass its proposal to amend the EURATOM treaty, notably after 
the failure to pass a motion in the National Council in January 2004303. These elements prove 
that opposition MPs, both SPÖ and later FPÖ, tried to influence parliamentary work through a 
different channel, as they did not benefit from the Government’s resources in the National 
Council. However, activities in the Federal Council on the Constitutional Treaty remained 
limited, as the upper chamber plays generally a weak role in the examination of international 
and European treaties. 
 
6.5 Evolution of parliamentary involvement in the context of negotiations on the Lisbon 
Treaty (2006-2009) 
 
The present section will analyse parliamentary involvement in the context of the Treaty 
of Lisbon. We saw that during the Constitutional Treaty, political competition played a 
significant role. We will check if we can observe the same trends between 2006 and 2009. Just 
as the previous section, we aim to test several sub-hypotheses. We will explain how polarisation 
trends affected parliamentary involvement (H1) and how the salience level of the treaty 
influenced the mainstreaming of EU affairs within Parliament (H2). Finally,  we will analyse 
how the Lisbon Treaty affected amendments to the Parliament’s scrutiny system (H3). 
 
6.5.1 Parliamentary involvement in the framework of the negotiations on the Lisbon Treaty 
 
General context 
 
The political landscape changed in October 2006, when the SPÖ gained the highest 
number of votes (35,34%) during the legislative elections. The FPÖ lost a substantial proportion 
of voices and stayed in the opposition. The BZÖ gained only 4% of the votes and switched into 
the opposition. The SPÖ established a coalition with the ÖVP and led a rather consensus-
oriented European policy until 2008. However, after the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon in 
 
303 See https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/BR/E-BR/E-BR_00189/index.shtml ; 
https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/BR/E-BR/E-BR_00189/index.shtml (last accessed 17.01.2019). 
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2008, strong ideological divergences on the ratification modalities of the Treaty of Lisbon 
between both coalition partners caused the early termination of the coalition agreement. New 
elections were organised on the 29th September 2008. Both big parties lost voices to the benefit 
of the FPÖ, which became the first opposition party. A new SPÖ-ÖVP coalition was set up. 
Political tensions between opposition and majority, but also within the coalition, built up 
between 2006 and 2008. EU issues, specifically the Treaty of Lisbon, were the main reason for 
such conflicts. 
 
Table 15: Legislative elections in Austria, 2006-2008 
Political parties 
Year of election GRÜNE SPÖ ÖVP FPÖ BZÖ OTHER 
2006 11,05 35,34 34,33 11,04 4,11 4,03 
2008 10,43 29,26 25,98 17,54 10,70 6,09 
Note: Percentage of votes per party for each legislative election. 
Sources: https://www.bmi.gv.at/412/Nationalratswahlen/Nationalratswahl_2006/start.aspx#pk_08; 
https://www.bmi.gv.at/412/Nationalratswahlen/Nationalratswahl_2008/start.aspx#pk_02 (last accessed 
04.07.2018). 
 
Euroscepticism grew not only within the ranks of the parties, both populist and pro-
European, but also among the population. In September 2006, only 36% of the population 
thought that EU membership was a good thing for Austria304. This proportion grew slightly in 
September 2007 to 38%305, but decreased again in spring 2008 to 36%306. Thus, negotiations in 
Parliament on the Treaty of Lisbon did not face popular enthusiasm. In addition, since the 
change of FPÖ leader in 2005, the party adopted a stronger Eurosceptic stance and multiplied 
requests and actions to counteract the Government’s EU policy. 
 
In the course of 2006, the National Council discussed the future of the Constitutional 
Treaty. Debates on the Treaty of Lisbon started in June 2007. On 19th June 2007, the EU Main 
Committee met to prepare the IGC on 21st-22nd June307. A Green MP requested the 
incorporation of the Charta on Fundamental rights in the new treaty308. The FPÖ/BZÖ requested 
new negotiations on the EU treaty without reference to the previous one, as well as the 
organisation of a national referendum309. The majority rejected both motions. On 17th October 
 
304 Standard Eurobarometer N°66, September 2006, 
http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/instruments/STANDARD
/yearFrom/2006/yearTo/2010/surveyKy/584 (last accessed 04.07.2018). 
305 Standard Eurobarometer N°68, September 2007, 
http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/instruments/STANDARD
/yearFrom/2006/yearTo/2010/surveyKy/664 (last accessed 04.07.2018). 
306 Standard Eurobarometer N°69, Spring 2008, 
http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/instruments/STANDARD
/yearFrom/2006/yearTo/2010/surveyKy/742 (last accessed 04.07.2018). 
307 19.06.2007, TOP 1 RAT 10494/07  Europäischer Rat am 21./22. Juni 2007 – Entwurf von Schlussfolgerungen  
(15287/EU XXIII.GP) , IV-3 der Beilagen zu den Stenographischen Protokollen des Nationalrates XXIII. GP 
308 19.06.2007, Ulrike Lunacek, Alexander Van der Bellen (GRÜNE), EU Hauptausschuss, Antrag auf 
Stellungnahme gemäß Art 23e Abs.2 B-VG betreffend den Europäischen Rat am 21./22. Juni 2007 und die weitere 
Vorgangsweise in der Regierungskonferenz zum Vertrag über eine Verfassung für Europa 
309 19.06.2007, Bösch, Strache, Fichtenbauer (FPÖ), EU Hauptausschuss, Antrag auf Stellungnahme gemäß Art 
23e Abs.2 B-VG  betreffend des Verhalten der Mitglieder der österreichischen Bundesregierung am Europäischen 
Rat am 21. und 22. Juni 2007 bzgl. der Verhandlungen über einen Verfassungsvertrag für die Europäische Union 
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2007, the EU Main Committee decided to establish a “Firefighting committee” to follow the 
IGC negotiations on 18th-19th October on the draft of a new EU treaty310. The EU Main 
Committee met once more on 12th December 2007 before the IGC on 13th December foreseeing 
the signature of the Treaty of Lisbon311. The Government Council submitted the final draft of 
the treaty to the National Council on 11th January 2008. It entered Parliament officially on 14th 
January and was transferred to the Constitutional Affairs Committee on 16th January 2008. The 
latter examined the treaty on 05th and 06th February and decided to organise public hearings on 
22nd February and 02nd April 2008 on the topic “The Lisbon Treaty – Facts and assessments”312.  
Discussions centred on security and neutrality issues. Arguments focused on the treaty’s 
threat to the Austrian neutrality principle and the necessity to organise a national referendum to 
ratify the Treaty of Lisbon. Experts from universities and the Federal Constitutional Court 
disagreed on the constitution-amending nature of the treaty. Finally, the Constitutional Affairs 
Committee concluded that the Treaty of Lisbon would not require a referendum, because it did 
not affect substantially the Austrian Federal Constitutional order. The committee met on 27th 
February and adopted a report suggesting the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon on 25th March 
2008313. The draft EU treaty, together with reports of the Constitutional Affairs Committee and 
the EU Main Committee on referendum requests314, was discussed in plenary on 09th April 
2008315. The Treaty of Lisbon was ratified with 151 votes against 27. The FPÖ and BZÖ 
rejected the treaty, while the SPÖ, ÖVP and Greens approved it. The treaty was then transferred 
to the Federal Council on 11th April 2008. The Committee on Constitution and Federalism 
produced a report on 23rd April and the upper chamber ratified the treaty in plenary on 24th April 
2008. After the ratification, discussions on the treaty continued in the National Council’s EU 
Main Committee and in plenary until the treaty’s entry into force in December 2009. On 17th 
June 2008, the EU Main Committee focused on the negative results of the Irish referendum316. 
 
310 17.10.2007: TOP1: CIG 1/1/07 REV 1  Regierungskonferenz 2007, IV- 4 der Beilagen zu den Stenographischen 
Protokollen des Nationalrates XXIII. GP 
311 12.12.2007: RAT 15278/07  Europäischer Rat am 13./14. Dezember 2007 – Entwurf der erläuterten 
Tagesordnung  (24853/EU XXIII.GP), IV-5 der Beilagen zu den Stenographischen Protokollen des Nationalrates 
XXIII. GP 
312 04.02.2008, Parlamentskorrespondenz Nr. 103, EU-Reformvertrag: Nationalratspräsidium einig über weiteren 
Fahrplan, Prammer, Spindelegger und Glawischnig für transparente Beratungen; 02.04.2008, 
Parlamentskorrespondenz Nr. 288, Hat der Vertrag von Lissabon Auswirkungen auf die Neutralität?, Spindelegger 
appelliert, sich seriös mit Fakten auseinanderzusetzen 
313 25.03.2008, Parlamentskorrespondenz Nr. 257,Verfassungsausschuss empfiehlt Ratifikation des EU 
Reformvertrags, SPÖ, ÖVP und Grüne gegen Abhaltung einer Volksabstimmung, 
https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/PR/JAHR_2008/PK0257/index.shtml (last accessed 04.07.2018). 
314 25.01.2008: TOP 5: Antrag der Abgeordneten Ing. Peter Westenthaler, Kolleginnen und Kollegen auf 
Durchführung einer Volksbefragung gem. Art. 49b B-VG über den EU-Reformvertrag (465/A); 25.03.2008: TOP 
4: Antrag der Abgeordneten Ing. Peter Westenthaler, Kolleginnen und Kollegen auf Durchführung einer 
Volksbefragung gem. Art. 49b B-VG über den EU-Reformvertrag (465/A)    
315 09.04.2008, 55. Plenary session, Parlamentskorrespondenz Nr. 305, Große Mehrheit für den Vertrag von 
Lissabon, Nationalrat ratifiziert mit 151 gegen 27 Stimmen EU-Reformvertrag 
316 17.06.2008: TOP 1 RAT 9410/08 Europäischer Rat am 19./20. Juni 2008  -  Entwurf der erläuterten 
Tagesordnung (37366/EU XXIII.GP), IV-7 der Beilagen zu den Stenographischen Protokollen des Nationalrates 
XXIII. GP 
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The FPÖ and BZÖ requested new treaty negotiations during EAC meetings on 09th December 
2008317, 17th March 2009318 and 28th October 2009319.  
 
Ideological differences were even more pronounced in the context of the Treaty of 
Lisbon than the Constitutional Treaty. Just as the latter, institutional aspects raised particular 
attention among parties. The Federal Chancellor, as well as the SPÖ-ÖVP majority and the 
Greens in the National Council supported the treaty and insisted on preserving the substance of 
the Constitutional Treaty. According to the SPÖ, the Treaty of Lisbon would reinforce the EU’s 
social dimension and the EU’s democracy. Both coalition partners argued that the treaty would 
preserve Austria’s neutrality320. The Greens welcomed the legally binding nature of the Charta 
on Fundamental rights, the strengthening of the EP and of the common European Foreign policy 
and the change towards qualified majority vote in the Council321. Most MPs welcomed the fact 
that the treaty strengthened the role of national parliaments (Interview 2a, 2017). The European 
symbols issue came back in the negotiations on the new treaty. An ÖVP MP regretted that 
France’s position predominated and that the symbols were not mentioned in the Treaty of 
Lisbon (Interview 4a, 2017). Despite the positive positions of the three parties, MPs admit that 
the Treaty of Lisbon did not bring substantial changes with it, because it did not solve the 
systemic problems (Interview 17a, 2017). An ÖVP MP regretted that the Lisbon Treaty 
represented a setback compared to the Constitutional Treaty (Interview 4a, 2017). The new 
subsidiarity monitoring procedure was also subjected to criticism. According to the Green EU 
group collaborator, the Greens thought that the subsidiarity monitoring would reinforce 
centrifugal tendencies in the EU and chaotic decision-making (Interview 5a, 2017).  
The FPÖ and BZÖ rejected the treaty, arguing that it would have a negative effect on 
the Federal Constitution. The main concern of both parties was the preservation of Austria’s 
neutrality and sovereignty. They insisted on organising a national referendum on the Treaty of 
Lisbon. Ratification without the population’s opinion would mean attacking Austria’s 
democratic principles and favouring citizens’ incapacitation322. The BZÖ submitted a motion 
in 2008 requesting the organisation of a national referendum323. The coalition and the Greens 
rejected the motion, but the FPÖ supported it. The latter organised a topical debate on 04th and 
05th December 2007 entitled “So that Austria remains sovereign and neutral – no ratification of 
the Reform Treaty” (“Damit Österreich souverän und neutral bleibt – kein Abschluss des EU-
Reformvertrages”)324. During the plenary debate on 09th April 2008, the FPÖ submitted a 
 
317 09.12.2008: TOP 3 RAT 15363/08-Tagung des Europäischen Rates am 11./12. Dezember 2008- Entwurf einer 
erläuterten Tagesordnung (1291/EU XXIV.GP) 
318 17.03.2009: TOP 1 RAT 7277/09 Europäischer Rat am 19./20. März 2009 –Entwurf von Schlussfolgerungen 
(8580/EU XXIV.GP) 
319 28.10.2009 RAT 12942/09 Tagung des Europäischen Rates am 29./30.Oktober 2009–Entwurf der erläuterten 
Tagesordnung(17860/EU XXIV.GP) 
320 09.04.2008, 55. Plenary session, Parlamentskorrespondenz Nr. 305, Große Mehrheit für den Vertrag von 
Lissabon, Nationalrat ratifiziert mit 151 gegen 27 Stimmen EU-Reformvertrag 
321 Position Paper Greens, November 2007, Europäische Reform unterstützen. Die Debatte offen führen! 
322 09.04.2008, 55. Plenary session, Parlamentskorrespondenz Nr. 305, Große Mehrheit für den Vertrag von 
Lissabon, Nationalrat ratifiziert mit 151 gegen 27 Stimmen EU-Reformvertrag 
323 Antrag der Abgeordneten Ing. Peter Westenthaler, Kolleginnen und Kollegen auf Durchführung einer 
Volksbefragung gem. Art. 49b B-VG über den EU-Reformvertrag (465/A) 
324 04-05.12.2007, 40. Plenary session of the Nationalrat, XXIII. Legislative period 
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motion for resolution appealing for a referendum325. The party’s strong opposition to the treaty 
was also reflected in the discourses of the FPÖ leader in the National Council. As a political 
strategy to criticise overtly the Government’s EU policy and to gain the support of a growing 
Eurosceptic population, the FPÖ became particularly virulent in the course of 2007-2008. 
During that plenary session on the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon, the FPÖ group leader 
accused the treaty to “sell Austria to the Brussels’ Eurocrats” and to restore the death penalty326. 
The treaty reform would be the result of a “European constitutional dictatorship”, an “attack on 
Austrian democracy” and would be comparable to the constitutional coup led by the Nazis in 
Austria in 1938. The harshness of these words were criticised by the proponents of the treaty. 
A Green MP argued for instance that the FPÖ and BZÖ lost their political credibility by 
rejecting a treaty that they previously supported327. Their campaign against it would be 
demagogical and populist.  
Ideological polarisation between the FPÖ/BZÖ and the other parties increased even 
more in the second half of 2008. Even within the coalition, tensions mounted on its EU strategy. 
The biggest Austrian newspaper Kronen Zeitung supported the Eurosceptic strategy of the FPÖ 
and promised a referendum on the treaty. Moreover, several NGOs such as ATTAC or the 
citizen initiative “Save Austria” demanded a national referendum before the treaty’s ratification 
in the National Council (Fallend, 2009). Due to the widespread anti-EU feeling in political 
circles and in the civil society, the “EU dispute” reached its paroxysm in June 2008 
(Schulmeister, 2008). The deteriorating reputation of the Federal Chancellor pushed him to 
nominate a new SPÖ member to the position of Secretary General of the party. In an attempt to 
restore his popularity among the public opinion, he published together with the new SPÖ 
Secretary General a reader’s letter in the Kronen Zeitung on 16th June 2008, announcing without 
prior deliberation with the party’s presidium that any future EU treaty reform would be 
submitted to a national referendum. Negative reactions on this strategical turnaround came both 
from within the SPÖ and from the ÖVP. In July 2008, the then ÖVP leader announced in a 
press conference that the ÖVP would terminate the coalition with the SPÖ (Schulmeister, 2008). 
In September 2008, legislative elections led to a new SPÖ-ÖVP coalition, with the mention in 
the coalition agreement that both partners would reject any future parliamentary request on a 
national referendum, at the risk of terminating the coalition. 
The Treaty of Lisbon was without doubt at the origin of a harsh ideological fight 
between the FPÖ/BZÖ and the parties supporting the treaty. Polarisation translated into an “EU 
dispute” over the organisation of a national referendum on the treaty. The widespread anti-EU 
campaign supported by the largest media in the country pushed political leaders to change their 
EU strategy. SPÖ leaders chose to secure electoral goals rather than to stick to their ideological 
positions. The FPÖ even filed a complaint to the Federal Constitutional Court, requesting the 
annulment of the Treaty of Lisbon. The Federal Constitutional Court rejected the complaint in 
 
325 See 09.04.2008, 55. Plenary session. 
326 Ibid. 
327 Ibid. 
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March 2009, pointing out that the arguments advanced by the parties were not justifying a 
violation of the Federal Constitution328. 
Individual strategies, political competition and party interests seem to have played a 
significant role in the follow-up of the Treaty of Lisbon in Austria. The second part will analyse 
to what extent this political atmosphere affected parliamentary involvement. 
 
Analysis of parliamentary activity 
 
The Treaty of Lisbon seemed to have triggered higher parliamentary activity compared 
to the Constitutional Treaty. Indeed, over a shorter period running from 2007 to 2009, the EU 
Main Committee met 9 times to discuss matters linked to the new EU treaty. The second most 
active player was the Constitutional Affairs Committee, which met 5 times over this period. 
The committee also produced the parliamentary report on the ratification of the treaty. MPs 
debated 6 times in plenary (table M, appendix 1). 
 
If we observe the number of EAC meetings on EU affairs in the context of negotiations on the 
Treaty of Lisbon, we find out that the number grew for the first time since 2003-2004 for the 
EU Main Committee, and since 2005-2006 for the EU Sub-Committee. A peak of activity can 
be observed in 2007-2008, during the period of parliamentary examination of the draft treaty. 
After 2008, the number of meetings decreased, probably because of the new legislative elections 
in September following the early dissolution of the ÖVP-SPÖ coalition. 
 
Figure 52: Number of EAC meetings in the context of the Lisbon Treaty (in total), 
National Council 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
The same trend can be observed in the number of parliamentary questions on EU affairs (see 
figure 46). The year 2007-2008 shows a peak in the use of these instruments in all cases. We 
identify that the lowest point in 2006-2007 might correspond to the electoral period in October 
2006 and the establishment of the new legislative session. The number of questions on EU 
 
328 See 
https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokument.wxe?Abfrage=Vfgh&Dokumentnummer=JFT_09909689_08G00149_00 
(last accessed 17.01.2019). 
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affairs then grew exponentially between 2007 and 2009, to reach its highest peak in 2008-2009. 
This trend shows that EU matters were “in vogue” during this period, probably because of the 
controversies surrounding the Treaty of Lisbon. Between 2007 and 2009, MPs were more active 
than during negotiations on the Constitutional Treaty. They submitted 13 motions for a 
resolution, 9 motions for an opinion, 2 motions for a committee assessment, 3 motions and 
asked 7 written and oral questions on the treaty (table N, appendix 1). 
 
Parliamentary activity increased substantially in the context of the Treaty of Lisbon. We 
can explain this evolution by the fact that treaty matters were transformed into a domestic 
priority from the moment Eurosceptic parties started to request a national referendum. 
Opposition MPs used parliamentary instruments to express their disapproval of the 
Government’s EU policy. FPÖ MPs kept insisting on organising a national referendum on the 
Treaty of Lisbon.  
Political ideologies clearly played a role in MPs’ level of involvement. Overall, MPs 
positions were all consistent with their parliamentary group’s EU line. Discipline within groups 
seemed to prevail on the Lisbon Treaty, as it was the case for the Constitutional Treaty. 
Parliamentary instruments do not show any dissident opinions within the respective fractions.  
Eurosceptic MPs were the most active. They used the Treaty of Lisbon to promote their own 
populist and electoral interests. However, pro-Europeans were not particularly active. We 
assume that majority MPs, which belonged mainly to the pro-Europeanists, did not want to 
thwart their own Government’s EU policy and abstained from using parliamentary instruments. 
Thus, we can confirm sub-hypothesis H1.1, even though there is no clear boundary between 
pro-Europeans and Eurosceptics, as even the SPÖ and the Greens started to criticise some 
aspects of the treaty.  
 
We saw that MPs’ position on the political scale influenced their involvement in EU 
affairs. Indeed, opposition MPs, in particular the FPÖ and BZÖ, became very active in 
criticizing the Government’s EU policy. Majority MPs supported their government and the 
coalition controlled the discussions in Parliament, notably by nominating an SPÖ rapporteur on 
the treaty. These arguments confirm sub-hypothesis H1.2. Sharper ideological differences and 
higher political competition led to a stronger polarisation between the parties. Divergent 
political interests caused this polarisation. The FPÖ aimed popularity gain and electoral benefits 
from its overtly Eurosceptic campaign. Another reason for FPÖ MPs to become particularly 
active comes from the fact that the party lost seats in the Federal Council since October 2005, 
losing at the same time their status as a parliamentary group329. Moreover, internal tensions and 
the split in 2005 weakened the party and evicted it from the coalition. As the FPÖ was probably 
unable to use the Federal Council or the government channel to influence EU policies, it might 
have relied mainly on its MPs in the National Council. FPÖ MPs started a publicisation 
campaign, trying to raise attention among voters thanks to nationalistic discourses. As they 
changed sides, they also changed their ideological positioning and political strategy. The FPÖ 
moved away from the integration-friendly vision of the ÖVP, SPÖ and Greens. To gain popular 
 
329 Between October 2005 and October 2009, the FPÖ was not considered as a parliamentary group in the Federal 
Council. Parliamentary groups can be established by at least 5 MPs. See the composition of the Federal Council: 
https://www.parlament.gv.at/WWER/BR/Mandate1945/index.shtml (last accessed 17.01.2019) 
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support and keep their influence on the decision-making process, the FPÖ and BZÖ insisted on 
the organisation of a national referendum. Even though supported by majority MPs, the nature 
itself of the referendum did not bring consensus. It was not in the FPÖ’s interest anymore to 
keep the consensus, which explains why they rejected systematically government proposals and 
took their opposition role seriously. Thus, polarisation grew further between the FPÖ/BZÖ and 
coalition parties. Indeed, while the FPÖ became more active in defending its own interests in 
the parliamentary arena, majority MPs remained reluctant to use parliamentary instruments. 
Here, we observe that group discipline might be linked to political polarisation tendencies, 
therefore validating sub-hypothesis H1.3. Indeed, MPs stuck to their party’s position on the 
treaties and voted according to it. The higher the ideological gap between parties and the more 
MPs needed to stick to their group’s line to preserve their solidarity and credibility in 
Parliament. We can also argue that MPs’ awareness about the Treaty of Lisbon certainly grew 
during this period due to the increased competition between parties. 
 
We noticed that most active MPs were EAC members, both in the EU Main Committee 
and the EU Sub-Committee. The EU Main Committee was the main competent committee 
during the treaty negotiations, because it heard ministers and gave binding mandates before 
Council meetings. Most MPs who were actively involved in the follow-up of the Treaty of 
Lisbon were the same who followed the Constitutional Treaty. On top of that, we figured out 
that Eurosceptic opposition MPs with “Europeanised” profiles and EAC memberships became 
particularly active scrutinisers during this period. The fact that key players with “Europeanised” 
profiles dealt with the core questions of the Treaty of Lisbon validates sub-hypothesis H2.1. 
MPs from sectoral committees also counted among active key players, but were not as 
numerous as EAC members (Interview 16a, 2017). Polarisation probably encouraged their 
involvement, especially on the side of Eurosceptic opposition MPs (FPÖ, BZÖ), even though 
we could not establish a clear correlation. Therefore, we can only partially validate sub-
hypothesis H2.2, because EAC members outnumbered sectoral committee members. Overall, a 
minority of parliamentarians handled institutional questions and Austrian priorities.  
Among these EAC members, more than half occupied leading positions in their 
parliamentary group (either chairperson or Secretary General of a group). Those that did not 
belong to the EAC had nonetheless a leading position in their group. In both cases, it indicates 
again that ties with their respective party was important. Parties wanted to keep control over the 
discussions in Parliament through the group leaders, especially in a context of growing 
ideological tensions between the majority and the opposition. 
 
The proportion of “Europeanised” profiles among the most active MPs is higher in the 
present situation than during negotiations on the previous treaty. Indeed, several MPs had 
already followed the Constitutional Treaty because of their high seniority in Parliament (more 
than 3 legislative periods) and handled EU affairs throughout their political career, even before 
their mandates. They were also (former) members of the COSAC delegation and other 
interparliamentary conference formats. For instance, the key player in the FPÖ who followed 
the most issues related to the Treaty of Lisbon was member of the Main Committee since 2006, 
was president of the FPÖ group in Parliament since 2006, as well as party leader since 2005. A 
Green MP was member of the Main Committee and EU Sub-Committee from 2006 until 2009, 
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had a long-term mandate in Parliament since 1999 and was deputy-chair of the Green group in 
Parliament at the time of the negotiations. A BZÖ member exerted his mandate since 1999, 
belonged to the Main Committee and was president of the BZÖ parliamentary group from 2006 
to 2008. These examples confirm the description made in section 6.3.1.2 on key players 
involved in EU affairs. MPs’ profiles show that the most actively involved in the follow-up of 
the Treaty of Lisbon exerted long-term mandates providing them with an extensive 
parliamentary experience. Their seniority and leadership functions in Parliament add legitimacy 
to their involvement, because their group and party see them as trusted EU experts. 
 
 However, membership in national unions did not seem to affect their activities. Few 
key players were at the same time member of a professional chamber or a trade union. Those 
who were member of a trade union organisation or professional chamber belonged mostly to 
the coalition parties SPÖ and ÖVP, because they were the most represented in these bodies. 
Following our observations in the previous part on the Constitutional Treaty, we also observed 
that MPs with memberships in national unions tended to defend domestic interests such as the 
preservation of national sovereignty, the neutrality principle or better information towards 
Austrian citizens. For instance, a key player from the FPÖ was President of the Austrian 
Confederation of the Freedomite Academics’ Associations since 1978 (Arbeitsgemeinschaft 
der Freiheitlichen Akademikerverbände Österreichs). This confederation defends rather 
nationalistic positions about Austria and Austrian identity. Thus, it is no surprise that the MP 
rejected the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty 330. 
 
All things considered, the salience of the Treaty of Lisbon was higher in Austria than 
the Constitutional Treaty, because it transformed into a domestic political conflict. Civil society 
and newspapers supported the Eurosceptic campaign and put the coalition under pressure. Both 
majority and opposition MPs wanted to prioritise their own agendas in parliamentary debates. 
However, it did not lead to any mainstreaming of EU affairs, as only a limited proportion of 
MPs dealt with these questions. Our observations showed that MPs with “Europeanised” 
profiles remained the most active, just as in the previous section. Finally, we can affirm that the 
high salience of the Treaty of Lisbon and the growing political polarisation within the National 
Council led to an overall higher use of parliamentary scrutiny instruments (H1). Opposition 
MPs used them the most to publicise their position and criticise the Government. 
 
 
6.5.2 The Lisbon Treaty: an opportunity for institutional change within the National Council? 
 
The Lisbon Treaty did not only trigger higher parliamentary activity in the National 
Council, but also institutional change in form of laws and RoP amendments reinforcing 
Parliament’s scrutiny rights. EAC members initiated discussions on institutional amendments 
but the main players that implemented the changes were the Constitutional Affairs Committee 
and the Committee on Rules of procedure (table O, appendix 1).  
 
330 See motion for a resolution, FPÖ, 05.12.2007, 41st plenary session. 
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We witnessed that amendment initiatives originated mostly from EAC members, 
followed by members from the Constitutional Affairs Committee. Thus, we can affirm that the 
“political entrepreneurs” of change were predominantly EAC members, even though the 
examination of the amendments happened in the Constitutional Affairs Committee and the 
Committee on Rules of procedure. Most initiators came from the SPÖ-ÖVP majority and the 
Greens. Just as the “political entrepreneurs” of institutional revisions in the wake of the 
Constitutional Treaty, EAC members tended to be senior MPs with extensive knowledge of 
parliamentary practices. They followed previous treaties and some of them even initiated 
revisions in the context of the Constitutional Treaty. Among these EAC members, more than 
half participated in interparliamentary conferences. Several MPs were for instance COSAC 
members, which means that they followed the debates on the role of national parliaments on 
the EU level and transposed them into discussions within the National Council. Whereas 
experience in the Government did not seem to play a big role in MPs’ general involvement in 
reform discussions, we observe that the main initiators of change had such an experience and 
came exclusively from the SPÖ and ÖVP. This could once again prove that the majority and 
thus the coalition wanted to keep its hands on the revision process. Majority MPs being among 
the leaders of the debates gave them the possibility to orient the direction of change and limit 
any attempt to reinforce measures towards more government control. On top of that, leadership 
positions among “political entrepreneurs” of change were common, be it within the majority or 
the opposition. It might be a sign that reforms needed to be monitored carefully by each party 
through a representative in Parliament. Opposition MPs were particularly interested in more 
control rights. 
Before the first IGC on the new EU treaty in June 2007, EU Main Committee members 
already discussed the role of national parliaments in European decision-making331. An SPÖ MP 
argued that parliaments should not only participate through the subsidiarity monitoring 
mechanism, but should be able to participate directly in European debates by giving concrete 
inputs. Overall, MPs were against the idea of a “red card” and the absolute veto possibility, the 
risk being to block the legislative process on the EU level. In October 2007, the FPÖ submitted 
a motion requesting a constitutional amendment to include national referenda on future EU 
treaty reforms332. The Constitutional Affairs Committee rejected the motion in its report on 25th 
March 2008. A majority of MPs adopted the report rejecting the motion on 09th April 2008. 
Moreover, several initiatives have been taken in the course of 2009 and 2010 to amend the RoP. 
On 17th April 2009, the Greens suggested several institutional improvements in a press 
conference. The party proposed that rapporteurs from the EP should be invited in the National 
Council depending on the EU dossiers. Ministerial departments should submit written 
explanations to each EU proposal. Specialised committees should deal with specific EU policies 
 
331 19.06.2007 : TOP 1 RAT 10494/07  Europäischer Rat am 21./22. Juni 2007 – Entwurf von Schlussfolgerungen  
(15287/EU XXIII.GP) , IV-3 der Beilagen zu den Stenographischen Protokollen des Nationalrates XXIII. GP 
332 Antrag der Abgeordneten Dr. Reinhard Eugen Bösch, Kolleginnen und Kollegen betreffend ein 
Bundesverfassungsgesetz, mit dem das Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz, BGBl. Nr. 1/1930 geändert wird (Abhaltung 
einer Volksabstimmung bei Abschluß eines Staatsvertrages, der eine Gesamtänderung des Bundes-
Verfassungsgesetzes bewirkt) 10.10.2007 
https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXIII/A/A_00394/index.shtml#tab-
ParlamentarischesVerfahren (last accessed 04.07.2018). 
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and obtain the same competences as the EU Sub-Committee. Some of these measures were 
implemented in 2011 in the EU-information law and RoP amendments.  
Institutional revisions in 2009 might have been triggered in the National Council after 
the ruling of the German Federal Constitutional Court on 30th June 2009333. Indeed, the Austrian 
legal system is based to a great extent on the German model (see section 6.1.1). Moreover, the 
perception of the role of national parliaments in the EU is similar in Germany and Austria, 
because in both cases the national chamber is seen as the main decision-maker. Therefore, all 
parliamentary groups in the National Council insisted on strengthening Parliament’s scrutiny 
rights. The German Court announced in its “Lisbon-judgment” that the accompanying law 
implementing the Treaty of Lisbon was not compatible with the German Constitution as long 
as parliament’s participation rights in EU affairs were not further improved. Ratification would 
be only possible with a new accompanying law. The SPÖ announced at that time that it would 
consider changes to the National Council’s RoP based on the ruling of the German 
Constitutional Court334. Whereas the complaint of the FPÖ and the subsequent ruling of the 
Austrian Constitutional Court had no effect on parliamentary work and reforms, the ruling in 
the neighbouring country did. At that time, the ÖVP did not see any amendments to the RoP as 
necessary.  
However, after the ruling of the German Court, MPs from the SPÖ, ÖVP, BZÖ and FPÖ 
submitted two law proposals amending the RoP on 08th July 2009335. SPÖ MPs were probably 
the main initiators, gaining the support of their coalition partner and some opposition MPs. 
Contrary to the discussions on the Lisbon Treaty itself, tensions between parties on institutional 
revisions seemed to disappear, at least before the major revision named “Lissabon-
Begleitnovelle” in 2010. MPs had a common vision that the National Council should be the 
main decision-maker in EU affairs. Therefore, they wished to encourage awareness within 
Parliament about EU issues. However, the positions diverged on the direction of change. For 
Eurosceptic opposition parties, it meant enlarging the debating arena and increasing their 
participation rights. Reforms should be a way to reinforce national competences and limit 
federalisation trends. For coalition parties and the Greens, amendments were necessary in the 
framework of the new subsidiarity monitoring. They wished to support European integration 
by promoting discussions on EU topics in Parliament. However, coalition partners were 
reluctant to reinforce procedures on government control. In the end, coalition partners were able 
to control the direction of change, because majority MPs closely monitored all revision 
proposals. The ÖVP designated one MP to become the rapporteur of all RoP amendments and 
procedural revision laws in 2009 and 2010, ensuring its influence on the scrutiny reforms. The 
general consensus on institutional change also allowed MPs with professionalised profiles to 
 
333 See BVerfG, Urteil des Zweiten Senats vom 30. Juni 2009  - 2 BvE 2/08 - Rn. (1-421), 
http://www.bverfg.de/e/es20090630_2bve000208.html (last accessed 17.01.2019) 
334 See https://diepresse.com/home/politik/eu/491552/LissabonVertrag_Urteil-hat-Auswirkung-auf-Oesterreich 
(last accessed 17.01.2019) 
335 Antrag der Abgeordneten Mag. Barbara Prammer, Fritz Neugebauer, Mag. Dr. Martin Graf, Herbert Scheibner, 
Kolleginnen und Kollegen betreffend ein Bundesgesetz, mit dem das Bundesgesetz über die Geschäftsordnung des 
Nationalrates (Geschäftsordnungsgesetz 1975) geändert wird (EU-Hauptausschuss, Europastunde, Aktuelle 
Europastunde, EU-Erklärungen), https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXIV/A/A_00705/index.shtml#tab-
Uebersicht (last accessed 04.07.2018). 
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lead the process, because “technicians” were less interested. Therefore, we can say that 
parliamentary culture determined which “political entrepreneurs of change” became active, 
confirming sub-hypothesis H3.2. 
The first amendment proposal suggested to replace the special EU plenary sessions with 
four EU topical debates per year and two debates close to EU summits (§74 RoP). The debates 
would follow the same rules as the special sessions: each parliamentary group would be able to 
choose alternatively a topic. Additionally, twice per year, MPs would discuss government 
members’ EU declarations. The Government would need to inform MPs on Council summits 
and Austria’s positions. Debates in the EU Main Committee should be video and audio recorded 
(§31 RoP). The Greens welcomed the initiative, but regretted that MEPs would not have the 
right to speak in these EU debates336. The second law proposal suggested among others to 
change the ratification procedure of EU treaties within the National Council by increasing the 
voting threshold. MPs requested that future treaty reforms would have to be adopted by a two-
thirds majority of votes in Parliament and the presence of at least half of MPs (§84 RoP)337. The 
four-party law proposals were examined in a first reading in plenary on 23rd September 2009. 
The Committee on Rules of Procedure produced reports on each proposal that were adopted 
without amendments by all groups on 18th November 2009338 (the Greens voted against the first 
law proposal). MPs discussed both reports during two plenary sessions on 10th and 11th 
December 2009. On 29th January 2010, MPs adopted the RoP modifications in plenary.  
The most significant change was probably the constitutional revision initiated in 2010 
(“Lissabon-Begleitnovelle”). It aimed to reinforce the scrutiny rights of the National Council in 
EU affairs in the wake of the Lisbon Treaty. The Greens established a working group to examine 
the constitutional revisions deriving from the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. The party 
organised hearings with experts in February 2010. In parallel, the SPÖ and ÖVP mentioned the 
idea of a constitutional revision in form of a “Lissabon Begleitnovelle”. On 24th February 2010, 
the SPÖ-ÖVP coalition submitted a law proposal requesting amendments to the EU chapter in 
the Constitution339. The Greens welcomed the initiative and the three parties started negotiations 
on constitutional revisions in April 2010. An agreement between the three parties was reached 
on 24th June 2010. The Constitutional Affairs Committee examined and adopted the modified 
 
336 28.10.2009 RAT 12942/09 Tagung des Europäischen Rates am 29./30.Oktober 2009–Entwurf der erläuterten 
Tagesordnung(17860/EU XXIV.GP) 
337 Antrag der Abgeordneten Mag. Barbara Prammer, Fritz Neugebauer, Mag. Dr. Martin Graf, Herbert Scheibner, 
Dieter Brosz, Kolleginnen und Kollegen betreffend ein Bundesgesetz, mit dem das Bundesgesetz über die 
Geschäftsordnung des Nationalrates (Geschäftsordnungsgesetz 1975) geändert wird (Anpassung an Änderungen 
des Bundes-Verfassungsgesetzes [Staatsverträge, Grenzänderungen, weisungsfreie Organe] und des 
Wehrgesetzes [Parlamentarische Bundesheerkommission] sowie an das Bundesfinanzrahmengesetz),  
https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXIV/A/A_00702/index.shtml#tab-Uebersicht (last accessed 
04.07.2018). 
338 18.11.2009, Parlamentskorrespondenz Nr. 991, EU-Debatten im Nationalrat werden neu gestaltet, 
Geschäftsordnungsausschuss stimmt Vier-Parteien-Antrag zu  
339 24.02.2010, SPÖ, ÖVP, Verfassungsausschuss, Antrag der Abgeordneten Dr. Josef Cap, Karlheinz Kopf, 
Kolleginnen und Kollegen betreffend ein Bundesverfassungsgesetz, mit dem zur Durchführung des Vertrags von 
Lissabon das Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz und das Bundesverfassungsgesetz, mit dem besondere Bestimmungen für 
die Neuermittlung der Verteilung von nach der Wahl der Mitglieder des Europäischen Parlaments 2009 zu 
vergebenden Mandaten durch die Bundeswahlbehörde erlassen werden, geändert werden (Lissabon-
Begleitnovelle), 978/A XXIV. GP 
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proposal on 30th June 2010, which was discussed and adopted by a two-thirds majority in 
plenary on 08th July 2010. The constitutional revision anchored the procedure of reasoned 
opinions, subsidiarity complaints (Article 23g and h) and “passerelle clause” (Article 23i) in 
the Constitution. The new article 23f regulated the obligation for government members to report 
to Parliament on the European Commission programme at the beginning of each year. The FPÖ 
rejected the amendments and voted against the constitutional law, because they considered that 
the subsidiarity monitoring was inefficient and a window-dressing competence 
(“Scheinkompetenz”).  
The consensus broke between the FPÖ and the rest of the parties, because the party 
brought back ideological considerations in the discussions. Even the BZÖ criticised the FPÖ’s 
unwillingness to cooperate in the revision talks. The FPÖ wished to reinforce solely the 
Parliament’s competences on the national level by ignoring the useless subsidiarity mechanism. 
Two ideological camps formed during the debates on the “Lissabon-Begleitnovelle”: pro-
European MPs in favour of deeper European Integration and Eurosceptic MPs rejecting the 
federalisation of competences. The Greens welcomed the modifications and the possibility for 
the National Council to send notifications to European institutions. The party succeeded in 
imposing several measures to strengthen the National Council’s participation rights. It also laid 
the foundations for an EU-information law and further RoP amendments modifying the EACs’ 
competences. Due to the two-thirds majority rule for constitutional amendments, the Greens’ 
support was essential for coalition partners. This might be the reason why the SPÖ and ÖVP 
accepted several amendments requested by the Greens, proof that political strategies even 
determined the direction of institutional change within the National Council. Both coalition 
partners highlighted the strengthening of the chamber’s participation rights, but pointed out that 
further improvements were needed. For instance, an ÖVP MP declared that the Parliament 
needed to create an EU database and to decentralise EU affairs340. 
The coalition partners with the Greens initiated further amendments in 2011. The first 
set of modifications concerned the Parliament’s information policy in EU affairs. On 06th July 
2011, the SPÖ, ÖVP and Greens submitted a proposal on an EU-information law341, together 
with RoP amendments on procedures in the EACs342. Just as previously, the coalition kept its 
control over the revision process and nominated an SPÖ rapporteur on the information law. The 
Constitutional Affairs Committee examined both proposals on 06th October 2011 and produced 
two reports asking the National Council to adopt the amendments. MPs adopted modifications 
 
340 08.07.2010, Parlamentskorrespondenz Nr. 592, Stärkere Rolle für Nationalrat und Bundesrat in Europa, 
Zweidrittelmehrheit für Lissabon-Begleitnovelle 
341 Antrag der Abgeordneten Mag. Christine Muttonen, Fritz Neugebauer, Dr. Alexander Van der Bellen, 
Kolleginnen und Kollegen betreffend ein Bundesgesetz, mit dem ein Bundesgesetz über Information in EU-
Angelegenheiten erlassen wird ("EU-Informationsgesetz", "EU-InfoG") (EU-Datenbank der 
Parlamentsdirektion), https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXIV/A/A_01624/index.shtml#tab-Uebersicht 
(last accessed 04.07.2018). 
342 Antrag der Abgeordneten Mag. Christine Muttonen, Fritz Neugebauer, Dr. Alexander Van der Bellen, 
Kolleginnen und Kollegen betreffend ein Bundesgesetz, mit dem das Bundesgesetz über die Geschäftsordnung des 
Nationalrates (Geschäftsordnungsgesetz 1975) geändert wird (Verfahrensbestimmungen des Hauptausschusses 
und des Ständigen Unterausschusses des Hauptausschusses in EU-Angelegenheiten), 
https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXIV/A/A_01657/index.shtml#tab-Uebersicht (last accessed 
04.07.2018). 
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to the EU-information law and RoP amendments in plenary on 20th October 2011. The required 
two-thirds majority of MPs adopted both laws on 15th November 2011. The FPÖ rejected both 
laws with the argument that the group was not involved in the discussions, while the BZÖ voted 
in favour of the EU-information law, but against RoP amendments. The EU-information law 
(“EU-InfoG”) provided detailed rules on the information flow between Parliament and 
Government. The latter became obliged to send explanatory notes on EU proposals to the EACs. 
MPs have now an extended right to submit written questions to ministers to request additional 
documentation on EU proposals. The law established EU debates in specialised committees and 
the possibility to organise special meetings on EU affairs in the EU Main Committee. The law 
also mentions the EU database. RoP amendments followed the constitutional revisions made in 
2010 and widened EACs’ catalogue of competences. Additionally, the subsidiarity control and 
complaint mechanisms, as well as the procedure of notifications to the EU institutions, were 
added to the RoP.  
In this section, we observed that the Treaty of Lisbon affected substantially the National 
Council’s scrutiny procedures. MPs undertook multiple revisions to strengthen their chamber’s 
participation rights and incorporate the new rules of the treaty into the Austrian constitutional 
order. These elements confirm hypothesis H3. The high salience of the Treaty of Lisbon seemed 
to have led to more institutional change compared to the Constitutional Treaty. In all cases, the 
majority in Parliament kept the direction of change under control, monitored narrowly by the 
Government via the coalition’s groups in the National Council. 
 
6.5.3 Conclusion 
 
This part analysed parliamentary involvement in the context of the Treaty of Lisbon. 
We observed that the main players were EAC members with significantly more “Europeanised” 
profiles than it was the case during the Constitutional Treaty. EAC members were active both 
in the use of scrutiny instruments and as “political entrepreneurs” of parliamentary reforms. 
These elements indicate that EU affairs became increasingly the prerogative of a small circle of 
key players with a specific sociological profile: MPs with long-term mandates that followed 
negotiations on the Constitutional Treaty, with a membership in EACs, eventual experience in 
the executive and with leading positions in their respective party and/or parliamentary group. 
These profiles show that parliamentary activity during negotiations on the Treaty of Lisbon was 
dominated by highly professionalised MPs. The latter consistently defended their group’s EU 
line, which indicates also that group discipline was particularly strong during the negotiations. 
This group discipline highlighted the gap between treaty proponents and opponents.  
Overall, political competition and polarisation played a predominant role in 
parliamentary activity. Parties instrumentalised a European event for their own electoral 
strategies. The Eurosceptic parties FPÖ and BZÖ were particularly active in the anti-EU and 
anti-Lisbon Treaty campaign. The use of parliamentary instruments showed clearly that FPÖ 
MPs were the most active in scrutinising the Government’s position on the Treaty of Lisbon, 
while coalition MPs abstained. An explanation could be MPs’ ideological position, based on 
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Eurosceptic feelings in the case of the FPÖ. FPÖ MPs tried to influence their Government’s EU 
policy by defending domestic interests such as national sovereignty or a national referendum 
on the treaty. As the FPÖ had become weaker in the Federal Council, MPs tried to use other 
channels to impact decisions, such as the Austrian Constitutional Court. However, even though 
the complaint might have been an attempt to publicise the party’s rejection of the Lisbon Treaty, 
the Court rejected the complaint and declared it non-admissible.  
Moreover, civil society did not seem to influence MPs’ parliamentary work either, with 
the exception of FPÖ MPs dependent on popular support. The number of key players with 
affiliations in a national union remained too low. On the contrary, we assume that Government-
Parliament relations tended to be the prevalent dynamics affecting parliamentary activities in 
EU affairs. Political strategies between coalition and opposition MPs played a crucial role, both 
in the use of parliamentary instruments, but also in institutional revisions. Political competition 
could be found in discussions over scrutiny amendments. Coalition partners were strategically 
searching for support from the opposition to back revisions. Government parties wanted to 
oversee the discussions on procedural revisions by giving the task to write the committee reports 
to their own MPs. The FPÖ rejected revisions in 2010 and defended the preservation of national-
based competences, rejecting window-dressing functions in the form of subsidiarity control 
procedures. Another external factor turned out to have influenced significantly parliamentary 
revisions: the “Lisbon-judgment” of the German Constitutional Court. Indeed, the ruling that 
allocated more powers to the German Parliament with regard to the scrutiny of EU affairs 
impacted Austrian MPs’ own projects to reform their scrutiny system.  
 
6.6 Evolution of parliamentary involvement in the context of negotiations on the ESM 
and the TSCG (2010-2013) 
 
The last section focuses on parliamentary involvement during the economic crisis, 
especially in the context of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and the Treaty on 
Stability, Coordination and Governance in the European Monetary Union (TSCG). Basing on 
our three main hypotheses, we will explain the trends and motivations behind parliamentary 
involvement, as well as how these two treaties affected institutional change within the National 
Council.  
6.6.1 Parliamentary involvement in the framework of the negotiations on the ESM and the 
TSCG 
General context 
 
After the Treaty of Lisbon, Eurosceptic sentiments stayed. The beginning of the 
economic and financial crisis in 2008 and especially the Greek crisis in 2010 exacerbated 
tensions between the political parties and anti-EU positions in the public opinion. In May 2010, 
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only 36% of the population thought that EU membership was a good thing343. Trust in the EU 
wavered between 2010 and 2012. In autumn 2010, 39% of Austrians trusted the EU344, against 
45% in spring 2011345 and only 37% in December 2012346 after the ratification of the ESM and 
TSCG. The FPÖ gained popularity, for instance during municipal elections in Vienna in 
October 2010. The party won 27% of the voices, surpassing the ÖVP.  
 
The EU Main Committee dealt increasingly with the financial crisis between 2008 and 
2010, starting discussions on the Greek government-debt crisis in March 2010347. The SPÖ 
organised an EU topical debate on 21st April 2010 on the topic “Overcoming the crisis” (“Die 
Krise überwinden – mit sozialer Gerechtigkeit und einer neuen Finanzarchitektur”)348. The 
Finance Committee met on 12th May 2010 to discuss Greece’s help package349. Parliament 
started to deal with the ESM at the end of 2010, even though the treaty entered the National 
Council only in 2012. The EU Main Committee met on 16th December 2010 to discuss the 
establishment of a permanent stability mechanism for the Eurozone350. On 20th January 2011, a 
heated EU topical debate on the stability mechanism “Kein Euro-Haftungsschirm ohne 
Volksabstimmung, Herr Bundeskanzler” was organised at the request of the FPÖ351.  
On 23rd March 2011, the EU Main Committee handled the ESM before the IGC on 24th-
25th March and decided to establish a “firefighting committee” to obtain regular information on 
the negotiations. The EU Main Committee handled the financial stability of the Eurozone and 
first ideas to amend Article 136 TFUE to incorporate the ESM in the EU treaties on 22nd June 
and 19th July 2011352. Controversial debates on the ESM and the EFSF happened in the Budget 
Committee on 13th September 2011 and in plenary on 27th September 2011353. The increase of 
 
343 Standard Eurobarometer 73, May 2010, 
http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/instruments/STANDARD
/yearFrom/2009/yearTo/2014/surveyKy/917 (last accessed 04.07.2018). 
344 Standard Eurobarometer 74, Autumn 2010, 
http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/instruments/STANDARD
/yearFrom/2009/yearTo/2014/surveyKy/918 (last accessed 04.07.2018). 
345 Standard Eurobarometer 75, Spring 2011, 
http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/instruments/STANDARD
/yearFrom/2009/yearTo/2014/surveyKy/1019 (last accessed 04.07.2018). 
346 Standard Eurobarometer 78, December 2012, 
http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/instruments/STANDARD
/yearFrom/2009/yearTo/2014/surveyKy/1069 (last accessed 04.07.2018). 
347 24.03.2010 : 6493/10 CO EUR Europäischer Rat (25. und 26. März 2010) -Entwurf einer erläuterten 
Tagesordnung (267 17/EU XXIV.GP) 
348 16.04.2010, Parlamentskorrespondenz Nr 263, Nächste Woche erstmals Aktuelle Europastunde im Nationalrat, 
Präsidiale berät Tagesordnungen für zwei Sitzungstage 
349 12.05.2010: TOP 1 Aussprache über aktuelle Fragen aus dem Arbeitsbereich des Ausschusses gemäß § 34 Abs. 
5 GOG - Hilfsmaßnahmen für Griechenland 
350 16.12.2010 12345/10 CO EUR  Europäischer Rat (Tagung am 16./17. Dezember 2010) - Entwurf einer 
erläuterten  Tagesordnung (40797/EU XXIV.GP) 
351 20.01.2011, 93. Plenary session, XXIV. Legislative period 
352 22.06.2011 9786/11 CO EUR Europäischer Rat (Tagung am 23./24. Juni 2011) -Entwurf einer erläuterten 
Tagesordnung (51945/EU XXIV.GP), IV-13 der Beilagen zu den Stenographischen Protokollen des Nationalrates 
XXIV. GP; 19.07.2011: EUCO 49/11 PRESSE 250 PR - PCE 24 President Herman Van Rompuy convenes a 
meeting of Eurozone Heads of State or Government (56824/EU XXIV.GP), IV-15 der Beilagen zu den 
Stenographischen Protokollen des Nationalrates XXIV. GP 
353 13.09.2011, Parlamentskorrespondenz Nr. 808, Budgetausschuss debattiert aktuelle europäische 
Finanzprobleme - Fekter zu Griechenland: Pleite viel teurer als Fortsetzung der Hilfe; 27.09.2011, 
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Austria’s financial participation in the EFSF was rejected by the FPÖ and BZÖ, but supported 
by the Greens and the coalition. Discussions on the ESM continued in the EU Main Committee 
on 21st October, 07th December 2011 and 27th January 2012354. The EU Sub-Committee also 
discussed ESM-related matters on 22nd November 2011.  
In January 2012, the EU Main Committee also started to handle the TSCG in parallel to 
the ESM. The Government Council approved the TSCG in March 2012 and transferred it to the 
National Council on 26th March 2012. In the meantime, both the ESM treaty and the European 
Council’s decision to amend Article 136 TFUE entered Parliament on 21st March for the latter 
and 27th March 2012 for the former. The EU Main Committee debated about the efficiency of 
the ESM and the TSCG in its meeting on 30th May 2012. A first reading on the ESM was 
organised in plenary on 14th June 2012. Both treaties were transferred to the Constitutional 
Affairs Committee, which organised a hearing with legal experts to examine them on 28th June 
2012355. The committee produced two reports on the ESM and the amendment of Article 136 
TFUE and on the TSCG on 02nd July 2012356. The Constitutional Affairs Committee 
recommended the ratification of the ESM. The Fiscal Compact generated high controversy 
between opposition and majority. In parallel, the Budget Committee met to discuss both treaties. 
On 04th July 2012, the reports of the Constitutional Affairs Committee as well as the treaties 
were examined in plenary357.  
The ESM treaty was adopted by 126 votes against 53 and the amendment of Article 136 
TFUE was adopted by 125 votes against 53. Both coalition partners and Greens voted in favour 
of the ESM, while the FPÖ and BZÖ voted against it. The majority supporting the TSCG was 
not as high, because 103 MPs voted in favour of the treaty and 60 against it. The Greens harshly 
criticised the Fiscal Compact and rallied the FPÖ and BZÖ against the Government. Once the 
National Council ratified both treaties, they were transferred to the Federal Council. On 05th 
July 2012, the Committee on Constitution and Federalism examined the treaties. The latter were 
ratified in plenary on 06th July 2012. 
 
The economic and financial crisis triggered heated debates between political groups in 
Parliament. The coalition parties supported the ESM, but its ratification was not straightforward 
from the beginning, as a two-thirds majority was required to adopt the amendments to Article 
136 TFUE. The ÖVP and the SPÖ welcomed the ESM as a means to strengthen coordination 
between Member States. The coalition partners defended the idea of a tax on financial 
transactions and a stronger regulation of financial markets. Through the ESM, the EU’s 
 
Parlamentskorrespondenz Nr. 843, Erhöhung des EFSF-Haftungsrahmens - Grünes Licht aus Österreich - S-V-G-
Mehrheit im Ausschuss, NR-Beschluss voraussichtlich am Freitag 
354 21.10.2011 13078/11 CO EUR-PREP 27 Europäischer Rat (Tagung am 17./18. Oktober 2011) - Entwurf der 
erläuterten Tagesordnung (58412/EU XXIV.GP); 07.12.2011 15950/11 CO EUR Tagung des Europäischen Rates 
(9. Dezember 2011) - Entwurf der erläuterten Tagesordnung (63753/EU XXIV.GP); 27.01.2012, EU HA, TOP 1 
EUCO 6/12 Informal meeting of members of the European Council (69686/EU XXIV.GP) IV-18 der Beilagen zu 
den Stenographischen Protokollen des Nationalrates XXIV. GP 
355 28.06.2012, Parlamentskorrespondenz Nr. 558, Euro-Schutzschirm: Positionen bleiben einzementiert, Keine 
Annäherung bei Hearing im Verfassungsausschuss des Nationalrats 
356 02.07.2012, Parlamentskorrespondenz Nr. 574, Ampel für Euro-Schutzschirm und für Fiskalpakt steht auf 
Grün, Verfassungsausschuss schickt ESM und Begleitgesetze auf den Weg 
357 04.07.2012, Parlamentskorrespondenz Nr. 586, Nationalrat: Faymann verteidigt ESM, Erklärung des 
Bundeskanzlers zur gemeinsamen Zukunft Europas; 04.07.2012, Parlamentskorrespondenz Nr. 587 vom 
04.07.2012, ESM und Fiskalpakt nehmen Hürden im Nationalrat, Parteien bekräftigen ihre Standpunkte 
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competitiveness would be reinforced. The FPÖ and BZÖ expressed their strong disagreement 
with the Government’s position on the ESM and rejected the treaty. The FPÖ requested a 
national referendum on any future EU treaty reforms and the exclusion from the Eurozone of 
Member States with bad macroeconomic situations. The party rejected any further help 
packages to Greece and criticised any establishment of a European transfer union or a European 
economic government. The ESM would be undemocratic, favour centralisation tendencies and 
signify the loss of Austria’s financial and budgetary sovereignty by being subjected to a 
European “financial dictatorship”358. During the plenary session on 04th July 2012, the FPÖ 
group argued that the ESM would be an aberration and would contradict principles of the 
monetary union359. The Government would betray the population by promoting a debt-, 
transfer- and banking-union on the EU level. Moreover, the ESM would not guarantee 
Parliaments’ democratic participation rights. The then FPÖ leader even qualified the ESM as a 
“sado-maso treaty” in light of all these elements360.  
The BZÖ supported the FPÖ’s position on a national referendum and pleaded for the 
creation of a “Euro core zone” and a “Euro light zone”. The first would comprise Eurozone 
members from the North of the EU, while Member States from the South would be grouped in 
the second category. The coalition partners perceived the FPÖ’s request for a referendum as a 
political spectacle.  
The SPÖ criticised the apocalyptical arguments, scaremongering tactics and populist 
stances of the FPÖ and BZÖ. The Greens, on the other hand, supported the ESM, but required 
some further improvements. They asked for a better involvement of the EP, improved 
information policy with the Government on the national level, the establishment of a 
Convention on the creation of a democratically legitimate European economic government and 
the establishment of Eurobonds and a fiscal union. Moreover, the group would accept the ESM 
treaty only if a rule on creditor participation and debt settlement procedures were added. At 
first, the SPÖ argued that these proposals were unrealistic.  
The ÖVP rejected the idea of a fiscal union. Both coalition partners also refused the 
establishment of Eurobonds. In the course of the ESM negotiations, the Greens turned out to be 
the only potential supportive partner for the majority groups to fulfil the required two-thirds 
majority to ratify the ESM. Divergences appeared within the coalition on the voting procedures. 
While the ÖVP thought to ratify the treaty with a simple majority, the SPÖ argued that a two-
thirds majority was necessary because of the EU treaty revision361.  
Finally, in June 2012, the government parties obtained the Greens’ support in exchange 
of the establishment of a tax on financial transactions, Eurobonds, a European Convention and 
strengthened scrutiny and information rights for the National Council. The coalition had to 
make trade-offs to gain the Greens’ support and fulfil the constitutional requirements. On 14th 
June 2012, the SPÖ, ÖVP and Greens submitted at short notice a common request modifying 
the agenda of the plenary. The groups wanted to include a first reading of the three-party motion 
 
358 13.09.2011, Parlamentskorrespondenz Nr. 808, Budgetausschuss debattiert aktuelle europäische 
Finanzprobleme - Fekter zu Griechenland: Pleite viel teurer als Fortsetzung der Hilfe 
359 04.07.2012, Parlamentskorrespondenz Nr. 586, Nationalrat: Faymann verteidigt ESM, Erklärung des 
Bundeskanzlers zur gemeinsamen Zukunft Europas 
360 Ibid. 
361 11.06.2012, Die Presse, « Rettungsschirm : Kein Alleingang der Koalition ». 
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on RoP amendments strengthening scrutiny rights on ESM matters362. The FPÖ accused the 
groups of constitutional breach through their “cloak-and-dagger operation”363. The FPÖ and 
BZÖ left the plenary in protest against the “common raid” of the coalition partners and the 
Greens against parliamentarism and democracy. Both the Eurosceptic parties and the media 
blamed the Greens for supporting the coalition with hope of participating in the next 
government364. Over the past weeks, the Greens had supported further coalition projects, which 
increased the gap between the “red-black-green trio” and the other opposition parties365. The 
SPÖ tended to be particularly willing to compromise with the Greens since the former won the 
municipal elections in Vienna. An informal coalition with the Greens would then serve political 
interests.   
In light of the coalescence of the coalition parties with the Greens, the FPÖ resorted to 
another means to highlight its arguments on the ESM: the MP Heinz-Christian Strache, group 
leader of the FPÖ in Parliament, filed a complaint to the Austrian Constitutional Court on the 
illegality of the ESM Treaty. The MP accused the ESM to limit Parliament’s participation rights 
in the national decision-making because of the curtailing of the federal budget. The Austrian 
Court rejected the complaint on 25th February 2013 and concluded that the arguments were not 
enough justified and legitimate366.  
 
Contrary to the ESM, a simple majority ratified the TSCG in Parliament. Coalition 
partners did not need the support of an additional party, which could explain why they did not 
attempt to negotiate with them. According to the SPÖ, the Fiscal Compact would ensure the 
stability of the Euro and could not be dissociated from the ESM. The ÖVP favoured solidarity 
in the EU. However, parties disagreed on budgetary discipline. Support to the Fiscal Compact 
crumbled within the SPÖ in the course of 2012, showing not only a tense opposition-majority 
relation, but also conflicts within the coalition. SPÖ members from Upper Austria expressed 
overtly their disagreement with the Government’s position on the Fiscal Compact367. 
Opposition parties, including the Greens, rejected the treaty. The latter submitted a minority 
report on 02nd July 2012 as a reaction to the report produced by the Constitutional Affairs 
Committee368. They criticised the intergovernmental nature of the TSCG, which would limit 
 
362 The reinforcement of parliament’s scrutiny and information rights on ESM-related matters was one condition 
for the Greens‘ support to the ESM treaty. 
363 15.06.2012, Der Standard, « Ein Tiefpunkt, Nacht, Nebel und ein paar Hooligans“ 
364 15.06.2012, Der Standard, « Grüne «Musterschüler » » 
365 03.07.2012, Die Presse, « ESM : Die nächste grüne Hilfsaktion », 04.07.2012, Die Presse, „Der Grüne 
„Koalitionär““ 
366 See Beschluss, Verfassungsgerichtshof, 25.02.2013, https://www.vfgh.gv.at/downloads/VfGH_G_104-
12_SV_1-12_ESM_Strache.pdf (last accessed 17.01.2019) 
367 22.05.2012, Der Standard, « Fiskalpakt : Prammer plädiert für Abwarten »; 23.05.2012, Die Presse, „Trotz 
SPÖ-Kritik: Spindelegger hält and Fiskalpakt fest“ 
368 02.07.2012, Minderheitsbericht gemäss §42 Abs 4 GOG der Abg. Alexander Van der Bellen, Wener Kogler 
und Albert Steinhauser zum Bericht des Verfassungsausschusses zur Regierungsvorlage: Vertrag über Stabilität, 
Koordinierung und Steuerung in der Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion  zwischen dem Königreich Belgien, der 
Republik Bulgarien, dem Königreich Dänemark, der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, der Republik Estland, Irland, 
der Hellenischen Republik, dem Königreich Spanien, der Französischen Republik, der Italienischen Republik, der 
Republik Zypern, der Republik Lettland, der Republik Litauen, dem Großherzogtum Luxemburg, Ungarn, Malta, 
dem Königreich der Niederlande, der Republik Österreich, der Republik Polen, der Portugiesischen Republik, 
Rumänien, der Republik Slowenien, der Slowakischen Republik, der Republik Finnland und dem Königreich 
Schweden (1725dBeil) 
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the EP’s powers. They also pleaded in favour of a European Convention establishing a 
European financial area based on democratic legitimacy and approved by a European 
referendum. The BZÖ called proponents of the Fiscal Compact “betrayers of the Nation”369. 
All three opposition parties criticised the ratification procedure, arguing that the TSCG had 
constitution-amending consequences and should have been approved by a two-thirds majority 
in both chambers. Reproducing the FPÖ’s strategy in the case of the ESM, they filed a complaint 
to the Federal Constitutional Court, which ruled on the constitutionality of the treaty in October 
2013. The Court concluded that it could not identify a constitutional breach. The TSCG fell 
under international law and did thus not require a two-thirds majority in the National Council. 
This decision benefitted the coalition partners, as a simple majority would be sufficient in 
Parliament to ratify the TSCG. ÖVP and SPÖ had together the required quorum to pass the 
treaty without the support of the Greens, who turned their back on the coalition partners. In the 
case of both treaties and especially the TSCG, the ideological gap between the majority and the 
opposition grew bigger. Indeed, two visions of the EU confronted each other: FPÖ MPs rejected 
any federalisation attempts and defended the preservation of Austria’s sovereignty; majority 
MPs and the Greens still supported a European-wide solution with the condition that Austria 
would not lose in the deal. 
 
Negotiations on both treaties turned out to be highly polarised in Austria. We observed 
polarisation between the majority rallied by the Greens and the populist parties on the ESM. 
The Fiscal Compact led to divergences between coalition partners and the opposition, but also 
within the SPÖ and the Greens. While group discipline prevailed in the National Council in all 
parliamentary groups, the Greens were divided on the Fiscal Compact in the Federal Council. 
A Green MP voted in favour of both treaties, despite knowing the critical position of his party 
on the Fiscal Compact370. Ideological discrepancies led to looser group discipline within groups 
and a slight weakening of the coalition’s credibility. 
In all these cases, political strategies seemed to have played a significant role. The FPÖ 
aimed at attracting the attention of the population with prospects for higher electoral gains. They 
resorted to all possible channels, mainly in the National Council, but also through the Austrian 
Constitutional Court and the Federal Council by opposing systematically the treaty ratifications. 
The Greens negotiated conditions for their support to the ESM, knowing that the two-thirds 
majority requirements empowered them to pressure government parties. Just as in the case of 
the Treaty of Lisbon, both treaties were transformed into domestic stakes, which fuelled 
political conflicts and higher party competition. Austria’s dependence over European economic 
and financial markets might explain why the ESM and the Fiscal Compact became salient 
matters. 
 
Analysis of parliamentary activity 
 
The high salience of the economic crisis in Austria pushed parliamentary activity in EU 
affairs. Before discussions started on the ESM and the TSCG, the EU Main Committee, the 
 
369 04.07.2012, Parlamentskorrespondenz Nr. 587 vom 04.07.2012, ESM und Fiskalpakt nehmen Hürden im 
Nationalrat, Parteien bekräftigen ihre Standpunkte 
370 See 811th plenary session, 06.07.2012, p31-33. 
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Budget Committee and the Finance Committee met several times in 2010 to debate the financial 
crisis and the Greek debt crisis (see the previous part). Between the end of 2010 and 2012, the 
EACs met 12 times to discuss the ESM and the Fiscal Compact. The Budget Committee and 
the Constitutional Affairs Committee met twice. MPs debated the treaties in five plenary 
sessions (see table P, appendix 1). The EU Main Committee led the debates, but the 
Constitutional Affairs Committee produced the reports on the treaties. Overall, the number of 
meetings on the ESM and the TSCG was not high, because the main interests lied in the Greek 
debt, the banking crisis and the financial crisis in general.  
 
The number of EAC meetings reached its highest peak in 2010-2011, before decreasing 
in 2011-2012. We can explain the growth through higher activity of the EU Main Committee 
in the context of the economic and financial crisis. Indeed, institutional issues falling into the 
EU-HA competences appeared more often on the agenda, such as the role of parliaments in the 
management of the crisis, IGCs on financial packages or the future of the EU. On the contrary, 
meetings on the ESM and TSCG themselves were rather limited. 
 
Figure 53: Number of EAC meetings in the context of the ESM and TSCG (in total), 
National Council 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
These trends fluctuate when we observe the use of parliamentary instruments. Indeed, 
the proportion of parliamentary questions on EU affairs remained stable and even decreased in 
2011-2012 (see figure 46). Opposition parties tended to use this scrutiny tool more often than 
majority MPs. The same trends can be observed with the number of motions, interpellations 
and resolutions on EU affairs. Their proportion grew in 2010-2011 and in 2012-2013371. A 
reason for this fluctuation could be the higher salience of the Greek debt crisis in 2010 that 
raised attention in Parliament. Compared to the Lisbon Treaty, both ESM and TSCG also 
affected substantially parliamentary activity, especially among opposition MPs. Between 2010 
 
371 MPs adopted 46 motions on EU affairs in 2010-2011, 34 in 2011-2012 and 41 in 2012-2013. 9 interpellations 
on EU affairs were submitted in 2010-2011, 3 in 2011-2012 and 10 in 2012-2013. These data were retrieved from 
the parliament’s document online database, https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/ (last accessed 04.07.2018). 
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and 2012, MPs submitted 30 motions for an opinion, 4 motions for a resolution and 9 questions 
on the ESM and/or the TSCG (see table Q, appendix 1). 
 
The initiators of the listed parliamentary instruments are predominantly opposition MPs. 
FPÖ MPs were the most active, followed closely by BZÖ and GRÜNE MPs. Just as the Lisbon 
Treaty, political ideologies and positioning on the political spectrum played a crucial role in 
MPs’ involvement. Indeed, opposition parties, especially the FPÖ and BZÖ, put all their efforts 
in the preservation of their interests. Their Eurosceptic stance on the treaties pushed them to use 
more frequently the scrutiny instruments to show their disapproval. In particular, the FPÖ and 
BZÖ used the parliamentary tools to publicise their positions. They benefitted from the growing 
Eurosceptic sentiments among the population to nurture their discourses. For them, staying 
close to the voters’ opinions was tactical to increase their influence on the parliamentary 
decision-making. It is no surprise that active FPÖ and BZÖ MPs had local political functions, 
as it ensured them a closer link to their voters. They used the European context to emphasise 
national interests through sometimes aggressive rhetoric. The financial crisis would be 
synonym of sovereignty loss, centralisation, de-parliamentarisation and against democracy.  
Eurosceptic parties also used the Eurozone crisis as an electoral argument during the 
election campaign in 2013. They were the only ones addressing EU issues in their campaign 
(Meyer, In: Maurer/Neisser/Pollak, 2015). Sub-hypotheses H1.1 and H1.2 seem to be 
confirmed. While pro-European MPs supported their Government during the negotiations on 
the ESM and the TSCG, Eurosceptic parties systematically rejected the financial measures. Pro-
European MPs did not use as much parliamentary instruments to scrutinise the Government’s 
EU policy than Eurosceptic parties. Majority MPs barely used scrutiny instruments, probably 
because they followed the same strategy of government support as for the previous treaties. The 
high salience of the treaties in a crisis context exacerbated polarisation trends between parties, 
but also within parties (Greens and SPÖ). For instance, the growing pressure of social partners 
on the Government’s social policy during the crisis could explain the split within the SPÖ on 
EU politics (Eichborst/Weishaupt, 2013). In the case of the financial crisis, both national and 
European levels were tied together in parties’ discourses (Puntscher Riekmann/Wydra, 2013). 
The gap between Eurosceptic and pro-European stances widened, while group discipline 
became loose. Single MPs started to disagree with their party’s line in a highly conflictual 
environment. Therefore, we cannot validate sub-hypothesis H1.3, because polarisation seemed 
to weaken group discipline. Moreover, the high polarisation pushed to higher parliamentary 
activity from the side of opposition MPs. Indeed, Eurosceptic MPs representing a minority in 
Parliament used more frequently parliamentary tools as a means to publicise their position and 
attract voter support.  
 
The analysis of key players’ profiles shows some slight differences with the previously 
identified profiles in the context of the Constitutional and Lisbon treaties. Whereas MPs who 
followed the previous treaties were either predominantly political leaders in their group/party 
and/or EAC members with extensive parliamentary experience, MPs’ profiles differ slightly in 
the case of the ESM and the TSCG. We still observe that EAC members were particularly 
involved, followed closely by Finance Committee members. Indeed, a new category of expert 
MPs seemed to take over the role of key players: budget and finance speakers, EU speakers and 
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MPs with memberships in national unions focusing on economic and financial policies. 
Therefore, awareness seemed to grow among MPs, breaking out of the limited circle of 
“Europeanised” EAC members and extending towards sectoral committees. However, only the 
Finance Committee, the Budget Committee and the Constitutional Affairs Committee dealt 
more intensively with the ESM and the TSCG. As we will show below, we can only partially 
confirm hypothesis H2, because awareness did not seem to have spread across the lower 
chamber. 
 
The first group of active key players is composed of highly professionalised EAC 
members. Most of them, independently from their parliamentary group, had a long-term 
mandate in Parliament and extensive experience in EU affairs. Several MPs had already 
followed the previous EU treaties. In light of these elements, we can already validate sub-
hypothesis H 2.1, because MPs with “Europeanised” profiles were the most involved in treaty 
negotiations. Opposition MPs that belonged to the EAC used the committee as an arena to 
defend their group’s opinion. The fact that most opposition MPs occupied leadership positions 
as well indicates once more that their aim was to publicise their party’s position in Parliament. 
As opposition groups have less resources and influence capabilities on parliamentary work, they 
have to resort to their “experts” in the group to lead the debates. Group spokespersons, whether 
member of the EAC or the Finance Committee, were also actively involved in the scrutiny of 
the treaties. We identified budget and finance spokespersons belonging to the SPÖ, ÖVP and 
GRÜNE, as well as EU spokespersons from the SPÖ and FPÖ. For instance, an FPÖ MP 
belonged to both EACs from 2008 to 2013 and was EU and Foreign Affairs speaker of the group 
(Interview 11a, 2017). One Green MP was former Finance speaker until 2008 and became EU 
speaker in 2012. He was at the same time budget expert in the Vienna Chamber of Labour. 
These spokespersons contributed to their party’s profiling in debates on the economic crisis and 
the help packages. The party and parliamentary group as essential arenas of decision-making 
were thus predominant in parliamentary discussions. MPs debated the economic crisis mainly 
in party working groups or informally within their parliamentary group. These were the main 
arenas of decision-making before MPs defended positions in committee or plenary debates.  
Contrary to the other treaties, experience in Government did not seem to play a 
predominant role. However, the Government still kept control over the ratification process in 
Parliament, just as in the case of the previous treaties. Indeed, each rapporteur on the ESM and 
the TSCG came respectively from the ÖVP and the SPÖ. Even though discussions happened in 
cooperation with the other groups, the final reports bared the trace of the coalition’s position. 
EAC members from the SPÖ and the Greens were the only ones with an experience on 
the EU level (EP or parliamentary conferences). For instance, the typical profile of an active 
EAC member would be Alexander Van der Bellen (GRÜNE), MP from 1994 until 2012, 
member of the Main Committee since 2006 and of the EU Sub-Committee from 2008 until 
2012, active during negotiations on the Constitutional and the Lisbon Treaty as leader of the 
Green parliamentary group. 
Finance Committee members were the second most active players. Here we can assume 
that the political polarisation certainly pushed sectoral committee members to become active, 
but that committee competences played a bigger role. Therefore, we can only partially confirm 
sub-hypothesis H2.2. Several Finance Committee members were also simultaneously member 
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of the EAC. The reason why the Finance Committee got more involved in discussions on the 
ESM and TSCG lies in its competences and the nature of the debates. The decentralisation 
efforts made within the National Council gave more competences to the Finance Committee, 
because these treaties dealt mainly with budget and finance issues. MPs with double 
memberships in the Finance Committee and the EAC thus benefitted from their specialised 
knowledge on finance and EU matters, which was clearly an advantage in their involvement. 
Members of the Finance Committee tended to have less parliamentary experience than EAC 
members (with the exception of one ÖVP MP who was both EAC member and Chair of the 
Finance Committee). This can be explained by the fact that a large proportion of active Finance 
Committee members were recently elected FPÖ MPs. Indeed, five FPÖ key players were either 
full members or deputy members of the Finance Committee, whereas only two ÖVP MPs, one 
SPÖ MP, two BZÖ MPs and two Green MPs belonged to this committee. MPs from other 
groups belonged mainly to the EACs. The low seniority among FPÖ and BZÖ MPs might show 
that new MPs instrumentalised the treaties and the context of the economic crisis to publicise 
their activities in Parliament and gain voters’ sympathies. Their objective was their re-election 
thanks to political profiling. 
This can also explain why we find more key players with memberships in national 
unions involved in discussions on the ESM and the TSCG. FPÖ MPs with a membership in a 
national union tend to be more numerous, followed by ÖVP MPs. We also observed that FPÖ 
MPs belonged mainly to regional entities, for instance business chambers, while the rest of the 
MPs involved in civil society organisations belonged to federal entities. FPÖ MPs’ 
memberships in regional organisations probably strengthened their sceptical position on the 
ESM and the TSCG. As explained above, their link to the local level was stronger than for 
majority MPs, so they could rely on stronger popular support through their nationalistic 
discourses. For instance, an FPÖ MP was member of the regional presidium of the Circle of 
Freedomite Entrepreneurs of Upper Austria. This organisation emphasises the protection of the 
national economy and regional autonomy372. Without surprise, the MP favoured the exclusion 
from the Eurozone of Member States with a bad macroeconomic situation (16.12.2010, motion 
for an opinion). Another FPÖ MP was member of the regional council of the Business chamber 
of Upper Austria since 1989 and requested a referendum on Austria’s participation in the ESM 
(31.03.2011, oral question). On the contrary, MPs from the ÖVP-SPÖ coalition who belonged 
to national unions might have used their position in civil society to highlight even more their 
arguments in favour of both treaties. For instance, an ÖVP MP was former member of the 
Federation of Austrian Industrialists from 1966 to 1991, as well as former Secretary General of 
the Austrian Business Chamber until 2000. He was also Chair of the Finance committee 
between 2008 and 2010, supporting the ESM just as the Austrian Business Chamber, but 
requesting more parliamentary participation rights. 
Expert knowledge on economic and financial matters, originating from either MPs’ 
professional experience, their membership in civil society organisations or their political 
functions in Parliament was clearly a predominant sociological feature found in key players’ 
profiles. A reason could be the complexity of the matters, which required specific competences 
and knowledge. While the previous treaties dealt mostly with broad institutional questions, the 
 
372 https://www.fw.at/ (last accessed 17.01.2019) 
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ESM and the TSCG concerned solely the European economic and financial policy fields. 
Therefore, specialised knowledge might have overridden “Europeanised” profiles.  
 
6.6.2 The ESM and the TSCG: an opportunity for institutional change within the National 
Council? 
 
The ESM triggered substantial institutional change within the National Council. As the 
ESM was considered as a Constitution-amending treaty requiring a two-thirds majority, 
institutional revisions were necessary. On the contrary, the TSCG did not affect the 
constitutional order to the same extent and did not require a two-thirds majority because of its 
intergovernmental nature. Revisions in this context were not seen as primordial. The Greens 
initiated amendments to the RoP and the Federal Constitution as a condition for their support 
to the ESM. The Constitutional Affairs Committee was the main examiner of the amendments 
in the context of the ESM, while EAC members pushed the discussions in plenary (see table R, 
appendix 1). 
Green MPs can be seen as one of the main political entrepreneurs of change, because 
they pressured majority MPs to revise the Constitution and the RoP to strengthen the discussion 
culture on EU affairs within the National Council. The Greens as the only opposition party that 
showed conditional support to the Government’s position on the ESM defended their own 
interests and managed to trigger institutional change in exchange of the ratification of the ESM. 
Institutional change was thus the results of political strategies and party competition. Indeed, 
coalition partners had to make concessions for the ratification of the ESM and the TSCG. A 
two-thirds majority was needed for the approval of the ESM, which required the support of at 
least one opposition group. As the FPÖ rejected the treaty, the Greens were the only viable 
partner. They used the situation to impose conditions towards stronger parliamentary scrutiny 
of EU affairs. If we observe more closely the profile of key players that participated in the 
debates on procedural revisions in the wake of the ESM, we see that the main amendment 
initiators from the ÖVP, SPÖ and the Greens were senior members of the EAC or the 
Constitutional Affairs Committee. Even though Finance Committee members were also active 
in the discussions, they focused more on the crisis itself rather than on procedural amendments.  
Again, MPs with the most knowledge on parliamentary practices led the discussions on 
institutional revisions. Some of the senior MPs also had prior experience in the Government. 
Their motivations might have been profiling in order to be nominated again in Government. In 
any case, MPs with previous government experience might tend to control the direction of 
change for the benefit of their coalition. However, overall, experience in government was very 
limited among the “entrepreneurs” of change in the context of the ESM. In fact, the main reason 
lies in the high proportion of opposition MPs with recent mandates that participated in the 
discussions. Active FPÖ and BZÖ MPs had low seniority in Parliament, but most of them had 
leadership positions in their group or party. These features prove that they used debates on 
procedural revisions to continue the publicisation of their position on the economic crisis for 
political profiling. Their recent mandates pushed them to seek re-election, rather than promote 
revisions. In addition, as these groups had limited ways to influence the decision-making in 
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Parliament, they resorted to the same means as during the previous treaties: they relied on their 
group and party leaders to convey their message and try to weigh on the legislative process. 
Here, we assumed that conflictual political environments would encourage non-EAC or MPs 
with “technician” profiles to become more active. Even though some “political entrepreneurs” 
of change from the opposition had a lower professionalisation level in EU affairs, EU experts 
remained the main initiators. Therefore, sub-hypothesis H3.2 can only be partially confirmed. 
Discussions on parliamentary participation rights in the context of the financial crisis 
started in 2011373. On 13th June 2012, the SPÖ, ÖVP and Greens submitted a motion amending 
the Constitution (ESM-Begleitnovelle)374 and a motion amending the RoP375. Both motions 
foresaw the inclusion of new legal provisions in the wake of the ESM treaty, especially with 
regard to parliamentary participation and information rights. Just as for the previous amendment 
proposals, the Government closely monitored discussions. An ÖVP MP was nominated to 
become the rapporteur on the “ESM-Begleitnovelle” and further RoP amendments. On 14th 
June 2012, a plenary debate was organised on the foreseen RoP amendments. The SPÖ pleaded 
for the establishment of two committees specialised in ESM-related matters376. The 
Constitutional Affairs Committee examined both motions on 02nd July 2012 and produced two 
reports that were adopted in plenary respectively on 04th and 06th July 2012377. The FPÖ and 
BZÖ rejected both amendments. The law amending the Constitution was transferred to the 
Federal Council, which adopted it on 06th July 2012.  
The “ESM-Begleitnovelle” anchored the articles 50a to 50d in the Constitution378. The 
Constitution mentions now the National Council’s participation in ESM matters (Article 50a 
BVG). The Austrian ESM representative can only take decisions on the modification of 
instruments, the increase of financial capital or the grant of financial help to a Member State 
 
373 05.12.2011, Parlamentskorrespondenz Nr. 1192, Die Demokratie in Zeiten der Eurokrise, "Sind wir am Weg 
zur Eurokratie ? - Diskussion im Parlament 
374 Antrag der Abgeordneten Dr. Peter Wittmann, Dkfm. Dr. Günter Stummvoll, Dr. Alexander Van der Bellen, 
Kolleginnen und Kollegen betreffend ein Bundesgesetz, mit dem das Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz und das 
Zahlungsbilanzstabilisierungsgesetz geändert werden (ESM-Begleitnovelle), 
https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXIV/A/A_01985/index.shtml#tab-Uebersicht (last accessed 
04.07.2018). 
375 Antrag der Abgeordneten Dr. Peter Wittmann, Dkfm. Dr. Günter Stummvoll, Dr. Alexander Van der Bellen, 
Kolleginnen und Kollegen betreffend ein Bundesgesetz, mit dem das Bundesgesetz über die Geschäftsordnung des 
Nationalrates (Geschäftsordnungsgesetz 1975) geändert wird (Mitwirkungsrechte des Nationalrates an der 
innerstaatlichen Willensbildung in Hinblick auf die laufende Tätigkeit des Europäischen Stabilitätsmechanismus), 
https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXIV/A/A_01986/index.shtml#tab-Uebersicht (last accessed 
04.07.2018). 
376 14.06.2012, Parlamentskorrespondenz Nr. 494, Erster großer Schlagabtausch im NR-Plenum zum Euro-
Schutzschirm, Nationalrat soll umfassende Mitwirkungsrechte beim ESM erhalten 
377 02.07.2012, Bericht des Verfassungsausschusses über den Antrag 1985/A der Abgeordneten Dr. Peter 
Wittmann, Dkfm. Dr. Günter Stummvoll, Dr. Alexander Van der Bellen, Kolleginnen und Kollegen betreffend ein 
Bundesgesetz, mit dem das Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz und das Zahlungsbilanzstabilisierungsgesetz geändert 
werden (ESM-Begleitnovelle), 1878 der Beilagen zu den Stenographischen Protokollen des Nationalrates XXIV. 
GP; 02.07.2012, Bericht des Verfassungsausschusses über den Antrag 1986/A der Abgeordneten Dr. Peter 
Wittmann, Dkfm. Dr. Günter Stummvoll, Dr. Alexander Van der Bellen, Kolleginnen und Kollegen betreffend ein 
Bundesgesetz, mit dem das Bundesgesetz über die Geschäftsordnung des Nationalrates (Geschäftsordnungsgesetz 
1975) geändert wird, 1879 der Beilagen zu den Stenographischen Protokollen des Nationalrates XXIV. GP 
378 25.07.2012, BGBl. I Nr. 65/2012 , Bundesgesetz, mit dem das Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz und das 
Zahlungsbilanzstabilisierungsgesetz geändert werden (ESM-Begleitnovelle), 
https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokument.wxe?Abfrage=BgblAuth&Dokumentnummer=BGBLA_2012_I_65 
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with the lower chamber’s prior approval (Article 50b BVG). Moreover, the responsible minister 
has to inform the chamber on all matters linked to the ESM. The National Council can then 
issue opinions that need to be taken into consideration by the Austrian representative in the 
ESM (Article 50c BVG). Finally, article 50d mentions the establishment by the Budget 
Committee of two sub-committees on ESM matters.  
Additionally to these constitutional amendments, the SPÖ, ÖVP and Greens managed 
to anchor additional rights in the RoP379. Members of the ESM directorate and the governors’ 
board can now participate and speak in debates of the ESM subcommittees (§20c GOG-NR). 
The establishment of a permanent subcommittee on secondary market measures and a 
subcommittee on ESM matters is now mentioned in §32f and 32g GOG-NR. The permanent 
ESM subcommittee can empower the Austrian representative in the ESM to accept or refuse 
changes in the share capital of the ESM and to decide about provisions on new instruments 
(§32h GOG-NR). On top of this, the ESM subcommittee can submit opinions and resolutions 
on legislative drafts and documents related to ESM matters (§32i and 32j GOG-NR). Whole 
paragraphs were also added in §74 GOG-NR. The RoP mentions explicitly that the National 
Council participates in ESM matters (§74c GOG-NR). In case of an emergency, the ESM 
subcommittee can also transfer a matter to the plenary where government members must make 
a declaration followed by a debate (§74d GOG-NR). The ESM subcommittee obtained the same 
functions and structure as the EACs (Interview 6a, 2017). The ESM subcommittee can bind 
ministers and obtain specific information. The ESM subcommittee met for the first time on 02nd 
October 2012 and is composed of 16 members nominated by the Budget Committee. However, 
it became only active in October 2013 and met four times between October 2013 and August 
2015. This very low number of meetings can be explained by the fact that the ESM 
subcommittee decides only on help packages to Member States, which did not happen often on 
the EU level over the past years. The rest of the time, the subcommittee is in a “standby mode”.  
The amendments to the RoP also strengthened the lower chamber’s information rights 
(“ESM-Informationsordnung” or ESM information law). A third section within the RoP 
mentions now explicitly the conditions for the transfer and management of documents linked 
to ESM matters. The “ESM-Informationsordnung” was amended one more time in 2014380. The 
responsible minister has to inform the National Council on all budgetary measures in the 
framework of the ESM (§1) and on decisions taken by the ESM bodies concerning their 
composition or competences (§2).  The minister has also to inform Parliament through a written 
note on Austria’s participation in financial help packages for Member States (§3). Moreover, 
after a quarter of the year, the responsible minister has to submit a report to Parliament on the 
measures taken within the ESM framework (§6).These wide-scoped revisions might have been 
pushed by the ESM-ruling of the German Constitutional Court on 19th June 2012381. Indeed, the 
ruling pointed out the obligation of the German Government to inform the German Parliament 
 
379 25.07.2012, BGBl. I Nr. 66/2012, Bundesgesetz, mit dem das Bundesgesetz über die Geschäftsordnung des 
Nationalrates (Geschäftsordnungsgesetz 1975) geändert wird, https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/eli/bgbl/I/2012/66 (last 
accessed 04.07.2018). 
380 29.12.2014, BGBl. I Nr. 99/2014 
381 See 
https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/DE/2012/06/es20120619_2bve000411.ht
ml (last accessed 17.01.2019) 
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at the earliest possible stage on all matters related to the ESM. In the same line with this ruling, 
the coalition partners with the Greens’ support initiated changes in the National Council. 
Procedural reforms were thus based on the German model. After a second ruling of the German 
Constitutional Court in September 2012, both ÖVP and SPÖ representatives welcomed the 
decision on the ESM and TSCG to strengthen even more the prerogatives of national 
parliaments in budgetary matters382. The Greens welcomed only the German ruling on the ESM.  
To conclude, the ESM affected parliamentary scrutiny rights in the sense that the Greens 
requested new provisions in order to improve parliamentary involvement. Several RoP 
amendments and a new information law were adopted, which confirm hypothesis H3. The 
salience of the ESM treaty and the new participation rights induced by it pushed parliamentary 
groups to initiate change. Political strategies and competition played a bigger role in 
institutional change than MPs’ conviction about the role of their parliament in the EU decision-
making. Contrary to the previous treaties, amendments did not unite the parties and bring 
consensus. One main reason could be the highly controversial debates on the economic crisis, 
which fuelled exasperation among FPÖ and BZÖ MPs. The latter were influenced by the 
Eurosceptic civil society and based their strategy on gaining popular support to attract voices 
from the mainstream parties. On the side of the coalition partners, revisions were undergone as 
a condition for the Greens’ support to the ESM. The Government still managed to direct the 
changes through its majority in Parliament. Overall, according to the Green EU collaborator, 
the new participation rights in the framework of the ESM have been barely implemented 
(Interview 5a, 2017).  
 
6.6.3 Conclusion 
 
In this section, we analysed parliamentary involvement during negotiations on the ESM 
and the TSCG. We observed that the degree of polarisation was very high and fuelled party 
competition. The gap grew bigger between opposition and majority MPs, within the opposition 
between the FPÖ/BZÖ and the Greens and finally within the coalition between SPÖ and ÖVP. 
Despite discrepant views and crumbling group discipline, coalition parties managed to make 
concessions to the Greens to gain their support for the ratification of the ESM. The deal between 
coalition parties and the Greens led to institutional change within the National Council. Even 
for such salient matters, we could not observe a mainstreaming trend within Parliament. 
However, polarisation grew even more in the case of the TSCG. The Greens rejected the treaty. 
Political strategies played a crucial role in both cases. Indeed, the Greens’ support was only 
needed for the ESM as its ratification required a two-thirds majority. The party saw the 
opportunity to impose its own political interests (the strengthening of the parliament’s scrutiny 
rights). The FPÖ and the BZÖ used both treaties to sharpen their anti-EU discourse and gain 
popularity among the voters. Complaints to the Austrian Constitutional Court against the ESM 
(FPÖ) and the TSCG (FPÖ, BZÖ and GRÜNE) were attempts to mediatise their rejection of 
the treaties. As the Federal Council was only involved at the last moment to ratify the treaty, 
 
382 See https://newsv2.orf.at/stories/2140502/2140531 (last accessed 17.01.2019) 
277 
 
the groups had no real impact on the treaties through this channel. The Committee on 
Federalism and Constitution of the upper chamber examined all treaties at once on 05th July 
2012383 and ratified them the day after, giving no opportunity to groups to publicise their 
positions to the same extent as in the National Council. In the end, the Austrian Constitutional 
Court as a channel of action turned out to be favourable to the coalition, as both treaties were 
not considered to breach the Austrian Constitution. The TSCG could even be ratified with a 
simple majority, releasing the SPÖ-ÖVP coalition from the need to search for support in the 
opposition. 
Parliamentary involvement in the context of both treaties showed that the circle of active 
MPs remained small. Eurosceptic MPs were particularly involved and used parliamentary 
instruments to defend their own interests. Key players were either EAC members with an 
extensive parliamentary experience, or members of the Finance Committee with more recent 
mandates. The expert profile in economic and financial matters emerged as well, proof that both 
treaties became a matter of domestic interest. The fact that numerous key players were as well 
members in a national union, be it professional chambers or interest groups, also underlines the 
argument that domestic interests affected MPs’ actions in Parliament. While we can explain 
EAC members’ involvement by their genuine interest for European integration (whether pro- 
or anti-European), expert MPs member of Austrian interest groups focused mostly on national 
priorities. Overall, we can conclude that the professionalisation level among MPs grew 
substantially compared to the Treaty of Lisbon and even more to the Constitutional Treaty. 
The ESM triggered further institutional change within the National Council. Political 
strategies seemed to play a crucial role, as the Greens conditioned their support to the ESM to 
an improvement of the Parliament’s participation rights in EU affairs. Contrary to the TSCG, 
which was voted by a simple majority, the ESM required a two-thirds majority, which made the 
support of the Greens necessary. While parliamentary debates on the treaties themselves and on 
institutional amendments were monopolised respectively by opposition MPs from the FPÖ, 
BZÖ and the Greens, the actual influencers of the legislative process were still the coalition 
partners. Moreover, an external event might have certainly accelerated the revision process 
inside the National Council. Indeed, the German Constitutional Court ruled on the ESM mid-
2012, while SPÖ-ÖVP and Green MPs were negotiating the direction of the structural and 
procedural revisions. While the ruling of the Austrian Constitutional Court on the ESM might 
have only given the green light for the ratification of the treaty, the ruling of the German Court 
might have affected directly the participation rights of the National Council. The historic 
decision on the role of the German Bundestag in EU affairs encouraged Austrian MPs to follow 
the German example. The ruling was thus an opportunity to back institutional change in the 
Austrian National Council. 
 
 
 
383 See https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXIV/I/I_01716/index.shtml#tab-ParlamentarischesVerfahren 
(last accessed 17.01.2019) 
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6.7 Summary and conclusion 
 
The present chapter aimed to explain the evolution and origin of parliamentary 
involvement in EU affairs in the Austrian National Council. We observed that the lower 
chamber developed substantial scrutiny rights since Austria’s accession to the EU in 1995. 
Parliamentary participation rights are anchored in the Federal Constitution, the RoP and several 
information laws. Despite these strong formal capacities, effective parliamentary activity in EU 
affairs remained quite limited since the Constitutional Treaty. Some explanations could be MPs’ 
limited time to deal with EU affairs due to their double mandates, multiple committee 
memberships and the centralisation of these issues in the EACs. Moreover, involvement 
depended highly on party discipline and political strategies. The neocorporatist culture also 
influenced the way coalition MPs act in Parliament. Sociological Institutionalism permitted to 
identify MPs’ opinions on European integration and the treaties. Ideologies and personal 
motivations clearly played a role in their involvement. Political competition, conflicts and 
strategical interests as explanatory factor of parliamentary involvement seemed to confirm 
arguments from the Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change. 
Each treaty exacerbated political competition and polarisation, which in turn influenced 
parliamentary involvement (H1). Party dynamics in the form of government-parliament and 
opposition-majority competition determined most parliamentary activity from the 
Constitutional Treaty to the TSCG. MPs’ political priorities depended on the extent to which 
they perceived the treaties to affect the domestic institutional framework. The Lisbon Treaty, 
the ESM and the TSCG seemed to be the most salient treaties, because they affected directly 
MPs’ parliamentary rights and ideologies on European integration. Before the split of the FPÖ 
in 2005, parties welcomed the Constitutional Treaty despite divergent ideological positions. 
The internal tensions in the FPÖ and the eviction of the party from the Government led to a 
different political landscape after 2005. The FPÖ started to criticise systematically the 
Government’s position on the Treaty of Lisbon, the ESM and the TSCG. Euroscepticism grew 
within the Green party and even the SPÖ during the financial crisis. We observed that 
Eurosceptic MPs tended to use more frequently parliamentary instruments than pro-European 
MPs to scrutinise the treaties (H1.1). Their strategy was to use EU issues to defend national 
interests.  
Growing salience meant that opposition MPs had to resort to all possible means and 
channels to supersede their position in Parliament. Within the National Council, they actively 
used parliamentary instruments to scrutinise their Government’s EU policy. The government-
parliament channel and all its resources being out of hand, they also turned towards other 
institutions such as the Austrian Constitutional Court. Overall, parliamentary activity grew 
since 2004. Majority MPs tended to follow their Government’s political line, while opposition 
MPs, both Eurosceptic and pro-Europeans, were the most active in criticising the coalition 
parties (H1.2). Polarisation grew from one treaty to the other and affected more or less group 
discipline (H1.3). The Constitutional Treaty did not trigger as much conflicts and competition 
as the Treaty of Lisbon, the ESM and the TSCG. The financial crisis represented probably the 
paroxysm of polarisation. While the FPÖ and BZÖ rejected systematically the treaties, the 
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Greens agreed to ratify the ESM only if coalition parties considered their political interests. 
Within parliamentary groups, divergent opinions on the crisis started to appear, even between 
coalition partners and within the SPÖ and ÖVP. Discrepancies could be found notably within 
the Green group, both in the National Council and in the Federal Council384. For instance, a 
member of the Federal Council belonging to the Green party voted in favour of the ESM and 
the TSCG, even though the Green group in the National Council rejected vehemently the TSCG.  
The growing political competition during the Treaty of Lisbon and the economic crisis 
between government parties and the FPÖ/BZÖ, and later the Greens, translated into the use of 
other channels on the national level to publicise the position of opposition parties. The weak 
competences of the Federal Council in the ratification process of European treaties pushed 
opposition MPs to use another institution with an essential influence on the Austrian legal 
system: the Federal Constitutional Court. Indeed, we assume that the lack of resources and 
personnel in both parliamentary chambers, resulting in a weak influence on the decision-making 
process, forced opposition MPs to resort to other means of actions outside of the parliamentary 
sphere, without success. Government parties kept their hands on the negotiations and the final 
decisions on the treaties, even though they had to face the challenge of crumbling party and 
group discipline in recent years. 
Within Parliament, higher salience and polarisation did not lead to a mainstreaming of 
EU affairs (H2). Indeed, the salience of each treaty raised partially MPs’ awareness about EU 
affairs. Most still think that EU affairs are complex and specialised matters. A sociological 
analysis of MPs’ profiles showed that only “Europeanised” MPs tended to become particularly 
active in the follow-up of EU treaties (H2.1). The financial crisis represented an exception in 
the sense that a new type of expert MPs emerged as key players alongside the predominant 
category of “Europeanised” EAC members (H2.2). Following sociological features characterise 
the latter category: long-lasting mandates, experience in the Government, party and/or group 
leadership, participation in European parliamentary conferences, experience as EU group 
speaker, educational background close to EU affairs, professional experience linked to EU 
affairs and interest for European integration. Only very few MPs that participated in pre-
accession talks and interparliamentary meetings with the EP between 1990 and 1994 stayed in 
Parliament after the accession and became active during EU treaty negotiations. For them in 
particular, pre-accession talks surely sensitised them to EU affairs and pre-determined their 
political career in the National Council.  
These elements indicate that highly professional MPs with close links to the 
Government led most legislative decisions regarding all the treaties. During debates on the 
economic crisis, expert key players from sectoral committees, mostly the Finance Committee, 
exerted recent mandates. Their priorities were different from MPs with “Europeanised” profiles. 
Moreover, they tended to be member of a national union. Most opposition MPs had this type of 
profile and used their political functions to promote their party’s position and criticise the 
Government. Their objective was clearly to gain popular support by using all possible channels, 
be it inside or outside Parliament. Memberships in interest groups were more numerous during 
 
384 The Greens were never considered a group in the Federal Council, as they did not have the minimum quorum 
of 5 members. 
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negotiations on the ESM and the TSCG, than the Treaty of Lisbon and the Constitutional Treaty. 
This observation clearly indicates that the nature of EU issues changed and seemed to affect 
even more national interests. Especially FPÖ MPs with affiliations in regional professional 
chambers tended to prioritise domestic interests when using parliamentary instruments. Overall, 
we observed that the level of professionalisation increased throughout the years. MPs’ 
professionalisation in EU affairs also meant that mainstreaming was unlikely to happen. Even 
though there were efforts to include formally sectoral committees in the examination of EU 
affairs, it was insufficient to encourage mainstreaming within the lower chamber.  
The salience of EU and intergovernmental treaties, influenced by political ideologies, 
sociological features and competition in the form of opposition-majority dynamics, determined 
to a large extent institutional change (H3).  Even though the Austrian National Council had 
already a well-developed scrutiny system, MPs initiated multiple amendments in the wake of 
the Lisbon Treaty and the ESM. Therefore, in the case of the Austrian chamber, we cannot 
validate sub-hypothesis H3.1, because MPs modified their procedures even though their 
scrutiny system counted already among the strongest. 
Revisions of scrutiny procedures also seemed to depend on parliamentary culture and 
the extent of political competition (H3.2). Coalition parties with the support of the Greens were 
the main initiators of institutional change. Contrary to parliamentary activity on the treaties, 
where we observed a shift from the role of “Europeanised” MP to the role of sectoral expert, 
institutional revisions remained between the hands of pro-European MPs, mostly from the 
majority, with an extensive experience in EU affairs. Coalition partners controlled 
systematically the direction of change in Parliament through their majority. Profiles of 
individual key initiators in each parliamentary group show that EAC members and 
“Europeanised” MPs were the main “entrepreneurs” of change, some of them being at the same 
time members of the Constitutional Affairs Committee or the Committee on Rules of Procedure. 
Their political position on European integration and their positioning on the political spectrum 
influenced their involvement in procedural changes. Indeed, we notice that pro-European MPs 
were the main initiators of change, be it from the opposition or the coalition. Most revisions 
happened in the wake of the Treaty of Lisbon and the ESM, the two most salient and 
controversial treaties in Parliament. While consensus reigned until the Treaty of Lisbon between 
coalition and opposition parties on RoP amendments, revisions during the ESM happened in a 
highly conflictual context. Political competition determined the direction and extent of 
procedural change within the National Council. In the cases of the Lisbon Treaty, the ESM and 
the TSCG, external factors such as the rulings of the German Constitutional Court might have 
affected significantly institutional change within the National Council in the form of 
Constitutional amendments and RoP revisions. 
The analysis of the direction and extent of institutional change operated within the 
National Council indicates that legal provisions were added gradually to the existing rules, 
confirming sub-hypothesis H3.3. Indeed, institutional change in the National Council happened 
through “layering. In the context of the Constitutional Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty, the 
chamber added successive rules onto pre-existing ones through constitutional and RoP 
amendments, as well as information laws. However, the economic crisis and to some extent the 
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Lisbon Treaty (subsidiarity mechanism) pushed the Parliament to create new rules from scratch 
to guarantee its effective participation rights in the scrutiny of ESM matters and the control of 
the subsidiarity principle. Parliament kept pre-existing institutions and did not aim to replace 
the whole system. The Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change argues that actors’ 
conflicting interests and coalition formations trigger change. This argument cannot be observed 
for revisions after the Constitutional Treaty and the Treaty of Lisbon. Indeed, change in the 
wake of the Treaty of Lisbon originated in a rather consensual atmosphere between opposition 
and majority MPs. Change seemed to have been triggered through normative rule 
reinterpretation rather than conflictual interests and strategical tactics. However, the deal made 
between the Greens and the SPÖ-ÖVP coalition in the wake of the ESM seems to fit the 
explanation given by the Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change. In fact, the Greens were 
competing against the coalition to pass amendments in return of their support. The Green party 
contested the existing rules and managed to form an alliance with the coalition parties to impose 
change within Parliament. The Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change states that 
strategical interests lead actors to form alliances to change their institutional environment. This 
assumption was confirmed in the wake of the ESM. However, more than political strategies, 
MPs’ motivations determined institutional change as well. Forced to adapt to a constantly 
changing European institutional framework, a limited number of MPs endorsed the role of 
“political entrepreneurs” of change in an attempt to strengthen their own participation rights. 
Change originated from bottom-up endogenous dynamics in response to European events. 
To conclude, European treaties brought with them increased parliamentary involvement 
in EU affairs within the National Council, in form both of higher parliamentary activity and of 
institutional change. However, motivation to engage in EU affairs remains generally limited to 
a small circle of professionalised MPs. Historical and Sociological Institutionalism both helped 
to explain how and why parliamentary involvement changed in Austria, in light of the 
interaction between MPs’ motivations and their institutional framework.  
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Chapter 7. Parliamentary involvement in EU affairs in the Finnish 
Eduskunta 
 
The third empirical chapter focuses on parliamentary involvement in EU affairs in the 
Finnish Eduskunta. Just as the previous chapters, we will outline the overall institutional 
framework with a particular emphasis on the actors and steps of the legislative process (7.1). 
Then, we will explain how the Eduskunta handles EU affairs (7.2). The section 7.3 will be 
dedicated to MPs’ profiles and how their institutional environment affects their parliamentary 
activity in EU affairs. The three following sections 7.4, 7.5 and 7.6 will draw on the elements 
analysed in the previous sections. Each section will handle a particular treaty and analyse how 
and why parliamentary involvement in EU affairs evolved within Parliament. 
 
7.1 Finland: General institutional framework 
 
Finland is a unitary state composed of powerful local governments. The Aland Province 
represents an exception, because it became autonomous in 1918. The self-governed province 
has a special language status, as well as its own unicameral parliament, the “Lagting”. On top 
of that, the Aland Province can send one representative to the Eduskunta385. Finland shifted 
from a semi-presidential system to a parliamentary democracy after the Constitutional revision 
of 2000, when the President’s competences were reduced (Arter, 2000; Karvonen, 2014). 
However, some elements from the semi-presidential regime persist nowadays (Paloheimo, In: 
Karvonen/Paloheimo/Raunio, 2016). Just as Luxembourg and Austria, the Finnish political 
system bases on consensus and corporatism (Raunio, 2005). Until the 1990s, a consensus based 
political system was all the more important for Finland, as the country had to maintain peaceful 
contacts with its neighbour, the Soviet Union. Thus, consensus drove Finland’s internal and 
foreign policy style. Until recently, “achieving national unity and avoiding public cleavages” 
were crucial elements in Finland’s political decision-making (Raunio, p.387, 2005).  
Finland started to develop its foreign policy in the 1960s by enhancing its neutral 
position in Europe. Due to its position between the Soviet Union and Western Europe, Finland 
encouraged initiatives to ensure peace and stability in Northern Europe. The country suggested 
the establishment of a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and hosted 
several events such as the SALT negotiations in 1969 and the signing of the CSCE in 1975 in 
Helsinki (Pesonen/Riihinen, 2002). Until the end of the Cold War, Finland tried to stay close to 
the Soviet Union through valuable foreign trade exchanges, while ensuring commercial 
relations with Western states, for instance through the European Free Trade Association 
(Raunio/Wiberg, 2001). From the late 1980s until the fall of the Berlin Wall, the country moved 
closer to the European Community. The collapse of the Soviet Union represented a trigger for 
Finland’s accession to the European Union. Finland applied for the European Economic Area 
 
385 See The Constitution of Finland, 11 June 1999, Chapter 3 - The Parliament and the Representatives, Section 
25 - Parliamentary elections 
283 
 
in 1990. In 1992, following the initiatives of Austria and Sweden, the Social Democratic Party 
(SDP), the National Coalition (KOK) and the Swedish People’s Party (RKP) suggested to 
submit an application for EU membership. In 1994, the accession treaty was signed and a 
referendum on the membership with positive results validated the accession. Finland became a 
member of the European Union in 1995, alongside Austria and Sweden. The EU membership 
was seen in Finland as an opportunity to be fully integrated in a bigger western community and 
to benefit from the internal economic market after a deep national recession in the early 1990s. 
Just as Austria, Finland had to integrate quickly the “acquis communautaire” in its political 
system. Constitutional reforms were undertaken to create a national and parliamentary EU 
scrutiny system. 
 
7.1.1 Actors of the legislative process 
 
The first section explains the role of the main Finnish actors in the legislative process. 
Based on consensual and corporatist practices, the executive and Parliament are the main 
leaders of decision-making, relying heavily on the opinion of civil society representatives. 
Political parties dominate government and parliament relations in a complex polarised and 
fragmented pluralist political system. 
 
7.1.1.1 The executive: the President and the Government 
 
The executive in Finland is bicephalous, even though the President of the Republic lost 
considerable power since the Constitutional reform of 1999 and the parliamentarisation of the 
political regime. According to the Finnish Constitution, the “governmental powers are exercised 
by the President of the Republic and the Government, the members of which shall have the 
confidence of the Parliament”386. Before 1999, the President could influence the formation of 
the governmental cabinet by nominating the formateur and even dissolve the Parliament without 
consulting neither Parliament nor Government. The President led bilateral negotiations with 
party leaders to determine the candidate for the Prime Minister position 
(Aylott/Blomgren/Bergman, 2013). The President of the Republic was considered as the 
supreme executive power and the exclusive holder of the competences in foreign policy 
(Raunio/Wiberg, 2008). Strong formal presidential powers in foreign policy were justified until 
the late 1980s by the Cold War and Finland’s difficult position as a small state between the 
Soviet Union and the Western bloc. Foreign policy was strictly separated from domestic policy 
and excluded from “the normal democratic field” (Tiilikainen, p.76, 2006).  
Since 1999, the President has the competence to appoint ministers depending on the 
Prime Minister’s proposal387, but is excluded from the coalition-building process. Officially, 
the President nominates the candidate that will form the Government, but parliamentary groups 
 
386 See The Constitution of Finland, 11 June 1999, Chapter 1 - Fundamental provisions, Section 3 - 
Parliamentarism and the separation of powers 
387 The Constitution of Finland, 11 June 1999, Section 61 – Formation of the Government. 
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decide about the government formation. According to Section 61 of the 1999 Constitution, 
“[t]he Parliament elects the Prime Minister, who is thereafter appointed to the office by the 
President of the Republic. The President appoints the other Ministers in accordance with a 
proposal made by the Prime Minister. Before the Prime Minister is elected, the groups 
represented in the Parliament negotiate on the political programme and composition of the 
Government”388. With the constitutional reform in 1999, the President’s foreign policy 
competences have been considerably diminished to the benefit of the Prime Minister. The new 
Constitution states that the President has competences in traditional foreign policy in 
cooperation with the Government389. The latter is responsible for European Affairs, including 
the foreign and security policy, which was previously between the hands of the President 
(Palosaari, 2013). Since the Treaty of Lisbon, the President cannot attend anymore European 
Council meetings with the Prime Minister (Raunio/Wiberg, In: Brouard/Costa/König, 2012). 
The double-headed representation in the European Council meetings was detrimental for 
Finland’s foreign policy, as confusion reigned over the official Finnish representative of foreign 
affairs on the EU level. The constitutional reform of 2012 restrained one more time the 
President’s ability to influence the national follow-up of Treaty reforms, shifting the 
competence towards the Government and Parliament (Raunio, 2012). 
 Finnish governments are typically surplus majority coalitions composed of parties from 
the left and the right of the political spectrum (Raunio, 2012). Between 1995 and 2003, the 
Government consisted of “rainbow coalitions” including all the parties in Parliament, except 
the Centre party (KESK) and the Christian Democrats (KD). Between 2003 and 2007, the first 
Vanhanen cabinet was led by the Centre (KESK), the Social Democratic Party (SD) and the 
Swedish People’s Party (SFP). In 2007, the second Vanhanen cabinet was composed of a centre-
right coalition formed between the KESK, the National Coalition Party (KOK), the Green 
League (VIHR) and the Swedish People’s Party (SFP). The 2011 elections led to the 
establishment of a “six-pack” cabinet composed of six parties, both from the left and the right. 
The Katainen cabinet included the KOK, SD, Left Alliance (VAS), VIHR, SFP and KD. Only 
two parties stayed in opposition. The table hereunder sums up the main government formations 
from 1999 until today. 
 
Table 16: Coalition governments in Finland, 1999-2019 
Period Government formation 
1999-2003 Second Lipponen cabinet: KOK, SD, SFP, VAS, 
VIHR 
April-June 2003 Jäätteenmäki cabinet: KESK, SD, SFP 
2003-2007 First Vanhanen cabinet: KESK, SD, SFP 
2007-2011 Second Vanhanen cabinet: KESK, KOK, VIHR, SFP 
June 2010-June 2011 Kiviniemi cabinet: KESK, KOK, VIHR, SFP 
2011-2014 Katainen cabinet: KOK, SD, VAS, VIHR, SFP, KD 
June 2014-May 2015 Stubb cabinet: KOK, SD, VIHR, SFP, KD 
2015-2017 Sipilä cabinet: KESK, PS*, KOK 
2017-2019 Sipilä cabinet: KESK, KOK, Blue Reform** 
 
388 Idem. 
389 The Constitution of Finland, 11 June 1999, Chapter 8 - International relations, Section 93 - Competence in the 
area of foreign policy issues 
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Sources: Aylott et al., 2013; Raunio, 2012. 
*PS: True Finns 
**In 2017, the True Finns split into two parties: the True Finns and the Blue Reform Party. The True Finns left 
government. 
 
Contrary to the model of Scandinavian parliamentarism characterised by minority 
governments, cohesive parties and informal deals between government and opposition, the 
Finnish political system is particular due to its broad coalitions backed by a large majority in 
parliament and the lack of bipolarisation between parties (Arter, 2000). The emergence of a 
Finnish model of consensual democracy happened only in the 1980s. Indeed, before that date, 
Finland was considered to have the most unstable cabinets, with 43 government cabinets since 
1945 (Karvonen, 2014). Oversized cabinets, surplus majority coalitions and a weak opposition 
have since replaced the unstable governments. In this perspective, the 2011 elections 
represented a challenge to Finnish consensualism, as the True Finns gained substantial power 
on the political scene. The populist Party obtained its highest score in the legislative elections 
and shook up the coalition formation dominated by the largest mainstream parties (KESK, 
KOK, SD). Elections are all the more crucial as the government formateur comes from the party 
with the largest number of seats in parliament. The formateur becomes the Prime Minister and 
nominates the government members. 
 
 The Government is composed of the Prime Minister and ministers responsible before 
Parliament390. The Prime Minister is not considered as the cabinet leader, but rather as being 
equal to the other ministers. Parties exert the actual power in cabinet (Karvonen, 2014). The 
Prime Minister manages the Government’s activities and chairs the Council of State or plenary 
meetings of the Government391. The Council of State is composed of a minimum quorum of 
five ministers, as well as the Chancellor of Justice appointed by the President of the Republic. 
The Council of State’s main task is to prepare government bills before submitting them to the 
President, who transfers them to the Eduskunta. The preparation of the meetings of the Council 
of State happens in four cabinet committees: the cabinet committee for foreign and security 
policy, the cabinet committee for the European Union, the cabinet fiscal committee and the 
cabinet committee for economic policy (Karvonen, 2014). Once discussions have been led in 
the committees, the Council of State meets in plenary.  
In addition to the cabinet committees, ministers belong to 12 working groups on 
particular topics: educational policy, energy and climate policy, Russian affairs, Sami affairs392, 
integration and migration policy, etc. Since the 1990s, the leaders of the coalition parties formed 
an internal informal cabinet represented in the most important cabinet committees and 
ministerial working groups, with the aim to control the well-functioning of the ministerial 
governance (Paloheimo, In: Karvonen/Paloheimo/Raunio, 2016). According to Paloheimo, the 
Finnish executive takes the form of a “mixture of eroded formal presidential rule, weakened 
cabinet government, and increased ministerial governance, supervised by a growing network of 
government committees and ministerial working groups” (Paloheimo, p.78, In: 
Karvonen/Paloheimo/Raunio, 2016). The predominance of parties in the functioning and 
 
390 The Constitution of Finland, 11 June 1999, Section 60. 
391 Idem, Section 66. 
392 The Sami are an indigenous community living in Northern Europe and representing a minority in Finland.  
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management of the Government is also reflected in the government-parliament relations. 
Indeed, through Government, parties manage to control the Eduskunta. According to Raunio, 
“governments have been able to rule without effective dissent from the Eduskunta” 
(Raunio/Wiberg, In: Strøm/Müller/Bergman, 2006). We will see later that this type of 
relationship affects group discipline within Parliament and parliamentary activity. 
 
7.1.1.2 The Eduskunta 
 
The Eduskunta as a unicameral parliament exerts the legislative power according to 
Section 3 of the Finnish Constitution. The autonomous Aland Province has its own directly 
elected parliament393. The latter is responsible to draft legislation for the Aland Islands and is 
composed of 30 members. The President of the Republic opens and closes the parliamentary 
sessions both of the Eduskunta and the Aland Parliament394.  
Through the parliamentarisation of the Finnish political system, the Eduskunta regained 
its powers that it had lost since the 1970s with the strengthening of governmental coalitions 
(Paloheimo, In: Karvonen/Paloheimo/Raunio, 2016). Parliamentary groups dominate 
negotiations on the establishment of the government cabinet. Once the government programme 
and portfolios have been decided, the Eduskunta nominates the formateur as Prime Minister395. 
Parliament can initiate motions of no confidence following an interpellation or at the request of 
the opposition during a plenary debate (Raunio/Wiberg, In: Strøm/Müller/Bergman, 2006). 
Parliament controls the Government through various instruments, such as questions (written 
and oral) or interpellations. According to section 3 of the Finnish Constitution, the Eduskunta 
holds the legislative power and decides on State Finances. Legislative initiatives can emanate 
either from the Government or from the Parliament. MPs can submit legislative, budgetary or 
petitionary motions396. Parliament has extensive information rights. The Government is obliged 
to inform immediately the responsible committees on all matters that need to be taken into 
consideration during the legislative process397. The Government must also submit annual 
activity reports and reports on State finances to the Eduskunta398. The Parliament also controls 
the Bank of Finland by electing the board of supervisors, the Social Insurance Institution and 
the Finnish Broadcasting Company. International treaties need to be ratified by the Eduskunta. 
The latter has strong participation rights in EU matters, as we will see later on. The Aland 
Parliament can also submit legislative initiatives to the Finnish Government, which will transfer 
them for consideration to the Eduskunta399. The Aland Province can also participate directly in 
the national parliamentary work through its representative in the Eduskunta.  
 
393 Act on the Autonomy of Åland (1991/1144), Section 3, 
https://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/kaannokset/1991/en19911144_20040068.pdf (last accessed 13.06.2019) 
394 See The Constitution of Finland, 11 June 1999, Section 33 and Act on the Autonomy of Åland (1991/1144), 
Section 14. 
395 The Constitution of Finland, 11 June 1999, Section 61 and 62. 
396 Idem, Section 39. 
397 Idem, Section 47. 
398 Idem, Section 46. 
399 Act on the Autonomy of Åland (1991/1144), Section 22. 
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The Eduskunta has 200 members elected for four years through a combination of 
proportional list system and mandatory candidate voting. There is no threshold for entry into 
parliament. Small parties get a chance to gain seats in parliament thanks to the proportional 
system. The list system obliges voters to vote for a single candidate, making the number of seats 
per party dependent on the number of votes on the whole list (Karvonen, 2014).  The preferential 
“candidate vote” brings MPs closer to the citizens and brings popular personalities to power 
(Arter, 2012). The challenge ensuing from this system is the difficulty for parliamentary groups 
to control these candidates and to ensure group discipline within Parliament (Raunio/Wiberg, 
2008). The individualisation of the voting system tends to increase the risk of group or party 
defection whenever votes have to be cast in the Eduskunta (Raunio/Wiberg, In: 
Strøm/Müller/Bergman, 2006). Moreover, ties between cabinet members and MPs from 
coalition parties can be very strong and give little space to the opposition in the legislative 
process (Karvonen, 2014). The current composition of the Eduskunta reflects the highly 
fragmented multi-party system, as shown in the graph below. The Centre Party has currently 
the biggest group with 48 MPs. It is followed by the National Coalition with 38 MPs, the Social 
Democrats with 35 MPs, the Blue Reform Parliamentary group with 17 MPs, the Finns with 17 
MPs, the Green parliamentary group with 15 MPs, the Left Alliance with 12 MPs, the Swedish 
People’s Party with 10 MPs, the Christian Democrats with 5 MPs and finally the Liike Nyt-
Movement and the Citizens' Party with respectively one MP each.  
Figure 54: Composition of the Eduskunta (in total), 2015-2019 
 
Source: Own calculation, based on the Eduskunta’s website 
https://www.eduskunta.fi/EN/kansanedustajat/Pages/default.aspx  
Notes: KESK = Centre Party; KOK = National Coalition Party; SD = Social Democratic Party; VIHR = Green 
League; VAS = Left Alliance; SFP = Swedish People’s Party; KD = Christian Democratic Party 
 
There are currently nine parliamentary groups in the Eduskunta. MPs can choose 
whether they want to belong to a parliamentary group. Usually, MPs choose to belong to their 
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party’s parliamentary group. Whenever an MP is nominated in the Government, he/she can 
keep the parliamentary functions, but has to resign from all committee memberships 
(Interviewees 4b and 7b, 2018). There is no incompatibility rule between the Eduskunta and 
ministerial functions. MPs can choose to become member of two out of 15 permanent special 
committees and a Grand Committee responsible for EU affairs. Each committee mirrors 
ministerial jurisdictions and is composed of 17 members and 9 alternate members. Exceptions 
are the Finance Committee with 21 members and 19 alternate members, the Audit Committee 
with 11 members and 6 alternate members and the Grand Committee, with 25 members and 13 
alternate members400. MPs usually belong to two committees. 
 Within the Eduskunta, the Speaker, together with the Speaker’s Council, directs 
parliamentary work401. The Speaker or a Deputy Speaker chairs and manages plenary sessions. 
The Speaker’s Council is composed of the Speaker, the Deputy Speakers and the committee 
chairpersons. Before the Speaker and Deputy Speakers are elected, the oldest MP chairs the 
first plenary session each year. Parliamentary sessions start in February402. On the 
administrative side, the Secretary General is the highest civil servant of Parliament and the head 
of the Parliamentary Office. The latter operates under the supervision of the Office 
Commission, which is composed of the Speaker, the Deputy Speakers and four members and 
four alternate members elected among MPs403. The Office Commission supervises the 
Parliament’s administration and takes decisions concerning the appointment of committee 
secretaries or parliamentary civil servants404. The Parliamentary Office is structured into six 
units focused on legislative matters, committee matters, international affairs, communications, 
information services and administrative matters. The Eduskunta has approximately 430 civil 
servants as of 2016. The parliamentary administration reached its highest number of employees 
in 2008, as illustrated by the following graph. Overall, the number of civil servants fluctuated 
only minimally and remained quite stable since 2005. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
400 Parliament’s rules of procedure, 17 december 1999, Section 7 and 8. 
401 Parliament’s rules of procedure, 17 december 1999, Section 5 
402 Idem, Section 1. 
403 Parliament’s rules of procedure, 17 december 1999, Chapter 7 — Administration of the Parliament, Section 72 
— Office Commission. 
404 Idem, Section 73 — Duties of the Office Commission. 
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Figure 55: Evolution of parliamentary staff (in total), Eduskunta, 1997-2016 
 
Note: MPs' personal assistants are not included 
Sources: Own calculations based on committee statistics, Eduskunta; Annual parliamentary reports 2003, 2004, 
2005, 2006, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2014, 2015, 2016. 
The Secretariat for EU affairs, which endorses also the role of GC secretariat, supports MPs’ 
work on EU affairs. Further details about this unit will be outlined in the section 7.2.2.  
 
7.1.1.3 The Chancellor of Justice, the Parliamentary Ombudsman and the Constitutional Law 
Committee 
 
Contrary to Austria and Luxembourg, Finland has no Constitutional Court. Instead, two 
bodies monitor the legality of decisions and one body controls the constitutionality of legislative 
proposals. The Chancellor of Justice and the Parliamentary Ombudsman are both responsible 
for the oversight of the legality of governmental, ministerial or presidential decisions. The 
position of Chancellor of Justice exists since 1713 and is attached to the Government405. The 
President of the Republic nominates both the Chancellor of Justice and the Deputy Chancellor 
of Justice406. The Parliamentary Ombudsman is elected by the Eduskunta and was initially 
established in 1919. Both bodies examine separate matters. Additionally to the Government and 
President of the Republic, the Ombudsman also oversees Defence forces and prisons. The 
Chancellor of Justice controls among others the legality of actions of courts of law, civil 
servants and public employees407. Both review written complaints or can take the initiative to 
investigate a matter. They can exchange complaints if the transfer is justified.  
The Chancellor of Justice gives information to and drafts opinions on legal issues and 
legislative drafts for the Government, ministries and the President. The Chancellor participates 
in meetings of the Council of State and to presidential meetings of the Government408. The 
Ombudsman can attend these meetings, but has no obligation to do so. Both the Chancellor of 
 
405 https://www.okv.fi/en/ (last accessed 13.06.2019) 
406 The Constitution of Finland, 11 June 1999, Section 69. 
407 The Constitution of Finland, 11 June 1999, Section 108. 
408 Idem, Section 111. 
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Justice and the Parliamentary Ombudsman submit reports to the Eduskunta. Annual and special 
reports are sent to the Constitutional Law Committee, which is examining the content and 
organising hearings with the corresponding experts from each institution. The latter can both 
participate in plenary sessions whenever their reports are being handled409. 
The Eduskunta’s Constitutional Law Committee, which exerts a “quasi-judicial function 
of interpreting the Constitution”, examines the constitutionality of legislative proposals and the 
relation to international treaties (Ojanen, p 251, 2013). The committee checks if international 
treaties and EU legislative acts are compatible with the Finnish Constitution. On top of these 
functions, the committee also checks ministerial responsibility and reports from the Chancellor 
of Justice, the Parliamentary Ombudsman and the Government. In the framework of the 
constitutionality check, Parliament and other institutions usually consider the opinions of the 
Constitutional Law Committee as binding, due to its non-partisan approach and independence 
towards parties and Government (Ojanen, 2007). In the case of EU law, the Finnish Constitution 
is almost silent about provisions related to EU affairs. Only domestic legal enactments can 
integrate an international treaty in the Finnish legal system. Parliament ratifies international 
obligations with a majority of votes. A two-thirds majority is required whenever an international 
treaty is in conflict with the Constitution. The Constitutional Law Committee determines the 
relation between the international treaty and the Constitution and decides whether a simple or 
a two-thirds majority is needed. The legislative provisions of international treaty are 
implemented through an Act of Parliament and are adopted in the Eduskunta according to the 
same rules as the ratification of international treaties. Whenever an international treaty 
contradicts the Finnish Constitution, no constitutional amendment is required (Ojanen, 2007).  
The Constitutional Law Committee’s interpretation of the constitutionality of an 
international treaty changed with the Constitutional Reform of 2000. Before 2000, the 
constitutionality of an international act was measured solely based on a strict interpretation of 
the sovereignty principle. An international treaty was thus declared as unconstitutional if it 
entailed a transfer of power from the national to the supranational level (Ojanen, 2007). Since 
2000, the Constitutional Law Committee changed its perception of sovereignty. The latter is 
now understood in a more flexible way due to Finland’s EU membership and the obligations 
ensuing from it. Limitations on Finland’s sovereignty emanating from EU legislation or treaties 
are now seen as compatible with the Finnish Constitution. This change of understanding applied 
to all EU and intergovernmental treaties adopted after 2000. The Constitutional Law Committee 
played a crucial role in the interpretation of the constitutionality of EU treaties.  
 
7.1.1.4 Social partnership  
 
Just as Luxembourg and Austria, Finland has a corporatist culture characterised by 
strong interest groups and their close links to Parliament and Government (Arter, 2000; Raunio, 
2004). There are four main trade unions that exert significant influence on the decision-making 
process: the Central Trade Union Organisation SAK, the Confederation of Unions for Academic 
 
409 Idem, Section 48. 
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Professionals in Finland AKAVA, the Finnish Confederation of Salaried Employees STTK and 
the Central Union of Agricultural Producers and Forest Owners MTK (Raunio/Wiberg, In: 
Strøm/Müller/Bergman, 2006). The labour movement was established at the beginning of the 
20th century, in response to the creation of the Confederation of Finnish Employers STK in 1907 
(Pesonen/Riihinen, 2002). The influence of trade union organisations on the Finnish society is 
substantial. Labour union confederations are composed of trade union federations and 
associations. The MTK does not belong to the labour market organisations such as SAK, STTK 
and AKAVA, but counts among the most influential organisations on the decision making 
process. Additionally to the labour movements, the Confederation of Finnish Industries EK is 
also an influential lobbyist in Finland. The EK represents the interests of 24 member 
associations and 15 300 member companies410.  
The SAK was founded in 1907 as the Finnish Federation of Trade Unions and is the 
largest confederation in Finland. Due to internal conflicts between leftist parties represented in 
the federation, the Social Democrats decided to leave and to establish in 1930 the Confederation 
of Finnish Trade Unions SAK (Raunio/Laine, In: Allern/Bale, 2017). Nowadays, the SAK has 
twenty-one member unions and approximately one million members from public and private 
sectors411. The STTK was originally founded as the Intellectual Employment Union in 1922, 
before becoming the STTK in 1946. The confederation has more than 600 000 members in 18 
unions. It represents nurses, health and social care professionals, technical engineers and 
secretaries. The AKAVA was established in 1950 and counts more than 600 000 members in 
36 unions412. It represents workers with higher-level education and students. MTK represents 
more than 310 000 farmers, forest owners and rural entrepreneurs413. The union was established 
in 1917.  
Trade union confederations have close contacts with the Government in the framework 
of the tripartite negotiations, but also with the Parliament. Their impact on the legislative 
process thus happens ex-ante, before the government bill is transferred to Parliament, but also 
during the negotiations in Parliament. For instance, interviewees from SAK and AKAVA stated 
that trade union confederations participate in tripartite meetings organised by the Government, 
as well as the EU sub-committee meetings of ministries. In these meetings, they can discuss EU 
legislation and government policies. The frequency of cooperation with trade union 
representatives varies between ministries, depending on the agenda. For instance, the current 
discussions on Finland’s EU Presidency in 2019 fuelled more frequent exchanges. Aside from 
that, trade union representatives have the possibility to meet ministers directly. 
Cooperation with Parliament happens through different channels: they can participate in 
official parliamentary hearings in committees if they are invited, they can meet individual MPs, 
they can send opinions to Parliament or they can influence informally the legislative process 
through their affiliated members in political parties. Cooperation with parliamentary sectoral 
committees happens mostly on topics close to the trade unions’ priorities, such as labour, 
 
410 https://ek.fi/en/ (last accessed 13.06.2019) 
411 https://www.sak.fi/ (last accessed 13.06.2019) 
412 https://www.akava.fi/ (last accessed 13.06.2019) 
413 https://www.mtk.fi/ (last accessed 13.06.2019) 
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education or immigration. Contacts with the Grand Committee are rare and debates on EU 
affairs do not happen often compared to domestic issues.  
Labour unions and specific political parties maintain very strong links, even though 
trade unions are supposed to be officially politically independent (Bergholm, 2012). For 
instance, MPs with trade union memberships represented a majority in the Eduskunta after the 
elections in 2003 and 2011. In both cases, approximately 120 out of 200 MPs were or have been 
members of unions414. The success of unionised candidates can be explained by the strong 
support provided by their national union and the local branches. In 2011, 60 elected MPs were 
affiliated in an AKAVA member union, 39 MPs in the SAK and 22 MPs in unions of the STTK. 
The SDP and the True Finns dominated the SAK in 2015, closely followed by the VAS. Almost 
28% of SAK representatives chose to belong respectively to the SDP and the True Finns during 
the Eduskunta elections in 2015. Within the AKAVA, the strongest party is the KOK, followed 
by the Greens VIHR and the Centre KESK (Raunio/Laine, p.108, In: Allern/Bale, 2017). The 
SDP and the KOK are both strong within the STTK. However, the Chair of the STTK came 
systematically from the SDP (Raunio/Laine, In: Allern/Bale, 2017). The close ties between 
SAK members and the SDP translate into regular common meetings, be it within the SDP 
working groups, the party bodies, the respective youth organisations, SAK meetings or on the 
personal level between “trade union MPs” (Raunio/Laine, p.100, In: Allern/Bale, 2017). Most 
SDP party officials have worked in the SAK before. Personal ties are also strong between SDP 
and STTK representatives. The VAS has personal contacts and personnel overlap with the SAK, 
but not to the same extent as the SDP-SAK relations. The high density of trade union 
organisations and their strong relationship to political parties makes them unavoidable 
stakeholders of the decision-making process. For some parties such as the SDP, trade union 
confederations can serve as a communication forum for politicians (Hastings, In: De 
Waele/Escalona/Vieira, 2013).  
Finnish trade union organisations have also established regular contacts with the EU 
level. SAK, STTK and AKAVA are members of the European Trade Union Confederation 
(ETUC) and cooperate actively with Nordic Countries, Baltic countries and Russia. EK is 
member of “BusinessEurope”, the European association for employers, commerce and industry. 
Both EK and the three main trade union confederations are represented in the European 
Economic and Social Committee, in the European Social Dialogue and in numerous European 
bodies. Trade union and employers’ associations have established offices in Brussels to follow-
up daily EU matters. The EK established a permanent office in Brussels in 1974. The MTK is 
also represented in Brussels since 1991 and is a member of the European Farmers and 
Cooperatives’ organisation Copa-Cogeca. The main Finnish trade unions have an EU office, 
“FinUnions”, which is managed every year by a representative of one of the trade union 
confederations415. FinUnions cooperates with the Permanent Representation of Finland in 
 
414 13.04.2003, Present and former trade union members a clear majority in the new Parliament, 
https://www.sak.fi/en/materials/news/present-and-former-trade-union-members-clear-majority-new-parliament 
(last accessed 13.06.2019) ; 24.04.2011, Most MPs of the new Parliament are rank and file members of trade 
unions, https://www.sak.fi/en/materials/news/most-mps-new-parliament-are-rank-and-file-members-trade-unions 
(last accessed 13.06.2019). 
415 https://www.finunions.org/finunions (last accessed 13.06.2019) 
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Brussels, but also with Finnish MEPs. Meetings are organised between them and 
representatives of the trade union confederations in Brussels. Contacts happen less frequently 
between individual trade union representatives and EU representatives. Additionally, each trade 
union confederation has an EU affairs department on the national level. For instance, the 
AKAVA and the SAK both have a head of international affairs that monitors EU matters and 
informs members on issues of interest. 
 
7.1.1.5 Political Parties 
 
The Finnish party system is highly fragmented and multipolar. Political fragmentation 
translates into a left-right cleavage between the right-wing parties KOK, SFP/RKP, KD and 
KESK and the left-wing parties SDP and VAS. The True Finns (PS) emerged as a strong party 
only after the 2011 elections and represent mostly the rural areas (Raunio/Wiberg, In: 
Strøm/Müller/Bergman, 2006). While Finland was considered as a case of extreme multipartism 
in the 1960s, it transformed into a “convergent party system (Arter, 2009) marked by a 
contraction in the policy distance between the parties and a shift to stable, broad-based 
government” (Arter, 2012). Electoral campaigns are usually non-conflictual because coalition 
governments are the rule (Karvonen, 2014). Until the 2011 elections, parties did not take sharp 
political positions to avoid conflicts. Only individual candidates competed mutually due to the 
party-list proportional representation system (Pesonen/Riihinen, 2002). Small parties make 
alliances to gain more seats in Parliament. Compromises and concessions found party strategies, 
because none manages to win more than 25% of votes during legislative elections. The 
fragmented party system thus facilitates consensual practices and ideological congruence 
between parties wishing to form a coalition (Raunio, 2012).  
The 2011 parliamentary elections represented a drastic change, as the True Finns used 
a more conflictual rhetoric to attract voters. According to Karvonen, there are no parties larger 
than their main competitors (Karvonen, 2014). Parties on the left side of the political spectrum 
tend to be weak and liberal parties are non-existent. Party and group discipline is particularly 
strong because government cabinets depend on the will of the parliamentary majority, 
especially of party leaders (Raunio/Wiberg, 2008). Strong party cohesion also means that 
Government tends to control parliamentary activity of MPs belonging to coalition parties 
(Raunio/Wiberg, In: Strøm/Müller/Bergman, 2006). Parliamentary groups dominate the 
Eduskunta, where parties and not individual MPs make decisions (Heidar/Koole, 2000).  
Until the 2011 elections, three main parties dominated the political landscape: the Social 
Democratic Party (SDP), the National Coalition Party (KOK) and the Centre Party (KESK). 
The True Finns came in the limelight when they won 19% of the votes during the 2011 electoral 
campaign. The oldest Finnish party is the Social Democratic Party (SDP) founded in 1899. Its 
core voters were industrial workers and urban wage-earners. The SDP is close to major labour 
unions, such as the SAK (Karvonen, 2014). The SDP is currently in opposition after losing 
votes in the 2015 elections, but participated in almost all coalition cabinets since 1999. The 
Centre Party was founded in 1906 and represents the Finnish rural population. Until 1965, the 
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party was called the “Agrarian Union”. The KESK has been the dominant party in Finland since 
its establishment and is still relying on its agrarian roots. The conservative National Coalition 
party (KOK) was founded in 1918 and represents the business elite and the educated upper 
classes (Karvonen, 2014). The KOK gained substantial votes during the 2007 elections and is 
currently in the coalition composed of the KESK and the Blue Reform Party. The latter was 
created in 2017 after the split of the True Finns (PS). The True Finns were established in 1995 
after the dissolution of the Finnish Rural Party. The PS is a nationalist and conservative party 
that gained substantial votes during the 2011 elections. In June 2017, 19 MPs decided to leave 
the True Finns in protest against the nomination of a new party leader. They created the far-
right Blue Reform Party, which is also considered to be a conservative and populist party. While 
the Blue Reform Party stayed in government, the True Finns went into opposition. The Green 
League (VIHR) was founded in 1983 and emerged from actions led in the 1970s raising 
awareness on environmental issues. The VIHR attracts mostly young urban voters. The Green 
League was the first Green party in Europe to participate in a governmental coalition. Since 
1999, the VIHR was represented in four coalition formations. The Left Alliance was founded 
in 1990 after the collapse of Finnish communism and positions itself on the left, as a reformed 
socialist party. Its origins lie in the People’s Democratic League of Finland, which was 
dominated by the Finnish Communist Party (Dunphy, 2007). The Swedish People’s Party 
(SFP/RKP) was founded in 1906 and represents the Swedish-speaking community in Finland. 
The party has a centrist moderate position and was represented in government from 1999 until 
2015. Finally, the Christian Democratic Party (KD) is a centrist party that was established in 
1958 as the Finnish Christian League, originating from the Christian faction of the National 
Coalition Party. The KD took its current denomination in 2001. The KD is a small opposition 
party that participated twice in coalition governments between 1999 and today.  
After the “six-pack” coalitions established without the Centre Party between 2011 and 
2014, the 2015 elections saw the re-emergence of the Centre Party in the government and the 
first participation of the True Finns in the coalition. The KESK became again the first political 
party with over 21% of the votes cast. The National Coalition came second with over 18% of 
votes and the True Finns third with 17,7%416. The emergence of the True Finns as serious 
political counterpart represented a challenge for the mainstream parties. Indeed, relations within 
Government and Parliament were affected by the new political constellation. The two biggest 
parties KESK and KOK had to find compromises with a populist and Eurosceptic party. Within 
Government, the True Finns and since 2017 the Blue Reform Party, are leading among others 
the Ministry for Foreign Affairs managed by Timo Soini417 and the Ministry for European 
Affairs headed by Sampo Terho. The distribution of these ministries to the populists might be 
explained by the wish of the KESK and KOK to keep the True Finns and the Blue Reform Party 
away from domestic affairs. The populist rhetoric might thus be tampered in ministries that 
 
416 https://www.stat.fi/til/evaa/2015/evaa_2015_2015-04-30_tie_001_en.html (last accessed 13.06.2019) 
417 Timo Soini was the co-founder and long-term leader of the True Finns. In March 2017, he announced his 
resignation from the party leadership. The selection of a new contested party chairman led to a break with the 
Prime Minister Sipilä, who refused to cooperate with the new chairman defending more radical views. Timo Soini 
decided to create a new parliamentary group to stay in government and was consequently expelled from the True 
Finns. The Blue Reform parliamentary group became a party in July 2017. 
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have to represent Finland in the EU and on the international stage. Key ministries remain 
between the hands of the mainstream parties. 
According to Raunio, European integration has always been a difficult subject for 
political parties since Finland joined the EU (Raunio/Wiberg, In: Brouard/Costa/König, 2012). 
Parties kept “a fairly low profile in integration matters” (Raunio/Wiberg, p.61, In: 
Brouard/Costa/König, 2012) and the consensual practices in EU affairs on the national level led 
to their de-politicisation. We can overturn this argument since the growing influence and radical 
rhetoric of the True Finns after 2011. The 1994 referendum on Finland’s accession to the EU 
showed the discrepancies between and within parties on European integration (Raunio, 2005). 
The KOK, SFP and SDP were the three most supportive parties of EU membership, while 
divisions reigned within the KESK, the VAS and the Greens. For instance, only 24% of VAS 
supporters voted in favour of EU membership in 1994 (Raunio/Wiberg, 2001). Within the 
KESK, 22 out of 55 MPs rejected the EU membership application in 1992 (Raunio, 1999). In 
1994, the KESK Congress decided after all to support membership. The Christian Union (KD) 
and the Rural Party (PS) were both against membership.  
Nowadays, the majority of parties are pro-integrationists, contrary to their voters. EU 
critical positions are found in the Blue Reform Party (True Finns previously), as well as the 
Left Alliance, the Christian Democrats and some groups within the Centre Party (Laursen, In: 
Carbone, 2010). The True Finns were against the EU, criticising its elitist bureaucracy, 
federalisation and centralisation tendencies, its negative impact on national sovereignty and its 
immigration policy (Raunio, 2012). The Greens defend a moderate EU line. The SDP, KOK 
and SFP count among the most united parties on EU integration. Overall, Finnish parties are 
not per se pro-federalists, but defend a rather state-centric view of the European integration 
(Raunio, In: Maurer/Wessels, 2001; Raunio/Wiberg, In: Strøm/Müller/Bergman, 2006). The 
discourse of a Europe of independent and sovereign nations is present in almost all the Finnish 
parties, be they pro-integrationists or Eurosceptics. The following table sums up each party’s 
positions on EU affairs in the wake of main parliamentary elections since 1999. 
Figure 56: Parties’ position on European integration, Finland 
 2003 2007 2011 
KESK - Promotes European 
environmental and climate policy 
- Finland needs more EU regional 
funds 
- Clarity about EU subsidies 
- Promotes reform of EU 
decision-making 
- Enhancement of EU's global 
competitiveness 
- Promotes EU enlargement 
- Defence of Finnish interests in 
EU decision-making 
- Strengthening of EU 
international role 
- Deepen CFSP, development of 
crisis management capabilities 
- EU as added-value for 
Finland 
- Finland's interests should be 
taken into account in EU's 
policies, notably CAP 
- Favours Turkey's accession 
to the EU 
- Promotes Finnish security 
policy Favours participation in 
civilian missions led by EU 
Nordic dimension 
SDP - Promotes CFSP, military non-
alignment and security options 
for Finland 
- Controlled EU enlargement 
Favours EU treaty reforms 
- EU as social and democratic 
community 
- Favours European Social 
dimension and solidarity 
- Favours civilian crisis 
management in CFSP 
- Strengthening of EU-Russia 
relations and Nordic dimension 
- Euro area crisis: decrease 
state debt 
296 
 
KOK - No mention of EU - EU as added-value for 
Finland's interests 
- Limitation of EU's 
competences 
- Support of EU climate policy 
- EU as added-value for 
Finland 
- Strengthening of CFSP and 
peacekeeping missions 
- Pursue Nordic cooperation 
and Russia-Finland relations 
VAS - Finland should participate in 
conflict prevention, consolidation 
of peace and democracy within 
EU framework 
- Stop tax competition in EU 
- Tax harmonisation in EU 
- Favours environmental-
friendly and sustainable EU 
economic policy 
- Promotes Social Europe 
- Strengthening of EP powers 
- Strengthening of environment 
and climate policy 
- Development of EU civilian 
crisis management 
- Supports EU's climate policy 
- Peacekeeping main priority 
for non-aligned Finland 
PS - Protectionist agricultural policy 
- EU of independent states 
- Maintain Finland's sovereignty 
- Rejects EU Constitutional 
Treaty 
- Referenda on EU treaty reforms 
Against federalism 
- Against Turkey's accession to 
EU 
- Against EMU 
- Favours national referendum 
on EU treaty 
- Favours intergovernmentalism 
- Preservation of state 
sovereignty 
- Finland does not benefit from 
CAP; Protectionism in 
agricultural policy 
- Against EU immigration 
policy 
- Strengthening of 
"Finnishness" 
- EU undemocratic and 
ineffective 
- Preservation of Finland's 
sovereignty and limit EU's 
competences 
- Against Turkey's accession 
to EU 
- EU membership should not 
be anchored in Constitution 
-Favours national referenda on 
EU treaties 
- Finnish EU membership 
uncertain 
- Against CFSP as federalist 
project 
VIHR - Favours military non-alignment 
- Against CFSP 
- EU should focus on crisis 
management 
- EU as key player of 
globalisation 
- Favours strong transparent EU 
- Against EU bureaucracy 
- Civilian crisis management 
within CFSP 
- Favours participation in CFSP 
- Supports EU environmental 
policy 
- Favours strong and 
democratic EU 
- Citizens and minorities 
should have more rights in  
EU 
- Favours ecological and 
sustainable EU 
- Supports EU as leader in 
climate policy 
- Cooperation with other MS 
in CFSP 
KD - No mention of EU - Maintain good relations with 
Russia 
- Promotes Nordic cooperation 
- Renegotiation of EU 
Constitutional Treaty 
- Clear distribution of EU/MS 
competences 
- Equality between MS 
- Preservation of Finland's 
interests 
- Independent foreign and 
security policy 
- Focus on EU's peacekeeping 
and humanitarian missions  
- EU's Christian identity 
- Supports subsidiarity 
principle 
- Limited distribution of 
competences and preservation 
of MS sovereignty 
- EU taxes to finance EU 
budget 
SFP - Finnish ecological agricultural 
model as example for EU 
- Promotes Nordic cooperation 
and Swedish language 
- EU regional policy needs to be 
reformed 
- Special conditions for Finnish 
agriculture in CAP 
- Strengthening of Nordic 
cooperation 
- Favours more EU integration 
to tackle the euro crisis 
Sources: Kristillisdemokraatit 2003, Aani ihmiselle - anna omatuntosi paattaa; Keskustan vaalikirja, 
Eduskuntavaalit 2003; SDP:n vaaliohjelma 2003, Varma vaihtoehto- tyolla turvaamme hyvinvointiyhteiskunnan; 
Vihrean liiton eduskuntavaaliohjelma 2003; Vasemmistoliiton vaaliohjelma eduskuntavaaleissa 
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2003;KOKOOMUS EDUSKUNTAVAALIT 2003, Tavoitteet ja hintalaput; Ruotsalainen kansanpuolue, 
Vaalijulistus 2003; Perussuomalaisten Eduskuntavaaliohjelma 2003; Kristillisdemokraatit, 
Riksdagsvalprogrammet Tro det eller ej, 2006; Suomen Keskusta, Keskustan tavoitteet vaalikaudelle 2007-2011, 
2006; Vasemmistoliitto, Eduskuntavaaliohjelma 2007, 2006; SDP:n Vaaliohjelma, Reilu Suomi – työtä ja 
välittämistä, 2006; Vihreät, Eduskuntavaaliohjelma 2007; Kookomus, Vastuullinen markkinatalous, 2006; SFP, 
Riksdagsvalsprogram 2007; Perussuomalaiset rp., Eduskuntavaaliohjelma 2007; Kristillisdemokraattien 
vaaliohjelma 2011–2015; Suomen Keskusta, Vaaliohjelma vuoden 2011 eduskuntavaaleihin, Koko Suomi, kaikki 
suomalaiset; SDP, TYÖN JA OIKEUDENMUKAISUUDEN PUOLESTA, 2011; Vihreä tehtävä 2010–2014; 
Vasemmistoliiton eduskuntavaalien 2011 vaaliohjelma; KOKOOMUKSEN EDUSKUNTAVAALIOHJELMA 
2011; SFP Valprogram, Riksdagsvalet 2011; Suomalaiselle sopivin, Perussuomalaiset r.p:n 
eduskuntavaaliohjelma 2011 
 
7.1.2 The legislative process: rules and procedures 
7.1.2.1 The legislative process step by step 
 
According to Section 70 of the Finnish Constitution, legislative initiatives can emanate 
from a government proposal or a legislative motion submitted by an MP. A government 
proposal can originate from statements made by Parliament or in the government programme, 
from citizen initiatives, an EU act requiring implementation in the national legal system, 
ministries’ own initiatives, etc418. Before a government proposal is transferred to Parliament, 
the legislative draft is prepared and assessed by the Finnish Council of Regulatory Impact 
Analysis. Once the government draft bill has been assessed, the consultation phase starts. The 
proposal is sent to the concerned stakeholders, who can give their opinion. The responsible 
ministry makes the necessary changes once the consultation process has finished. Drafts are 
translated in Swedish and their final version is presented to the Council of State for examination. 
If the proposal contains any financial impacts, the Cabinet Finance Committee examines the 
matter as well. Before the matter is sent to the Council of State, the government proposal can 
be debated in ministerial working groups, cabinet committees, informal government sessions 
or political meetings where parliamentary groups from all political sides can participate419. 
Once the Council of State has voted and accepted the proposal, it is sent to the Eduskunta.  
Until the 1990s, decision-making in the government cabinets was collegial and 
centralised. In the mid-1990s, the practices evolved towards the decentralisation of decisions in 
the government bodies (Paloheimo, In: Karvonen/Paloheimo/Raunio, 2016). Once arrived in 
Parliament, the Speaker announces in plenary session the arrival of a government proposal420. 
The Eduskunta organises a preliminary debate in plenary session to decide, on the proposal of 
the Speaker’s Council, which sectoral committee will be responsible for the examination of the 
government draft bill or legislative initiative421. Parliament can decide to transfer a matter to 
several committees whenever different competences are required. The Eduskunta has 15 
permanent committees and a Grand Committee. The committee system has been adapted to 
ministries’ competences in the 1990s to improve the scrutiny of sectoral matters (Anckar et al., 
2015). Within committees, the parliamentary administration drafts reports on government bills 
which are presented by the committee chair, because the position of “rapporteur” does not exist. 
 
418 http://lainvalmistelu.finlex.fi/en/ (last accessed 13.06.2019) 
419 http://lainvalmistelu.finlex.fi/en/5-valtioneuvoston-paatoksenteko/#esittely (last accessed 13.06.2019) 
420 Section 19, Parliament’s Rules of Procedure, 1999. 
421 Idem, Section 32. 
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Individual MPs can also draft dissenting opinions if they wish to express a different view on a 
matter422. 
Once the designated committee has examined the matter and organised expert hearings, 
the draft is sent back to plenary, where it goes through two readings (Isaksson, In: 
Karvonen/Paloheimo/Raunio, 2016). Before the constitutional reform of 2000, legislative 
proposals and government draft bills were submitted to three readings in parliament. Nowadays, 
the first reading permits the examination of the draft and the submission of amendments by 
opposition MPs (Pesonen/Riihinen, 2002). The second reading is dedicated to the vote on the 
draft bill (Section 72, Finnish Constitution). Once an Act has been adopted in parliament, it has 
to be submitted to the President of the Republic for confirmation (Section 77 of the Finnish 
Constitution). During plenary sessions, question times and topical debates can be organised 
depending on the decision of the Speaker’s Council423. Additionally, MPs can submit oral or 
written questions to ministers. The following scheme illustrates the legislative process in 
Finland. 
Figure 57: Legislative process in Finland 
 
 
 
422 Idem, Section 42. 
423 Idem, Section 25 and 26. 
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Just as in the Austrian National Council, party dynamics play a significant role in the 
Eduskunta throughout the legislative process. Parliamentary groups related to coalition parties 
exert the most influence. Opposition MPs are largely outnumbered by majority MPs who 
support their Government’s policy. According to Raunio and Wiberg, the Government’s 
influence on the legislative process through the parliamentary groups in Parliament weakens 
the Eduskunta’s own participation rights, because “the bulk of parliamentary business consists 
of reacting to initiatives from the government” (Raunio/Wiberg, p595, 2008). Furthermore, 
whenever the opposition criticises government policies, dissident views are expressed by single 
MPs instead of whole parliamentary groups. 
 
7.1.2.2 The handling of EU affairs on the national level 
 
Just as in Luxembourg, consensual political practices prevail in EU affairs to guarantee 
effective influence and coherence on the EU level through national unity (Paloheimo, In: 
Karvonen/Paloheimo/Raunio, 2016; Tans/Zoethout/Peters, 2007; Raunio, In: 
Hefftler/Neuhold/Rozenberg/Smith, 2015; Raunio, 2016). Contrary to domestic matters, EU 
affairs also enable opposition MPs to play an important role, as their backing of the 
Government’s EU policy is needed in case of negotiations on the EU level. Finnish elites tend 
to have a pragmatic approach on EU matters (Raunio, In: Maurer/Wessels, 2001). The EU is 
seen as a way to defend Finnish national interests such as the country’s security and economic 
stability, but also to secure its position in the West as a small state (Antola, In: Laursen, 2006; 
Tans/Zoethout/Peters, 2007). The EU is thus seen as a means to protect the rights of small states. 
These logics are applied to the domestic EU coordination system. According to Raunio, the 
latter is designed to “manufacture national unanimity, or at least broad elite consensus” (Raunio, 
p. 317, 2016). Ideological conflicts over EU issues were almost non-existent until the 2011 
elections. The True Finns began to politicise the issues during the electoral campaign and the 
management of the economic crisis. 
EU affairs in Finland are government-driven, just as the domestic legislative process 
(Raunio, In: Karvonen/Paloheimo/Raunio, 2016). However, the Eduskunta’s acceptance is 
required whenever international treaties with legislative obligations need to be ratified424. The 
main challenge with Finland’s EU accession consisted in separating EU affairs from foreign 
policy and delimiting accordingly the competences of the Prime Minister and the President. 
According to Section 93 of the Finnish Constitution, the President of the Republic together with 
the Government manage foreign policy. The Government leads the Finnish EU coordination 
system425. The latter stayed unchanged since Finland’s EU accession. Within the Prime 
Minister’s Office, the Government EU Affairs Department coordinates EU matters, prepares 
European Council meetings, instructs the Finnish Permanent Representation in Brussels and 
supervises the good functioning of the coordination system. Until 2000, the Department was 
under the responsibility of the Foreign Affairs Minister (Raunio, In: 
 
424 The Constitution of Finland, 11 June 1999, Section 94. 
425 See https://valtioneuvosto.fi/en/government/eu-affairs (last accessed 13.06.2019) 
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Karvonen/Paloheimo/Raunio, 2016). It serves as a secretariat for the Ministerial Committee on 
EU affairs and the Committee for EU affairs (Johansson/Raunio, 2010).  
The Ministerial Committee on EU affairs meets every Friday and discusses EU affairs 
before parliamentary plenary sessions. The Prime Minister chairs the committee, which 
prepares meetings of the Council of the EU. Whenever matters are within the competences of 
the Aland Islands, the chair of the Aland Government can participate in meetings of the 
Ministerial Committee on EU Affairs. Finally, the Committee for EU Affairs is composed of 
ministry representatives, the Office of the President and the Chancellor of Justice, the Bank of 
Finland and the Aland Government whenever matters fall within the Province’s 
competences426. It serves as a cooperation body between the different ministries. Additionally, 
the Committee for EU Affairs has established 37 EU sub-committees in each ministry, 
responsible for the preparation of sector-specific EU matters. For instance, the Ministry of 
Agriculture has an EU affairs sub-committee on agriculture and food (EU18), which forms the 
Finnish position on agricultural policy on the EU level. The Ministry for Social Affairs and 
Health chairs six EU sub-committees, such as the sub-committee EU16 “insurance services” or 
EU25 “social affairs”. The EU sub-committees are composed of civil servants from the 
competent ministries. Interest groups can also participate in EU sub-committee meetings. The 
preparation of EU affairs at the ministerial level is supported by the information management 
system EUTORI established at the beginning of the EU membership as the Eurodoc system. 
Each ministerial coordinator responsible for EU affairs registers and archives EU documents in 
the EUTORI system. Once an EU matter has been prepared in the above-mentioned government 
bodies, the Council of State transfers it to the Parliament. Within the Eduskunta, the Grand 
Committee is the main responsible for the examination of EU affairs, supported by opinions 
from sectoral committees. 
 
7.1.3 Conclusions 
 
This part outlined the Finnish political system and its characteristics. Just as 
Luxembourg and Austria before the European economic crisis, consensual practices prevailed 
in Finland. The main reason is the multiplicity of political parties and their ideological 
proximity on the left-right spectrum. Government coalitions are usually composed of large 
majorities, which strengthens Government’s influence on Parliament through the parliamentary 
groups. According to Raunio and Wiberg, “the executive and parliament are often so 
intertwined that measuring their independent influence in decision-making is at best very 
difficult” (Raunio/Wiberg, 2008). Just as in Austria, Finnish political parties have a particularly 
strong anchorage in society and the corporatist culture is well developed. A large proportion of 
party members and MPs come from interest group organisations, such as trade union 
confederations. The influence of trade unions on the legislative process in parliament might 
thus be strong.   
 
426 Act on the Autonomy of Aland, Chapter 9 a European Union affairs (30 January 2004/68) Section 59 a (30 
January 2004/68) Preparation of national positions  
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EU affairs are more consensual than domestic affairs, even though they tended to 
become politicised after the True Finns gained substantial votes in 2011 and established a strong 
populist rhetoric. However, compromises are still the usual practice in governmental and 
parliamentary interactions to ensure a unanimous European position. The electoral system also 
forces ideological consensus on EU affairs. Consequently, parties are not representative of the 
Eurosceptic Finnish population. The Finnish EU coordination system counts among the 
strongest in the EU, because it enables every minister to participate in the preparation of EU 
affairs and to contribute to Finland’s EU policy.  
To conclude, external constraints weighing on parliamentary activity are numerous. The 
legislative process is government-driven and parties exert considerable influence on the 
Eduskunta through their groups. The close ties between parties and trade union confederations 
might also affect MPs’ activities and positioning on EU issues. Within Parliament, the judicial 
powers of the Constitutional Law Committee might also influence the way it handles EU affairs, 
especially EU treaties. Whether a treaty is adopted with simple or two-thirds majority might 
determine parliamentary groups’ voting strategies. 
 
7.2 Parliamentary participation rights in EU affairs: current status quo 
 
The present section will focus on the Eduskunta’s participation rights in EU affairs and 
the corresponding parliamentary actors involved. As we will see, Parliament’s formal capacities 
barely evolved since Finland’s accession to the EU. One reason is the emphasis that was put 
from the very beginning on designing a particularly strong scrutiny system. The structure of the 
parliamentary administration aims to support mainly committee work. The decentralised 
scrutiny of EU affairs forces sectoral committees to get involved. Moreover, parliamentary 
groups play a significant role in EU scrutiny, especially those with close links to government 
parties. We assume that Parliament’s formal capacities might encourage mainstreaming trends 
in EU affairs, therefore giving first insights into hypothesis H2. We use legal documents 
(Finnish Constitution, Parliament’s Rules of Procedure) and interviews with civil servants from 
the parliamentary administration, MPs (current and former) and EU advisors from 
parliamentary groups to outline Parliament’s participation rights in EU affairs. In the 
Europeanisation literature, the Finnish Eduskunta has been unanimously considered as having 
one of the strongest EU scrutiny systems among national parliaments in the European Union427. 
 
7.2.1 The legal basis of parliamentary participation in EU affairs 
 
The Eduskunta’s understanding of EU scrutiny is that EU policy should remain between 
the government’s hands, therefore scrutiny should focus solely on the government. The 
Parliament’s scrutiny system was therefore designed following this principle. Any other 
 
427 Auel/Rozenberg/Tacea, In: Hefftler/Neuhold/Rozenberg/Smith, 2015; Bergman, 2000; Maurer/Wessels, 
2001; Kiiver, 2006; Winzen, 2012. 
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attempts to strengthen parliaments in EU affairs, for instance through interparliamentary 
cooperation, was always perceived with scepticism. It also explains why most scrutiny happens 
in committees and less in plenaries, as Parliament’s goal is to control the Government’s EU 
policy (Raunio, 2016). 
The Eduskunta started to strengthen its participation rights in EU affairs even before 
Finland’s accession to the EU. In 1990, the Foreign Affairs Committee requested that 
Parliament and sectoral committees obtain information on EEA matters to be able to exert 
influence on it through the national channel (Raunio, In: Tans/Zoethout/Peters, 2007). 
According to Raunio, the main political parties consensually agreed on this measure to ensure 
powerful parliamentary participation rights based on the Danish model. In 1991, the Eduskunta 
reformed its committee system, so that committees reflected ministerial jurisdictions. Paving 
its way to participation in EU affairs, the Eduskunta passed an amendment in 1993 revising 
paragraph 33 of the Form of Government Act and paragraph 4 of the Parliament Act in the old 
Constitution (Tiilikainen, 2006). The amendment was entitled “Parliament to take part in the 
national preparation of matters to be decided in international bodies as legislated in the 
Parliament Act” (Raunio, 2001). The amendment laid the foundation of the current sections 93 
and 96 of the Finnish Constitution, anchoring Parliament’s scrutiny and information rights on 
EU matters. The 1993 amendment was transferred without substantial changes to the new 
Constitution in 2000. 
EU membership in 1994 triggered substantial changes both in the Constitution and in 
the parliamentary structures. The Grand Committee became the main coordinating and 
decisional body in EU affairs within Parliament. From the beginning, parliamentary scrutiny 
rights entailed a combination of a strong document- and mandate-based system. According to 
Raunio, the Eduskunta’s EU scrutiny rights are characterised by a strong anchorage in the 
Constitution, an early involvement, unlimited access to government information, regular 
ministerial hearings and decentralisation to sectoral committees (Raunio, In: 
Hefftler/Neuhold/Rozenberg/Smith, 2015). Parliament’s approval of international obligations 
and European affairs is regulated in Section 93 of the Constitution: “The Parliament participates 
in the national preparation of decisions to be made in the European Union, as provided in this 
Constitution”428. Parliament’s approval for treaties containing legislative provisions, such as 
EU treaties, is regulated in Section 94. The explicit participation of the Eduskunta in EU affairs 
is anchored in Section 96, which states that “[…] Parliament considers those proposals for acts, 
agreements and other measures which are to be decided in the European Union and which 
otherwise […] would fall within the competence of the Parliament”429. This section also anchors 
the Parliament’s strong information rights, in addition to Section 47 and 97 of the Constitution.  
Section 96 mentions the so-called “U-matters” that include all EU documents such as 
EU legislation, treaties and budget matters that fall into the competences of the parliament. 
Other EU documents such as EU communications or the EU Multiannual Financial Framework 
are “E-matters” and regulated in Section 97. The Government must transfer without delay all 
 
428 The Constitution of Finland, 11 June 1999, Chapter 8 – International relations, Section 93- Competence in the 
area of foreign policy issues. 
429 Idem, Section 96 – Participation of the Parliament in the national preparation of European Union matters. 
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information on EU matters to the Grand Committee, especially before and after European 
Council and Council meetings. Moreover, the Government has to submit reports to the 
Eduskunta on matters linked to international relations (Section 44). At the beginning of each 
electoral term, the Government also submits a report on Finland’s EU policy objectives. The 
Finnish Constitution limits narrowly the scope of action and position of ministers and the Prime 
Minister. Indeed, the Government is allowed to take only those actions mentioned in the 
Constitution or mandated by act of parliament, which means that no actions in EU affairs can 
be initiated without the approval of the Grand Committee. EU matters that are not 
constitutionally delegated to the government have to pass through parliament.  
Additionally to the Finnish Constitution, the Parliament’s Rules of Procedure also 
contains provisions regulating Parliament’s participation rights in the scrutiny of EU affairs. 
Section 30 of the RoP was amended in 2009 and states that government communications on EU 
affairs must be sent to either the Grand Committee or the Foreign Affairs Committee depending 
on the nature of the matter. The Speaker of the Eduskunta has the responsibility to designate 
which sectoral committee will give an opinion to one of the two committees. The subsidiarity 
control mechanism was also added to the RoP, including the participation of the Aland 
Parliament. The transfer of EU matters to sectoral committees is regulated in Section 32 of the 
RoP, which was amended in 2011 and 2013. According to Section 34 revised in both 2006 and 
2011, committees must give priority to EU matters. Moreover, confidentiality of EU documents 
on Government’s request was anchored in Section 43a of the RoP. What is noticeable about the 
legal basis on participation in EU affairs is the absence of mention of MEPs. The latter are put 
in the same category as external “experts” when invited in committees, and do not benefit from 
a special status within parliament. They are unable to participate on their own initiative in the 
Eduskunta’s committee meetings. According to an interviewee, there have been discussions 
within the Eduskunta on the possibility for MEPs to participate permanently in Grand 
Committee meetings (Interview 5b, 2018). The former MP insists that MEPs could provide 
added value to the Parliament’s work and should be able to access Grand Committee 
documents. However, these discussions are still ongoing. 
Overall, the legal basis of the Eduskunta’s participation rights in EU affairs has not 
changed substantially since 1994 because MPs did not question it (Interviews 4b, 7b and 10b, 
2018). A major constitutional change has been the recognition and explicit mention of Finland’s 
EU membership in the Constitution in 2012 after long-lasting discussions since 1994. The aim 
of this reform was to consolidate constitutional regulation on EU membership (Ojanen, 2013). 
Several other attempts or minor revisions have been made since Finland’s accession. For 
instance, a special working group composed of parliamentary civil servants and MPs was 
responsible to draft suggestions to improve the EU scrutiny procedure in Parliament. Even the 
Government reflected on revisions, such as how to improve the information policy or to draft 
understandable written reports for Parliament. Subsequently, a report was published in 2005, 
but concluded that the scrutiny procedure was satisfying. According to an interviewee, no 
substantial change resulted from the report and conclusions were more a self-congratulation of 
the current system (Interview 2b, 2018). 
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Since 1994, the Eduskunta has barely amended its scrutiny procedures. In 2004, the 
Grand Committee modified its schedule. Its meeting time on Wednesdays and Fridays was re-
adjusted according to a change in the plenaries’ schedule. Nowadays, Grand Committee 
meetings on Fridays start at 13h30 after the plenary, whereas before meetings started earlier 
and had to be interrupted until the end of the plenary (Interview 2b, 2018). In 2006, the 
Eduskunta took over the Finnish Institute for International Affairs (FIIA). The latter was a 
private foundation focused on International Relations. The Parliament saw it as an opportunity 
to obtain factual data on EU affairs that could benefit decision-making. Currently, the FIIA’s 
board is composed among others of three MPs and a member of the Prime Minister’s office. 
However, results are mitigated. In 2007, the committee manual was modified to incorporate EU 
affairs. The manual is addressed to committee chairs and civil servants and contains rules and 
details about parliamentary procedures. Following the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon, a 
second working group on the revision of the Eduskunta’s EU scrutiny procedures was created 
in 2009.  However, results were the same as in 2005 (Interview 2b, 2018). Some MPs took the 
initiative to establish such a working group to undergo a periodic self-assessment. Discussions 
were held for instance on the cooperation with MEPs. We observed that reform initiatives have 
been taken over the last years, but effective change remained minimal. 
 
7.2.2 Parliamentary administration and EU affairs: composition and tasks 
 
Civil servants of the parliamentary administration are recruited via competitive selection 
following a public announcement. They become permanent state officials. Within Parliament, 
the Secretariat for EU affairs, which is also the Grand Committee’s secretariat, is responsible 
for the examination and preparation of EU matters. The Secretariat for EU affairs was created 
in 1995 and is composed of two academic staff, three clerical staff and one technical staff 
(Interview 2b, 2018). The composition of the secretariat did not change since its creation. Back 
in 1995, the current Head of the EU secretariat was the only staff handling EU affairs, as he 
established it. The EU secretariat/Grand Committee (GC) secretariat also deals with EU 
interparliamentary cooperation and other EU related activities. Whenever the GC needs more 
information on a specific policy, it can rely on the staff from other committee secretariats. The 
Foreign Affairs Committee, the second most active in EU affairs, has 5 staff.  
Overall, sectoral committee staff devote about thirty to fifty percent of their time to EU 
business (Interview 2b, 2018). Even though few staff is specialised in these matters, the 
workload of civil servants and sectoral committees in EU affairs has increased due to the latter’s 
transversal nature. However, matters falling within the subsidiarity control get limited attention, 
because the Eduskunta is generally critical towards this mechanism, which does not bring 
substantial added value to parliamentary work. As the GC is the main decisional body in EU 
affairs, only few staff with generalist profiles deal exclusively with these matters. However, 
these few civil servants have a solid knowledge of EU affairs. Indeed, the Head of the GC 
secretariat has a long-term experience in Parliament, as he started to work in the Eduskunta in 
1990 (Interview 2b, 2018). He studied Law in Helsinki and worked in several countries for the 
UN for several years. He participated in the EU pre-accession negotiations on the parliamentary 
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level by being member of a working group that drafted constitutional amendments deriving 
from accession. He also established the Parliament’s current EU scrutiny system from scratch. 
His knowledge is thus not only well-developed on internal parliamentary procedures, but also 
on EU issues. He witnessed the successive procedural revision steps within Parliament since 
Finland’s EU-accession. Therefore, his Europeanised profile and expertise in parliament have 
been forged through his field experience rather than prior knowledge and educational 
background. Whenever interviewed MPs and former MPs talked about the Eduskunta’s scrutiny 
system, they referred to the Head of the Grand Committee secretariat as the founding father of 
the system and senior expert civil servant incarnating somewhat the memory of the Eduskunta’s 
participation in EU affairs.  
The GC secretariat deals mainly with government documents related to EU affairs and 
less directly with EU documents themselves, with exception of those falling into the subsidiarity 
control mechanism. The Government transfers all EU related documents to the GC. Once the 
documents classified as “U-matters” or “E-matters” or those concerning subsidiarity matters 
arrive in the committee, the civil servants are responsible to distribute them to the competent 
sectoral committees. According to the Head of the GC secretariat, the selection happens 
schematically based on a table that he reviews every Thursday after the government session 
(Interview 2b, 2018). He then sends a message to the Speaker’s secretariat to suggest the 
redistribution of issues to sectoral committees. Thus, the Head of the GC secretariat is both the 
legal and constitutional counsellor of the GC responsible for the management of the EU affairs 
monitoring system. He has to make sure that sectoral committees submit their opinions to the 
GC within the requested deadlines and the appropriate format. He ensures that procedures and 
timing are respected. His functions give him a privileged position towards the political sphere, 
as he can point out the unconstitutionality of a legislative matter initiated by MPs (Interview 
2b, 2018). The Head of the GC secretariat also manages the Parliament’s information database 
and can access the Government’s database. GC staff usually receive data on EU affairs as 
downloadable metadata including only non-classified documents. Classified documents have to 
be requested separately and the Government is obliged to provide the information if the 
confidentiality of the data is secured. 
The Head of the GC secretariat makes sure that coordination between parliament and 
government in EU affairs works properly. He makes sure that information arrives on time. He 
coordinates the timetables of the ministerial civil servants and gives them feedback on 
parliament’s activities (Interview 2b, 2018). The Head of the GC secretariat has privileged 
personal contacts with ministerial civil servants and ministers themselves, mainly due to the 
small political environment, just as in Luxembourg. Moreover, he becomes an arbitrator 
whenever a sectoral committee expresses an opinion diverging from the majority’s position. In 
that case, he contacts the responsible ministry and tries to find a compromise between the 
committee’s and the ministerial position. However, contacts to political group staff are seldom. 
On the EU level, relations to Finland’s Permanent Representation are not regular and happen 
only whenever a parliamentary delegation visits Brussels. Due to the difference in schedules 
and topical priorities between the Eduskunta and Finnish MEPs, contact with MEPs is also 
limited. The Head of the GC secretariat would meet more frequently a Finnish MEP if the latter 
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would be a rapporteur or shadow rapporteur in the European Parliament, which does not happen 
often (Interview 2b, 2018).  
The main EU contact of the GC secretariat is the parliamentary liaison office in Brussels. 
The liaison officer is directly attached to the GC secretariat and reports to the Head of the 
secretariat. The Eduskunta was one of the first parliaments to create the position of a 
parliamentary representative in Brussels. Before its existence, MPs were relying exclusively on 
COSAC meetings or connections to European parties. The liaison officer has a special status, 
because he/she is recruited by the Government, but the officer is accountable to the GC 
secretariat. The current liaison officer worked in the Ministry of Education and Culture before 
being dispatched to Brussels (Interview 1b, 2018). The representative holds the position since 
2013, with prior professional experience linked to EU affairs. The liaison officer studied EU 
affairs and did an internship at the European Commission, which provided her with an insight 
on the functioning of EU institutions. Both the educational background and professional 
experience linked to EU affairs might have been an advantage to access the position of liaison 
officer.  
Just as the Austrian and Luxembourgish representative, the Finnish liaison officer has a 
communication and logistics function (Interview 1b, 2018). Tasks include drafting analytical 
and non-partisan reports destined for MPs and the parliamentary administration, the 
organisation of MPs’ and GC visits to Brussels, participation in COSAC meetings and the 
management of social media. The representative’s office is in the European Parliament, but 
he/she covers EU topics that concern all EU institutions. The liaison officer puts MPs and MEPs 
in contact and sends weekly reports that are published on the Eduskunta’s website. Exchanges 
also happen with committee counsellors. The main role of the liaison officer is thus to provide 
political inputs and background information from the EU level that differ from the formal 
government information to facilitate the formulation of positions in parliament. The liaison 
officer maintains contacts with the EU coordinators of the Eduskunta’s parliamentary groups, 
the staff of the GC secretariat, the Permanent Representation of Finland430 and the EU office of 
Finnish trade union confederations FinUnion. Exchanges with parliamentary group and 
administrative staff happen through email. Meetings are organised whenever the GC visits 
Brussels or when the liaison officer returns four times per year to Helsinki (Interview 1b, 2018). 
Overall, there are privileged links between the parliamentary representation in Brussels, EU-
based bodies and GC members. Sectoral committees and the rest of the MPs in the Eduskunta 
only request information when needed.  
 
7.2.3 Parliamentary groups: composition and tasks 
 
Just as in Luxembourg and to a bigger extent Austria, parliamentary groups are the main 
influencers in the decision-making process within the Eduskunta. According to an interviewee, 
financial support for groups depends on their size (Interview 6b, 2018). The biggest groups of 
 
430 Contacts with ministerial staff on the national level are very rare (Interview 1b, 2018).  
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the current legislative period (2015-2019) are the KESK, KOK, SDP and Blue Reform431. The 
SDP has the most staff (41), followed by the VIHR (21), the Blue Reform (16), the KESK (12), 
the VAS (12), the KOK (10), the KD (8), the PS (6) and the SFP (4)432. Each group can organise 
their staff as they wish. For instance, the VAS has parliamentary advisors responsible for one 
or more committees and three policy experts focusing on Foreign Affairs, Security and EU 
affairs, Environment and Economic Affairs (Interview 6b, 2018). Advisors and group assistants 
have different statuses and different employers. Generally, group assistants depend on the 
parliament and policy experts on MPs. Group staff are usually recruited through direct job 
applications (Interviews 6b, 11b, 12b, 2018). 
Almost every parliamentary group engaged staff dedicated to EU affairs. The latter are 
considered as experts within their respective groups and support MPs’ work on EU issues, 
especially GC members. However, their number is circumscribed. Indeed, parliamentary groups 
have only one EU advisor that benefits eventually from the support of other group staff. Some 
groups do not have enough resources or are too small to have an EU advisor, such as the SFP. 
The VIHR has one Legislative Secretary responsible among others for EU affairs. The KD had 
a part-time EU collaborator, which was replaced recently by a permanent position. Within the 
KOK, the policy advisor handling EU affairs is called a “Secretary for International Affairs”, 
in the Blue Group “policy expert in International Affairs”, in the KESK “senior advisor in EU 
affairs and Foreign and Security Policy” and in the SDP “EU affairs advisor”. Despite different 
denominations, the statuses of EU advisors are quite similar. However, some have permanent 
positions and others change their functions after legislative elections.  
Overall, interviewed EU advisors have different educational backgrounds not 
automatically linked to EU affairs. For instance, the KD EU advisor did a PhD in engineering 
in India. The SDP EU advisor studied International Relations and Law, while the VAS EU 
advisor did a master in Politics and History. The common feature of their educational 
background is their international experience. Almost all interviewed EU advisors spent time 
abroad in the framework of their studies. Most started with a different position within the group 
before becoming EU advisor. Some interviewees had long-term functions, such as the KESK 
EU advisor who started as an MP assistant in 2001 (Interview 11b, 2018). The advisor started 
to deal with International Affairs in 2003, when he became the advisor of delegation members 
to the EU Convention. The KD EU advisor first started as editor in chief of the party’s magazine 
for ten years, then became MEP assistant between 2009 and 2014 (Interview 12b, 2018). 
Younger EU advisors exert their current functions after a short prior experience in the group. 
For instance, the SDP EU advisor worked in the Finnish embassy in Lithuania as an EU 
coordinator before joining the group, first as a political assistant (Interview 8b, 2018). The VAS 
EU advisor worked for NGOs and the EU Unit of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, before being 
recruited as a group assistant (Interview 6b, 2018).  
 
431 See https://www.eduskunta.fi/EN/kansanedustajat/eduskuntaryhm%C3%A4t/Pages/default.aspx (last accessed 
13.06.2019) 
432 See https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/kansanedustajat/eduskuntaryhmat/Sivut/default.aspx (last accessed 
13.06.2019) 
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Few interviewees also had professional experience in the executive, which might give 
them an advantage in terms of personal contacts and resources in their work. For instance, the 
KESK EU advisor was a press-advisor to the Minister of Foreign Trade and Development in 
2005-2006, as well as EU advisor to the Prime Minister Juha Sipilä from 2015-2017 (Interview 
11b, 2018). The VAS EU advisor worked in a ministry before, which might be beneficial, even 
though the party is currently in the opposition. Interviewees became EU advisors for different 
reasons: genuine interest for EU affairs, ideological proximity to the party, prior associative 
commitments433 and professional/educational background. 
Tasks vary slightly between EU advisors. The KESK and VAS advisors are responsible 
for three committees (GC, Foreign Affairs and Defence), while the KD and SDP advisors focus 
on the GC (Interviews 6b, 8b, 11b, 12b, 2018). Generally, EU advisors read EU documents 
according to the group’s priorities, gather background information and prepare GC meetings. 
Advisors in opposition groups also prepare dissenting opinions. As GC meetings are not public, 
political group staff cannot attend them. However, they participate in the group meetings of 
their respective GC members. Every group has so-called committee-group meetings, where 
MPs from the same group and the same committee meet to discuss and coordinate their position 
before official committee meetings. For instance, the KESK advisor attends meetings of KESK 
GC members every Friday at noon before GC meetings. The VAS advisor checks every 
Tuesday and Friday morning the committee agenda and coordinates with VAS MPs. 
Communication with the media is also one of the tasks of an EU advisor (Interview 6b, 2018).  
EU advisors use different information sources to stay informed on EU matters, such as 
European media, the mailing list of the Parliament containing among others the report of the 
liaison officer and daily newsletters, national newspapers, governmental decisions and other 
public sources. Some information from the GC is only accessible to group staff if they maintain 
a good relationship with their MPs, which places personal connections as an additional 
important resource (Interview 6b, 2018). EU advisors also obtain information through 
cooperation with national and EU actors. Cooperation with ministers or their staff depends on 
the party’s position on the majority-opposition scale. For instance, neither the KD nor the SDP 
EU advisors have contact with ministries, contrary to the KESK EU advisor (Interviews 8b, 
11b, 12b, 2018). Exchanges with the parliamentary administration are quite rare and happen via 
email or phone. Moreover, contacts to other parliamentary groups are infrequent and occur only 
if a group needs support in drafting a position (Interview 6b, 2018). In that case, opposition 
groups would tend to establish a common position for strategical purposes. On the EU level, 
contacts are non-existent with the Permanent Representation and very seldom with MEPs and 
their collaborators due to schedule problems, even though some MEPs have local assistants 
based in Helsinki.  
Whenever an EU issue requires special competences, EU advisors cooperate with their 
group colleagues. For instance, when an EU document is sent to a sectoral committee, SDP 
collaborators following the specific committee get in touch with the EU advisor to provide 
information about SDP MPs’ position within the concerned committee (Interview 8b, 2018). 
 
433 For instance, the KESK EU advisor was active in the European Movement of Finland and engaged in the pro-
EU referendum campaign back in 1994-1995 (Interview 11b, 2018).  
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This allows coordination across SDP committee members and with GC members. Within the 
KESK group, staff exchange emails regularly and attend weekly staff meetings. The latter differ 
from one group to the other. For instance, KESK staff meet every Tuesday morning and VAS 
staff every Monday morning to discuss the weekly agenda (Interviews 6b, 11b, 2018). 
Additional smaller discussion rounds can be organised whenever matters need to be discussed 
in detail. On top of the meetings for group employees, meetings for party employees are 
organised every Monday morning at the KESK headquarters. In that case, group staff, party 
staff, KESK ministers’ advisors, party officers etc can attend these meetings. On top of the staff 
meetings, general group meetings composed of both staff and MPs, with the presence of 
ministers, are organised in each group every Thursday afternoon. These meetings serve to find 
a consensus on controversial matters. Whenever MEPs participate in group meetings, they 
usually come to meetings of GC group members. 
Just as in Luxembourg and Austria, MPs and MEPs can participate in working groups 
on EU affairs within their party to formulate positions and discuss EU issues ex-ante. The 
denomination and organisation of these working groups vary. For instance, the VAS has a 
working group on Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. In general, EU advisors are also the 
secretaries of these working groups which main goal is to design the party’s EU guidelines. 
Meetings are not frequent and topics are chosen depending on the topics on the agenda. The 
KD party has no EU working group, but instead ad hoc meetings are organised whenever an 
important event needs to be prepared. Currently, the 2019 European elections and the Finnish 
EU Presidency in 2019 occupy EU working groups’ agendas. Within the SDP, an MP and the 
director of FinUnions chair the working group on Europe. According to an interviewee, the 
creation of a working group in the SDP was an evidence with regard to the pro-European 
“genes” of the party (Interview 9b, 2018). This reflects one more time the close link between 
trade unions and the SDP. Additionally, the SDP created recently an EU taskforce that 
formulates opinions on specific EU matters, such as the EMU or the European Social 
Dimension. The taskforce is supposed to be more reactive than the EU working group and was 
designed to prepare Finland’s EU Presidency in 2019 (Interview 8b, 2018). 
 
7.2.4 Parliamentary committees and EU affairs 
 
In the literature, the Eduskunta is characterised as a “working parliament”, because it 
relies mainly on committee work rather than plenary debates (Raunio, In: 
Hefftler/Neuhold/Rozenberg/Smith, 2015; Raunio/Wiberg, 2008). The Parliament’s debating 
function has been improved with the economic crisis and the politicisation of EU affairs, but 
still remains marginal. Focus on committee work can be explained by several factors. Firstly, 
the scrutiny of EU affairs within the Eduskunta aims primarily to control the Government’s EU 
policy. Secondly, the low salience of EU affairs within Parliament does not encourage 
mediatisation of EU topics through public debates. Thirdly, the growing Euroscepticism of the 
public opinion leads Parliament to prioritise non-public committee meetings (Raunio, 2016). 
Finally, EU affairs might divide parties during public debates, which could undermine the 
consensus-oriented practices (Raunio, In: Tans/Zoethout/Peters, 2007). Within the Eduskunta, 
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the scrutiny of EU affairs is decentralised. The main responsible for EU affairs is the Grand 
Committee, which deals with national policy formulation of EU issues and justice matters 
(Wiberg/Raunio, 1996). The Foreign Affairs Committee handles the CFSP. The Foreign Affairs 
Committee is responsible for the examination of government bills on treaty amendments, while 
the GC is competent for controlling the Government’s negotiating behaviour during IGCs 
(Raunio, In: Karvonen/Paloheimo/Raunio, 2016). 
Every sectoral committee is involved in the scrutiny of EU affairs according to Sections 
30 and 38 of the RoP, either for regular EU matters or for matters linked to the subsidiarity 
control mechanism434. Just as in the Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies and the Austrian 
National Council, sectoral committees deal differently with EU affairs depending on the topics 
on the agenda and their priorities. For instance, the Education and Culture Committee as well 
as the Committee on the Future handle the least EU issues (Raunio, In: 
Karvonen/Paloheimo/Raunio, 2016). Reversely, the Committees on Environment, Agriculture 
and Forestry and Commerce are the most involved in EU scrutiny. According to Raunio and 
Wiberg, the high workload of sectoral committees on EU topics can be explained by the 
anchorage of their participation in the Finnish Constitution in Section 96 and 97435. The Grand 
Committee is responsible of consulting the competent sectoral committees, of receiving their 
opinions and if necessary of arbitrating between diverging positions. 
The Grand Committee is the biggest committee in the Eduskunta and was originally 
established in 1906, but became the Parliament’s EAC when Finland joined the EU. It has 25 
members436 and the MP from the Aland Islands can participate in its meetings (Raunio, In: 
Tans/Zoethout/Peters, 2007). The GC secretariat and the liaison officer in Brussels support GC 
members’ work. Opposition MPs can chair the GC (just as sectoral committees). An 
interviewed former MP admitted for instance that he became GC chair when his party was in 
the opposition (Interview 7b, 2018). The GC chair of the current legislative period 2015-2019 
comes from the majority party KOK. Usually, strategic committees remain between the hands 
of the majority. The GC holds meetings every Friday afternoon after the Friday morning 
meeting of the Ministerial Committee on EU affairs. The GC hears ministers before they attend 
Council meetings on the EU level. 
The GC’s functions are regulated in the Finnish Constitution, the Parliament’s RoP and 
the GC’s own RoP. The GC has a unique position as it has the ability, like the “EU-
Hauptausschuss” of the Austrian National Council, to take decisions on behalf of the plenary 
(Section 96, Finnish Constitution). Whenever a “U- or E-matter” arrives in parliament, the 
 
434 “At the same time, the Speaker shall designate the Committee that is to provide a statement to the Grand 
Committee or the Foreign Affairs Committee. The Grand Committee or the Foreign Affairs Committee may set a 
deadline for the statement of that Committee.” Section 30 - European Union Matters, Parliament’s Rules of 
Procedure, 1999; “In addition, the Grand Committee and the Foreign Affairs Committee may request the statement 
of another Committee on a proposal or report referred to in sections 96 and 97 of the Constitution.” Section 38 – 
Statement of another Committee, Parliament’s Rules of Procedure, 1999. 
435 “The proposal is considered in the Grand Committee and ordinarily in one or more of the other Committees 
that issue statements to the Grand Committee.” Section 96 - Participation of the Parliament in the national 
preparation of European Union matters; “The appropriate Committee of the Parliament may issue a statement to 
the Government on the basis of the reports or information referred to above.” Section 97 - Parliamentary right to 
receive information on international affairs, The Constitution of Finland, 11 June 1999. 
436 Section 35, The Constitution of Finland, 11 June 1999. 
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Speaker transfers it to the GC, which can decide which sectoral committees to include. The GC 
examines mostly secondary legislation and sometimes institutional affairs. Thus, the committee 
has a wider vision on EU issues, as it focuses on the Government’s annual EU priorities and 
general strategies. The GC also receives the sectoral committees’ opinions and exerts the final 
decisional power. Together with its secretariat, the GC drafts an opinion that includes all the 
committees’ positions. In case of diverging opinions, the competent committee chairs can also 
try to find a compromise together with the GC secretariat. Thus, the GC determines the most 
consensual national position to be presented on the EU level. Apart from that, direct cooperation 
between the GC and sectoral committees is rare. Only MPs from the same parliamentary group 
and different committees get together in group meetings. Ministers are obliged to provide all 
information to the GC with regard to European Council or Council meetings, so that the GC 
can prepare a position. Information includes among others memos with document references 
and an explanation of the Government’s position. Ministers and the Prime Minister are then 
bound to the GC’s opinion when negotiating on the EU level. Generally, coordination between 
the GC and the ministers before EU-level meetings happens beforehand. However, GC 
members might be obliged to meet ad hoc during Council or European Council meetings 
whenever ministers need to take decisions diverging from the GC’s position. In that case, they 
need the GC’s prior approval. According to an interviewee, late-night phone calls from the 
Prime Minister during a European Council meeting were quite frequent when the former MP 
was GC Chair (Interview 7b, 2018). Therefore, the GC’s schedule differs from sectoral 
committees, because GC members need to be available all year long at any time. According to 
an interviewee, while the Foreign Affairs Committee would have only three to five issues on 
its agenda per meeting, the GC can have up to 40 issues (Interview 6b, 2018). This might 
discourage MPs to become GC member.  
MEPs can be invited in GC meetings, but are considered as external experts. Common 
meetings between MEPs and GC members are programmed twice per year. Additionally, GC 
members travel to Brussels once per year and participate in study visits in European and 
candidate countries. The presence of MEPs in GC meetings has not been institutionalised yet 
and is confined to a system of habits (Interviews 4b, 9b, 2018). MEPs cannot participate in GC 
meetings on their own initiative. The same applies to sectoral committee meetings. Sectoral 
committees invite very rarely MEPs. Overall, the contributions of MEPs in the Eduskunta are 
not seen as beneficial. Inviting them might be complicated due to diverging schedules, but also 
because no Finnish MEP holds any rapporteur position within the European Parliament. This 
means that whenever an MEP is invited, all Finnish MEPs need to be convened to avoid political 
conflicts and ensure ideological representation (Interview 2b, 2018).  
 
7.2.5 Cooperation between parliament and government on EU affairs 
 
As mentioned earlier, the Finnish scrutiny model on EU affairs copied the Danish 
system, which emphasises in particular a strong parliamentary control over governmental 
activity. The Government’s obligation to transfer information to Parliament is regulated in the 
Finnish Constitution in Sections 96 and 97. The Government must send without delay all 
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information on EU proposals that could affect the legislative or budgetary decision making in 
Finland (Interviews 4b, 7b, 9b, 2018). The information sent to parliament in form of “U- or E-
letters” must contain the Government’s position, as well as the content and effects of the 
proposal. Usually, ministers present their position every Friday during GC meetings, after prior 
morning meetings of the Government EU Ministerial Committee. Even if the Government’s 
position on an EU matter has not been formed yet, information has to be sent to Parliament.  
Within Parliament, the GC or the Foreign Affairs Committee can issue statements on 
government proposals. The GC’s statements bind the responsible minister during negotiations 
on the EU level. Constitutionally, the Eduskunta has thus powerful competences to control the 
Government’s EU policy. Access to governmental information is unlimited (Raunio, In: 
Wessels/Rozenberg et al., 2013) and the GC can stay in constant contact with ministers during 
(European) Council meetings. Ministers also have to appear in front of the GC before and 
frequently after Council meetings. Ministerial civil servants or experts usually accompany 
them. Moreover, upon request of the Parliament, the Government must also submit reports on 
Foreign and Security policy. Even though most MPs admit that governmental information is 
satisfying and comprehensive, the quality and quantity of this information and personal contacts 
with civil servants still depend on MPs’ political positioning (Interview 3b, 9b, 2018). 
Interviewees who belonged to majority parties had easier contacts with government officials 
than opposition MPs. Majority MPs receive privileged information and support strongly their 
ministers. Thus, parliamentary work tends to be highly dependent on ministries and ministers’ 
positions, at least within majority groups. Opposition MPs must often draft their own positions 
or dissenting opinions, while majority MPs settle for the Government’s position. 
Until the economic crisis, EU scrutiny in Finland has been consensual and pragmatic. 
Consensual practices through voluntary absence of conflicts between government and 
parliament or opposition served to show a unitary and coherent position on the EU level 
(Raunio, In: Karvonen/Paloheimo/Raunio, 2016). These dynamics have changed since the 
economic crisis, with increased reluctance from some opposition groups to support the 
Government’s crisis management. While consensual relations might have led the Eduskunta to 
be rather passive during the Constitutional Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty, increased conflictual 
lines between parliamentary groups might have fuelled increased parliamentary activity during 
the ESM and the TSCG. Political dynamics between opposition and majority are different 
within the GC. Indeed, on top of the traditional cleavage, the Government’s EU policy happens 
also to be criticised by single MPs from both sides of the political spectrum (Raunio/Wiberg, 
In: Strøm/Müller/Bergman, 2006). According to the authors, the GC “has refused to act as the 
government’s rubber-stamp” (Raunio/Wiberg, p.71, In: Strøm/Müller/Bergman, 2006).  
Overall, the executive remains the predominant actor in the Finnish legislative process, 
also in EU affairs (Interview 5b, 2018). According to an interviewee, Parliament lacks 
initiatives and endorses a rather reactive role in EU affairs (Interview 10b, 2018). Moreover, 
mandates given to ministers are not as strict as formally regulated (Interview 10b, 2018). Rather, 
the GC sets targets with a bottom-line and ministers follow these. If a minister did not manage 
to follow the targets, he/she has to come back to the GC after the Council meeting to expose the 
reasons. Loose mandates enable ministers to negotiate according to the majority on the EU level 
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without being blocked by a strict domestic position. According to an interviewee, the aim to 
reach a unanimous position on the EU level and to avoid a reputation of “blocker” led the GC 
to loosen up its mandating policy (Interview 4b, 2018). As we will see later in this chapter, the 
economic crisis and electoral promises led the SDP to put this strategy into question. Instead, 
the SDP requested collaterals with Greece, which were controversial both on the national and 
European level. To sum up, party dynamics seem to affect substantially the relation between 
government and parliament, and thus also parliamentary work. 
7.2.6 Discussion 
 
This section outlined the Eduskunta’s formal EU scrutiny system and the different 
parliamentary actors in charge of these issues. Overall, the scrutiny system did not evolve 
substantially since Finland joined the EU in 1995. The Finnish scrutiny system focuses on the 
Government’s EU policy and is deeply rooted in the Finnish constitutional system (Interview 
7b, 2018). In general, interviewees are very satisfied with the Eduskunta’s participation rights, 
which are described as the most far-reaching in the EU (Interviews 3b, 4b, 5b, 9b, 10b, 2018). 
The Parliament even sent out delegations to candidate countries before 2004 to provide advice 
on EU scrutiny and spread good practices (Interview 7b, 2018). The GC can bind ministers with 
a mandate and impose a position before the negotiation on international treaties (Interview 4b, 
2018). We observed that the highly decentralised scrutiny system enables sectoral committees 
to participate regularly in EU affairs, in close cooperation with the GC, which coordinates their 
position. This means that theoretically, all MPs can be involved in EU issues, regardless of their 
ideological or political positioning. The Eduskunta is thus a “working parliament” focused on 
committee work instead of plenary debates, which forged its  “strong legislative culture” (Arter, 
p. 279, 2012). 
Finnish MPs highly value the parliamentary administration’s support, especially the 
Secretariat for EU Affairs. Civil servants from the Unit are seen as EU experts, even though 
they are not numerous. Additionally, parliamentary groups constitute the second most important 
support in MPs’ EU activities. Within most groups, EU coordinators or advisors support GC 
members by searching background information or drafting reports. The Eduskunta’s confidence 
about its strong formal capacities and the focus on government control has two consequences. 
First, it means that the Eduskunta avoids direct engagement at the EU level (subsidiarity 
monitoring) and participation in interparliamentary conferences (Cooper, 2015). Parliament is 
also sceptical towards cooperation with MEPs, which is reflected in its legal bases. MEPs 
participation in the Eduskunta’s work is mentioned only indirectly, as their added value for the 
Eduskunta’s scrutiny is seen as low (Raunio, In: Tans/Zoethout/Peters, 2007). Moreover, some 
interviewees admitted that the parliamentary liaison office in Brussels constituted a limited 
information channel for MPs (Interview 7b, 2018). As scrutiny bases on government control, 
any source of information from the EU level is seen as superfluous. Secondly, the Eduskunta 
does not see the necessity to improve its formal capacities or practices, as its parliamentary 
strength in EU affairs is widely recognised (Raunio, 2016).  
The strength of the Danish inspired scrutiny system lies in the fact that parliament is 
involved at a very early stage in the legislative process and cooperates closely with the 
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government. Indeed, the Eduskunta’s control rights are well developed. Just as in the Danish 
Parliament, the Finnish GC can issue a binding mandate to ministers before Council 
negotiations. Ministers come every Friday before Council meetings and have to report to the 
GC after the meetings. Moreover, both in Denmark and Finland, sectoral committees can 
scrutinise EU affairs. Therefore, just as the Danish Parliament, the Eduskunta is seen as a strong 
policy-maker and “national player” by Wessels et al. (p.462-463, 2001). Just as in Luxembourg 
and Austria, majority MPs benefit from more information from their ministers, but remain more 
passive than opposition MPs. The latter have to produce more efforts to obtain and process 
information, even though the information flow works well. The GC is usually headed by a 
majority MP, which could also mean that the GC’s agenda might be indirectly influenced by 
ministries through parliamentary group meetings with ministers (Interview 6b, 2018). Before 
the economic crisis, all MPs, whether from the majority or the opposition, made sure that the 
Government respected its information obligations. According to an interviewee, the close 
intertwining between government and parliament limits the Eduskunta’s influence on EU 
affairs, as most MPs simply agree with the Government’s line (Interview 5b, 9b, 10b, 2018). 
This changed after the 2015 elections. While until the economic crisis, EU affairs were largely 
consensual, the situation changed when the True Finns entered the coalition in 2015 (Interview 
4b, 2018). Work in committees became more politicised and the ideological gap grew bigger 
between the centre-right government and the centre-left opposition.  
In conclusion, committee work and party-group dynamics determine to a large degree 
parliamentary activity in EU affairs within the Eduskunta. Formally, the decentralised scrutiny 
seems to support hypothesis H2 in the sense that mainstreaming happened through a systematic 
involvement of sectoral committees. However, in practice, some elements nuance it, as 
involvement varies considerably between committees depending on the topics on the agenda. 
Moreover, the predominance of majority groups on parliamentary work also tends to limit the 
involvement of opposition MPs. Based solely on the analysis of formal scrutiny procedures and 
infrastructures, we can already observe a rather incomplete mainstreaming of EU affairs in the 
Eduskunta. However, we have to underline that mainstreaming seems to be more pronounced 
in the Finnish Parliament than in the National Council and the Chamber of Deputies. 
 
7.3 EU affairs in parliamentary work: opportunities and constraints 
 
This part seeks to draw a sociological picture of MPs’ involvement in EU affairs. The 
first section will focus on socio-demographic characteristics within the Eduskunta, while the 
second section will analyse general parliamentary activity and motivations lying behind it. In 
this part, we will test sub-hypothesis H2.1 according to which MPs with “Europeanised” 
profiles would tend to be more active in EU affairs. Just as in the Austrian case, we assume for 
instance that senior MPs who participated in the 1994-1995 accession process would be 
particularly inclined to follow EU treaties and intergovernmental treaties on the EMU. 
Moreover, contrary to the Luxembourg and Austria cases, we expect MPs from sectoral 
committees to be more involved in EU affairs within the Eduskunta, due to the high 
decentralisation tendencies (H2.2). This leads us to test hypothesis H2 on the mainstreaming of 
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EU affairs. The socio-demographic explanations and the analysis of parliamentary activity base 
on statistics retrieved from the Eduskunta’s website, MPs’ biographies and interviews with 
parliamentary civil servants, group collaborators and (current and former) MPs.  
 
7.3.1 General socio-demographic characteristics of the Eduskunta 
 
In the present section, we will analyse the composition of the Eduskunta, more 
particularly the profile of the key players active in EU affairs. We base our analysis on 
sociological and motivational criteria that might influence parliamentary involvement.  
 
7.3.1.1 Composition of the Eduskunta: MPs’ profiles 
 
Within the Eduskunta, more than half of the members (58%) exerted their first or second 
mandate as of the current legislative period (2015-2019). This can be explained by the massive 
electoral gain of the True Finns in 2015 and the entry into parliament of numerous new PS 
members. Only 27% of the MPs exerted more than three mandates, which places the Eduskunta 
as the parliament with the youngest MPs among the three case studies. Young MPs do not have 
the same knowledge of parliamentary practices as senior MPs. However, they might be more 
active, because they need to position themselves politically and prove to their voters that their 
choice was justified. 
Figure 58: Number of exerted parliamentary mandates per MP (in %), Eduskunta, 2015-
2019 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
Just as in the Austrian National Council and the Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies, some MPs 
had a prior experience in the Government. However, contrary to Austria and Luxembourg, the 
proportion of Finnish MPs with prior or current executive functions is considerably high. 
Indeed, out of 200 MPs, 49 had experience or still exert functions in the executive. The graph 
below shows the proportion of MPs with current or prior experience in government. 
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Figure 59: Number of MPs with experience in government (in total), Eduskunta, 2015-
2019 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
The high number of MPs with prior experience in government can be explained by the 
fact that several MPs exerted ministerial functions only for a very short amount of time. 
Changes within the Government seem to be quite frequent. Several MPs were ministers for only 
a few months before coming back to parliament. Most MPs with government experience come 
from the biggest parties SDP, KOK and KESK that usually form coalitions together. 
Just as in the Austrian National Council, nominated ministers can keep their MP 
function, but have to resign from all committees and other parliamentary positions (Interview 
4b, 7b 2018). This means that they can still participate in parliamentary voting. Even though 
not mentioned explicitly in the Finnish Constitution or the Parliament’s RoP, incompatibility 
between ministerial and parliamentary functions are accepted in practice. According to Section 
63 of the Finnish Constitution, “[w]hile holding the office of a Minister, a member of the 
Government shall not hold any other public office or undertake any other task which may 
obstruct the performance of his or her ministerial duties or compromise the credibility of his or 
her actions as a Minister”437. The article remains vague on the compatibility between 
parliamentary and ministerial positions as such, but confirms that any additional functions 
within the Eduskunta might represent an obstruction to ministerial performance. The 
implication of this double-hat possibility can be that MPs abstain from engaging in conflictual 
strategies within parliament to increase their chances to be nominated in the government in the 
future. This behaviour might thus encourage passivity in terms of parliamentary activity. 
Indeed, there are higher chances for Finnish MPs to integrate future coalition formations, 
because coalitions are usually composed of multiple parties. Prior government members use the 
parliamentary arena to leave a political mark. Some MPs might also use the Eduskunta as a last 
step in their political career after a long period spent in government. 
 
In the Eduskunta, just as in the Luxembourg and Austrian chambers, most MPs exert 
double mandates: they have both national and regional or local representative functions. As 
illustrated by the graph below, almost half of the 200 members exert a local mandate as 
municipal councillor.  
 
 
437 Section 63 - Ministers' personal interests, The Constitution of Finland 11 June 1999. 
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Figure 60: Distribution of representative functions among MPs (in %), Eduskunta, 2015-
2019 
 
Source: Own calculations438. 
Mandates in regional bodies represent the second biggest category. In Finland, local and 
regional authorities play a particularly strong role in the territorial management of the State. 
This could explain why a large proportion of MPs also exert functions on these levels. Contrary 
to the Austrian National Council, positions in local parties are circumscribed. Due to the 
electoral system privileging individual candidates, the ties to local parties tend to be loose 
because profiling and closeness to the voter pass mainly through positions in local or regional 
bodies such as municipalities. Unlike Austria, most MPs did not start their political career in 
the local branch of their party. Rather, affiliation to political parties plays a bigger role on the 
national level, because they are the main determinant of the government-parliament relations. 
Surprisingly, trade union membership seems to be less predominant, even though trade 
union confederations tend to be close to some parties. As explained before, trade union 
affiliation concerned mainly MPs from the SDP, VAS and PS. On top of that, Finnish MPs 
exert very few functions in European associations or bodies, proof that their interest is turned 
mainly towards domestic matters. 
The large proportion of overlapping mandates could be an indicator of insufficient time 
spent on national-level issues, as constituency agendas might play a big role in MPs’ schedules. 
MPs usually return to their constituencies on Fridays until Mondays, but miss local meetings 
during the week to attend parliamentary committee meetings. According to an interviewee, 
some MPs deliberately chose to avoid GC membership, because its Friday afternoon meetings 
would prevent them from returning to their constituency (Interview 7b, 9b, 2018). 
 
438 The data was retrieved from MP’s profiles on the Eduskunta’s website, as well as MP’s personal websites. Data 
on trade union affiliation are scarce, therefore the graph might not show an exhaustive picture of the real 
affiliations. 
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Within parliament, a large majority of MPs are member of less than five committees. 
Usually, MPs belong to two parliamentary committees (Interview 3b, 9b, 2018). MPs can also 
be committee substitutes. Section 9 of the RoP sets the limits to committee membership. An 
MP belonging to two committees can refuse any additional memberships. However, this choice 
depends on each MP and restriction is not clearly delimited. Unlike Luxembourg and Austrian 
MPs, Finnish MPs can focus on detailed issues due to their few memberships. They can handle 
issues as thoroughly as possible, because they have less time constraints. 
Figure 61: Number of full committee memberships per MP (in %), Eduskunta, 2015-2019 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
Whenever MPs choose their committees, they check the compatibility of their 
schedules. Some committees meet in the morning, while others in the afternoon. Selection in 
committees depends largely on MPs’ parliamentary group. Indeed, the latter makes the final 
decision according to MPs’ wishes, competences and seniority in parliament (Interview 10b, 
2018). For instance, MPs’ professional experience outside of the parliamentary sphere might 
influence its selection in committees. Former doctors will have more chances to sit in the Social 
Affairs and Health Committee. Moreover, as explained earlier (Section 7.2.4), opposition MPs 
can chair committees according to the principle of proportionality, strictly applied within 
parliament439. 
To conclude this section, we observed that Finnish MPs assign importance to local 
mandates. Domestic priorities seem to be prevalent, just as in Austria. Moreover, the current 
legislative period (2015-2019) is characterised by a young parliament. MPs with short-term 
mandates might be less inclined to get involved in EU affairs because of re-election prospects. 
Professionalisation among MPs seems also to be lower compared to the Austrian or 
Luxembourg chambers. Overall, the possibility for government members to stay in parliament 
and the important role of parties on the national level might affect parliamentary work. The next 
section outlines the profile of identified key players involved in EU issues. 
 
 
 
 
439 See Information report n°43 of the French Senate, 2006. 
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7.3.1.2 Profiles of the parliamentary key players in EU affairs 
 
We identified key players based on lists of presence in committee meetings, minutes of 
plenary debates and committee opinions. We observed the same patterns as in Luxembourg and 
Austria: GC members are very active in EU affairs and the follow-up of EU treaties; sectoral 
committee members became active mostly during the economic crisis (especially PS MPs). 
GC members 
 
The GC is the biggest committee in the Eduskunta. The GC is composed of 14 MPs 
from majority parties and 11 opposition members. The GC is seen as a prestigious committee 
within the Parliament. Therefore, mostly experienced senior MPs get the chance to be 
nominated in the GC, even though this trend has changed in 2015 when the True Finns entered 
parliament. The predominance of majority MPs on the work of the GC reinforces the 
Government’s influence on parliamentary activity in EU affairs. Among the represented groups 
from the opposition, most have pro-European positions (SDP, VIHR), except the Finns and 
VAS. The Eurosceptic Blue Reform group is in the majority, alongside the KOK and KESK. 
The multiplicity of parties results in an ideologically scattered majority. 
Figure 62: Ideological distribution of GC membership (in total), Eduskunta, 2018 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
The current GC Chair (in 2019) is from the pro-European coalition party KOK, while 
the first vice-chair comes from the Blue Reform Group. Pro-European coalition partners keep 
control over European affairs, especially considering the fact that a committee chair can 
prioritise issues on the agenda. The nomination of the GC Chair is thus a clear sign that the 
KOK as the biggest party wants to control parliamentary work and tame its Eurosceptic partner.  
Compared to the rest of Eduskunta members, the proportion of GC members with 
experience in the executive is slightly lower (20%). Former government members might prefer 
GC membership to sectoral committees, because the GC has powerful scrutiny competences 
within the Eduskunta. The reputation of the GC makes it a useful arena to boost political careers. 
Only two MPs also had a prior experience on the EU level as MEPs. Their experience on the 
EU level sensitised them more to EU affairs and legitimated them as EU experts within the GC. 
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Figure 63: Political experience of GC members (in total), Eduskunta, 2015-2019 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
The distribution of committee memberships among GC members mirrors the 
distribution observed in the whole parliament. Almost all GC members belong to less than five 
committees, reflecting the general trend and the limits set by the RoP.  
Figure 64: Number of full committee memberships per GC member (in %), Eduskunta, 
2015-2019 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
Usually, GC members take their knowledge into the sectoral committees to which they 
belong, especially when an EU issue is on their agenda. Time spent on EU affairs outside of the 
GC depends on the sectoral committees’ topics and agenda. For instance, an interviewee is 
simultaneously member of the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, which deals frequently 
with EU affairs due to the importance of the CAP in EU policy (Interview 9b, 2018). CAP-
related issues might figure frequently on the agenda of the committee, in which case the MP 
can mobilise his knowledge on EU affairs from the GC to facilitate the examination of the 
matter in the Committee on Agriculture. Moreover, the majority of GC members has double 
mandates on the local and regional levels, mirroring again the general trends observed before. 
Compared to the rest of parliament members, the proportion of MPs belonging to national 
unions or with functions linked to the EU is higher. 
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Figure 65: Distribution of representative functions among GC members (in %), 
Eduskunta, 2015-2019 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
Membership in national unions was calculated based on GC members’ profiles. We 
observed that none of the GC members is simultaneously member of a trade union 
confederation. Thus, there is no sign that the latter exert any influence on the GC’s work.  
Without surprise, GC members are more active on the EU level than sectoral committee 
members. They participate in interparliamentary cooperation, meetings of EP political groups 
or EU bodies such as the Committee of the Regions. Thus, GC members tend to be more 
sensitised to EU issues through their networking activities and direct access to information on 
the EU level.   
The argument underlining the young composition of the Eduskunta also applies to the 
GC. Indeed, only 32% of its members exerted 3 or more mandates as of 2018. Most recently 
elected MPs come from the True Finns/ Blue Reform group, because a big proportion was 
elected in 2011 when the party became strong on the national political stage. 
Figure 66: Number of exerted parliamentary mandates per GC member (in %), 
Eduskunta, 2015-2019 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
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The young composition of the GC also indicates that MPs have less parliamentary 
experience in EU affairs and are less professionalised. On the one hand, this might be a 
challenge whenever complex issues arise, because the Government might keep the upper hand 
over EU affairs. On the other hand, an SDP interviewee admitted that more “young” MPs 
become interested in the GC, breaking the practice of a committee reserved initially to senior 
experienced MPs (Interview 9b, 2018). 
In closing, the GC mirrors almost perfectly the overall composition of the Eduskunta. 
The only element that might indicate explicitly that GC members are more inclined to get 
involved in EU affairs is their higher participation in EU-level activities. Contrary to Austria 
and Luxembourg, we could not identify a clear profile of a typical GC member. Nowadays, GC 
members are rather “young” MPs coming from very different political horizons. They have less 
prior experience in the Government than the average MP. GC members do not have multiple 
committee memberships. Overall, like the rest of the parliament, we could not identify a high 
level of political professionalisation among GC members. Their profile is thus the complete 
opposite observable in the two previous cases. However, we need to underline that the elements 
observed above concern the current legislative period 2015-2019. The composition of the 
Eduskunta changed substantially with the emergence of the True Finns on the political stage. 
Key players in the follow-up of EU treaties and intergovernmental treaties on the EMU 
 
Just as in the Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies and the Austrian National Council, we 
identified different types of key players involved in the follow-up of EU and intergovernmental 
treaty negotiations: GC members, Foreign Affairs (FA) committee members and some sectoral 
committee members. The first and second categories of MPs were predominantly involved in 
all treaties. The contrast between the profile of an average Finnish MP and GC/FA committee 
members (current and former) that followed EU and intergovernmental treaties is quite 
important. Most interviewed key players were or are GC members and exert(ed) long-term 
mandates.  
Indeed, we observe firstly that the seniority rate of key players is higher than the 
average. Key players’ seniority in parliament illustrates the fact that the most experienced MPs 
with extensive knowledge on parliamentary practices, EU affairs and EU treaties were the most 
legitimate to deal with the treaties, because they were seen as experts. GC key players with 
more than 3 exerted mandates by 2015 represented 53% of all identified key players involved 
in the follow-up of EU treaties and intergovernmental treaties on the EMU440. A high seniority 
rate was also the norm among active sectoral committee members (more than 31%). Among the 
interviewed senior MPs, some even participated in the preparations of Finland’s EU 
membership, which shaped their interest for EU affairs (Interview 3b, 10b, 2018). Those MPs 
who accompanied Finland’s EU accession followed closely the evolution of scrutiny procedures 
and became sensitised quite early to EU affairs, because they followed the issues since the 
beginning of Finland’s membership. For instance, a former MP exerted his mandate from 1983 
to 2015 and was member of the GC before Finland joined the EU, as well as member of the 
 
440 Own calculations based on key players’ biographical data. 
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Finnish delegation to the European Parliament before 1995 (Interview 10b, 2018). He witnessed 
the successive transformation of the Eduskunta’s participation rights in EU affairs and 
participated in the scrutiny of EU treaties. The interviewee admitted that the EU accession 
represented for him a significant achievement in his political career. Another MP who 
participated in the EU accession discussions as member of the Constitutional Law Committee 
was MP from 1991-1995 and 1999-2011 (Interview 3b, 2018). Another interviewee counts 
among the most senior MPs in parliament and was member of the FA committee since the 
beginning of his mandate (Interview 4b, 2018). This confirms that the highest proportion of 
senior MPs could be found, at least before 2015, in the GC and the FA committee. GC key 
players with recent mandates justify their involvement in EU affairs with their specialised 
knowledge. Indeed, an interviewee started a mandate in 2011, during the economic crisis 
(Interview 9b, 2018). Political experience within parliament did not seem to play a role in her 
involvement or selection in the GC, but rather her competences acquired outside of parliament.  
Most interviewees started their political career on the local level, in city councils 
(Interviews 4b, 5b, 7b, 9b, 10b, 2018). For some, their prior political career was already linked 
to EU affairs. Two interviewees exerted for instance local and regional political functions and 
were responsible for EU structural funds (Interview 7b, 9b, 2018). Moreover, GC key players 
tend to have a higher experience in the executive. Some interviewees were either Minister for 
European Affairs, or long-term Foreign Affairs Minister (Interview 4b, 7b, 2018). Their 
experience in Government might give these MPs more credibility and a good reputation in 
Parliament as EU or Foreign Affairs experts. It might also facilitate their contacts with the 
Government in the framework of their parliamentary mandate, as they kept connections within 
ministries and know how the Government works. Sectoral committee key players, on the other 
hand, do not have such an extensive political career, either in parliament or in government. 
All interviewees have a higher education degree in Law, Economics or Social Sciences. 
In the framework of their studies, some of them went abroad to gain international experience. 
Their background brought them closer to EU issues and shaped their interest before they entered 
Parliament. For instance, an interviewee did a bachelor in Law in Helsinki, a bachelor in 
Economics in Sweden and a Master of Law in New York (Interview 10b, 2018). Another 
interviewee studied at the Sussex University (Interview 5b, 2018). Other interviewees studied 
Political Science or Philosophy in Finland. The beginning of their professional careers also 
looked similar. Indeed, most of them continued on the academic level for some time, as research 
fellow, adjunct professor, assistant professor or R&D coordinator (Interview 4b, 5b, 7b, 9b, 
2018). After their studies, interviewees started to deal with EU affairs through their professional 
career. All interviewees exerted prior positions that were linked to EU issues. For instance, an 
interviewee was a long-term journalist who handled political and EU affairs (Interview 3b, 
2018). Another interviewee began an international career in the OSCE, UNICEF and UNDP 
due to his deep-rooted interest for International Relations derived from his studies (Interview 
5b, 2018). A former MP counted among the first Finns to do an internship at the European 
Commission and became an assistant in the European Parliament (Interview 7b, 2018). Interest 
for EU affairs was therefore already present before these key players joined Parliament.  
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Overall, membership in national unions did not play a significant role in their 
involvement. Very few key players were member of a trade union confederation or domestic 
association. However, their interest for EU matters translated into memberships in different 
associations and political bodies dealing with the EU. For instance, an interviewee was 
Chairman of the European Movement in Finland (Interview 7b, 2018). Another key player was 
the President of the Finnish UN association and chaired several working groups on EU affairs 
and Migration policy within his party (Interview 5b, 2018). These biographical elements 
indicate that key players were conditioned at an early stage to participate in EU affairs. 
Moreover, the internationality of their profile is mirrored in key players’ participation 
in international and/or European interparliamentary cooperation. Indeed, 62% of them were 
active in these formats441. Specifically, interviewees participate(d) in delegations to 
parliamentary conferences of the Nordic Council, the Baltic Sea, the Arctic Council, NATO, 
COSAC, OSCE etc. We find that Northern cooperation plays a significant role within 
Parliament and among MPs. Two interviewees were also very active in the Finnish delegation 
to the Convention on the Future of Europe. Some participated in delegations to the European 
Parliament to prepare Finland’s EU accession, or in delegations to candidate countries that 
joined the EU in 2004. Among key players from sectoral committees, we conclude that few of 
them were member of an interparliamentary conference, mostly in international formats such 
as the IPU, WEU or Nordic Council442.  
Political leadership positions are common among GC key players, followed closely by 
sectoral and FA committee members. Among the key players, approximately 30% exerted the 
functions of parliamentary group chair and 25% the functions of committee chair during 
negotiations on EU and intergovernmental treaties. Just as in the case of Luxembourg and 
Austrian MPs, these leadership positions indicate that key players represent their party’s or 
committee’s opinion, as the main experts or spokespersons with the most competences and 
knowledge on EU affairs. Group or committee leaders follow actively EU treaties, because they 
need to defend a certain position in the name of a whole group. Their leadership position let 
them appear more legitimate to lead debates and they take the opportunity for political profiling 
in Parliament. We discovered that the more a treaty was salient on the national level, the more 
political leaders took centre stage. For instance, we find among interviewees former GC 
Chairmen or Chairs of party EU working groups (Interview 5b, 7b, 9b, 2018). An interviewee 
was also EU Speaker for the group (Interview 10b, 2018). These leadership positions provide 
MPs with privileges, acknowledgement and an expert reputation. The GC chair is a unique 
privileged function that gives MPs an extended communication freedom compared to sectoral 
committee chairs (Interview 7b, 2018). GC chairs have frequent and direct contacts with 
ministers and the Prime Minister. They are the last decisional body to approve binding mandates 
to ministers.  
In sum, key players’ profiles look very similar to those observed in Luxembourg and 
Austria. Indeed, even though some sectoral committee members also got involved, we note that 
 
441 Among them, 37,5% were GC members, 10,7% FA committee members and 14,2% sectoral committee 
members. Own calculations based on key players’ biographical data. 
442 Information based on the analysis of sectoral committee key players’ biographical data. 
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GC members represented the largest proportion of active MPs during negotiations on the four 
treaties. Explanation lies in the fact that they were pre-conditioned to engage in EU affairs 
through their prior professional, educational and political experience. GC members, in 
particular specific key players, have the same “Europeanised” profiles observed in the 
Luxembourg and Austrian chambers. Distinctive characteristics of GC key players is their high 
seniority in Parliament, their deep interest for EU affairs, their extensive international or 
European experience, their frequent participation in interparliamentary conferences, their 
experience in the executive and their political leadership positions. Contrary to Austria, 
relations to national unions do not seem to play an important role in parliamentary involvement 
in EU affairs. Moreover, we observe that GC key players usually belong to majority or large 
pro-European mainstream parties (with exceptions), whereas sectoral committee key players 
come mostly from opposition and/or Eurosceptic parties443. This can be explained by the fact 
that sectoral committee key players became active mostly during the economic crisis. Among 
their ranks, they counted more opposition MPs due to growing discontent and saw the 
emergence of active PS MPs. 
 
7.3.2 Parliamentarians’ level of involvement in EU affairs 
 
The present section bases on the previous one to explain the evolution of parliamentary 
activity in EU affairs within the Eduskunta. We will first outline the general trends observable 
since 2003. Secondly, we will expose the motivational reasons behind parliamentary activity. 
 
7.3.2.1 General trends 
 
The GC meets generally twice per week, making it the committee with the most frequent 
meetings among the three case studies444. The main reason for such frequent meetings is the 
central role played by the GC in EU matters, because it coordinates the Parliament’s EU 
activities and scrutinises thoroughly the Government’s EU policy. Friday sessions are 
especially important, because ministers usually come to the GC after their weekly government 
meeting on EU affairs. The graph below illustrates the evolution of GC meetings since 2002. 
We observe that activity is fluctuating. Just as in Luxembourg and Austria, the decreasing trends 
correspond each time to parliamentary elections in March 2003, March 2007 and April 2011. 
The transition period between two legislative periods might explain why the GC met less 
frequently. Peaks of activity can be observed between 2004-2005, 2007-2009 and 2010-2011, 
corresponding each time to negotiations on EU treaties and intergovernmental treaties on the 
EMU. 
 
 
443 Observations made on the basis of biographical data after selection of all key players according to parliamentary 
documents (minutes of plenary debates, committee opinions). 
444 For instance, the EU-HA in the Austrian National Council meets once per month. 
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Figure 67: Number of GC meetings (in total), Eduskunta, 2002-2013 
 
Source: Calculations based on a compilation of data retrieved from annual parliamentary reports from 2003, 
2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013. 
The increase in GC meetings observable from 2006 on could be explained by the start 
of the new legislative period, but also by the organisation of the Finnish EU Presidency during 
the second half of 2006 and discussions on a new EU treaty. The curve seems to indicate that 
the GC met the most during the negotiation phase on the Treaty of Lisbon and the start of the 
economic crisis.  
If we compare the number of meetings of all committees, we observe that sectoral 
committees met more often445. The GC counts among the committees with the least meetings, 
alongside the Finance Committee. However, evolutionary trends are similar in all committees. 
Figure 68: Comparative evolution of committee meetings (in total), Eduskunta, 2002-2013 
 
Sources: Own calculations based on committee statistics and annual parliamentary reports. 
Contrary to the Austrian National Council and the Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies, 
sectoral committees seem to be more active in the Eduskunta. This trend could be explained by 
the efforts of decentralisation and responsibility delegation to sectoral committees. Indeed, EU 
affairs are systematically redistributed to sectoral committees. The latter have thus to deal with 
both domestic and EU matters, whereas the GC handles only EU topics. Therefore, this graph 
 
445 For more visibility and clarity, we did not include all sectoral committees in the graph. 
0
20
40
60
80
100
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Grand Committee
Constitutional Law
Committee
Foreign Affairs Committee
Finance Committee
Committee on Transport and
Communications
Agriculture and Forestry
Committee
327 
 
could represent a partial illustration of mainstreaming trends within the Eduskunta, even though 
it does not show the content of committee debates. 
The analysis of parliamentary activity in EU affairs implies to check the use of 
parliamentary instruments. If we focus on the number of statements submitted by committees 
on Union matters, we observe that EU affairs represent most of the time more than half of all 
submitted statements. 
Figure 69: Proportion of statements on Union matters compared to total number of 
statements (in total), Eduskunta, 2003-2015 
 
Source: Own calculations, based on annual parliamentary reports from 2003 to 2015. 
In particular, the GC submitted most opinions on EU affairs. The number of GC 
opinions to the Government grew punctually between 2004 and 2006, as well as in 2008 and 
2012. Considering that these opinions were on EU matters, there is a strong probability that 
they concerned or were affected by EU-level events such as EU treaties or the Finnish EU 
Presidency in 2006. 
Figure 70: Comparative evolution of opinions sent by committees to government or 
ministries (in total), Eduskunta, 2003-2015 
 
Source: Statistics on committees 2003,2004,2005,2006,2007,2008,2009,2010,2011,2012,2013,2014 2015. 
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The analysis of submitted parliamentary questions on EU affairs helps checking how 
actively MPs scrutinised their Government’s EU policy. The same fluctuations observed before 
appear in the following graph illustrating the evolution of the number of parliamentary 
questions on EU affairs (including both written and oral questions). 
Figure 71: PQs on EU affairs (written and oral, in total), Eduskunta, 2003-2014 
 
Sources: Own calculations446.  
The curve indicates that the use of parliamentary questions on EU affairs was 
particularly high during negotiations on the Constitutional Treaty between 2003 and 2005. 
Scrutiny dropped in 2006-2007, probably because of the parliamentary elections in 2006 and 
the Finnish EU Presidency, which required MPs to be supportive of their government. The 
number of questions increased slightly during negotiations on the Lisbon Treaty and reached a 
peak in 2010 during the economic crisis and the help packages for Greece. If we analyse the 
proportion of questions on EU affairs compared to the total number of questions, we observe 
that the percentage of questions is higher in the contexts of the Constitutional Treaty and the 
economic crisis. 
Figure 72: Percentage of PQs on EU affairs, Eduskunta, 2003-2014 
 
Source: Own calculations447.  
 
446 Data based on annual parliamentary reports 2003, 2004,2005, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2015 
and statistics compiled by parliamentary civil servants and retrieved from the search engine of the Eduskunta by 
typing "European Union". This data is not exhaustive. 
447 Data based on annual parliamentary reports 2003, 2004,2005, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2015 
and statistics compiled by parliamentary civil servants and retrieved from the search engine of the Eduskunta by 
typing "European Union". This data is not exhaustive. 
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The peak of questions in 2011 can be explained by the systematic involvement of PS MPs in 
the scrutiny of the economic crisis. 
To sum up, the fluctuation in parliamentary activity resembled our observations in the 
Luxembourg and Austrian chambers. However, we can already identify a clear trend: the use 
of parliamentary instruments increased especially during the negotiation periods of the 
Constitutional Treaty and the ESM/TSCG. These two events seemed to have been the most 
salient in Finland according to the observations made in the graphs above. EU and 
intergovernmental treaties affected parliamentary activity by influencing MPs’ use of scrutiny 
instruments. In the next section, we will analyse the motivations hidden behind these statistical 
observations. 
 
7.3.2.2 Reasons for MPs’ (non) involvement in EU affairs 
 
Within the Eduskunta, the handling of EU affairs became a matter of fact, with EU 
topics appearing more often on political and legislative agendas (Interview 11b, 2018). 
According to an interviewee, MPs became more aware of EU affairs in their own sectoral 
committees, because they handle EU matters every week. A study also demonstrated that 
Finnish MPs think that they exert actual influence on the EU decision-making (Öberg/Jungar, 
2009). However, the involvement level varies between committees and depends on domestic 
priorities and MPs’ schedules. EU issues are time-consuming due to their large amount. GC 
members are often too busy and receive EU documents too late, which means that they cannot 
scrutinise thoroughly the content of EU proposals transferred by the Government. Depending 
on how thoroughly MPs want to acquire knowledge on a matter, they will invest more or less 
time. Most MPs have double-mandates and limited time to engage in EU affairs. MPs engage 
in weekend associative commitments and work in their respective constituencies.  
Sectoral committee members are more interested in salient issues on the national level. 
For instance, farming and forestry are important economic sectors in Finland and trigger wider 
attention within Parliament whenever EU issues concern these domains (Interview 6b, 2018). 
Peaks of attention occur whenever EU issues concern national interests, as we observed in the 
graphs from the previous section. The next elections to the European Parliament, the 
composition of the next European Commission or the next Multiannual Financial Framework 
are for instance topics that trigger more attention within Parliament (Interview 11b, 2018). Thus, 
decentralisation tendencies in the Eduskunta are not always reflected in practice in 
parliamentary activity. According to an interviewee, mentalities within Parliament are still 
focused on the domestic level (Interview 5b, 2018). MPs must accept the fact that European 
Integration implies multiple levels of decision-making. 
Participation in EU affairs also depends on personal and ideological priorities of parties 
and their parliamentary group members. During the economic crisis, we observed the highest 
peaks of activity, because opposition parties (especially the PS) were scrutinising the most the 
Government’s EU policy (Interview 6b, 2018). An interviewee admits that within the VAS 
group, sectoral committee members tend to be passive towards EU affairs compared to their 
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colleagues from the GC (Interview 6b, 2018). Moreover, the way the Government perceives 
EU affairs also determines how Parliament handles these matters. During the current legislative 
period, an interviewee pointed out that the Prime Minister and the Foreign Affairs Minister are 
respectively not interested in EU affairs and critical towards European integration (Interview 
11b, 2018). This behaviour might affect the content and outcome of public policies related to 
EU affairs. MPs belonging to the same parties as the Prime Minister (KESK) and the Foreign 
Affairs Minister (Blue Reform) might thus adopt the same passive or critical attitude in 
parliament. Since the outbreak of the economic crisis and the entrance of the True Finns in 
government, the usual consensual atmosphere around EU affairs broke. This might represent a 
challenge to the close cooperation between parliament and government that characterises the 
Finnish scrutiny model of EU affairs.  
Moreover, during EU and intergovernmental treaty negotiations, the Government kept 
its predominant position, which can explain why parliamentary instruments were less used 
between periods of activity peaks (Interview 2b, 2018). Majority MPs questioned less the 
Government’s EU policy and did not apply the mandating powers to the fullest. Opposition 
MPs had thus less chance to influence the legislative process. Nowadays, the fragile coalition 
government forces compromises in parliament and obliges MPs to respect artificial 
group/majority discipline. Their passive support to the Government leads to a decreasing use of 
scrutiny instruments. Therefore, the nature itself of the MP position has changed (Interview 2b, 
2018). MPs became less independent in their work. Due to the proportional list system, MPs 
have to fight individually for their seat in parliament. Once they are elected, they lack political 
connections because of the individualistic electoral system. Thus, they have to rely primarily 
on the government’s information. According to an interviewee who worked previously in the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, there is a clear information asymmetry between parliament and 
government (Interview 6b, 2018).  
Parliamentary activity also depends largely on MP’s personal interests and sociological 
background. Indeed, just as in the Luxembourg and Austrian chambers, EU affairs are not 
understandable and accessible to all MPs. According to an interviewee, EU affairs represent a 
positive experience for GC members, but can be technical for most MPs (Interview 10b, 2018). 
Sectoral MPs do not understand EU documents mostly written in English. For most MPs, EU 
affairs do not constitute an incentive for re-election (Interview 5b, 2018). GC, FA committee 
members as well as committee chairs tend to deal more with EU affairs than the average MP, 
because their position obliges them to stay informed on the agenda topics. Especially MPs with 
identified “Europeanised” profiles (mostly GC members) have a deep interest for EU affairs 
and invest more time in it. For instance, GC members and those MPs particularly interested in 
EU affairs are more likely to engage in networking activities on the EU level (Interview 7b, 
2018). Professional and personal experience linked to EU affairs influence substantially their 
involvement level as well. According to an interviewee, his function as Board Chair of the 
Finnish Broadcasting Company and as Chair of the Committee on Transport and 
Communication reinforced his interest for EU affairs (Interview 3b, 2018). Another interviewee 
explained that his membership in the European Movement and the fact that he comes from a 
small secluded town in northern Finland with a high unemployment rate gave him the 
opportunity to discover the EU as a new open-minded environment (Interview 7b, 2018). 
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Most sectoral committee members are aware of EU affairs, but become active only when 
they affect national interests or when it triggers media’s attention (Interviews 4b, 5b, 10b, 2018). 
Overall, senior MPs focus more on European and international issues, because they are less 
interested in re-election prospects compared to recently elected MPs. Proof of the general 
disinterest for EU affairs is for instance MPs’ passivity towards the liaison officer in Brussels 
(Interview 1b, 2018). They barely ask for information and the liaison officer admits that MPs 
might not even read the regular reports sent to parliament.  
On the whole, parliamentary activity in the Eduskunta is as fluctuant as trends observed 
in the Luxembourg and Austrian chambers. Peaks of activity can be observed whenever an 
important EU event occurs, or after legislative elections. While strong formal capacities clearly 
empower MPs, their practical use is limited because of multiple sociological and institutional 
factors. EU affairs remain circumscribed to a small group of MPs. Domestic priorities tend to 
prevail over EU issues. 
 
7.3.3 Discussion and conclusions 
 
In this part, we analysed the Eduskunta’s general socio-demographic features and their 
impact on MPs’ involvement in EU affairs. The current legislative period (2015-2019) shows 
exceptional trends within Parliament since the arrival of new MPs from the True Finns party. 
On top of the very “young” composition of the Eduskunta, the cohabitation of a Eurosceptic 
party with pro-European coalition partners renders EU scrutiny difficult within the Eduskunta. 
Overall, Finnish MPs are satisfied with their parliament’s scrutiny power. However, when we 
observe the evolution of parliamentary activity, we see that the latter fluctuates considerably. 
Based on the analysis of the evolution of committee meetings, parliamentary questions and 
statements on Union affairs, we identified periods of peaks corresponding more or less to 
negotiations on EU and intergovernmental treaties, but also national legislative elections. 
Indeed, the contexts of the Constitutional Treaty, the ESM and the TSCG seemed to have 
triggered more activity within Parliament than the Lisbon Treaty. In between these peaks, MPs 
did not use intensively the scrutiny tools at their disposal. Parliamentary activity thus depends 
on the national salience given to EU issues. 
From a practical point of view, several elements hinder the use of the strong formal 
capacities. Just as in Luxembourg and Austria, MPs exert double-mandates, which reduces their 
time spent in parliament. However, they are member of only two committees on average. 
Committee membership is an important determinant as well. Indeed, whether an MP is member 
of the GC or a sectoral committee, he/she will be involved differently in EU affairs. 
Government-opposition dynamics also determine largely how MPs use scrutiny instruments. 
Indeed, majority MPs represent a large proportion of the Eduskunta due to the large 
governmental coalitions. The Government enjoys therefore a strong support from its majority 
in Parliament, while opposition MPs exert barely any influence on the decision-making due to 
the parliamentary culture of consensual decision-making. Even though the Eduskunta is 
involved at an early stage, receives all necessary information on time and possesses strong 
mandating powers towards ministers, the Government remains the predominant actor in the EU 
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legislative process. In the end, political dynamics play a significant role in parliamentary 
involvement, just as in Austria.  
These institutional elements combined with different perceptions among MPs about the 
salience of EU issues lead to differentiated levels of involvement within Parliament. Indeed, the 
sociological analysis of MPs’ profiles and motivations regarding EU affairs showed that 
sectoral committee members are less active than GC members. Moreover, MPs with 
“Europeanised” profiles, mainly GC and FA committee members, tend to be more involved 
than the rest. Focusing on general EU affairs, this confirms sub-hypothesis H2.1, according to 
which MPs with “Europeanised” profiles are more active in EU affairs However, even though 
formal capacities support the mainstreaming of EU affairs within Parliament, the results are 
quite mitigated in practice. The special position of the GC within Parliament makes it the main 
coordinator of EU issues. In the end, all EU opinions are being centralised in the GC, which has 
the final decisional power. GC members are logically more involved in EU affairs, because the 
committee deals exclusively with these. When we analyse more thoroughly their motivations 
to get involved in EU affairs, we observe that their prior professional and political experience 
was already linked to EU matters. Overall, MPs with “Europeanised” profiles have more 
European and international experience than the average MP. This is reflected in parliamentary 
activity, with the exception of the economic crisis, as we will see later. Indeed, political 
dynamics seemed to play a more important role than sociological profiles, because opposition 
MPs were the most active in criticising the Government’s EU policy.  
The observations of the present part base on statistical and qualitative data 
(parliamentary documents, interviews). Sociological Institutionalism helped to identify the 
motivations of Finnish MPs to engage in EU affairs. To sum up, the Finnish consociational and 
corporatist system affects substantially EU scrutiny in the Eduskunta. Large government 
coalitions and the influence of parties on their parliamentary groups limit effective scrutiny 
within Parliament, as most MPs support their Government’s EU policy and remain passive. 
However, the punctual salience of specific EU events led to exceptional departures from the 
usual consensual-based system, especially during the economic crisis. Trade union 
confederations do not seem to play a significant role in MPs’ involvement in EU affairs. We 
will see in the next sections if this is still the case during negotiations on EU and 
intergovernmental treaties. Furthermore, the normative perception of Parliament’s role in EU 
affairs is very positive among MPs, which explains why they are reluctant to cooperate with 
European level bodies. It also explains why the Finnish Parliament initiated few institutional 
amendments since Finland’s accession to the EU. The next sections explain parliamentary 
involvement during treaty negotiations, starting with the Constitutional Treaty. 
 
7.4 Evolution of parliamentary involvement in the context of negotiations on the Treaty 
establishing a Constitution for Europe (2002-2006) 
 
In this part, we will focus on parliamentary involvement in the context of negotiations 
on the Constitutional Treaty. Based on the institutional and socio-demographic outline made 
in the previous parts, we will assess parliamentary activity and institutional change within the 
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Eduskunta during an exceptional European event. The first section will analyse how MPs’ 
ideological positions (H1.1), their position on the political spectrum (H1.2) and thus the 
polarisation level (H1.3) affected parliamentary involvement. We will also check to what 
extent MPs’ awareness rose depending on the salience of the Constitutional Treaty in Finland 
(H2). Basing on these observations, we will determine if the salience of the treaty led to a 
higher use of parliamentary instruments among parliamentarians. Finally, in the second 
section, we will look into institutional change within the Eduskunta and if it originated from 
the context of the Constitutional Treaty (H3).  
 
7.4.1 Parliamentary involvement in the framework of the negotiations on the Constitutional 
Treaty 
General context 
 
Legislative elections in 2003 marked the end of the “Rainbow coalition” including the 
KOK, SDP, SFP, VAS and VIHR. Instead, the KESK gained the most seats in parliament (55) 
and became the largest party with the SDP (53 seats). The conservatives KOK lost six seats. 
The Greens (VIHR) and the Christian Democrats (KD) obtained their best score, while the 
Swedish party SFP its worst score since 1983 (Arter, 2003). The new coalition in the form of 
the first Vanhanen cabinet was established between three parties: the Centre Party (KESK), the 
Social Democrats (SDP) and the Swedish People’s Party (SFP). 
Table 17: Legislative elections in Finland in 1999 and 2003  
 Political parties 
Year of 
election 
KESK SDP KOK VAS VIHR SFP KD PS 
1999 22,40 22,86 21,03 10,88 7,27 5,12 4,17 N.A 
2003 24,69 24,47 18,55 9,93 8 4,61 5,34 1,57 
Source: http://archive.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2111_99.htm ; http://archive.ipu.org/parline-
e/reports/arc/2111_03.htm (last accessed 13.06.2019) 
For the Left Alliance, its shift into the opposition came as a surprise (Dunphy, 2007). 
Subsequently, divisions appeared within the party on its position on European integration. 
While the new coalition government designed more right wing policies, some VAS leaders 
favoured a stricter defence of social democratic values. Part of the VAS members started to 
defend a populist and anti-European strategy in order to “restore the party’s morale, identity 
and raison d’être” (Dunphy, p.48, 2007). They favoured protectionism, Finnish neutrality and 
rejected European integration. Others within the VAS refused to criticise the SDP and supported 
its pro-European position, with the hope to return to government soon. The ideological gap 
within the VAS grew further until 2006, when Siimes decided to resign from her leadership 
position. Political rifts within the VAS affected its positioning on the Constitutional Treaty, as 
we will see later.  
On top of the Constitutional Treaty negotiations, European and municipal elections were 
held in 2004. The KESK and SDP both won more votes than in the last European elections. On 
the local level, the SDP became the first party. The KOK lost again votes in both the European 
and municipal elections, confirming the trend observed during the legislative elections in 2003. 
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On the EU level, Finland held its EU Presidency during the second half of 2006. All these events 
added to the treaty negotiations, especially the European elections and the Finnish EU 
Presidency, might have affected parliamentary involvement in EU affairs. They also affected 
the public opinion’s support to the EU and the treaty, which turned out to be very fluctuant 
between 2003 and 2006. Indeed, the start of the negotiations on the Constitutional Treaty 
seemed to have triggered positive feelings among the population. 39% thought that EU 
membership was a good thing and 49% of the population supported the treaty in October 
2003448. In October 2004, 48% of the population thought that EU membership was a good thing 
and 58% favoured the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty449. The negative referenda in 
France and the Netherlands in 2005 led to a decreasing support, as only 38% of the Finnish 
population thought EU membership was a positive thing in October 2005450. Moreover, 54% 
thought that the Constitutional Treaty should be renegotiated. Finally, during Finland’s EU 
Presidency in the second half of 2006, support to EU membership remained low (39%), but 
56% of the population expressed its support for the Constitutional Treaty before its ratification 
in parliament451. 
Parliament handled the Constitutional Treaty just as any other EU matter according to 
some interviewees (Interviews 1b, 2b, 2018). Compared to other Member States, Finland started 
to deal quite late with the treaty. Indeed, the ratification process in Finland came to a halt after 
the negative referenda in France and the Netherlands in 2005. The Government decided in 
autumn 2005 to submit a report to Parliament in the wake of the European Council’s decision 
to establish a period of reflection. The report did not contain a ratification proposal, but rather 
information on the Constitutional Treaty that should provide the Eduskunta with the opportunity 
to debate on the future of the EU and to give a “political ratification”452. In fact, the Finnish 
Council of State thought that due to the failed referenda, ratification might be premature and 
submitted instead an analytical report on the content of the treaty. In its report, the Government 
supported the treaty as an improvement over existing EU treaties.  
In November 2005, the government report on the Constitutional Treaty was announced 
in plenary453 and sent to the Foreign Affairs Committee with requested opinions of the Grand 
Committee and the Constitutional Law committee. Numerous sectoral committees consulted 
experts between December 2005 and March 2006. The Grand Committee gave its opinion in 
April 2006. The Foreign Affairs Committee discussed the report and opinions on 28th April 
 
448 Standard Eurobarometer N°60, October 2003, 
http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/instruments/STANDARD
/yearFrom/2002/yearTo/2007/surveyKy/397 (last accessed 13.06.2019) 
449 Standard Eurobarometer N°62, October 2004, 
http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/instruments/STANDARD
/yearFrom/2002/yearTo/2007/surveyKy/455 (last accessed 13.06.2019) 
450 Standard Eurobarometer N°64, October 2005, 
http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/instruments/STANDARD
/yearFrom/2002/yearTo/2007/surveyKy/833 (last accessed 13.06.2019) 
451 Standard Eurobarometer N°66, September 2006, 
http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/instruments/STANDARD
/yearFrom/2002/yearTo/2007/surveyKy/584 (last accessed 13.06.2019) 
452 11.02.2006, Turun Sanomat, « The EU Constitutional Treaty breaks into a new debate ». 
453 29.08.2005, 127th plenary session, PTK 127/2005vp, Government report on the Treaty establishing a 
Constitution for Europe. 
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2006, suggesting that the Eduskunta accepts the report. In May 2006, MPs adopted the 
governmental report by 104 votes against 24. Following the vote, the Parliament published a 
statement on 17th May 2006 asking the Government to submit a ratification proposal. The 
Government submitted such a proposal on 02nd June 2006 and sent to the Foreign Affairs 
Committee with requested opinions from sectoral committees. Committees consulted experts 
until October 2006. On 29th November 2006, the Foreign Affairs Committee submitted a report 
based on committees’ opinions and suggesting that Parliament ratifies the treaty. The first 
reading in plenary was held on 30th November 2006.  
The second reading and the vote were held on the 04th and 05th December 2006. The 
treaty needed to be ratified by a two-thirds majority in parliament according to an opinion of 
the Constitutional Law Committee454. 125 MPs voted in favour of the treaty, while 39 voted 
against it455. Among the supporters, 83 MPs came from the majority and 42 from the opposition. 
Both Government and opposition were divided on the issue. The KESK, SDP, KOK, VIHR and 
SFP voted mostly in favour, while the KD, True Finns and VAS against the treaty. The votes 
showed dissensions within parties. For instance, 4 KESK members voted against the treaty, 
while the majority supported it. Within the KOK, 7 MPs voted against it and 28 in favour. 
Within the VAS, the ideological divergences were visible as well. 2 VAS members voted in 
favour of the treaty, while the rest of the party voted against it.  
Overall, Finnish parties agreed that the Constitutional Treaty could be further improved, 
but that it was the best achieved deal (Raunio, In: Tans/Zoethout/Peters, 2007). All parties 
defended the community-method. During the Finnish EU Presidency in 2006, the Government 
set the objective to transform the reflection period into an active engagement towards the 
ratification of a new EU treaty456. KESK MPs were generally in favour of the treaty as a 
necessary improvement towards a democratic, effective and transparent EU457. The 
Constitutional Treaty clarifies the EU decision-making process, strengthens economic activity 
and reinforces the EU as a security community. SDP MPs also welcomed the treaty as a means 
to strengthen the EU’s external capacities, fundamental rights, the idea of a social Europe and 
a European political leadership458. In the same line of thought, KOK MPs underlined the 
democratising nature of the treaty, but criticised the Government’s lack of a clear EU policy459. 
The party also insisted that the Government defends EU security guarantees as a national 
interest460. SFP MPs accepted the fact that the Constitutional Treaty would not change 
fundamentally the EU, but supported explicitly its ratification. The Greens argued that the treaty 
 
454 2403.2006, Opinion of the Constitutional Law Committee, PeVL 9/2006 vp – VNS 6/2005vp, Government 
report on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe 
455 05.12.2006, 127th plenary session, PTK 127/2006vp, Government’s proposal for the adoption of a Treaty 
establishing a Constitution for Europe and a law on the transposition of its legislative provisions. 
456http://www.eu2006.fi/NEWS_AND_DOCUMENTS/PRESS_RELEASES/VKO26_/EN_GB/162650/INDEX.
HTM;http://www.eu2006.fi/NEWS_AND_DOCUMENTS/SPEECHES/PRESS/EN_GB/1150877429794/INDE
X.HTM (last accessed 13.06.2019) 
457 10.05.2006, 51st plenary session, PTK 51/2006vp, Government report on the Treaty establishing a Constitution 
for Europe. 
458 Ibid. 
459 Ibid. 
460 30.08.2005, YLE.fi, [The Coalition Party is in favour of EU security guarantees], https://yle.fi/uutiset/3-
5218620 (last accessed 13.06.2019) 
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would strengthen human rights, the EU’s international role and the European social dimension. 
Pro-European parties were backed by all trade union confederations and employers’ 
associations (SAK, AKAVA, STTK, EK and MTK). According to the SAK, the new treaty 
strengthens the employee status in Europe through the recognition of Social Partners on the EU 
level, as well as the status of sparsely populated regions of Northern Europe and the inclusion 
of the Charter of fundamental rights461. The VAS, True Finns and KD rejected the treaty from 
the beginning, arguing that it would threaten national sovereignty and the Northern welfare 
model, reinforce the undemocratic nature and federalist tendencies of the EU462. All three 
parties and the Greens pleaded for the organisation of a referendum on the Constitutional 
Treaty.  
While the Constitutional Treaty itself led to moderate debates in Parliament with little 
polarisation, the referendum issue seemed to trigger more attention and tensions among all 
political players. The idea of a national referendum emerged right after the EU Convention 
(Ojanen, 2007). The Constitutional Law Committee stated in 2003 that a referendum would not 
be necessary considering that the treaty would not considerably affect the national constitutional 
order. Nonetheless, the VAS requested the organisation of a referendum in June 2004 as a 
means to increase trust in the EU463. In July 2004, the then Minister of Transport Mauri 
Pekkarinen (KESK) defended publicly the idea of a national referendum, which was supported 
by the SDP Chair of the FA Committee in Parliament464. Even a KOK MEP argued that the 
Government should hold a referendum, otherwise the coalition would run into a “political 
crisis”. Prime Minister Vanhanen reacted to these scattered positions in August 2004, ruling out 
any referendum in Finland based on the argument that no substantial changes on the EU level 
justified such measure465.  
The referendum issue led to internal disagreements within the coalition and among 
Finnish political actors and the public opinion. The liberal newspaper Kauppalehti strongly 
defended the idea of a referendum, arguing that the power belonged to the Finnish population 
to decide about the ratification of the treaty466. While the Speaker of the Eduskunta did not 
support the idea of a referendum, the former Finnish European Ombudsman from the S&D 
recommended it467. In September 2004, the coalition partners and the main opposition party 
 
461 05.07.2004, SAK, New constitution strengthens employee status in Europe, https://www.sak.fi/en/whats-
new/news/new-constitution-strengthens-employee-status-europe (last accessed 13.06.2019); 04.07.2006, SAK, 
Ten main objectives of the Finnish trade unions for the Finnish EU presidency, https://www.sak.fi/en/whats-
new/news/ten-main-objectives-finnish-trade-unions-finnish-eu-presidency (last accessed 13.06.2019) 
462 Ibid. 
463 17.06.2004, https://www.kaleva.fi/uutiset/kotimaa/vasemmistoliitto-eun-perustuslaista-
kansanaanestys/381801/ (last accessed 13.06.2019) 
464 28.07.2005, mtv.fi, Jaakonsaari ja Stubb: EU:n perustuslaista kansanäänestys [Jaakonsaari and Stubb: 
referendum on the EU Constitution] 
465 16.08.2004, EU Observer, Finnish prime minister rules out EU Constitution referendum, 
https://euobserver.com/institutional/17088 (last accessed 13.06.2019) 
466 21.06.2004, Kauppalehti, Tarvitaanko EU:n perustuslaista kansanäänestys? [Do we need a referendum on EU 
constitution?]. 
467 22.08.2004, Turun Sanomat , 
http://www.ts.fi/mielipiteet/paakirjoitukset/1073987416/Jacob+Sodermanin+aliokirjoitus+Kansaa+kuultava+Eur
oopan+unionin+perustuslaista (last accessed 13.06.2019); 23.08.2004, Former EU Ombudsman recommends 
Constitution referendum https://euobserver.com/institutional/17118 (last accessed 13.06.2019) 
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KOK decided not to submit the treaty to an advisory referendum in Finland. According to 
Raunio and Wiberg, the reason behind this decision lied in the fact that most parties were 
internally divided over EU affairs. Coalition partners did not want to run the risk of organising 
a referendum, all the more so as Finland does not have a deep-rooted referendum culture468 
(Raunio/Wiberg, In: Brouard/Costa/König, 2012). Despite this clarification from the 
Government, several MPs from the SDP, VIHR, KESK, KOK, PS and KD submitted a law 
proposal on a consultative referendum on the Constitutional Treaty in February 2005469. The 
initiative was submitted to the Constitutional Law Committee and discussed in plenary in 2005 
and 2006470. In the meantime, throughout the year 2006, MPs from the True Finns, KD, VAS 
and VIHR pleaded repeatedly for the organisation of a referendum471. Especially the then 
leaders of the True Finns and the KD criticised the ratification plan as an elite project 
minimising citizens’ voices472. Finally, the parliamentary initiative was abandoned in October 
2006 and in November 2006, the Greens accepted the fact that there would be no referendum.  
Just as in Austria, tensions arose from a domestic issue and not from the Constitutional 
Treaty itself. Indeed, political positions started to diverge on the referendum question. Only 
single political personalities and individual MPs, however, expressed their support for a 
referendum. Within Parliament, group discipline did not seem to be strong, especially within 
the biggest parties. Single MPs decided to vote against their party’s line. As we saw earlier, we 
can explain this by the electoral system that encourages individualistic strategies and ideological 
positioning. The referendum topic sparked tensions between and within parties, but we cannot 
observe clear polarisation tendencies, as opponents of the treaty represented only a minority. 
Clearly, ideological positions affected the way MPs engaged in the debates on the Constitutional 
Treaty and the referendum.  
Eurosceptics such as the True Finns and the majority of VAS members (following the 
ideological split after the legislative elections in 2003) opposed strongly the treaty and pleaded 
for a national referendum. Pro-Europeans such as the KESK, SDP, KOK, SFP and VIHR 
supported the treaty. Single MPs from these parties also supported the referendum idea, but not 
for the same reasons as the Eurosceptics. The latter aimed to promote national sovereignty and 
interests through the referendum, hoping it would signify the failure of the treaty. The Greens 
and single MPs from the biggest parties wanted a referendum to enhance the legitimacy of the 
treaty. Pressure on MPs came both from the growing Euroscepticism of the public opinion and 
 
468 Until now, only two referenda have been organised in Finland : the Prohibition referendum in 1931 and the 
referendum on Finland’s EU membership in 1994. 
469 18.02.2005, Arja Alho, SD (main initiator), Greens, Centre party, National Coalition party, Finns, Christian 
democrats, Law on a consultative referendum on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, LA 11/2005 
vp 
470https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/Vaski/sivut/trip.aspx?triptype=ValtiopaivaAsiakirjat&docid=PTK+18/2005+ke+
p+2 (last accessed 13.06.2019) 
471 07.04.2006, Opinion of the Grand Committee, Dissenting opinions 1 and 2, SuVL 2/2006 vp – VNS 6/2005 vp, 
Government report on the Constitutional Treaty of the European Union; 10.05.2006, 51st plenary session, PTK 
51/2006vp, Government report on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe; 07.06.2006, 67th plenary 
session, PTK67/2006vp, Government’s proposal for the adoption of a Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe 
and a law on the transposition of its legislative provisions. 
472 08.04.2006, mtv.fi, Räsänen ja Soini vastustavat EU:n perustuslain ratifiointia [Räsänen and Soini are opposed 
to the ratification of the EU Constitution] 
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the approaching parliamentary elections in March 2007 pushing MPs to enhance their political 
profiling. 
Analysis of parliamentary involvement 
 
Between 2005 and 2006, the Eduskunta actively scrutinised both the government report 
on the Constitutional Treaty and later the government proposal on the treaty ratification. Apart 
from the FA Committee, the GC and the Constitutional Law Committee as the main scrutinisers, 
we observe that sectoral committees were particularly involved. They organised numerous 
expert hearings to give their opinion to the FA Committee. Within these expert hearings, 
representatives from different trade union and interest group organisations, professors, MEPs 
and ministerial civil servants were invited in committees. Overall, the FA Committee met 41 
times between the end of 2005 and the end of 2006. The GC and the Constitutional Law 
Committee both met 18 times (see table S, appendix 1). In total, MPs debated the report and the 
treaty in 8 plenary sessions. Compared to the Austrian National Council and the Luxembourg 
Chamber of Deputies, the frequency and number of meetings of the Eduskunta’s committees is 
significantly higher, which confirms its classification as “working parliament”473. 
Unfortunately, we did not have access to the minutes of the committee meetings, so we 
were unable to assess the content of the discussions. According to Ojanen, security and defence 
issues have triggered more debates than other issues (Ojanen, 2007). Moreover, discussions 
concerned less the Constitutional Treaty itself, but broader matters directly linked to Finnish 
interests (national referendum, agricultural policy, welfare model, status of the Aland Islands 
and sparsely populated areas, etc)474. The trends observed can be found in the analysis of the 
number of committee meetings. Indeed, the graph below shows that GC and FA Committee 
meetings grew during 2005 when the government report needed to be discussed. As explained 
before, the report did not address solely the treaty, but also more generally Finland’s EU policy. 
The number of meetings decreased in 2006 when the Government submitted the ratification 
proposal. Discussions on the treaty itself dropped. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
473 See Raunio, In: Hefftler/Neuhold/Rozenberg/Smith, 2015; Raunio/Wiberg, 2008. 
474 See for example the opinion of the Foreign Affairs Committee, 29.11.2006, UaVM 13/2006vp – HE 67/2006 
vp, Government proposal for the adoption of a Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe and a law on the 
transposition of its legislative provisions. 
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Figure 73: Number of GC and FA committee meetings in the context of the Constitutional 
Treaty (in total), Eduskunta 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
If we draw our attention specifically on parliamentary tools such as questions, we 
identify the same trends. Parliamentary questions on EU affairs more generally grew between 
2004 and 2005. They diminished from 2005 onwards, as shown in figure 71. At the same time, 
the number of parliamentary questions on EU affairs was never as high as during that period. 
The same can be said of committee statements on Union matters. Parliamentary committees 
were particularly active between 2004 and 2006, period corresponding to the negotiations on 
the Constitutional Treaty. 
Figure 74: Statements on Union matters (in total) in the context of the Constitutional 
Treaty, Eduskunta 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
Between 2003 and 2006, questions (written and oral) as well as committee opinions constituted 
the most used instruments to scrutinise the Constitutional Treaty475. Overall, committee 
opinions and dissenting opinions were the most efficient tools. The table T (see appendix 1) 
sums up the used instruments and their authors. 
 
475 The number of submitted instruments might not be exhaustive due to difficult access to the data. 
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First observations show that majority MPs from KESK were more active in plenary 
debates, while opposition MPs were using mostly the scrutiny instruments. However, the 
content of these instruments did not follow clear ideological patterns, no matter MPs’ 
positioning on the political spectrum. These elements do not permit to fully confirm the sub-
hypotheses H1.1 and H1.2. Indeed, opposition MPs counted among their ranks both 
Eurosceptics and pro-Europeans. While Eurosceptic MPs from the opposition (VAS, PS) tended 
to use the tools to reject the treaty and support a national referendum, pro-European opposition 
MPs did not follow this strategy (KOK, VIHR). For pro-European opposition MPs, they 
abstained from harsh criticism probably because of their ideological proximity with the 
governmental coalition, as well as their potential participation in future government formations.  
Moreover, some majority MPs were not automatically in favour of the Government’s 
EU policy. Indeed, several single MPs from the majority (KESK, SDP) either joined the 
Eurosceptic ranks and rejected the treaty, or supported the referendum project alongside 
opposition MPs (either pro-Europeans or Eurosceptics). This explains why both majority and 
opposition MPs that refused to comply with their group’s ideological position submitted 
together some parliamentary instruments. This loose group discipline can be explained by the 
electoral system favouring individual candidates who can be more detached from their party’s 
line. Single MPs can decide to diverge from their party’s position without fearing consequences 
on their political career. Therefore, we cannot validate sub-hypothesis H1.3, because loose 
group discipline appeared even in the absence of political polarisation. Despite the lack of 
clarity about ideological positions on the treaty, we can sum up by saying that most opposition 
MPs listed above had a Eurosceptic stance, while majority MPs had a pro-European stance. We 
could not identify clear polarisation patterns in the use of parliamentary instruments and in the 
debates. The referendum sparked tensions between and within the parties, but not to the extent 
of a division between camps. Consensual practices between pro-European parties prevailed, no 
matter their position on the political spectrum. 
According to interviewees, interest for the treaty was rather limited within parliament, 
even though the referendum triggered national attention (Interview 3b, 5b, 2018). Attention 
remained limited to a specific circle of actors. Indeed, we notice that MPs from the GC and the 
FA Committee have used primarily the above listed scrutiny tools compared to sectoral 
committee members476. Moreover, in plenary debates, members of the GC and FA committee 
were also more represented than sectoral committee members. We found that key players from 
sectoral committees had more recent mandates than MPs from the other two committees. They 
probably took the opportunity to position themselves politically during the debates, while GC 
and FA Committee members were involved for different reasons. They had a higher seniority 
in Parliament compared to the average MP and were thus more sensitised to EU issues due to 
their extensive experience. Unlike recently elected sectoral committee members, they were 
more interested in the treaty itself than in electoral benefits.  
 
476 See for instance debates in plenary where most speakers were GC and FA Committee members : 10.05.2006, 
51st plenary session, PTK 51/2006vp, Government report on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe; 
07.06.2006, 67th plenary session, PTK 67/2006vp, Government’s proposal for the adoption of a Treaty establishing 
a Constitution for Europe and a law on the transposition of its legislative provisions. 
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Key players with prior experience in government came mainly from the GC and FA 
Committee, probably because these two committees count among the most powerful bodies in 
parliament. Previous government members targeted these committees for political profiling in 
parliament with the aim to reintegrate future coalitions. Key players with experience in 
government came from the KESK and KOK, the biggest parties that formed coalitions together. 
Therefore, we assume that GC and FA Committee members with prior experience in 
government might be more sensitive to governmental positions and tend to support them in their 
parliamentary work.  
Additionally, they participated more systematically in interparliamentary conferences 
than sectoral committee members. Their regular contact with representatives from other 
parliaments and the European Union sensitised them more to EU affairs. Reversely, key players 
from sectoral committees barely participated in such cooperation formats, which proves once 
again that their focus was predominantly domestic-based. Overall, key players with 
“Europeanised” profiles dominated the scrutiny of the Constitutional Treaty within the 
Eduskunta. Therefore, we can validate sub-hypothesis H2.1, because the level of 
“Europeanisation” of MPs’ profiles determined significantly their involvement.  
Sectoral committee members were more passive, which does not validate sub-
hypothesis H2.2. For instance, we interviewed one of the above listed GC member from the 
SDP, who worked previously for the UN and started his political mandate in 1995 (Interview 
5b, 2018). He participated in numerous interparliamentary conferences and was also member 
of the FA Committee. In general, active GC members from the majority belonged mostly to the 
SDP. KESK MPs represent the exception, because they belonged mainly to sectoral 
committees. Most dissident MPs belonged to the opposition and sectoral committees. We 
observed exceptions such as a majority MP who defended a sceptical position (KESK) and 
belonged to the FA Committee, or active opposition MPs who were either GC or FA Committee 
members (KD, VAS, VIHR).  
We observed that several key players had leadership positions in Parliament, either as 
group chairs or as committee chairs. Their role was mainly to represent the position of their 
group/party or committee in the discussions on the Constitutional Treaty. This shows clearly 
that debates on the treaty were reserved to a privileged group of experienced and influential key 
players in Parliament. Political leadership positions were more common among GC and FA 
Committee members, as well as among opposition MPs. Political leaders were thus typically 
opposition members of the GC or the FA Committee. Indeed, as opposition MPs were under-
represented in Parliament, group chairs endorsed the main role to increase the visibility of their 
group’s position. Most group chairs came from the opposition groups VAS, VIHR, PS and KD. 
Opposition groups have usually less resources, information and influence than the majority, 
therefore leaders needed to defend the group’s position in the discussions in order to weigh in 
the decisions. Moreover, political leaders from the GC or FA Committee had more legitimacy 
to deal with the treaty, because they were seen as experts. In terms of committee leadership, 
one of the key players chairing the GC was an opposition MP from KOK, while a majority MP 
from the SDP chaired the FA Committee. Unlike the Austrian chamber, opposition MPs tended 
to chair influential committees within the Eduskunta. Even though the KOK group switched to 
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opposition in 2003, it still supported the Government’s EU policy as a pro-European party. 
Therefore, EU affairs in Parliament were still dominated by the Government despite a GC Chair 
coming from the opposition, due to ideological similarities and highly consensual practices.  
Moreover, we could not establish any link between the above listed MPs and trade union 
confederations. None of them seemed to belong to such interest groups, which means also that 
the latter did not exert any particular influence on the scrutiny process itself. A probable 
explanation could be the fact that MPs affiliated to trade unions tended to belong to sectoral 
committees close to trade unions’ priorities. Therefore, few MPs from the GC or the FA 
Committee had links to trade union confederations. However, the SAK’s public position on the 
treaty might have backed or oriented the SDP’s opinion as its main affiliated party. Indeed, both 
SAK and SDP supported the treaty. Influence on EU affairs came mainly from opinions 
expressed by the confederations themselves rather than from MPs with trade union affiliations. 
In summary, the Constitutional Treaty itself was not the most salient issue in Finland. 
Domestic priorities such as the organisation of a national referendum seemed to play a bigger 
role. Parliamentary activity dedicated to the scrutiny of the treaty was quite high within a one-
year period, but was not specifically on the treaty itself. It did not depend on polarisation trends, 
because consensus between parties was quite high. Finland’s EU Presidency affected more the 
activity of parliamentary committees. The GC hosted two COSAC meetings and four sectoral 
committees hosted common meetings with the corresponding committees in the EP and national 
parliaments from member and candidate countries477. Thus, it was less the salience of the treaty 
than the referendum and Finland’s EU Presidency that triggered the use of parliamentary 
instruments. The scrutiny of EU affairs was reserved to a limited circle of expert and influential 
MPs. Due to the large consensus among pro-European MPs on the treaty, whether from majority 
or opposition, criticism towards the Government’s position was almost non-existent. The 
passivity of most MPs towards the Government’s handling of the Constitutional Treaty explains 
why the majority had no difficulties to impose its views. The absence of serious political 
competition in Parliament and the fact that pro-European groups chaired both the GC and the 
FA Committee were at the benefit of coalition partners. 
The next section analyses the impact of the Constitutional Treaty negotiations on institutional 
change within the Eduskunta. 
 
7.4.2 The Constitutional treaty: an opportunity for institutional change in the Eduskunta? 
 
Within the Eduskunta, several revisions and revision attempts have been made between 
2003 and 2006 in the wake of the EU Convention and the context of the Constitutional treaty. 
Reflexions on the Parliament’s EU scrutiny procedures started at the end of 2003, when the GC 
and the Speaker’s Council decided to establish an EU-review committee in November. The 
latter was responsible to discuss potential improvements of the current EU scrutiny procedures. 
In this framework, MPs, parliamentary and ministerial civil servants discussed the impact of 
the Constitutional Treaty on Parliament’s role in the national and European legislative process. 
 
477 Annual report of the parliamentary office, Parliament of Finland, 2006. 
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The objective was to publish an assessment report by 2005. Overall, the EU-review committee 
met 21 times between December 2003 and February 2005 (see table U, appendix 1). 
The composition of the EU-review committee reflected the proportional representation 
of all political parties within the Parliament. One MP per group was member of the committee, 
both from the majority and the opposition478. The analysis of parliamentary documents indicates 
that most MPs who were member of the EU-review committee were also very active in the 
follow-up of the Constitutional Treaty. Therefore, we assume that the discussions around the 
Constitutional Treaty pushed them to trigger the debate on the EU scrutiny procedure. Most 
MPs were either GC or FA Committee members, with few being member of the Constitutional 
Law Committee and other sectoral committees. If we observe the profile of these “political 
entrepreneurs” of change, we note that the seniority rate is high among MPs. Indeed, most 
committee members had 3 or more mandates behind them at the time of the discussions. They 
had the needed knowledge on parliamentary practices and procedures to reflect on the revision 
of the scrutiny system. Moreover, some of them also participated in the preparation of the 
accession negotiations before 1994. They were member of joint committee meetings with the 
EP responsible to prepare Finland’s EU accession. They followed the development of the 
Eduskunta’s scrutiny system since the beginning. Therefore, they appeared as the most 
legitimate EU experts to assess the scrutiny procedures of the Eduskunta. 
Among the 8 MPs in the EU-review committee, 5 had a prior experience in the 
Government. For instance, the PS MP had been Minister of Transport from 1989 to 1990. 
Another KOK MP has been Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister for Trade and Industry 
between 1999 and 2002. We discover that prior experience in government played a significant 
role in their involvement. Prior government members engaged in discussions on institutional 
revisions probably because they wanted to gain acknowledgement with the aim to enter future 
government formations. As said before, ministers switch quite frequently their position, which 
could be an opportunity for MPs who publicise their work in Parliament to be noticed. For 
instance, some members of the EU-review committee managed to become government 
members after the parliamentary elections in 2007. 
Again, membership in trade union organisations was almost non-existent, which 
confirms that MPs with more European-based focus engage in debates on EU issues and related 
changes. Indeed, most MPs were member of a delegation to a European or international 
interparliamentary conference, even though international formats seemed to prevail in their 
case. Indeed, most MPs were member of delegations to the Nordic Council, the OSCE and 
NATO parliamentary assemblies or the Council of Europe. They benefitted from the access to 
privileged information, which contributed to their interest for EU affairs and the role of their 
parliament in the European Union. Moreover, we observed that half of the members of the EU-
review committee were also COSAC members in 2004, when the first bi-annual report on 
parliamentary procedures in EU affairs was published. Thus, they participated in the discussions 
on revision procedures and encouraged initiatives in their own parliament.  
 
478 18.02.2005, Improving EU scrutiny, Report of the Committee to assess EU scrutiny procedures, Eduskunnan 
Kanslian Julkaisu, 4/2005, https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/tietoaeduskunnasta/julkaisut/Documents/ekj_4+2005.pdf 
(last accessed 13.06.2019) 
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Apart from MPs, civil servants from the parliamentary administration, notably the GC 
Secretariat, but also officials from ministries, were member of the EU-review committee and 
participated actively in the discussions and the drafting of the final report. This indicates that 
the parliamentary administration plays a significant role in the definition of the EU scrutiny 
system (the Head of the GC Secretariat designed it from scratch), but also that the Government 
monitored closely the developments within parliament through its own civil servants. Overall, 
consensus on institutional change was large among majority and opposition MPs. Instead of 
competing for amendments, the groups relied on their EU experts to lead the discussions. 
Therefore, we can confirm sub-hypothesis H3.2, because MPs with “Europeanised” profiles 
benefitted from the consensual atmosphere to become the “political entrepreneurs of change”.    
In the meetings between 2003 and 2004, MPs discussed committee procedures, 
schedules and competences, especially with regard to the GC and the FA Committee479, as well 
as the Government’s information policy480 and procedures related to the subsidiarity 
monitoring. The secretary of the EU-review committee, a committee counsel, made a note on 
the difficulties to delimit the powers between the GC and the FA Committee. It was decided 
that the GC drafts reports on intergovernmental conferences, while the FA Committee is 
responsible for government reports on treaties. Moreover, the schedule of the GC was re-
adjusted, so that Friday meetings start 30 minutes earlier at 1.30pm. Friday plenary sessions 
would then be dedicated solely to announcements and votes. The report published in 2005 
outlined some suggestions to improve the Eduskunta’s EU scrutiny. For instance, the EU-
review committee suggested that more plenary debates should be dedicated to EU issues and 
that MEPs should participate more often in sectoral committee hearings481. Since 2005, 
secretary generals of the parliamentary groups meet every Friday. The GC schedule has been 
modified according to the suggestions in the report. Apart from these measures, the committee 
concluded that “[…] the system for national policy formulation on EU matters that is ordained 
in sections 93, 96 and 97 of the Finnish Constitution is functional and will remain so after the 
constitutional treaty becomes effective”482. According to the Head of the GC Secretariat, the 
concluding report rather resembled a self-congratulation of the current scrutiny system 
(Interview 2b, 2018).  
In 2006, with the new start of the ratification process within the Eduskunta, a new round 
of discussions appeared in the GC and the FA Committee on parliamentary scrutiny procedures 
in EU affairs. For instance, in April 2006, in its opinion on the government report on the treaty, 
the GC emphasised that the Parliament’s role should not be undermined through the 
strengthening of the European Council’s role483. In October 2006, in its opinion on the 
 
479 14.04.2004, 04.05.2004, Minutes of the EU-review committee meeting, Eduskunta. The Head of the GC 
Secretariat kindly shared the documents. 
480 Ibid., 21.10.2004. 
481 18.02.2005, Improving EU scrutiny, Report of the Committee to assess EU scrutiny procedures, Eduskunnan 
Kanslian Julkaisu, 4/2005, https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/tietoaeduskunnasta/julkaisut/Documents/ekj_4+2005.pdf 
(last accessed 13.06.2019) 
482 18.02.2005, Improving EU scrutiny, Report of the Committee to assess EU scrutiny procedures, Eduskunnan 
Kanslian Julkaisu, 4/2005, https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/tietoaeduskunnasta/julkaisut/Documents/ekj_4+2005.pdf 
(last accessed 13.06.2019) 
483 07.04.2006, Opinion of the Grand Committee, SuVL 2/2006 vp – VNS 6/2005 vp, Government report on the 
Constitutional Treaty of the European Union 
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government ratification proposal, the GC reiterated the obligation for the Government to keep 
the Eduskunta informed on any progress on the Constitutional Treaty484. Moreover, in 
November 2006, the FA Committee suggested to the Government to provide written 
information on formal and informal meetings of the European Council on top of the existing 
oral communication485. The committee also underlined the necessity to strengthen 
parliamentary control over European Council meetings.  
In conclusion, the proposed changes were only marginally implemented. MEPs still 
come very rarely or not at all to sectoral committee meetings. EU matters are rather debated in 
committees than in plenary. The limited institutional change can be explained by the fact that 
MPs’ normative conception of their Parliament’s role was positive. They thought that the 
scrutiny procedures were already satisfying and that the Eduskunta’s functions in EU affairs 
did not need any substantial changes. Even though the salience of the Constitutional Treaty 
itself was quite limited in Parliament, MPs referred to it in their discussions on potential 
procedural revisions. Therefore, we can say that hypothesis H3 is validated. The context of the 
treaty represented a salient moment where MPs took EU issues and transformed them into 
domestic issues. The gap between treaty provisions on parliamentary participation in EU affairs 
and the national scrutiny system encouraged MPs to trigger reform debates. Overall, discussions 
on the amendment of the scrutiny system were rather consensual and did not trigger any sharp 
conflict lines between pro-European and Eurosceptic or opposition and majority MPs. We 
noticed that the “political entrepreneurs” of change within the Eduskunta had “Europeanised” 
profiles and were familiar with parliamentary procedures due to their extensive political 
experience. The parliamentary administration and the Government were also actively involved 
in reflections on revisions within the Eduskunta. 
 
7.4.3 Conclusion 
 
In this part, we analysed parliamentary involvement in the context of the Constitutional 
Treaty. The analysis of both parliamentary activity and institutional change showed that MPs’ 
sociological features affected their involvement in EU affairs. In the case of parliamentary 
activity, MPs’ political positions within parliament, their position on the political spectrum and 
their ideological orientation seemed to play a significant role. Socio-demographic elements 
seemed to affect substantially institutional change, as no political conflicts could be identified 
in debates on parliamentary procedures. 
We observed that political tensions emerged between and within the parties, not so much 
on the Constitutional Treaty itself than on the issue of a domestic referendum on the treaty. 
Especially Eurosceptic opposition MPs insisted in parliament about the need to organise such a 
 
484 06.10.2006, Opinion of the Grand Committee, SuVL 8/2006vp – HE 67/2006vp, Government proposal for the 
adoption of a Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe and a law on the transposition of its legislative 
provisions 
485 29.11.2006, Opinion of the Foreign Affairs Committee, UaVM 13/2006vp – HE 67/2006 vp, Government 
proposal for the adoption of a Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe and a law on the transposition of its 
legislative provisions 
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public consultation. Consensus was large among pro-European MPs from both opposition and 
majority. However, single MPs had divergent positions. Group discipline was quite loose, as 
single majority MPs joined the opposition to support the referendum idea. We cannot speak of 
clear polarisation patterns, as both opposition and majority MPs were divided over the issue.  
Parliamentary scrutiny of the Constitutional Treaty depended mainly on governmental 
information. The Government was Parliament’s main counterpart, which means that majority 
MPs played a significant role in influencing the outcome of the discussions. However, it is 
difficult to say that parliamentary activity increased because of the Constitutional Treaty, as 
most salient issues were actually more wide-scoped. Trade unions did not influence explicitly 
MPs’ work, even though they might have played a role in some affiliated parties’ positions. 
Indeed, the SDP supported the treaty and so did the SAK, the trade union confederation closest 
to the party. Moreover, the analysis of key players’ profiles shows that “Europeanised” profiles 
prevail. GC and FA Committee members were mainly active in the scrutiny process and debates 
on procedural revisions. The rest of the parliament was aware of the treaty, but mainly through 
the referendum issue. We identified the same trends in the Austrian National Council, where 
MPs seemed to be more interested in national topics than in the treaty. The Constitutional Law 
Committee played a role mainly in the definition of the voting procedure. The treaty required a 
two-thirds majority that was easily fulfilled by the government parties in Parliament. Therefore, 
no strategical competition could be observed within Parliament to gather the necessary votes. 
Without surprise, opposition MPs used the most the tools to scrutinise their Government’s EU 
policy. However, as said before, we could not identify clear ideological boundaries within the 
opposition and the majority. While opposition MPs were mainly focusing on the referendum 
issue, the rest was scrutinising Finland’s general EU policy.  
Furthermore, institutional change remained limited to few superficial measures, as most 
MPs agreed consensually on the Eduskunta’s satisfying scrutiny infrastructure. Multiple actors 
were involved in the revision process: MPs, the parliamentary administration and government 
officials. The Secretary General of the Parliament chaired the EU-review committee and could 
monitor closely the direction of change. In the political sphere, pro-European MPs maintained 
the consensus over institutional change, because they had a common normative understanding 
of their Parliament’s role in EU policy. This consensual atmosphere strengthened indirectly the 
Government’s control over institutional change, even more so as a majority of members of the 
EU-review committee were prior government members. 
 
7.5 Evolution of parliamentary involvement in the context of negotiations on the Lisbon 
Treaty (2006-2009) 
 
This part will base on the same institutional and sociological features as the previous 
one. We will check the influence of MPs ideological positions (H1.1), their political position 
(H1.2) and the overall polarisation trends (H1.3) on parliamentary involvement in the context 
of the Lisbon Treaty. Just as in the previous section, we assume that the mainstreaming of EU 
affairs depends on the salience of the treaty in Finland and within parliament (H2). Moreover, 
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the salience level of the Lisbon Treaty will determine to what extent MPs used parliamentary 
instruments to scrutinise their government. The second section will analyse if and how the 
Lisbon Treaty led to institutional change within parliament (H3). 
 
7.5.1 Parliamentary involvement in the framework of the negotiations on the Lisbon Treaty 
General context 
 
Between the end of the discussions on the Constitutional Treaty and the beginning of 
the ratification procedure of the Lisbon Treaty within the Eduskunta, Finland had legislative 
elections on 18th March 2007. The elections were a victory for the conservatives (KOK), while 
the SDP lost votes and seats in parliament. The KESK arrived first with 51 seats in parliament, 
but lost 4 seats in total. The KOK gained substantial votes and became the second biggest party 
with 50 seats in parliament. The SDP had a big loss of 8 seats in parliament. The Greens (VIHR) 
and the True Finns (PS) gained both votes and seats. 
Table 18: Legislative elections in Finland in 2003 and 2007 
 Political parties 
Year of 
election 
KESK SDP KOK VAS VIHR SFP KD PS 
2003 24,69 24,47 18,55 9,93 8 4,61 5,34 1,57 
2007 23,1 21,4 22,3 8,8 8,5 4,6 4,9 4,1 
Source: https://www.stat.fi/til/evaa/2007/evaa_2007_2007-03-22_tie_002_en.html (last accessed 13.06.2019) 
Overall, the parliamentary elections in 2007 represented a difficult episode for the SDP. 
For the first time, the SDP became the third biggest party, behind the KOK and KESK (Arter, 
2007). Indeed, a new centre-right coalition was formed between the KESK, KOK, VIHR and 
SFP. The Vanhanen II cabinet evicted the SDP from the coalition. Non-socialist coalitions 
happened rarely in Finland before the 2007 elections. The majority in parliament became 
bigger, with 126 MPs out of 200 coming from coalition parties. The opposition was constituted 
of the SDP, PS, VAS and KD. Due to party finance scandals within the KESK that began in 
2008486, the Prime Minister Vanhanen had to resign by mid-term, in June 2010. Mari Kiviniemi 
replaced him and led a new coalition formed with the same parties until the next elections in 
2011. The difficult domestic political situation between 2008 and 2010 might have affected the 
attention given to the Lisbon Treaty. 
The Eduskunta received the Government’s proposal to ratify the Lisbon Treaty on 28th 
March 2008. Several sectoral committees pre-examined the matter and consulted experts. 
Parliamentary discussions on the Lisbon Treaty started officially on 10th April 2008 when the 
State Secretary of the Foreign Affairs Ministry launched a debate on security guarantees 
included in the new treaty (Gassen, In: Lieb/Maurer/Von Ondarza, 2008). The FA Committee 
was designated to produce a report on the proposal, with the opinions of the GC and the 
Constitutional Law Committee. The Prime Minister Vanhanen came to the Parliament a week 
 
486 KESK politicians were accused of corruption in the framework of an election funding scandal. While public 
opinion became more and more frustrated with the situation, the Greens called for new elections. See 
http://www.helsinkitimes.fi/htimes2/index.php/domestic-news/politics/6912-election-funding-scandal-reveals-
routine-misuse-of-political-power (last accessed 13.06.2019) 
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later to hold a speech on the Lisbon Treaty. In its opinion, the GC explained that the Lisbon 
Treaty was less clear than the Constitutional Treaty, but represented nonetheless a more 
satisfactory result than the current treaty487. The Constitutional Law Committee set the voting 
framework, just as for the Constitutional Treaty. A two-thirds majority was needed. The 
committee also underlined the necessity for the Parliament to give its approval to the ratification 
proposal, considering that the Lisbon Treaty contains comprehensive provisions on the EU’s 
decision-making system488. Sectoral committees organised hearings and submitted their opinion 
to the FA Committee, which presented its report on 30th May 2008. The committee welcomed 
among others the extension of the qualified majority voting and the security guarantees. It 
concluded that Parliament should ratify the treaty489. On 04th June 2008, the Parliament 
discussed and adopted the report of the FA Committee. The Eduskunta approved the 
government bill and ratified the treaty on the 10th and 11th June 2008. The Lisbon Treaty was 
adopted by 151 votes. 85 majority MPs voted in favour and 6 MPs against the treaty. In the 
opposition, 66 MPs voted in favour and 21 against the treaty490.  
Overall, the KESK, SDP, KOK, VIHR and SFP voted mainly in favour, while the PS, 
KD and VAS rejected the treaty. However, like the previous time, some groups were divided 
over the issue. Indeed, within the majority, 3 KESK MPs and 3 SDP MPs decided to go against 
the current and to reject the Lisbon Treaty. Within the opposition, 5 VAS MPs and 3 KD MPs 
voted in favour of the treaty and against their party’s political line. In particular, we see that 
group discipline became weaker within the KD and SDP and stronger within the KOK and 
VIHR. While a majority of MPs adopted the treaty in parliament, within the civil society, 
Euroscepticism grew stronger. In autumn 2007, the negative perception of the EU reached its 
highest score. 35% of the population thought that the EU had a negative role in Finnish 
economy491.  
Overall, parties supporting the treaty welcomed the strengthening of the EU’s legal 
personality and the protection of fundamental rights, the reference to the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and the simplification of the decision-making process. Still, the Lisbon 
Treaty was seen as a more blurred and complicated product compared to the Constitutional 
Treaty. The KESK, KOK, SDP, SFP and VIHR supported more or less the same elements in 
the Lisbon Treaty. For the KESK, the Lisbon Treaty was seen as a necessary tool to improve 
the democratic accountability of the EU, clarify the division of power between EU institutions, 
strengthen the EP and citizens’ rights492. A KESK MEP called also for maintaining one 
 
487 16.05.2008, Opinion of the Grand Committee, SuVL 1/2008vp – HE 23/2008 vp, Proposal of the government 
on the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on the European Union and the Treaty establishing 
the European Community and on the transposition of the legislative provisions. 
488 23.05.2008, Opinion of the Constitutional Law Committee, PeVL 13/2008vp – HE 23/2008vp, Ibid. 
489 30.05.2008, Opinion of the Foreign Affairs committee, UaVM 6/2008vp – HE 23/2008vp, Ibid. 
490 11.06.2008, 66th plenary session, Government proposal to parliament on the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon 
amending the Treaty on the European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community and the Act 
concerning the transposition of the legislative provisions. 
491 Eurobarometer N°68, Autumn 2007, 
http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/instruments/STANDARD
/yearFrom/2006/yearTo/2009/surveyKy/664 (last accessed 13.06.2019) 
492 10.04.2008, 36th plenary session, PTK 36/2008vp, Government proposal to parliament on the adoption of the 
Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on the European Union and the Treaty establishing the European 
Community and the Act concerning the transposition of the legislative provisions. 
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European Commissioner per country in Finland’s interests493. The KOK party emphasised 
Finland’s willingness to be an active player in the EU494. KOK MPs underlined the 
democratising effect of the treaty and its contribution to the improvement of the CFSP495. SDP 
MPs highlighted the development of a Social Europe and the strengthening of the fundamental 
rights and the transparency of the EU decision-making.  
Interest groups also supported the treaty. For instance, all wage-earners organisations 
favoured the strengthening of the fundamental rights and their binding nature, as well as the 
EU’s social base496. The SAK, STTK and AKAVA welcomed among others the recognition of 
the status of labour market organisations, the Finnish earnings-related pension scheme and the 
status of Finnish sparsely populated areas497. From the side of the population, even though 
negative feelings grew, the positive image of EU membership grew as well. Indeed, while 42% 
of the population supported EU membership as a good thing in April 2007498, the percentage 
increased to 45% in September 2007, 48% in October 2008 and 52% in June 2009499. The main 
reason might be the successful ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon, which gave the impression 
of a concrete outcome of the almost decade-long discussions. 
Among the opponents of the treaty, VAS MPs argued that the Lisbon Treaty increases 
neoliberal trends within the EU and contradicts the social model. The party also put the 
referendum idea back on the agenda. The KD favoured an intergovernmental EU with Member 
States as the main actors of the legislative process. The PS harshly criticised the Lisbon Treaty 
as a mean towards the end of national sovereignty and independence. The party also reproached 
the Government for not encouraging civic debates on the treaty500. From all the topics discussed 
 
493 19.06.2008, Kauppalehti, Jäätteenmäki haluaa kaikille jäsenmaille oman EU-komissaarin [Jäätteenmäki wants 
all EU MS to have their own EU Commissioner] 
494 27.05.2009, https://www.kokoomus.fi/ukkola-eu-on-arvoyhteiso/ (last accessed 13.06.2019) 
495 10.04.2008, 36th plenary session, PTK 36/2008vp; 04.06.2008, 63rd plenary session, PTK 63/2008vp, 
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496 18.06.2007, Position of wage-earners organisations on the EU Constitution, FinUnions, 
https://www.finunions.org/ajankohtaista/uutiset/uutisarkisto/2007/palkansaajajarjestojen_kannanotto_eu_n_peru
stuslaista.143.news?1047_o=80 (last accessed 13.06.2019) ; 30.04.2008, SAK, Government proposal on the 
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Community and the Act concerning the transposition of the provisions of its law HE 23 2008 
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in the plenary sessions, the CFSP seemed to be the most important one. Indeed, pro-European 
MPs welcomed the strengthening of the CFSP and the development of civilian crisis 
management, mutual assistance obligations and structural cooperation between Member States. 
Eurosceptic MPs, especially the Eurosceptic branch of the VAS, worried about the 
militarisation of the EU.  
Another issue that weighed on the parliamentary ratification of the Lisbon Treaty was 
the demands made by the Aland Parliament in exchange of its agreement to pursue the 
ratification process. In 2008, the Aland “Lagting” set conditions in return of its support to the 
treaty ratification. The regional parliament requested a seat in the EP, more weight in the 
European Commission and the European Council as well as a right of participation in the 
subsidiarity monitoring501. However, none of the Lagting’s demands were taken into account 
by the Finnish President when he ratified the treaty in October 2009, which raised consternation 
of the regional parliament. Finally, the Aland Parliament approved the Lisbon Treaty in 
November 2009 after intense discussions. The trigger for the turnaround might have been the 
discussions within the Eduskunta about Aland’s participation in the subsidiarity monitoring. 
Even though the Aland Parliament could have rejected the Lisbon Treaty, it would not have 
affected the ratification process. However, the deliberate disregard of the regional parliament’s 
demands triggered domestic political tensions. 
Overall, the Lisbon Treaty did not seem to be the main object of discussions and tensions 
between MPs. Indeed, several domestic issues attracted more attention in Finland than the treaty 
itself. Firstly, debates arose mid-2007 on the European Agricultural policy and the subsidies 
received by Finnish farmers anchored in the 1995 accession treaty. Political tensions between 
Sweden and Finland grew when the first requested an end to national farm subsidies in 
Finland502. The Prime Minister Vanhanen even threatened to link this agricultural issue to the 
treaty negotiations. Subsequently, the VAS, KD and PS announced in Parliament that they 
refused the signature of the Lisbon Treaty in light of this situation (Gassen, In: 
Lieb/Maurer/Von Ondarza, 2008). On top of this, requests for a national referendum emerged 
once again in 2007 in the ranks of the VAS and the PS. However, unlike in the case of the 
Constitutional Treaty, other parties and the Government were not interested to subject the treaty 
to a referendum (Raunio/Wiberg, In: Brouard/Costa/König, 2012). Thirdly, the issue with the 
Aland Islands in 2008-2009 attracted considerable attention from political players, fearing that 
the regional parliament could block the whole ratification process in Finland. Finally, internal 
difficulties within the KESK in 2009 and the resignation of the Prime Minister in 2010 occupied 
most of the media landscape.  
To sum up, we could not observe clear polarisation trends on the Lisbon Treaty itself. 
Within Parliament, debates on the Lisbon Treaty were moderate. A large majority of the parties 
voted in favour of the treaty, even though some single MPs decided to move away from the 
 
Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community and the Act concerning the transposition of the 
legislative provisions. 
501 Sundberg, Yearly country report on Finland, In : European Journal of Political Research, 2009. 
502 10.10.2007, YLE, Sweden and Finland in Farm Subsidy Spat, 
https://yle.fi/uutiset/osasto/news/sweden_and_finland_in_farm_subsidy_spat/5805377 (last accessed 13.06.2019) 
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majority’s line. Dissident opposition MPs were not numerous and did not weigh on the final 
decision. Moreover, multiple domestic issues diverted MPs’ attention from the treaty 
negotiations. 
Analysis of parliamentary involvement 
 
The number of committee meetings and plenary debates dedicated to the Lisbon Treaty 
were lower than that on the Constitutional Treaty. The Foreign Affairs Committee remained the 
most active player, with 21 meetings in 2008. Indeed, the CFSP was once of the crucial topics 
on the Finnish agenda. The GC met only 6 times and the Constitutional Law Committee 11 
times (see table V, appendix 1). MPs participated in 5 plenary sessions. Sectoral committees 
also participated in the discussions on the treaty and submitted their opinions to the FA 
Committee. They organised hearings and received written statements from the different trade 
union organisations (SAK, STTK, AKAVA, EK, MTK). 
The number of meetings of the GC and the FA Committee remained high, as we counted 
only the year 2008, whereas meetings in the context of the Constitutional Treaty were held over 
a wider timespan (2003-2006). Just as for the Constitutional Treaty, the main issues of concern 
in the context of the Lisbon Treaty seemed to be the CFSP and the preservation of Finland’s 
representativeness on the EU level, which could explain why the FA committee met more often. 
The graph below shows the evolution of the GC’s and FA Committee’s meetings. 
Figure 75: Number of GC and FA committee meetings in the context of the Lisbon Treaty 
(in total), Edsukunta 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
A reason that might explain the increase in the number of meetings since the legislative 
session 2006-2007 is the parliamentary elections in March 2007 and the boost of parliamentary 
activity after the electoral campaign and the election results. However, the number of meetings 
does not automatically indicate the level of activity. Indeed, when we analyse the number of 
Union matters received and handled by the GC, we observe that the GC was more active than 
the FA Committee over the same period of time. The graph hereunder illustrates the evolution 
of statements on Union matters, which increased between 2007-2008. 
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Figure 76: Statements on Union matters (total U+E) in the context of the Lisbon Treaty 
(in total), Eduskunta 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
The evolution of parliamentary questions on EU affairs is another element that can explain 
trends in parliamentary activity in the context of the treaty negotiations (see figure 71). We note 
that the number of questions increased between 2007 and 2009, probably for the same reasons 
as the committee meetings and the Union statements. However, they stayed almost at their 
lowest during that time. An explanation could be the aftermath of the legislative elections in 
2007, which meant renewed parliamentary activity after the election campaigns, but also the 
lower salience of EU issues in Parliament following the failure of the Constitutional Treaty. 
The graphs show that there is a clear gap between committee activity and MPs’ 
involvement. Even though committees met more frequently, the level of activity remained low 
on the side of single MPs. This observation can be made specifically for the Lisbon Treaty. 
Indeed, MPs tended to use less scrutiny tools than during negotiations on the Constitutional 
Treaty. The table W (see appendix 1) sums up the used scrutiny instruments in the framework 
of the negotiations on the Lisbon Treaty. Just as in the previous section on the Constitutional 
Treaty, questions and committee opinions were the two main used scrutiny instruments. 
The analysis of submitted parliamentary instruments shows clearly that the opposition 
(SDP, VAS, KD and PS) was more active than the majority (KESK, KOK, VIHR, SFP). Indeed, 
only few majority MPs asked questions to their government. Opposition MPs submitted 
questions and dissenting opinions. The proportion of active Eurosceptic opposition MPs is 
higher than pro-European opposition MPs, which explains why the tools were mainly used to 
reject the treaty or request a national referendum. However, if we analyse plenary debates, we 
witness that opposition and majority MPs were equally involved in the discussions, especially 
the KOK and the VAS groups. Overall, be they from the majority or the opposition, pro-
European MPs were still majoritarian in the debates. In any case, both camps defended their 
position according to their opinion on European integration. Therefore, we can validate both 
sub-hypotheses H1.1 and H1.2 according to which MPs’ ideologies and their positioning on the 
political spectrum influenced their involvement. Even though in the opposition, SDP MPs did 
not criticise the Government’s EU policy. Rather, the group asked for additional information 
not available to opposition MPs. A reason could be the party’s wish to re-integrate the next 
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coalition formation and thus MPs’ strategy to abstain from criticism. Overall, the number of 
dissident MPs in each group was also lower than in the case of the Constitutional Treaty. Group 
discipline seemed to be stronger. However, as the pro-European SDP represented a large 
proportion of the opposition, Eurosceptic voices were dampened and did not lead to polarisation 
tendencies within the Eduskunta. The VAS, KD and PS had only 29 MPs altogether, which did 
not affect significantly the majority’s position. Even within the VAS, MPs were divided over 
the treaty. Therefore, we can partially confirm sub-hypothesis H1.3, because growing political 
tensions forced MPs to stick more to their group’s position. However, we could not observe any 
polarisation between the groups. 
Overall, the interest for the treaty was circumscribed, as it changed only marginally the 
content of the Constitutional Treaty (Interview 3b, 2018). Weariness and the lack of technical 
knowledge might have been the reason why awareness was low. Indeed, the Lisbon Treaty was 
salient only for a limited number of MPs. Thus, hypothesis H2 cannot be validated. We 
identified two types of key players involved in discussions on the Lisbon Treaty: on the one 
hand GC and FA Committee members, and on the other hand some sectoral committee 
members. Sectoral committee members were more involved in the debates than GC or FA 
Committee members. Just as in the case of the Constitutional Treaty, the seniority of GC 
members was higher than that of sectoral committee members, which indicates once again that 
EU experts with extensive political experience were more legitimate to handle these issues and 
more interested in EU affairs. Several key players already followed the Constitutional Treaty 
and used their acquired knowledge to handle the Lisbon Treaty. 
Moreover, most active GC and FA Committee members had a higher experience in the 
Government than sectoral committee members, even though to a lesser extent than during the 
previous treaty. Influence of the Government on these MPs was limited, but the perspective to 
reintegrate future coalitions might have oriented their behaviour. Indeed, most MPs with 
government experience came from the VAS and SDP, both in opposition. They might have used 
their prior ministerial experience to leave a political mark in parliament. The regular changes 
in coalition formations obliged them to support the current government with the hope to be 
nominated minister in the future. However, direct contacts with ministry representatives or civil 
servants might not have been easy because of their political positioning. We can say that MPs’ 
prior experience in the Government certainly helped the latter to exert indirect influence on 
parliamentary discussions, but that the low number of former ministers limited this influence. 
Government influence on parliamentary discussions probably passed through the GC Chair, 
who belonged to the pro-European opposition SDP, supportive of the treaty.  
Political leaders were less numerous among the key players than during the previous 
treaty. Group chairs came mainly from the Eurosceptic opposition. Their main role was to 
represent their group’s position in the discussions on the Lisbon Treaty, to gather information 
and criticise the Government’s EU policy. The lower proportion of political leaders among key 
players proves that there was a general disinterest from the parties towards the treaty, because 
it was not as salient and publicised as the Constitutional Treaty.  
Moreover, key players involved in discussions on the Lisbon Treaty had fewer 
memberships in interparliamentary conferences than during the previous treaty. They were 
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mainly member of formats such as the Nordic cooperation or international interparliamentary 
cooperation. The fact that more sectoral committee members were involved could explain the 
lower proportion of MPs with a direct link to the EU level. Indeed, GC and FA Committee 
members were usually more active in these formats. It also means that less MPs were sensitised 
to EU affairs through the European channel. 
Therefore, we cannot clearly say that MPs with “Europeanised” profiles were the most 
active key players, as sectoral committee members with less professionalised profiles shared 
the stage with GC and FA Committee members. This validates only partially sub-hypothesis 
H2.1. Overall, personal motivations forged by MPs’ position in Parliament, the length of their 
mandate, their prior professional experience and whether they accompanied Finland’s EU 
accession were significant factors that influenced their involvement. For sectoral committee 
members, involvement was motivated mostly by political strategies, while GC and FA 
Committee members were driven by personal conviction and EU-centred interests.  
To conclude, the multiplicity of domestic challenges that punctuated the discussions on 
the Treaty of Lisbon diminished the treaty’s salience in Finland. Scrutiny was not as important 
as during the Constitutional Treaty, because MPs were interested in other issues and were tired 
of repetitive unfruitful debates. Therefore, we cannot validate hypothesis H1, as we observed 
the opposite. Indeed, the low salience of the treaty led to less parliamentary activity. Only 
Eurosceptic opposition MPs used actively the scrutiny tools, but their weight on the decisions 
remained minimal. Indeed, a large majority in parliament composed of pro-European groups 
supported consensually the Government’s position on the Lisbon Treaty, giving at the same 
time a significant influence to the coalition. The next section will analyse the impact of the 
treaty on the Eduskunta’s scrutiny system. 
 
7.5.2 The Lisbon Treaty: an opportunity for institutional change in the Eduskunta? 
 
Contrary to the Constitutional Treaty, the context of the Lisbon Treaty seemed to have 
triggered more attention on procedural and constitutional revisions related to national EU 
scrutiny. During discussions on the Lisbon Treaty, first reflections on the Parliament’s role in 
EU affairs started beginning of 2008. Debates continued after the ratification of the treaty, until 
February 2010. In 2008, the Eduskunta debated the cooperation framework with the 
Government for the national preparation of EU issues. In 2009 and 2010, Parliament considered 
a revision of its RoP and discussed the distribution of competences between the Prime Minister 
and the President of the Republic with regard to representation in the European Council. The 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs created an EU-review committee in June 2009, composed of MPs, 
parliamentary civil servants, ministerial experts and a Finnish expert from the EP. The table X 
(see appendix 1) sums up the meetings that dealt with institutional change in the context of the 
Lisbon Treaty. 
In the framework of the Lisbon Treaty, less MPs were involved in discussions on 
institutional change. The main initiators were the GC, the EU-review committee or working 
group assessing the EU scrutiny procedures and the parliamentary administration. MPs from 
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the Constitutional Law Committee and FA Committee also participated in the debates, but to a 
lesser extent. Officials from the GC Secretariat were actively involved in the discussions of the 
EU-review committee. The Eduskunta’s Secretary General also reflected on RoP amendments. 
The second EU-review committee was composed of less MPs than the first committee was in 
2004. Identifying single MPs as the initiators of change was difficult, as most discussions 
happened within the committee arena503. The 2009 EU-review committee was composed of 
only three MPs, among them two from the majority and one from the opposition. All of them 
came from parties with pro-European tendencies. This time, Eurosceptic MPs were not directly 
included in the discussions.  
MPs from the coalition parties KESK and KOK, alongside MPs from the opposition 
party SDP kept control over the procedural revisions. The then GC Chair came from the SDP 
and was the chair of the EU-review committee, while KOK MPs chaired the FA and 
Constitutional Law committees. Overall, we can say that the biggest mainstream parties with 
pro-European positions dominated parliamentary debates on institutional change, backed by the 
parliamentary administration. We could not observe political tensions on the scope and 
direction of change, which gave even more legitimation to EU experts. Parliamentary culture 
determined which players led institutional change, which confirms sub-hypothesis H3.2. 
Indeed, in this consensual atmosphere dominated by pro-European MPs, key players tended to 
have “Europeanised” profiles. Political competition was not at the origin of change, because 
EU experts monopolised the stage and reinterpreted normatively the Eduskunta’s role in EU 
affairs. 
Most key players were senior MPs with GC or FA Committee memberships. They 
counted among the most active MPs that scrutinised the Lisbon Treaty as well as the 
Constitutional Treaty. Thus, their knowledge on both treaties was significant and helped them 
assessing the status quo of the Eduskunta’s scrutiny system in light of the legal developments 
on the European level. Only one MP had a recent mandate, but occupied a political leadership 
position just as most “political entrepreneurs” of change. In fact, most were committee chairs 
and came from the GC. As outlined above, the chair of the EU-review committee from the SDP 
was at the same time GC Chair and member of the Speaker’s Council that suggested RoP 
amendments in 2009. Another KOK MP was vice-chair of the EU-review committee and vice-
chair of the GC, just as a KESK MP.  
Additionally, the members of the EU-review committee participated actively in 
interparliamentary conferences. Without surprise, they were particularly sensitised to EU 
norms. More specifically, just as in the 2004 EU-review committee, all three MPs were COSAC 
members in 2008 when reflections on procedural revisions started in Finland. During the 2008 
COSAC meeting in Slovenia, discussions focused on the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in 
parliaments, as well as the treaty’s impact on national parliaments. These MPs followed 
discussions on the implications of the subsidiarity monitoring on the national legal system. 
Therefore, we assume that discussions within the COSAC probably influenced the Finnish 
delegation members to request the establishment of the EU-review committee in 2009.  
 
503 Unfortunately, we did not have access to the full minutes of committee meetings. 
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Prior experience in government did not seem to play a role in MPs’ involvement in 
discussions on institutional change. Only the SDP GC Chair had been Foreign Affairs Minister. 
His involvement in revision procedures within the Eduskunta emanated surely from personal 
convictions originating from his extensive political career. He still exerts a mandate in the 
Eduskunta and counts among the MPs with the highest seniority in parliament (Interview 4b, 
2018). He participated in COSAC meetings in 1996 and from 2007 to 2010. Therefore, he was 
probably perceived as an expert in EU affairs and mainly competent to assess Parliament’s 
scrutiny rights. His expertise probably helped him to position himself politically in parliament 
in case the Government would call him back. This could be even truer as he became once again 
Foreign Affairs Minister during the 2011-2015 legislative period. 
In light of these elements, we conclude that single MPs with important positions within 
parliament initiated the most change. Overall, political leaders from the GC, pro-European MPs 
and civil servants from the GC Secretariat monopolised revision initiatives. Motivations for 
such amendments came from personal convictions rather than political considerations, as 
consensus reigned over the direction of change. 
As we announced earlier in the section, discussions on the national preparation of EU 
matters started already in January 2008 in the Government, before the ratification process of 
the Lisbon Treaty even started in Parliament. On 21st January 2008, the Ministry of Justice 
published guidelines on the “Cooperation between Parliament and Government in national 
preparations on European Affairs”504. The guidelines stressed out the need for the Government 
to inform Parliament without delay on any EU matter, attaching a memo to “U-letters”. 
Moreover, the Government has to send emails to the Parliament on any other Union matters 
that do not fall within the Parliament’s mandate, such as the European Commission’s or 
Council’s work programmes or the Commission’s communications. In addition to these 
guidelines, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs published complementary guidelines on 05th March 
2008 on EU agreements505. The GC gave its opinion on the guidelines on the 18th June 2008, 
outlining the main issues that the Eduskunta was facing at that time. Parliament did not have 
enough time to position itself on a European legislative act between the moment the 
Government receives it and the moment it transfers the proposal to Parliament506. The GC also 
asked for more governmental information during the proceeding of U-matters in Parliament. 
The subsidiarity monitoring as established through the Lisbon Treaty was not considered as 
central to the Eduskunta’s activities. At the same time, single MPs from both the majority and 
the opposition, as well as the Constitutional Law Committee, the GC and the FA Committee, 
started to militate in favour of the anchorage in the Finnish Constitution of Finland’s EU 
membership507. 
 
504 21.01.2008, Oikeusministeriö, EU;Eduskunnan ja valtioneuvoston yhteistoiminta Euroopan unionin asioiden 
kansallisessa valmistelussa, OM2008-00023 [Cooperation between Parliament and the Government in national 
preparations for European affairs]. 
505 05.03.2008, Ulkoasiainministeriö, EU; EU-sopimusten valmistelua ja voimaansaattamista koskevat ohjeet, 
UM2008-00482 [Guidelines for the preparation and implementation of EU agreements] 
506 18.06.2008, Opinion of the GC, SuVL 2/2008vp – E130/2007 vp – E 11/2008vp, Government report on the co-
operation between Parliament and the Government in national preparations for European affairs. 
507 23.05.2008, Opinion of the Constitutional Law Committee, PeVL 13/2008vp – HE 23/2008vp, Government 
proposal to parliament on the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on the European Union and 
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Following these first reflections, more debates on procedural reforms followed in 2009. 
The EU-review committee met for the first time in June 2009 and resumed its activities in 
January 2010. The main objective of the working group was to assess the status quo of the EU 
scrutiny procedures and the cooperation between MPs and MEPs in light of the new provisions 
of the Lisbon Treaty. A report was published in February 2010 summing up the conclusions508. 
The committee underlined the necessity of timely information and sectoral committees’ active 
participation in EU affairs. The working group suggested also allowing MEPs to participate in 
plenary and committee debates. Following that suggestion made during the working group’s 
meetings in 2009, the Speaker’s Council, led by the Speaker belonging to the majority group 
KOK, decided in November 2009 to establish a joint parliamentary meeting between MPs and 
MEPs in Spring 2010, with the prospect of transforming it into an institutionalised practice.  
The Speaker’s Council, backed by the Secretary General of Parliament, also submitted 
a proposal to amend the Parliament’s RoP in light of the subsidiarity monitoring and reporting 
guidelines for Finnish representatives in international institutions509. The proposal was 
discussed solely in the Constitutional Law Committee chaired by the KOK group. It suggested 
that all EU documents related to the subsidiarity control sent electronically to the GC Secretariat 
should be transferred to sectoral committees (Section 30 RoP). The Aland Islands should also 
be entitled to participate in the subsidiarity monitoring through the Eduskunta, which implied 
to add a provision on Aland’s participation in the RoP. Moreover, Finnish representatives in 
international institutions should report directly to parliament instead of submitting written 
reports (Section 10 RoP). The Constitutional Law Committee adopted the proposal on 26th 
November 2009510. Parliamentary activity around the proposal remained limited. Only one SFP 
MP gave a speech on the proposal in the plenary session dedicated to it. Most of the work was 
done in committee. 
Additionally, in December 2009, the Government submitted a report to Parliament on 
amendments to the European Council on the Lisbon Treaty511. The subject of the report was the 
distribution of competences in EU affairs between the Prime Minister and the President of the 
Republic. A potential trigger for these debates might have been a statement by the Chancellor 
of Justice in June 2009 based on observations made between 2008 and 2009. The Chancellery 
of Justice inquired about delays in the information flow between the Government and the 
Parliament on EU issues512. It concluded that the Government should stick to its obligation to 
 
the Treaty establishing the European Community and the Act concerning the transposition of the legislative 
provisions; 04.06.2008, 63rd plenary session, PTK 63/2008vp, Government proposal to parliament on the adoption 
of the Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on the European Union and the Treaty establishing the European 
Community and the Act concerning the transposition of the legislative provisions 
508 15.02.2010, Development of EU affairs in Parliament, Report of the EU Affairs Working Party, Eduskunta, 
1/2010 
509 12.11.2009, Proposal of the Speaker’s Council to amend parliament’s RoP, PNE 2/2009 vp 
510 26.11.2009, Report of the Constitutional Law committee, PeVM 9/2009vp – PNE 2/2009vp, Proposal of the 
Speaker’s Council to amend parliament’s RoP 
511 Government report to the Parliament on the Council of State's amendments to the European Council on the 
Lisbon Treaty, E 162/2009 vp 
512 03.06.2009, State Chancellery of Justice, Valtioneuvoston kirjelmien toimittaminen eduskunnalle (Perustuslain 
96 § 2 momentti) [Submission of Government Declarations to the Parliament (Constitution Section 96 (2))], 
OKV/12/50/2008; 05/06/2009, Justice Chancellor Jaakko Jonkka: Government to Deliver EU Affairs Immediately 
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transfer Union matters to Parliament as soon as possible. In this framework, the Constitutional 
Law Committee led again the discussions, receiving the opinion of the FA Committee. In 
February 2010, the Constitutional Law Committee concluded that the Government’s 
competences in EU affairs should be extended to all EU policies including the CFSP and that it 
represents Finland during negotiations in the European Council513. The President of the 
Republic was then excluded from European Council meetings, even though a close cooperation 
with the Government was still recommended. In the meantime, the Government also submitted 
a report on an EU impact assessment to the GC in December 2009. The report complemented a 
previous government report on Finland’s EU policy and evaluated ways to enhance Finland’s 
influence on the EU decision-making process514. The GC submitted its opinion on the same date 
as the Constitutional Law Committee, in February 2010. It highlighted the need to maintain 
parliament’s early involvement in EU affairs. 
On top of RoP amendments, the multiplication of evaluations and attempts to revise the 
Finnish scrutiny procedure in EU affairs led to the drafting of a bill in May 2010 containing 
several constitutional amendments (Ojanen, 2013). Parliament adopted the amendments by a 
broad majority. The new constitutional provisions relate to the mentioning of Finland’s EU 
membership in the Finnish Constitution, the reduction of the presidential powers in EU affairs 
and the necessity of a two-thirds majority in Parliament in case of substantial transfer of powers 
from the state to the EU and international levels. 
In sum, debates on procedural revisions multiplied in the wake of the Lisbon Treaty. 
Compared to the Constitutional Treaty, reflections on Parliament’s role in EU affairs were more 
intense, even though the Lisbon Treaty was less salient. We can validate hypothesis H3, because 
revisions depended on the implications of the treaty on the Eduskunta’s participation rights, i.e. 
the necessity to preserve Parliament’s strong scrutiny system. The Lisbon Treaty created a 
“misfit” between European and national rules, in particular concerning the introduction of the 
subsidiarity monitoring mechanism. We observed that the direction of change within the 
Eduskunta was dictated by majority groups and pro-European MPs backed by the parliamentary 
administration. Therefore, we can say that the coalition had an indirect influence on institutional 
change within Parliament through its majority MPs and the large support of the pro-European 
opposition. There was a consensual normative perception of the necessity to reinforce 
Parliament’s rights in the wake of the Lisbon Treaty. The Parliament also integrated the 
subsidiarity mechanism in its internal procedures, but the establishment of new rules was only 
window dressing. Indeed, priority was given to the government-parliament cooperation as the 
central element of the Eduskunta’s EU scrutiny system. 
Ideas suggested in the report of the EU-review committee were barely implemented 
afterwards. Indeed, the Eduskunta did not organise more plenary debates on EU affairs. MEPs 
still have no explicit right to participate in plenary and sectoral committee meetings. The 
subsidiarity monitoring is also perceived as inefficient within the Eduskunta. In its 2009 annual 
 
to Parliament, https://www.okv.fi/fi/tiedotteet-ja-puheenvuorot/220/oikeuskansleri-jaakko-jonkka-hallituksen-
toimitettava-eu-asiat-viivytyksetta-eduskuntaan/ (last accessed 26.07.2019) 
513 12.02.2010, Opinion of the Constitutional Law committee, PeVL 2/2010 vp – E 162/2009vp, Government 
statement on the Council of State’s amendments to the European Council concerning the Treaty of Lisbon 
514 12.02.2010, Opinion of the GC, SuVL 1/2010vp – E 168/2009vp, Government report on EU impact assessment 
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report, the Parliament admits that “[t]he Lisbon Treaty […] will have little impact on 
parliamentary work. National parliaments’ possibility to take a position on whether a 
Commission proposal infringes the principle of subsidiarity […] is nothing new for 
Parliament”515. Additionally, in the 2008 COSAC report, the Eduskunta wrote: “A specific 
procedure for subsidiarity issues will be added to the RoP, but it is assumed that it will be rarely 
or never be used”516.  
 
7.5.3 Conclusion 
 
In this section, we analysed parliamentary activity and institutional change in the 
Eduskunta in the context of the Lisbon Treaty. Firstly, we observed that parliamentary activity 
was low in terms of used scrutiny tools. Indeed, even though the total number of GC and FA 
Committee meetings was high during the year 2008, it did not translate into higher scrutiny of 
the Lisbon Treaty itself. Eurosceptic opposition MPs used mostly scrutiny tools to either reject 
the treaty or call for a national referendum. Group discipline got stronger in some parties (KOK) 
and looser in others (KD, VAS). Overall, their impact on the Government’s EU policy was 
minimal, as the new coalition also obtained a larger majority in Parliament. Pro-European MPs 
from both the majority (KESK, KOK, VIHR, SFP) and the opposition (SDP) supported the 
treaty. Due to this large majority and the more or less loose party discipline, we could not 
identify sharp political conflicts and polarisation trends. Rather, party dynamics in the form of 
a strong alliance of pro-European MPs seemed to be the main influencer of parliamentary 
activity and institutional change. Indeed, we could not observe any particular pressure from 
interest groups, be it externally through opinions or within Parliament through MPs’ affiliations. 
We cannot state that the Lisbon Treaty was salient in Finland. Indeed, several domestic 
incidents between 2007 and 2009 punctuated the discussions and diverted MPs’ attention from 
the actual treaty. Contrary to the key players that scrutinised the Constitutional Treaty, we 
discovered that the most active MPs during the ratification process of the Lisbon Treaty came 
from sectoral committees. All in all, the Lisbon Treaty itself triggered equal attention from 
Eurosceptic opposition MPs, pro-European opposition MPs and pro-European majority MPs. 
The few interventions of pro-European MPs focused more on the treaty, while the Eurosceptic 
opposition instrumentalised the issue to bring the attention on the effects of the treaty on the 
national level, just as in the Austrian case. For the first, motivation was based on personal 
convictions, while for the latter, motivation was of strategic and rational nature. 
Moreover, we could not clearly identify to what extent the Lisbon Treaty affected 
institutional change in the Parliament. It certainly influenced the RoP amendments on the 
subsidiarity monitoring, even though its implementation remained limited. Within Parliament, 
 
515 Annual report of the parliamentary office, 2009, Parliament of Finland, 
https://www.eduskunta.fi/EN/tietoaeduskunnasta/Documents/Eduskunta_2009_vuosikertomus_ENGLANTI.pdf 
(last accessed 26.07.2019) 
516 COSAC, Annex to the Ninth bi-annual report by COSAC: replies to the questionnaire by the National 
Parliaments and the European Parliament, May 2008, FINLAND: EDUSKUNTA 
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the Constitutional Law Committee was the main “political entrepreneur” of change, alongside 
single MPs from the GC and the FA Committee with typical “Europeanised” profiles. The 
biggest mainstream parties monopolised the discussions on change within the Eduskunta. Just 
as in the previous section on the Constitutional Treaty, we noticed that party competition was 
not at the origin of change, because consensus was large among pro-European “political 
entrepreneurs” to change the procedures. The main reason of change lied in a normative 
reinterpretation of the Eduskunta’s role in the EU. Indeed, there was a general opinion that the 
Eduskunta had one of the strongest scrutiny systems among Member States. In general, Finnish 
MPs think that the scrutiny of EU affairs should pass through the control of the Government’s 
EU policy. In this framework, cooperation between Parliament and Government was perceived 
as sufficiently developed to guarantee the Eduskunta’s early involvement. The work of the 
Finnish Parliament and the Government is generally so closely intertwined through their 
respective party dynamics that the governmental majority easily controlled the revision 
procedures within the Eduskunta.  
 
7.6 Evolution of parliamentary involvement in the context of negotiations on the ESM 
and the TSCG (2010-2013) 
 
The last part of this chapter will analyse parliamentary involvement during the economic 
crisis, in particular in the context of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and the Fiscal 
Compact (TSCG). Just as in the previous parts, we will test the same hypotheses and see to 
what extent the treaties affected parliamentary activity and institutional change within the 
Eduskunta. 
 
7.6.1 Parliamentary involvement in the framework of the negotiations on the ESM and the 
TSCG 
 
General context 
 
Negotiations on the ESM and the TSCG were preceded by rough parliamentary 
elections in April 2011. The electoral campaign turned mainly around the economic crisis. The 
conservative party KOK became the largest party for the first time since the Finnish 
independence (Arter, 2011) and gained 44 seats in parliament. The previous coalition partners 
KESK, SFP and SDP lost altogether 27 seats in parliament. The populist True Finns won their 
highest score (19,1%), becoming the third biggest party in Finland, even outpacing the Centre 
party. It obtained 39 seats in parliament (compared to 5 seats in 2007), while the KESK got 35 
seats, losing 16 seats compared to 2007. The VAS and VIHR also lost some votes, but to a 
lesser extent than the larger parties. The table hereunder sums up the electoral results. 
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Table 19: Legislative elections in Finland in 2007 and 2011 
 Political parties 
Year of 
election 
KESK SDP KOK VAS VIHR SFP KD PS 
2007 23,1 21,4 22,3 8,8 8,5 4,6 4,9 4,1 
2011 15,8 19,1 20,4 8,1 7,3 4,3 4,0 19,1 
Note : Percentage of votes per party and per election year. 
Source: https://www.stat.fi/til/evaa/2011/evaa_2011_2011-04-29_tie_001_en.html  
 
The low scores of the KESK party can be explained by the scandal around its finances 
that led in 2010 to the resignation of the Prime Minister. Moreover, the economic crisis and the 
unpopular measures of the Government fuelled criticism among the public opinion and parties 
such as the SDP and the PS. Euroscepticism grew among the population. In May 2011, only 
31% of the Finns thought that the EU had a positive image517. This proportion dropped to 22% 
in November 2011 and 21% in May 2012518. The economic crisis affected the population’s 
opinion on the EU. The PS used the situation to gain popular support thanks to its populist 
rhetoric (Sundberg, 2011). The True Finns leader Timo Soini became the centre of attention 
during the electoral campaign thanks to his harsh criticism of the financial crisis and the Greek 
debt (Sundberg, 2012). As the PS became one of the largest parties, the coalition formation was 
difficult, as the mainstream parties were reluctant to cooperate with a populist counterpart. The 
new Prime Minister Jyrki Katainen (KOK) was responsible to lead the coalition negotiations 
and decided first to include the SDP and the PS in the coalition talks. However, Timo Soini 
rejected the offer due to ideological divergences on financial issues. In the end, a rainbow 
coalition or, as Arter called it, an “anything goes” government was established two months after 
the elections between the KOK, SDP, VAS, VIHR, SFP and KD, excluding the KESK and the 
PS (Arter, 2011). This configuration was more prone to political tensions due to a very large 
majority composed of parties with different ideological orientations, as well as a populist 
oriented rising PS in the opposition. This political constellation had an impact on parliamentary 
involvement during negotiations on the ESM and the TSCG. 
 
ESM 
 
Before the actual parliamentary ratification of the ESM, the Government submitted two 
memoranda in May 2011 outlining the participation requirements of Finland in the treaty (Leino 
/Salminen, 2013). Therefore, before the actual treaty even reached the parliamentary arena, the 
Eduskunta had scrutinised it ex-ante. The Constitutional Law Committee handled the 
memoranda and underlined that the Parliament’s approval was necessary, as the treaty affected 
directly its legislative and budgetary powers. Even though outside of the EU’s legal framework, 
 
517 May 2011, Standard Eurobarometer 75, 
http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/instruments/STANDARD
/yearFrom/2011/yearTo/2013/surveyKy/1019 (last accessed 26.07.2019) 
518 November 2011, Standard Eurobarometer 76, 
http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/instruments/STANDARD
/yearFrom/2011/yearTo/2013/surveyKy/1020 ; May 2012, Standard Eurobarometer 77, 
http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/instruments/STANDARD
/yearFrom/2011/yearTo/2013/surveyKy/1063  (last accessed 26.07.2019) 
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the ESM was still considered by the Constitutional Law Committee as being part of the 
Government’s competences (instead of the President’s). This meant that Parliament received 
extensive information and participation rights on the matter. In September 2011, the Eduskunta 
received a government proposal to approve amendments to Article 136 TFUE. The proposal 
was examined in the FA Committee, which received opinions of the Finance and Constitutional 
Law committees. The proposal was discussed and approved in plenary in May 2012. 120 MPs 
voted in favour and 33 against it519. Within the majority, all MPs welcomed the proposal. 
Among opposition MPs, 28 voted in favour and 33 against it. The largest group to reject the 
treaty was the PS. In the meantime, the Government submitted a proposal to ratify the ESM 
treaty, which was announced in plenary on 27th April 2012520. The proposal was sent to the 
Finance Committee on 03rd May, which was responsible to draft a report with required opinions 
of the Constitutional Law, Commerce and Audit committees. MPs discussed and voted on the 
proposal and the report of the Finance Committee in plenary on 13th, 19th and 21st June 2012. 
The ESM treaty was adopted with 104 votes in favour and 71 against it521. All 104 MPs that 
approved the treaty came from the majority. The 71 MPs that rejected the treaty came all from 
the opposition, i.e. the KESK, PS and Left Party. Unlike the Constitutional Treaty or the Lisbon 
Treaty, group discipline seemed to be very strong, as no party was internally divided during the 
votes. We also observe that the usually pro-European KESK voted against the government 
proposal, taking its opposition role seriously.  
TSCG 
 
In the case of the Fiscal Compact, the Government informed the Eduskunta on 22nd 
December 2011 and submitted four additional memoranda informing about the treaty 
negotiations (Leino/Salminen, 2013). The government proposal to ratify the TSCG was 
announced in plenary on 09th November 2012522. The matter was sent to the Finance Committee 
on 13th November with opinions from the Constitutional Law and Audit committees. On 12th 
December 2012, the Finance Committee suggested in its report to approve the treaty. The TSCG 
was discussed and voted on during the plenary sessions of 13th, 14th, 17th and 18th December. A 
large majority approved the treaty (139 votes in favour and 38 against). All majority MPs 
welcomed the treaty, while opposition MPs were more divided over the issue. The PS and Left 
Party rejected the treaty, while the KESK approved it, with the exception of one KESK MP. 
Overall, group discipline during the voting was as strong as during the vote on the ESM. Indeed, 
apart from the single KESK MP that did not follow the party’s voting instructions, all MPs 
voted according to their party line.  
 
EU affairs became already a priority in the electoral campaign discourses in 2011, both 
for majority and opposition parties (Jokela/Korhonen, 2012). The consensus around EU politics 
 
519 09.05.2012, 49th plenary session, Government proposal to parliament to approve the amendment of Article 136 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
520 Government proposal to parliament to approve the agreement establishing the European Stability Mechanism 
(EVM) and to transpose its legislative provisions, HE 34/2012vp. 
521 21.06.2012, 71st plenary session, Government proposal to parliament to approve the agreement establishing the 
European Stability Mechanism (EVM) and to transpose its legislative provisions 
522 Proposal by the government to parliament on the approval of the treaty on stability, coordination and governance 
in the economic and monetary union and on the law enforcing its legislative provisions, HE 155/2012vp 
363 
 
that prevailed before 2011 broke when more parties started to criticise the EU (Raunio, 2016). 
The elections themselves became politicised and polarisation grew between the parties. This 
trend was reinforced after the elections, in the course of 2011 and 2012 when the ESM, TSCG 
and financial packages were discussed in Parliament. The PS pushed to a politicisation of EU 
issues by using its populist anti-EU rhetoric to criticise the unpopular financial measures taken 
by the Government. Opposition parties felt excluded from the decision-making process on the 
Eurozone crisis. According to Raunio, the economic crisis led not only the PS, but also other 
parties, to emphasise national interests and the preservation of national sovereignty. Instead of 
consensual practices, cautiousness about EU policies prevailed after 2011 (Raunio, 2012). As 
Leino and Salminen formulate it, “[t]his is a clear change to the generally more mainstream and 
integration-oriented Finnish EU politics, where issues provoking national passion have been 
few and EU membership is generally understood in positive […] terms” (Leino/Salminen, 
p.451, 2013).  
 
In 2012, the EU financial crisis became a domestic matter and fuelled tensions within 
the government coalition between the Prime Minister and the SDP Finance minister supported 
by the trade unions (Sundberg, 2013). For instance, just as the SDP, the SAK, AKAVA and 
STTK argued among others in favour of enhanced private sector liability523. Before the 
parliamentary elections, while still in opposition, the SDP operated already a change in its 
position on EU issues. Indeed, the SDP rejected the Greek and Irish loan packages, moving 
closer to nationalistic considerations (Jokela/Korhonen, 2012). The SDP had requested 
collaterals for loans given to Greece during the electoral campaign, which were highly 
controversial among coalition parties. However, the Finance minister kept her promise and 
passed the deal. The SDP supported the ESM, but called for higher responsibility of banks and 
private investors in the crisis management. The party rejected any solidarity of debts in the 
EU524. The SDP also welcomed the TSCG, but highlighted the need to preserve the Parliament’s 
budgetary powers and Finland’s sovereignty525. Moreover, coalition partners were also 
internally divided over the question of European integration, in particular within the Prime 
Minister’s party (KOK). Criticism of the Prime Minister’s decisions came also from his party’s 
own ranks. Overall, the KOK supported the ESM and the TSCG, and argued that Finland’s 
participation in help packages would secure its own economic growth and interests526. Just as 
the SDP, the KOK rejected a debt union. The VIHR, SFP and KD supported the Government’s 
crisis management. The VIHR insisted on preserving the Parliament’s budgetary competences 
and the KD rejected the solidarity principle, just as the SDP and KOK. VAS MPs expressed 
more doubts about the efficiency and appropriateness of the ESM, but approved it. They 
 
523 28.11.2011, SAK, AKAVA and STTK, Kuinka ulos eurokriisistä?, Palkansaajakeskusjärjestöjen ekonomistien   
keskusteluasiakirja [How to leave the euro crisis? Working paper for economists’ recruitment centers].  
524 13.06.2012, 66th plenary session, PTK 66/2012vp, 1) Government’s line in the economic crisis in the euro area 
525 13.12.2012, 128th plenary session, PTK 128/2012 vp, Proposal by the government to parliament on the approval 
of the treaty on stability, coordination and governance in the economic and monetary union and on the law 
enforcing its legislative provisions 
526 See 14.09.2011, 33rd plenary session, PTK 33/2011vp, Government proposal to Parliament to approve the 
amendment to Article 136 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union;  13.06.2012, 66 th plenary 
session. 
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rejected rhetorically the TSCG in the name of democracy and requested a consultative 
referendum on EU membership527. However, VAS MPs voted in favour of the TSCG.  
Additionally to ideological tensions between coalition partners, conflicts arose with 
opposition parties. Taking advantage of its strong representation in Parliament, the PS 
repeatedly denounced Finland’s participation in the financial aids and used the increased media 
attention to ignite debates. The party accused the VAS and the SDP to disregard their electoral 
promises by supporting the ESM. Majority MPs would follow systematically the Government’s 
position and ignore the opposition’s opinion. PS MPs rejected systematically every decision 
related to financial packages, including the ESM and the TSCG. According to PS MPs, the 
ESM meant a transfer of parliamentary budgetary power to the EU level, which would lead to 
a loss of independence and a deterioration of Finnish democracy and sovereignty528. In the 
debates on the TSCG, PS MPs rejected the creation of an economic union and favoured a 
consultative referendum on any measures towards further integration in the Euro area529. 
Finally, the KESK rejected the ESM, but welcomed the TSCG. KESK MPs rejected the idea of 
a common EU budget that would impinge on the Parliament’s budgetary competences. Contrary 
to PS MPs who rejected the treaties because of purely ideological considerations, KESK MPs 
seemed to follow a logic of political competition since they switched to opposition. The only 
common ground between majority and opposition MPs was their intergovernmental vision of 
the EU in terms of financial measures. Overall, MPs rejected the solidarity principle and the 
federalisation of the decision-making concerning financial measures.  
 
Everything considered, the growing ideological gap between the PS and the rest of the 
parties, within the parties, as well as the general trend towards Euroscepticism in pro-European 
parties, fuelled polarisation and politicisation of EU issues. National interests seemed to matter 
more, because these European measures affected directly Finland’s economic situation. 
Contrary to the Constitutional Treaty or the Lisbon Treaty, both ESM and TSCG triggered 
heated debates in Parliament, led mostly by Eurosceptic PS MPs. Consensus over EU politics 
broke even within the coalition. When the True Finns opposed the TSCG, the then Foreign 
Affairs Minister (SDP) joined the populists’ position and described the treaty as “unnecessary 
and harmful” (Leino /Salminen, 2013). 
 
Analysis of parliamentary involvement 
 
The economic crisis kept the Eduskunta particularly busy in the course of 2011. For 
instance, when the help package for Spain needed to be approved, the Parliament even convened 
during summer for the first time in fifty years530. Unlike the Constitutional Treaty or the Lisbon 
Treaty, the Constitutional Law Committee and the Finance Committee mainly handled the ESM 
 
527 14.12.2012, 130th plenary session, PTK 130/2012 vp, Proposal by the government to parliament on the approval 
of the treaty on stability, coordination and governance in the economic and monetary union and on the law 
enforcing its legislative provisions. 
528 See 13.06.2012, 66th plenary session. 
529 12.12.2012, Dissenting opinion 2, Report of the Finance committee, VaVM 38/2012vp – HE 155/2012vp, 
Proposal by the government to parliament on the approval of the treaty on stability, coordination and governance 
in the economic and monetary union and on the law enforcing its legislative provisions 
530 Parliament of Finland, Annual report of the parliamentary office, 2012. 
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and the TSCG. The GC and FA Committee were barely involved in the ratification procedures 
of both treaties, but their members were very active in plenary discussions on the economic 
crisis. Overall, the number of meetings on both the ESM and the TSCG remained low. Both 
treaties were handled in Parliament like any other national matter. The Constitutional Law 
Committee discussed the ESM and the TSCG respectively in 3 meetings in 2012. The focus 
lied on the unanimity principle in the decision-making procedures within the stability 
mechanisms. The committee insisted that unanimity voting guaranteed Finland’s sovereignty 
and constitutional order (Leino/Salminen, 2013). The Finance Committee was busier and met 
respectively 5 times to handle the ESM and the TSCG. By looking at the table Y (see appendix 
1), we see that the number of plenary discussions was substantially higher in the present 
situation than during the previous treaties. Indeed, MPs debated the ESM and the TSCG 
respectively in 5 plenary sessions. The intensity of the discussions reflects MPs’ politicisation 
and mediatisation strategies of these issues. Overall, parliamentary activity remained lower than 
for the previous treaties. MPs seemed to be more interested in general economic issues than in 
the treaties themselves. 
As mentioned above, the Finance Committee and the Constitutional Law Committee 
were mainly active in the scrutiny of both treaties. Therefore, the number of GC and FA 
Committee meetings will not allow to find a clear correlation between higher activity and the 
salience of these treaties. The graph hereunder shows that the number of GC and FA Committee 
meetings grew in 2011 and 2012, but the meetings’ agenda were related to neither the ESM, 
nor the TSCG. The GC gave some opinions on the ESM to the Finance Committee, but most of 
GC members’ activities related to the treaties happened in plenary. We also find that meetings 
of the Constitutional Law Committee grew substantially during the same period. The latter dealt 
repeatedly with constitutional issues during the economic crisis, which could explain this 
growth. 
Figure 77: Number of committee meetings in the context of the ESM and TSCG (in total), 
Eduskunta 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
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Overall, even though the economic crisis and the treaties were salient in Finland, MPs did not 
seem to translate their growing attention into higher parliamentary activity. Indeed, statements 
on Union matters barely grew in 2011-2012. 
 
Figure 78: Statements on Union matters in the context of the ESM and TSCG (in total), 
Eduskunta 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
The same can be said from parliamentary questions on EU affairs. MPs did not seem to use this 
instrument often, as their number dropped drastically in 2011 (see figure 71). The parliamentary 
elections in 2011 can be at the origin of a halt to parliamentary activity. Moreover, after the 
elections, a large majority entered Parliament due to the large coalition that formed on the 
governmental level. Majority MPs supported their Government’s measures and remained 
passive, even though some coalition partners expressed critical views on the ESM and the 
TSCG. PS MPs became active scrutinisers and used parliamentary instruments to criticise the 
Government. However, as PS MPs do not represent a substantial proportion of voices in 
parliament, their activity did not substantially affect parliamentary activity, as shown in the 
graph above. The table Z (see appendix 1) sums up the main scrutiny instruments used during 
debates on the ESM and the TSCG within the Eduskunta. 
Overall, discussions in plenary on the economic crisis and specifically the ESM and the 
TSCG were led by GC members. Members of the FA Committee, the Constitutional Law 
Committee and the Finance Committee were the second most active in plenary. We discover 
that several MPs had double memberships in these committees, which probably facilitated their 
specialisation on the matter and thus their involvement in the debates. The table above shows 
in particular the players who used parliamentary instruments such as opinions or questions to 
scrutinise both treaties. Firstly, we observe that opposition MPs were almost the only initiators 
of scrutiny tools. Only once did a KOK MP submit a dissenting opinion in 2011 on the ESM. 
The latter treaty triggered more attention from opposition MPs than the TSCG. Indeed, aside 
from their committee membership, PS MPs were by far the most active scrutinisers, be it 
through parliamentary instruments or their participation in plenary debates. KESK MPs also 
scrutinised more the ESM than the TSCG, probably because the first was more salient than the 
second. An explanation could be that their position changed from one treaty to the other. Indeed, 
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they rejected the ESM but approved the TSCG. Thus, KESK MPs tended to criticise the 
Government’s position on the ESM, while supporting the Government’s position on the TSCG 
and therefore staying passive in Parliament. MPs’ political positioning played a significant role 
in their involvement. PS MPs were the most active, followed by KESK MPs who took their 
opposition role seriously, even though they still positioned themselves as pro-Europeans. 
Majority MPs did barely use any scrutiny tool, because their strategy was to support the 
Government’s line. We can also explain their passivity by the fact that the majority had control 
over the main responsible committees that dealt with the treaties. The chairs of the GC and the 
Constitutional Law Committee were from the SDP, while KOK MPs led the Finance Committee 
and the FA Committee. Government parties had thus considerable influence on the 
parliamentary agenda.  
Ideological considerations did not always correspond to MPs’ actions. While we can 
identify a clear opposition strategy among PS MPs motivated by their Euroscepticism, it was 
less clear for KESK MPs that were in the opposition but still positioned themselves as pro-
Europeans. Moreover, among coalition partners, VAS MPs expressed critical views on the 
treaties, but still supported their coalition partners. Political strategies played a significant role 
for some parties, which positioned themselves on the treaties according to benefits that they 
could retrieve from their support to the coalition. Therefore, we can only partially validate sub-
hypothesis H1.1 according to which MPs’ involvement depended on their political ideologies. 
Sub-hypothesis H1.2 can be validated, because MPs’ positioning on the political spectrum 
clearly influenced their involvement. Moreover, polarisation between parliamentary groups was 
clear on the ESM issue, as two distinct camps formed. This trend was less obvious in the case 
of the TSCG, as a majority of MPs approved the treaty. Compared to the Constitutional Treaty 
and the Lisbon Treaty, polarisation was present in the case of the economic crisis. Polarisation 
certainly pushed MPs to scrutinise the ESM, while it was less evident in the case of the TSCG 
and led to less parliamentary activity. We can say that group discipline was strong in both camps 
and certainly linked to ideological polarisation, which validates sub-hypothesis H1.3. Indeed, 
opposition MPs (both pro-European and Eurosceptic) and majority MPs stuck to their party’s 
position on the economic crisis. The growing tensions forced opposition MPs to take their role 
seriously and majority MPs to support even more their government.  
Even though the economic crisis was particularly salient in Finland, the ESM and the 
TSCG seemed to catch the attention of few MPs within Parliament. Indeed, apart from members 
in the GC, FA Committee, Finance Committee and Constitutional Law Committee, almost no 
other MPs participated in the debates. We can only partially validate hypothesis H2, because 
general awareness was high on the national level, but involvement in Parliament did not reflect 
it. One explanation could be the technicity and complexity of the treaties. Unlike the 
Constitutional Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty, plenary debates on the ESM and the TSCG were 
dominated by MPs from sectoral committees with a low level of seniority in Parliament. Most 
MPs came from the PS and exerted their first legislative period as of 2011. Contrary to senior 
MPs, newly elected MPs tended to follow a rational strategy in Parliament to attract voters’ 
support for future elections. In their case, personal convictions played a minimal role, while 
political strategies in the name of electoral benefits were their main motivation. Therefore, 
without surprise, most key players were not professionalised, had no prior experience in the 
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government and did not participated in interparliamentary conferences. These MPs were less 
sensitised to EU affairs because of the absence of direct links with the EU level and had a 
domestic-centred approach when handling the treaties. Indeed, they used the ESM and the 
TSCG to emphasise national interests. Among the active GC and Finance Committee members, 
we can also observe that few were involved in the follow-up of previous treaties. 
Trade union membership played only a limited and probably indirect role in MPs’ 
involvement, especially for SDP MPs. Indeed, trade unions supported the SDP’s position. 
However, as SDP MPs were not active scrutinisers, we assume that the trade unions’ influence 
passed through MPs’ discourses in plenary. As both opposition parties PS and KESK had barely 
any support from the trade union organisations, their scrutiny activities in Parliament did not 
reflect directly the opinion of the civil society. Rather, they counted on the support of the 
population.  
Moreover, compared to the key players involved in discussions on the previous EU 
treaties, leadership positions played a significant role in the present situation. Indeed, group 
leaders belonged mainly to the opposition and to sectoral committees. As explained earlier in 
this chapter, group leaders needed to represent the opinion of their group or party in 
parliamentary debates. This is even more important for opposition groups as they benefit from 
less channels of influence. Additionally, several committee chairs participated in the 
discussions, mainly from sectoral committees. This could be indicative again that most MPs 
were interested in the impact of the treaties on the national policy fields.  
To summarise, unlike the Constitutional Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty, the scrutiny of 
the ESM and the TSCG seemed to be dominated by sectoral committees, among them the 
Finance Committee. MPs with “Europeanised” profiles did not count among the most active 
players. Therefore, we cannot validate sub-hypothesis H2.1. GC members were the second most 
active players, but overall the seniority rate was very low. Instead of “Europeanised” profiles, 
we concluded that key players were mainly young, inexperienced but specialised MPs. They 
were more interested in electoral benefits and political competition than in EU affairs per se. 
The nature of MPs’ incentives changed with the economic crisis due to different factors: the 
shift from a consensual to a more competitive political environment and the emergence of 
recently elected MPs with no prior political experience. As sectoral committee members 
became more active due to growing polarisation trends, we can validate sub-hypothesis H2.2, 
because “technicians” took the lead in a conflictual political environment.  
Overall, parliamentary activity did not seem to be very high in the case of the ESM and 
the TSCG. Parliamentary instruments were used more often in the case of the ESM and mostly 
by opposition MPs. The TSCG did not seem to attract more attention. In both cases, majority 
MPs kept control over the discussions.  
 
7.6.2 The ESM and the TSCG: an opportunity for institutional change in the Eduskunta? 
 
During the negotiations on the ESM and the TSCG, several discussions took place in 
Parliament to preserve the Eduskunta’s budgetary competences. While no concrete procedural 
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revisions have been made, debates on budgetary powers started in 2010 and intensified in 2012. 
In December 2010, the Constitutional Law Committee submitted an opinion on several 
governmental reports linked to financial measures, highlighting the need to safeguard 
Parliament’s ex-ante information rights531. The same argument was repeated in the Finance 
Committee’s opinion on 10th December 2010532, the Constitutional Law Committee’s opinion 
on the ESM on 14th June 2011533 and the GC’s opinion on 17th June 2011534. There was no 
particular pressure on parliamentary reforms, because consensus prevailed once again among 
all groups that Parliament’s budgetary rights needed to be preserved. Therefore, majority MPs 
who chaired these committees kept control over potential scrutiny amendments. 
The analysis of the profile of “political entrepreneurs” of change was not easy, as 
minutes of committee meetings were not available. Therefore, we base our observation on 
plenary debates that handled the treaties, where MPs mentioned the preservation of the 
Eduskunta’s budgetary powers. Just as in the previous part on parliamentary activity during the 
economic crisis, we observe that most key players came from sectoral committees, followed by 
the GC and the FA Committee. Finance Committee members were the most numerous ones, 
probably because their competences were more appropriate to handle the matters. Some MPs 
had double memberships in the GC and Finance Committee and could use their expertise in 
both committees.  
This time, senior MPs were more involved in the discussions, even though the 
proportion of active “young” MPs remained high. Recently elected MPs engaged in discussions 
on the Parliament’s scrutiny system to leave a political mark and publicise the matter in plenary 
debates. Senior MPs came from the biggest mainstream parties and belonged to the majority. 
However, both opposition and majority MPs were equally involved in the debates on 
Parliament’s scrutiny rights. Only few senior MPs had a prior experience in government. They 
belonged to majority parties, which could mean either that they represented their government’s 
position, that they wanted to distinguish themselves politically or that they were motivated by 
personal convictions. For instance, an interviewee from the KOK group who was already very 
active during the previous treaties was also chair of the Finance Committee at that time 
(Interview 10b, 2018). His extensive political career within the Eduskunta, his participation in 
the preparation of Finland’s EU accession and in the discussions on the Constitutional Treaty 
and the Lisbon Treaty, his membership in the 2004 EU-review committee and his participation 
in multiple interparliamentary conferences makes him the prime example of the EU expert 
 
531 08.12.2010, Opinion of the Constitutional Law committee, PeVL 49/2010vp – U 34/2010vp, E 86/2010vp, 
Government's statement on the European Commission's legislative proposals to improve coordination of the 
economic policies of the European Union and the euro area; Government report on possible changes to the 
constitution needed to enhance economic policy co-ordination 
532 10.12.2010, Opinion of the Finance Committee, VaVL 8/2010vp – U 34/2010vp, E 31/2010vp, E 86/2010vp, 
E 90/2010vp, Government's statement on the European Commission's legislative proposals to improve 
coordination of the economic policies of the European Union and the euro area ; Government report on Finland's 
position on the work of the Van Rompuy working group and the Commission Communication on closer 
coordination of economic policies ; Government report on possible changes to the constitution needed to enhance 
economic policy co-ordination ; Government report on government restructuring of government debt 
533 14.06.2011, Opinion of the Constitutional Law committee, PeVL 1/2011vp – U6/2011vp, Government 
Statement on a draft amendment to the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) 
534 17.06.2011, Opinion of the GC, SuVL 2/2011vp – U 5/2011 vp, U 6/2011 vp, E 13/2011vp, Financial crisis 
management and crisis management tools EFSF and ESM 
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driven by a deep interest for EU affairs. To sum up, while professionalised senior MPs were 
motivated by personal beliefs forged through their extensive political career and prior 
professional experience, “young” MPs wanted only to attract their voters’ attention. 
In December 2011, the GC, the Constitutional Law Committee and the Audit Committee 
reiterated the need to inform the Eduskunta on decisions taken in the ESM board of 
governors535. These opinions stated that the Government needed to develop its information 
policy towards the Parliament in order to safeguard the latter’s constitutional rights. The 
cooperation between parliament and government was also at the centre of the GC’s attention in 
2012. The committee argued that Euro-summits needed to be better prepared through timely 
information from the Prime Minister. Opposition MPs also repeatedly emphasised these points 
in dissenting opinions, criticising the fact that the ESM and the TSCG would accelerate the 
transfer of budgetary competences to the EU level. The PS also questioned repeatedly the 
constitutionality of the treaties in dissenting opinions accompanying positions of the 
Constitutional Law Committee (Leino/Salminen, 2013). The latter concluded that the 
Government needed Parliament’s prior approval for any new financial obligations. 
The Audit Committee examined the government report on the ESM in May 2012 and 
concluded that Parliament needed to receive annual governmental reports on the ESM536. In 
July 2012, private persons submitted several complaints to the Chancellor of Justice and the 
Parliamentary Ombudsman, querying the Government’s consistent information policy towards 
the Eduskunta in the case of the ESM537. The Chancellor of Justice concluded that Parliament 
obtained overall the necessary information on the ESM. According to an interviewee (Interview 
2b, 2018), the ruling did not affect parliamentary work, because the Government corrected the 
inaccuracy on its own initiative. MPs agreed that the lack of information was unintentional and 
due to time pressure. However, the complaint might have encouraged the National Audit Office 
to produce an additional report on Parliament’s access to information on the ESM538. The Audit 
Office reflected on ways to improve the cooperation between the Eduskunta and the Finance 
Ministry, suggesting that Parliament needs to receive more systematically confidential written 
information on budgetary and financial issues. 
In the same line of thought, the GC underlined the necessity to “guarantee the Eduskunta 
the powers of supreme organ of state also in respect of EU policy formulation” in the framework 
of Article 13 TSCG539. The GC criticised the undemocratic arrangement of the Article 13 
 
535 21.12.2011, Opinion of GC, SuVL 9/2011vp – E99/2011 vp, Government report on guidelines for the use of 
the European Financial Stability Facility 
536 30.05.2012, Opinion of the Audit Committee, TrVL 5/2012 vp – HE  34/2012vp, Government proposal to 
parliament to approve the agreement establishing the European Stability Mechanism (EVM) and to transpose its 
legislative provisions 
537 10.10.2012, To the Government of the Republic of Finland on EVM's creditor's subordinate status; Approval 
of the EVM agreement and the Spanish loan program, OKV / 975/1/2012  https://www.okv.fi/fi/ratkaisut/id/177/ 
+ 10.10.2012, Parliament did not mislead the EVM treaty, https://www.okv.fi/fi/tiedotteet-ja-
puheenvuorot/408/eduskuntaa-ei-johdettu-harhaan-evm-sopimuksen-kasittelyssa/  (last accessed 26.07.2019) 
538 Audit reports of the National Audit Office, 16/2012, Parliament's access to European financial stabilization 
arrangements, fiscal policy audit report 
539 STATEMENT OF THE GRAND COMMITTEE 4/2012, Parliament of Finland, Banking Union and the Future 
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conference and pleaded for reinforced parliamentary power and influence on governmental 
positions in the Council.  
In conclusion, both majority and opposition defended improved parliamentary rights in 
the framework of the economic crisis, but to different degrees and with different arguments. 
Both agreed that the parliamentary budgetary powers should be preserved. Unlike the treaties 
themselves that fuelled tensions between governmental and opposition parties, positions were 
similar and somewhat consensual on the Eduskunta’s participation rights. The main reason of 
this large consensus despite tensed political relations on the treaties could be the shared 
normative perception within parliament that the Eduskunta’s scrutiny system should base on a 
strong domestic-based government control. 
However, even though the ESM and TSCG were salient on the domestic level and 
triggered heated debates within the opposition, most opinions turned out to be suggestions with 
minor practical adjustments that did not require RoP amendments. Therefore, we cannot 
validate hypothesis H3 according to which a higher salience of EU issues led to more procedural 
revisions within parliament. MPs and national bodies merely repeated the need for the 
Government to inform Parliament on EU matters related to financial measures. This illustrates 
one more time the general perception that the Finnish scrutiny system counts among the 
strongest in the EU and does not need substantial reforms. 
 
7.6.3 Conclusion 
 
This section explained parliamentary involvement in the Eduskunta in the context of 
negotiations on the ESM and the TSCG. These treaties triggered differentiated attention and 
activity within Parliament. Indeed, parliamentary activity seemed to be higher during 
discussions on the ESM than on the TSCG. A reason could be the growing polarisation between 
the coalition partners and the main opposition party PS. The latter used particularly the ESM to 
criticise the Government’s support of financial measures on the EU level. Their anti-EU 
discourses aimed to gain popular support through the politicisation of the matter. Majority MPs 
participated in parliamentary debates, but abstained from criticising their government. Even the 
VAS, which usually expressed doubts about EU policies and still did it during the economic 
crisis, supported the Government’s position. The artificial consensus within the majority 
followed a logic of political solidarity towards a virulent opposition. Indeed, scrutiny tools were 
used only by the two opposition groups KESK and PS, the latter being primarily active. Their 
strategy consisted in making their opinion visible within parliament to face a government that 
dominated the national decision-making in EU affairs. Within-group solidarity was thus 
observable in the opposition, whose parliamentary activity was motivated by political 
competition and ideological differences. Therefore, group discipline was strong in both the 
majority and the opposition, contrary to the previously analysed treaties.  
The analysis of the used scrutiny tools and plenary debates shows that the circle of active 
key players was very different from the other treaties, contrarily to what we observed in Austria 
and Luxembourg. Indeed, a large proportion of active MPs came from the opposition and from 
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sectoral committees, mainly the Finance Committee and the Constitutional Law Committee. 
GC members were the second category of most active players, among them a substantial amount 
of PS MPs. The profile of the “expert” MP in financial and constitutional questions dominated 
parliamentary activity on both treaties. Their main sociological features were their recent 
mandates in parliament, which underlined their absence of professionalisation within 
parliament, as well as their domestic-centred interests, which translated into an 
instrumentalisation of the treaties for electoral purposes. Only senior MPs had similar profiles 
observed in the previous sections and can be considered as “Europeanised” and “socialised into 
EU norms”. 
The ESM and TSCG did not trigger any substantial procedural revisions within the 
Eduskunta, even though constitutional questions related to Finland’s sovereignty reappeared in 
MPs’ discourses. Consensus reigned on the need to preserve Parliament’s budgetary powers. 
This can be directly linked to the general opinion among majority and opposition MPs that 
Member States should keep most of their competences in an intergovernmental decision-
making process. In this framework, national parliaments should remain the main actors of EU 
policy. As the Eduskunta perceives itself as one of the strongest parliaments in the EU in terms 
of formal capacities and control of the Government’s EU policy, MPs did not see the necessity 
to reform procedures and structures. The information policy was slightly adjusted by the 
Government itself. Institutional change was thus non-existent during the economic crisis. 
 
7.7 Summary and conclusion 
 
This chapter explained parliamentary involvement in Finland in the context of several 
EU and intergovernmental treaties. The outline of the institutional framework showed that the 
Eduskunta established just before Finland’s EU accession a strong scrutiny system based on ex-
ante participation rights and strong cooperation with the Government. However, the scrutiny 
system and infrastructure barely changed since 1994. One main reason is the Eduskunta’s 
general perception that the scrutiny system is one of the best in the EU and does not need any 
revision. This was reflected in the minor reforms undergone after almost each treaty: changes 
affected only minimally parliamentary work. Moreover, we observed that parliamentary 
activity on all studied treaties was not particularly significant, because they were handled as 
any other matter within Parliament. Only the economic crisis and the sudden popularity of the 
True Finns since the 2011 elections led to higher polarisation and politicisation of EU issues in 
Finland. Within Parliament, these trends affected parliamentary work on the ESM, but not on 
the TSCG. While consensus on EU politics prevailed before 2011, parties became more 
sceptical and split on this issue after the parliamentary elections. Hereafter, we will sum up the 
findings of each hypothesis and sub-hypotheses.  
The analysis of parliamentary activity in the context of each treaty showed that the 
Constitutional and Lisbon treaties were not the only triggers that led to more activity. Especially 
in those cases, aspects of the treaties were transformed into domestic priorities, which overtook 
MPs’ attention. Moreover, some treaties such as the Constitutional Treaty or the ESM were 
salient in Finland, but parliamentary activity remained nonetheless rather low. Due to Finland’s 
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highly consensual political system and its large coalitions, polarisation was very limited until 
2011. Therefore, parliamentary activity was not primarily linked to the competition level and 
ideological gaps between parties (H1).  
Overall, we can say that party dynamics and the relation between the Government and 
Parliament played a significant role in MPs’ involvement. However, political ideologies had a 
nuanced impact. Indeed, pro-European and Eurosceptic MPs had dispersed opinions on the 
Constitutional Treaty. Several MPs belonged to pro-European majority parties, but rejected the 
treaty and did not follow their party’s voting instructions. Group discipline was reinforced 
during the follow-up of the Lisbon Treaty. The economic crisis showed clear ideological 
cleavages between opposition and majority, but less between pro-Europeans and Eurosceptics. 
Indeed, pro-European parties started to become more sceptical about financial help packages, 
even those within the coalition. The Government’s legitimacy in the management of the crisis 
was threatened by a virulent opposition, which could explain why coalition partners stuck to an 
artificial consensus despite growing ideological divergences. Overall, ideological 
considerations played a blurred role in MPs’ involvement, so that we can only partially validate 
sub-hypothesis H1.1.  
In the same line of thought, we could not always correlate MPs’ positioning on the 
political spectrum with their involvement in parliament. Indeed, majority and opposition were 
most of the time equally involved in the discussions. Moreover, during negotiations on the 
Constitutional Treaty, single MPs from both the majority and the opposition deviated from their 
party’s position and voted differently on the treaty. However, group discipline became stronger 
during the follow-up of the Lisbon Treaty and especially during negotiations on the ESM and 
TSCG. An explanation could be the growing tensions between the coalition and the opposition, 
especially the PS, which forced both camps to reinforce their internal cohesion to face unusual 
political competition. Therefore, we can only partially validate sub-hypothesis H1.2. Factors 
that could explain such behaviour are the electoral system favouring individual profiling instead 
of party discipline, as well as the evolution from consensual dynamics on EU policies to 
increased competition between majority and opposition since 2011 due to the abrupt emergence 
of the True Finns.  
Before 2011, the large consensus between government and parliament on EU politics 
did not fuel any important political tensions. However, the True Finns started to publicise their 
Eurosceptic stance after 2011, contributing to the polarisation of opinions between and within 
parties. For the first time since Finland’s EU accession, the consensus on EU affairs and 
Government’s authority on EU policy was overtly challenged by a more powerful Eurosceptic 
opposition group. Polarisation was noticeable on the ESM, but less on the TSCG. Indeed, 
mainstream parties started to raise sceptical voices on EU issues within their ranks. 
Accordingly, group discipline became stronger the more the political environment became 
conflictual. Sub-hypothesis H1.3 is therefore validated. 
The second hypothesis focused on mainstreaming trends within the Eduskunta, 
influenced by formal capacities, MPs’ profiles and their awareness of EU affairs. The two last 
criteria are closely linked to MPs’ position on European integration, their ideological and 
political positioning on the domestic level and in parliament. Even though the Eduskunta’s 
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procedures and infrastructure have been designed to encourage decentralisation of EU affairs, 
parliamentary work in practice does not always reflect it. We can only partially confirm 
hypothesis H2. Overall, mainstreaming was certainly facilitated by the Eduskunta’s formal 
capacities, but was not reflected in the actual scrutiny of the treaties. In fact, MPs’ general 
awareness about EU affairs was rather limited until the economic crisis. Other domestic issues 
had priority over the Constitutional Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty. In addition, the fact that all 
treaties were handled like any other matter in Parliament did not help raise attention. The 
situation changed after 2011 due to the active involvement of the True Finns, both in Parliament 
and in the media. They openly criticised the financial help packages and the Government’s 
measures.  
Even though awareness grew due to the instrumentalisation of the crisis for domestic 
political purposes, the involvement level among MPs remained circumscribed. However, we 
cannot clearly say that MPs with “Europeanised” profiles were the most active players for all 
treaties. Even though it was the case for the Constitutional Treaty, other players scrutinised 
more actively the Lisbon Treaty, the ESM and the TSCG. Especially in the context of the 
economic crisis, opposition PS MPs with Eurosceptic stances and a membership in sectoral 
committees (Finance Committee) were the most involved. Therefore, sub-hypothesis H2.1 can 
only be partially validated. One main reason could be the competence distribution between 
committees. For the Constitutional and Lisbon Treaty, institutional questions prevailed and fell 
into the interest and competences of EU professionals in the GC and Constitutional Law 
Committee. However, the ESM and TSCG fell directly into the competences of the Finance 
Committee. On top of that, the newly elected Eurosceptic True Finns used the matters to 
promote their populist discourses, while debates on the Constitutional Treaty and the Lisbon 
Treaty were dominated by pro-European MPs from large majorities. The more the ideological 
gap grew between parliamentary groups, the more MPs from sectoral committees with less 
knowledge on EU affairs engaged in scrutiny activities. Sub-hypothesis H2.2 is thus confirmed. 
Finally, we checked how institutional change depended on the salience of the treaties 
and their legal provisions on parliamentary participation in EU affairs (H3). We concluded that 
the extent of institutional change did not always correspond to the salience level of the treaties. 
While we can confirm that the Constitutional Treaty led to procedural revisions in Parliament, 
it is less obvious in the case of the Lisbon Treaty. Moreover, the economic crisis triggered some 
discussions on the Eduskunta’s budgetary powers, but no substantial revisions were undergone. 
One main reason could be the general perception within the Eduskunta (shown in most 
interviews) that the scrutiny procedures count among the best in the EU and do not need to be 
substantially changed (H3.1). Finnish MPs were the least involved in institutional change, 
because they were particularly satisfied with their EU scrutiny system. Moreover, the Eduskunta 
and Finnish MPs in particular have a quite intergovernmentalist vision of the EU, including a 
strong opinion on the fact that national parliaments should keep most of their competences in 
the European decision-making process. This strong normative perception of Eduskunta’s role 
did not push MPs to question fundamentally the current formal capacities.  
Using both Sociological Institutionalism and the Theory of Endogenous Institutional 
Change (HI), we explained how procedural revisions stemmed from MPs’ motivations, 
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themselves influenced by the context of treaty negotiations. We observed that within the 
Eduskunta, consensus instead of competition seemed to prevail in the discussions on 
institutional revisions. This calls into question the argument of the Theory of Endogenous 
Institutional Change, according to which actors would be driven by strategical and competitive 
motivations to trigger change. Instead, Finnish MPs, both from the majority and the opposition, 
pushed reform debates because they reinterpreted the normative role of their parliament, just as 
in Luxembourg. The strong consensual belief that Parliament possesses one of the most 
accomplished scrutiny system in the EU is the prevailing normative perception in Finland and 
dampened any attempts to revise it. Therefore, we can best explain the motives of change within 
the Eduskunta through Sociological Institutionalism. Indeed, MPs’ beliefs about the role of their 
parliament shaped their involvement and the way they conceived institutional change. 
The Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change helped explaining how actors 
interacted together to make that change happen. We identified “political entrepreneurs” that led 
the discussions, especially in the context of the Constitutional and Lisbon treaties. These MPs 
had an extensive “Europeanised” experience and appeared to be professionals socialised into 
European norms. Their experience probably legitimised them to lead the revisions. In the case 
of the economic crisis, entrepreneurs of change were more scattered. We could not clearly 
identify profiles of reform “leaders”. However, the True Finns were particularly active in 
pointing out the need to secure Parliament’s sovereignty and budgetary competences. 
Parliamentary culture was thus an important factor of change, just as in the case of 
parliamentary activity (H3.2). 
Finally, based on the Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change, we identified two 
different trends of change within Parliament. Indeed, just as in Luxembourg and Austria, 
“layering” happened also in the Finnish Parliament between 1994 and the Lisbon Treaty. 
Parliament added minor changes to its scrutiny system. Revisions came to a halt in the context 
of the economic crisis. Moreover, MPs were very reluctant to change some aspects of their 
system, such as MEPs’ participation in the Eduskunta’s work. The large consensus on 
Parliament’s role in the EU and the majority’s influence on institutional change limited 
considerably the scope of change. Therefore, “drift” also characterises institutional change 
within Parliament, especially in the context of the Constitutional Treaty and the economic crisis 
(ESM/TSCG). According to the Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change, “drift” means that 
actors deliberately chose not to change rules despite their changing institutional environment 
(Streeck/Thelen, 2005, p.57). Therefore, we can only partially validate sub-hypothesis H3.3, 
because institutional change in the Eduskunta happened through “layering” and “drift”.  
To conclude, we can say that the government-parliament relation, in particular party 
dynamics, and the general Finnish perception leaning towards an intergovernmental EU 
affected the most parliamentary involvement in EU affairs. Parliament’s awareness about its 
strong formal capacities affected its involvement and the direction of institutional change. The 
Eduskunta was always kept informed on the treaties and controlled narrowly the Government’s 
position. Above all, whether MPs were in the opposition or in the majority and whether they 
maintained consensual or competitive relations on EU affairs determined largely how they 
scrutinised the treaties. Even though single MPs stood out from the rest because of their higher 
376 
 
sensitisation to EU affairs and their “Europeanised” profiles, we drew the conclusion that their 
positioning on the political spectrum and the level of competition between parties determined 
even more prominently parliamentary involvement.  
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Chapter 8. Comparative assessment of parliamentary involvement 
during EU and intergovernmental treaty negotiations 
 
The present chapter seeks to explain differences and similarities in parliamentary 
involvement across the three studied parliaments. To do so, we will focus on the following 
leading question: What are the determinants of parliamentary involvement during EU and 
intergovernmental treaty negotiations in all three countries? What explains the behavioural 
variations? In the introduction of the present thesis, we stated that the Luxembourg Chamber of 
Deputies, the Austrian National Council and the Finnish Eduskunta were similar in terms of 
their small size as well as the neocorporatist and consociational systems in which they were 
embedded, even though this argument can be questioned for Austria after 2005 and Finland 
after 2011. Differences between the cases lied in their EU accession and the formal 
parliamentary capacities.  Based on these initial assumptions, we will check first to what extent 
parliament’s institutional framework influenced parliamentary involvement. Then, we will 
compare their formal capacities and their parliamentary activity in EU affairs. By doing so, we 
will integrate the motivational aspect in our analysis. Finally, we will analyse how far they 
changed their scrutiny system to adapt to the developments following each treaty. While the 
first hypothesis H1 on polarisation will be tested in the first and third sections, the second 
hypothesis H2 can be tested in the second and third sections. We will check hypothesis H3 in 
the third and fourth sections. 
 
8.1 Evolving institutional contexts as predetermining factors of parliamentary 
involvement: differences and similarities 
 
We assume that the most important factors that influenced parliamentary involvement 
during EU and intergovernmental treaty negotiations were the nature of the political systems 
and each parliament’s perception of European integration. 
 
8.1.1 Consociational vs post-consociational political systems: a comparative assessment of 
the impact of the nature of political dynamics on parliamentary involvement 
 
We observed that the three countries in which our cases are situated had to some extent 
similar political systems, but that this changed in the course of the period under analysis (2004-
2015). The fact that all three countries have coalition governments reinforces even more the 
effect of consensual practices on parliamentary involvement. Indeed, supporting the majority’s 
line might be a strategy for parties to accede to future government formations. Consensus might 
also be a tactic to increase a state’s influence on EU decisions through unanimous positions 
shared by parliament and government. 
Luxembourg maintained its highly consensual political system throughout the 
negotiation processes, even though some parties such as the ADR took their opposition role 
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more seriously after the referendum on the Constitutional Treaty in 2005. Indeed, we could not 
observe sharp conflicts between the parliamentary groups. The only moments of increased 
political tensions appeared during the campaign on the referendum, when a committee for the 
“No” formed on the national level, and during the debates on the TSCG, when Déi Gréng joined 
the ADR and Déi Lénk to reject the treaty. Overall, these positions had only a limited impact 
on the consensual practices within Parliament, because dissident parties represented only a 
minority. Sometimes, critical discourses did not reflect the final parliamentary vote, as it was 
the case for the DP during discussions on the TSCG. The party expressed an overtly sceptical 
opinion on the treaty, but still voted for it. Parliamentary groups’ behaviour within Parliament 
was thus not always straightforward. Debates did not show harsh conflict lines on the treaties.  
The situation was different in Austria over the same period. Until 2005, while the FPÖ 
was in the majority, political parties expressed consensual positions on EU affairs and the 
Constitutional Treaty. However, the FPÖ’s internal tensions and split in 2005 changed the 
political landscape. From then on, the party was relegated to the opposition and adopted more 
critical views towards European integration, systematically rejecting the Lisbon Treaty, the 
ESM and the TSCG. The economic crisis represented an additional step towards a more 
competitive system, with growing tensions within the SPÖ-ÖVP coalition as well as between 
the majority and the Greens. The latter rejected the TSCG. 
In Finland, consensus over EU affairs was quite large until the economic crisis. Before 
2011, the PS was not an influential opposition party and coalitions consisted of large majorities, 
sometimes including partners with sceptical positions on European integration. After 2011 and 
the emergence of the PS on the political stage, consensual practices were challenged by growing 
tensions between the majority and opposition. The PS expressed harsh criticism towards the 
Government’s EU policy and used the ESM and TSCG to reinforce anti-EU sentiment among 
the population. Subsequently, group discipline also changed. While single MPs disagreed with 
their party’s line during negotiations on the Constitutional Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty, the 
growing political competition forced both the majority and opposition to stay united and 
reinforce group discipline. 
In the end, Luxembourg’s political system remained consensual and consociational 
because of the ideological proximity of political parties and thus the absence of ideological 
conflicts between them, as well as the incapacity of the sovereignist party ADR to establish 
itself as strong political opponent against the coalition. Therefore, the Luxembourgish 
Government had no serious competitor and influenced the discussions through its majority in 
parliament. Austria’s and Finland’s political systems shifted from consensus to political 
competition. The following table sums up the evolution of each country’s political system, 
applied to EU affairs. 
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Table 20: Evolution of each country’s political system 
Countries 
 
Treaties 
 
 
Luxembourg 
 
Austria 
 
Finland 
Constitutional Treaty Consociational Consociational Consociational 
Lisbon Treaty Consociational Post-
Consociational/Competitive 
Consociational 
Economic crisis 
(ESM, TSCG) 
Consociational Post-
Consociational/Competitive 
Post-
Consociational/Competitive 
Source: Own classification. 
External events such as EU treaties and intergovernmental treaties on the EMU, 
combined with the emergence of strong Eurosceptic opposition parties, triggered political 
tensions and forced mainstream parties to reflect about their own strategies. We can notice that 
the more the party dynamics of the country became competitive, the higher parliamentary 
activity was, and the more coalition policies were challenged within parliament. On the one 
hand, competitive and post-consociational environments, notably in Austria after 2005 and in 
Finland after 2011, led to higher polarisation between parties and thus to higher activity, at least 
on the side of treaty opponents. On the other hand, in Luxembourg, in Austria before 2005 and 
in Finland before 2011, the large consensus on EU affairs led to passive reactions from 
parliamentary players, because they were widely supporting their government’s EU policy. 
Through this passivity, government parties could take control of the discussions on the EU. 
However, these trends cannot be applied strictly to institutional change within these 
parliaments. Without surprise, consensual practices between majority and opposition party 
groups prevailed in Luxembourg because of the necessity to reinforce parliamentary scrutiny 
rights. In Austria, revisions of the scrutiny procedures took place in an environment that was 
both consensual and competitive. Indeed, in the context of the Constitutional Treaty and the 
Lisbon Treaty, RoP and constitutional amendments were largely accepted by both the majority 
and the opposition, even the FPÖ and BZÖ. However, revisions in the context of the economic 
crisis obeyed political competition. Firstly, the Greens exchanged their support for the ESM in 
return of the coalition’s promise to initiate amendments to the National Council’s participation 
rights in EU affairs. Secondly, the FPÖ rejected any further amendments as a clear sign of 
discontent towards the Government’s management of the crisis. Finally, in the Eduskunta, 
amendments of the scrutiny procedures did not lead to any particular political tensions during 
the whole period under analysis, even though the PS harshly criticised the ESM and TSCG.  
Therefore, in light of these elements, we can state that the more consensual a political 
system was, the more parliamentary involvement depended on personal motivations and 
sociological factors. Reversely, the more competitive and polarised a political system was, the 
more parliamentary involvement originated from rational strategies and political factors in a bid 
to gain popularity and attract voters’ support. The changing nature of countries’ political 
dynamics affected parliamentary involvement in the sense that MPs steered their behaviour 
according to government-parliament relations, the extent of party competition, their positioning 
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on the majority-opposition spectrum and their ideological positioning towards European 
integration.  
 
8.1.2 A differentiated perception of European integration and the role of national parliaments 
 
Another factor that affected MPs’ involvement in the follow-up of EU and 
intergovernmental treaties was clearly their position towards European integration and the role 
that their parliament should play within the EU. Their opinion can be explained by their party 
affiliation, i.e. whether they belong to a pro-European or Eurosceptic party, as well as their 
country’s perception of European integration itself, dependent on the moment of their EU 
accession. Firstly, the three countries joined the EU at two different moments. Luxembourg 
counts among the founding countries of the EU. The elite’s common understanding of European 
integration is that the EU is inseparable from Luxembourg’s economic and political 
development. As a small state, Luxembourg is highly dependent on other countries’ decisions 
and uses the European level to endorse a role of arbitrator. All parties in Luxembourg defend a 
pro-European position, even the ADR. That is why the latter cannot be considered as a 
Eurosceptic party, but rather as a sovereignist party, because it defends an intergovernmental 
vision of the EU while the rest supports federalisation trends. All parties also agree that the 
Chamber of Deputies should have strong participation rights in EU affairs, but also that the role 
of the European Parliament should be strengthened as a sign of deeper European integration.  
These elements support our previous arguments about Luxembourg and 
consociationalism. Consensual practices prevail especially in EU affairs, because the assurance 
of Luxembourg’s unanimous position on the EU level guarantees its effective influence. Large 
majorities supported the treaties and parliamentary debates were not conflictual, despite 
disagreements from some opposition parties. Despite growing tensions and scepticism towards 
the EU in the context of the economic crisis, most parties still supported European integration. 
For instance, due to its strong pro-European identity and its support of European solidarity, the 
DP still voted in favour of the TSCG even though the party criticised it. Within the Chamber of 
Deputies, we could not observe a clear pattern of parliamentary involvement dependent on 
political ideologies on European integration, certainly due to the common understanding that 
EU affairs should be consensual. Indeed, while the majority and opposition were equally 
involved in the scrutiny of the Constitutional Treaty, pro-European opposition MPs were more 
active during the Lisbon Treaty and sceptical opposition MPs were more active during the 
economic crisis.   
Austria and Finland joined the EU in 1995 and have a different perception of European 
integration than Luxembourg. Both were first members of EFTA, respectively from 1960 and 
1986 until 1995. Austria’s motivation to move closer to the European Community was the 
perspective of economic benefits, especially for its SMEs. Due to its historical past and its 
geographical position, the country saw the EU accession as a means to reinforce above all its 
crumbling economy. Finland multiplied regional cooperation initiatives in the 1960s and 1970s 
in an attempt to ensure peace and stability in Northern Europe in a context of the Cold War. 
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Finland’s geographical position between the Soviet Union and Western Europe forced the 
country to stay neutral and maintain only commercial relations with the EC. When the Soviet 
Union collapsed, Finland followed the initiative of Austria and Sweden to apply for EU 
membership. Therefore, contrary to Luxembourg, both countries joined the EU quite late and 
had to adapt very quickly to the “acquis communautaire”. The historical past of both countries 
explains why their political elites express mitigated opinions about European integration. Since 
their EU accession, Austria and Finland sought to protect their neutrality and their sovereignty. 
Even though most political parties support European integration, they conceive it in a rather 
nationalist and intergovernmentalist way. Structured cooperation between Member States is 
preferable to federalisation. These general positions are also reflected in their way to conceive 
normatively the role of their parliament in the EU. Indeed, there is a strong belief among 
Austrian and Finnish MPs that parliamentary scrutiny in EU affairs should focus on government 
control, i.e. the national level rather than the EU level. Moreover, MPs from both countries are 
quite reluctant towards the interference of the EU level with their parliamentary work, 
especially in the Finnish Eduskunta. The best example is the sceptical position of the Eduskunta 
and to some extent the National Council towards MEPs’ participation in parliamentary 
discussions and the subsidiarity monitoring mechanism. Additionally, the Eduskunta is also 
reluctant towards interparliamentary cooperation, because the focus of Finnish MPs should be 
the scrutiny of their national government’s EU policy.  
In Austria, when the FPÖ participated in the coalition with the ÖVP until 2005, positions 
on European integration were quite consensual and supportive. The FPÖ somewhat supported 
the EU. For instance, in its electoral programme in 2002, the party was in favour of the creation 
of a European social model, as well as EU enlargement if the criteria were respected by the 
candidate country540. The fact that the FPÖ was in the coalition with the “European Party” 
ÖVP541 might have tamed the party and encouraged it to support more European friendly 
positions. These elements probably explain why the FPÖ voted in favour of the Constitutional 
Treaty in 2005. The opposition, which was constituted at that time of the pro-European parties 
SPÖ and the Greens, also supported the government’s EU policy and the Constitutional Treaty. 
After 2005, when the FPÖ split and opted for a change of course on EU affairs, we can clearly 
identify ideological polarisation between pro-European parties and the Eurosceptic FPÖ. From 
that moment on, the party systematically rejected the treaties and was clearly more involved in 
parliamentary discussions than other parties. The pattern of parliamentary involvement in the 
National Council was thus clearer after 2005. During discussions on the Constitutional Treaty, 
pro-European opposition (SPÖ, Greens) was more active, but did not use the scrutiny 
instruments to criticise the Austrian Government. Eurosceptic opposition MPs from the FPÖ 
were mainly active during the Lisbon Treaty, the ESM and the TSCG. Without surprise, they 
used the parliamentary arena to express their discontent towards the government after their 
ideological turnaround in 2005. 
The Finnish political landscape changed between 2003 and 2015, but parties with pro-
European tendencies dominated the stage until 2011. Coalitions were usually formed of the 
 
540 FPÖ, Programm 2002, Wir gestalten Österreich mit Sicherheit 
541 Das Österreich-Programm der Volkspartei, 2002  
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biggest mainstream parties, such as KESK, SDP or KOK. Large coalitions and their majority 
in the Eduskunta outnumbered Eurosceptic opposition MPs from the KD, VAS and PS. The 
low influence of Eurosceptic MPs, the high proportion of pro-Europeans in both the opposition 
and the majority, as well as the large consensus on EU affairs before 2011 led to similar patterns 
of involvement as in Luxembourg during discussions on the Constitutional Treaty. Both pro-
European majority, pro-European and Eurosceptic opposition MPs were equally involved in the 
debates. This could be explained by the fact that in a consensual system, individual MPs tend 
to make abstraction of their positioning on the political spectrum and get involved because of 
personal and ideological motivations. This means that single majority MPs scrutinised their 
government, even though they should show support. However, unlike in the Luxembourg 
Chamber of Deputies where MPs from both political sides agreed on the government’s EU 
policy, single Finnish MPs from the majority showed divergent opinions. A reason could be the 
loose party discipline caused by the individualistic electoral system that was encouraged by the 
lack of strong opposition to the government, allowing dissident views without fearing political 
consequences.  
Discussions on the Lisbon Treaty showed again that pro-European opposition and 
majority MPs dominated the stage, even though Eurosceptic opposition MPs submitted the most 
scrutiny tools. Indeed, the latter represented a minority compared to pro-European MPs. The 
situation changed drastically after the parliamentary elections in 2011. The PS gained 
substantial political power within the Eduskunta and could have accepted a coalition formation 
with the KOK and SDP. The Eurosceptic party stayed in opposition and a large six-party 
coalition formed to counteract the PS. Within parliament, political dynamics changed 
subsequently. Contrary to the previous treaties, Eurosceptic opposition MPs dominated the 
parliamentary arena during debates on the economic crisis and overtly criticised the Finnish 
Government. Indeed, when we analyse the speaking time of each party during plenaries on the 
ESM or the TSCG, we observe that PS MPs took the floor more often than other parties. 
Reasons could be the electoral salience of the crisis for the PS, which used plenaries to reach 
out to their voters; the absence of clear limitation of the speaking time, which gave the PS the 
opportunity to express itself extensively; finally the strength of the PS in parliament, which 
represented the third-largest force after the KOK and SDP and provided the party with 
privileges in terms of speaking time in plenaries. To sum up, the nature of parliamentary 
involvement changed due to the emergence of the PS, a higher political polarisation between 
coalition MPs and the PS and thus the disappearance of the long-term consensual atmosphere 
prevailing on EU affairs. 
 
8.1.3 Conclusion 
 
This first section showed that the nature of the political system itself and party dynamics, 
as well as ideological orientations on European integration, substantially affected MPs’ 
involvement during negotiations on the studied treaties. While consensual systems limited 
parliamentary activity in the sense that MPs remained passive in the use of scrutiny tools and 
systematically supported their government, competitive or post-consociational systems fuelled 
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higher parliamentary activity, especially on the side of the opposition. A more aggressive 
Eurosceptic opposition, that sought to attract voters in a bid to gain popularity for the next 
legislative elections, challenged the governments’ EU policies in Austria and Finland. These 
observations support the argument of Gava/Sciarini/Varone (2017) according to which the “less 
intrusive scrutiny [of non-Eurosceptic governing parties] may seek to avoid a ministerial drift 
in EU matters […] to strengthen the bargaining position of the government at the EU level and 
to protect the government from Eurosceptic parties” (Gava/Sciarini/Varone, 2017, p.9). These 
first institutional elements bring some answers to the first and second hypotheses. Indeed, the 
political polarisation affected parliamentary activity. The higher the salience of the treaties, the 
more MPs became aware of EU affairs in parliament. 
 
8.2 Differentiated formal capacities as foundation of parliamentary involvement in EU 
affairs: a comparative assessment 
 
In this section, we will compare the parliaments’ formal capacities as basis of 
parliamentary involvement. Based on existing literature and data retrieved from interviews and 
parliamentary documents, these indicators will allow us to measure parliamentary strength in 
EU affairs. The stronger formal parliamentary capacities, the more MPs are using the scrutiny 
tools because they think that they can have an impact on the decision-making. As explained 
previously in the present thesis, all three parliaments have different scrutiny systems and are 
commonly classified in the academic literature from the weakest to the strongest542. 
Luxembourg is usually described as a “slow adapter” with few resources, Austria as a medium-
strong “national player” and Finland as a strong “national player” in terms of scrutiny of EU 
affairs (Maurer, In: Maurer/Wessels, 2001; Maurer, In: Abels/Eppler, 2011). We will go into 
details on some indicators of parliamentary strength in the following sections. Firstly, we will 
compare the legal bases of each parliament. Then, we will check how the scrutiny infrastructure 
affected MPs’ involvement. Finally, we will analyse scrutiny procedures in EU affairs, which 
will determine how much influence a parliament can have compared to the government.  
 
8.2.1 A comparative assessment of parliaments’ legal bases 
 
Formal rules are one of many criteria that permit to measure parliamentary strength in 
the scrutiny of EU affairs, as well as parliamentary involvement based on this strength. Indeed, 
according to Auel et al. (2015), strong formal institutional rights imply a higher level of 
parliamentary activity in EU affairs. However, it does not mean that parliaments are actually 
using their formal powers in practice (Auel, 2007). The density of the legal bases on EU scrutiny 
differs between the three studied chambers.  
 
542 See the classifications of Auel/Rozenberg/Tacea, In: Hefftler/Neuhold/Rozenberg/Smith, 2015; Karlas, 2011; 
Maurer/Wessels, 2001; Raunio, 2005; Winzen, 2012 
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Among the three cases, Luxembourg has the least written rules on parliamentary 
scrutiny of EU affairs. The Constitution does not mention directly the chamber’s participation 
in the scrutiny of EU policies. The RoP is the only legal source that refers to the role of the 
Chamber of Deputies in EU affairs, but only in Article 168 and in a memorandum on the 
cooperation between parliament and government. Revisions of these rules happened late 
considering that the country belonged to the founding fathers of the EU and had time to adapt 
to the “acquis communautaire”. Indeed, the Article 168 in Chapter 15 was added in the RoP 
only in 2005 and modified in 2010. The memorandum was incorporated in 2009. The quasi 
absence of strong formal rules indicates that the Luxembourgish Government might have a 
bigger leeway in the decision-making compared to the parliament. Another explanation could 
be that the consensual system in Luxembourg aims to limit Parliament’s possibilities to 
counteract the government. Both institutions share the same opinion on EU affairs, which would 
not require a reinforcement of parliament’s rights in the name of consensus. The Government 
still dominates EU policies and also controls the evolution of formal rules within parliament 
through its large majority. Less formal rules regulating parliamentary participation in EU affairs 
thus mean less autonomy vis-à-vis the government.  
Austria established the strongest formal rules among the three cases. The National 
Council’s participation rights are regulated in several articles of the Federal Constitution, the 
RoP and national information laws. Therefore, theoretically, the National Council has powerful 
and well-developed institutional rights. Contrary to Luxembourg, the National Council adapted 
its formal rules when Austria joined the EU in 1994. After each EU treaty, the Parliament 
reinforced its legal bases. The main reason for the multiple rules on EU scrutiny might be the 
fact that the Parliament focused since the beginning on the national decision-making and 
rejected any federalisation of national competences. Another reason could be the powerful 
opposition in Parliament, especially the Greens during the economic crisis, which managed to 
impose institutional change for the sake of political strategy. Within a growing competitive 
environment, modifications of the formal rules could be encouraged by the tensions between 
the opposition who demands more rights and the majority who wishes to brake further 
amendments. 
Finally, the Finnish Eduskunta anchored its participation rights in the Constitution and 
its RoP, but to a lesser extent than in Austria. Apart from the Section 96 in Chapter 8 of the 
Finnish Constitution, which was established in 1995, the other amendments to the legal bases 
were made only after 2003. Just as in Austria, the Eduskunta adapted its scrutiny system when 
the country joined the EU and left it untouched until the Convention on the Future of Europe. 
Both parliaments established mandating systems, with a scrutiny model based on narrow 
relations between parliamentary groups and the government. They both have strong Grand 
Committees, which possess extensive prerogatives in EU affairs. Indeed, both bodies can take 
decisions in place of the plenary. However, the density of legal bases is lower in Finland than 
in Austria. Unlike in the Austrian National Council, Finnish MPs tend to use more 
systematically of their formal rules and also rely on unwritten practices. Moreover, unlike 
Luxembourg and Austria, the Finnish Eduskunta considers its scrutiny system as one of the 
strongest in the EU. Its reluctance towards further amendments was therefore stronger than in 
the other chambers.  
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The density of legal provisions on parliamentary rights in EU affairs can be summed up in the 
following table. 
 
Table 21: Countries’ legal provisions on parliamentary participation in EU affairs 
 Luxembourg Austria Finland 
Constitution  
/ 
Article 23c, e, f, g, h, I, k, 
50a, b, c, d 
- Chapter 1, Section 1 
- Chapter 5, Section 66 
- Chapter 8, Section 93, 
94, 96, 97 
RoP - Article 168, Chapter 15 
- Annex 3 
GOG §19a, §20c, §26a, 
§29, §31, §31b, c, d, e, f, 
§32f, g, h, i, j, §74b, c, d, 
e, f, g 
Section 30, 32, 34 and 38 
National Law  
 
/ 
- Informations- 
ordnungsgesetz (InfOG) 
- Informations-
verordnung (InfoV) 
- EU-Informationsgesetz 
- ESM-Informations-
ordnung 
 
 
/ 
Source: Own summary based on national Constitutions, parliaments’ RoPs and national laws. 
If we check for a correlation between the strength of each parliament’s EU scrutiny 
system and parliamentary activity during negotiations on the studied treaties, we observe that 
some indicators follow the arguments of Auel/Rozenberg/Tacea (2015). As we will see in 
section III of the present chapter, parliamentary activity depends among other factors on the 
legal basis of each parliament. Indeed, if we take for instance the number of motions, 
resolutions, parliamentary questions or the number of question hours on EU affairs between 
2004 and 2015, we observe that the National Council was the most active, followed by the 
Finnish Eduskunta and the Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies543. Obviously, the salience of EU 
issues and political dynamics also played an important role in parliamentary activity. However, 
the fact that the National Council and the Eduskunta have strong formal prerogatives might 
have been a crucial determiner for parliamentary involvement.  
In Luxembourg, the most used instruments during treaty negotiations were 
parliamentary questions, while Austrian MPs mostly used resolutions and motions. Within the 
Eduskunta, committee opinions and MPs’ dissenting opinions were the most used tools. To sum 
up, the more the salience of the treaties increased, the more MPs made use of their parliament’s 
formal institutional rights. However, parliamentary involvement depended also on other 
criteria, such as the scrutiny infrastructure of each parliament. 
 
 
 
543 Own calculations, based on the number of parliamentary questions and question hours on EU affairs calculated 
for each parliament between 2004 and 2015. 
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8.2.2 A comparative assessment of scrutiny infrastructures dedicated to EU affairs  
 
Overall, there are several veto players in each country. In Austria, the Federal 
Constitutional Court and trade union organisations represent constraints on parliamentary 
involvement. In Luxembourg, trade unions, professional chambers and opinions of the Council 
of State affect MPs’ behaviour within the Chamber of Deputies. In Finland, the Chancellor of 
Justice, the Parliamentary Ombudsman, the Eduskunta’s Constitutional Law Committee and 
trade union organisations influence parliamentary activity. Constitutional Courts or bodies 
checking the legality or constitutionality of legislative proposals are able to overturn a proposal 
or legislative processes. Interest groups influence decisions of single MPs or parties on specific 
public policies, especially in countries where consociational and social partnership practices 
prevail. Moreover, in all three cases, parliament-government relations, but also party dynamics, 
constitute additional constraints or opportunities for MPs, depending on their position on the 
political spectrum. 
If we focus now on the internal scrutiny structures of the three parliaments, we observe 
several similarities and differences. The way scrutiny is organised in each parliament 
determines how much support MPs can obtain in their parliamentary work. The table hereunder 
sums up the main features of each chamber’s scrutiny structure. 
Table 22: Features of chambers’ scrutiny infrastructure with regard to EU affairs 
 Chamber of Deputies, 
Luxembourg 
National Council, 
Austria 
Eduskunta, Finland 
Type of parliament Unicameral Bicameral Unicameral 
EAC Committee on Foreign 
and European Affairs, 
Defence, Cooperation 
and Migration 
- EU-Main Committee 
- EU-Sub Committee 
- Grand Committee 
- Foreign Affairs 
Committee (CFSP) 
Distribution of 
competences in EU 
affairs 
Decentralised in theory, 
but centralised in 
practice 
Centralised 
(with EU-Main 
Committee as 
coordination body) 
Decentralised 
(with GC as coordination 
body) 
Parliamentary staff 
dedicated to EU 
3 staff (International 
Relations Department, 
European Unit)544 
21 staff (shared with 
Federal Council, EU and 
International 
Department) 
10 staff (GC Secretariat) 
EU-database No, only internal 
document classification 
programme 
Yes No, internal database and 
access to government 
database 
Brussels representation 
office 
January 2006 May 2005 1995 
Parliamentary group 
EU-collaborator 
- Yes, depending on 
group size 
- no MP assistants 
Yes, pool of 
collaborators depending 
on group size 
Yes, depending on group 
size 
 
544 Among the ten staff in the International Relations Department, only three staff work on EU affairs. Among 
these three staff, two work part-time and one staff works full-time on EU affairs. 
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Party EU-working 
group 
Yes, depending on party Yes, depending on party Yes, depending on party 
Source: Own classification, based on data retrieved from parliaments’ websites, parliamentary reports, interviews, 
secondary literature. 
First, the Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies and the Finnish Eduskunta are unicameral 
parliaments, while Austria has a bicameral parliament composed of the National Council and 
the Federal Council. Therefore, there is an additional veto player in the Austrian political 
landscape, which might affect MPs’ involvement in the National Council. Indeed, whenever the 
National Council rejects a legislative proposal, MPs try to submit it again in the Federal 
Council, where political tensions are less important and ministers do not have to attend meetings 
(Interview 3a, 2017). Between 2004 and 2013, the SPÖ and the ÖVP kept their majority in both 
chambers, ensuring them a large support from parliament. From 2015 on, the re-emergence of 
the FPÖ as a strong political player on the national level also affected the composition of the 
Federal Council. The FPÖ gained a substantial amount of seats in the upper chamber. The party 
is now able to influence the legislative process within the whole parliament. 
The structures dedicated to EU affairs differ within each chamber. All three cases have 
EACs, but their statuses and competences diverge. The Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies and 
the Finnish Eduskunta have both bodies dealing with EU affairs with blurred denominations. 
The Chamber of Deputies has a Committee on Foreign and European Affairs, Defence, 
Cooperation and Migration encompassing several policy fields on top of EU affairs. The 
Eduskunta has a Grand Committee that deals with EU affairs since 1995, together with the 
Foreign Affairs Committee that deals with the CFSP. The Austrian National Council established 
EACs with more circumscribed functions and names: the EU-Main Committee and the EU-Sub 
Committee. The distribution of tasks between the EACs and sectoral committees looks 
somewhat similar in Luxembourg and Austria. In practice, the Committee on Foreign and 
European Affairs, Defence, Cooperation and Migration centralises EU scrutiny, even though 
the chamber made efforts towards decentralisation in theory.  
The National Council’s EACs also tend to centralise EU affairs, but in their case, they 
act as coordination bodies whenever sectoral committees become active in the framework of 
the subsidiarity monitoring. On the contrary, the distribution of competences within the 
Eduskunta is decentralised, with the Grand Committee acting as a coordination body whenever 
sectoral committees give their opinion on an EU matter. These elements indicate that Finnish 
MPs tend to deal more often with EU affairs than MPs from Luxembourg or Austria, because 
the Eduskunta seems to encourage the mainstreaming of EU affairs. In the other chambers, EAC 
members might be the only ones involved in EU affairs. During EU and intergovernmental 
treaty negotiations, EACs usually monitor IGCs and deal with broader institutional issues, while 
sectoral committees handle specific aspects of the treaties. However, as we will see in the next 
chapters, the salience of EU treaties and intergovernmental treaties on the EMU also encourages 
non-EAC members to become active for competence or strategical reasons. For instance, the 
economic crisis was not centralised anymore within EACs, but obliged Finance committees to 
get involved in the technical discussions. 
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Administrative support to EACs and their members is distributed unevenly in the three 
chambers. Surprisingly, even though the Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies has comparatively 
less resources in personnel than the other parliaments, it has proportionally more staff dedicated 
to EU affairs than in the Finnish Eduskunta (around 3%). Indeed, among the 94 parliamentary 
staff, around 3 work in the International Relations Department and its “European Unit”. The 
Finnish Eduskunta has the most civil servants of all three cases, but the least officials dealing 
with EU affairs. Indeed, we counted 10 staff out of 431 assisting the GC’s work, which 
represents approximately 2% of the total number of parliamentary civil servants. Finally, in 
Austria, the National Council shares its parliamentary administration with the Federal Council. 
Within their “EU- and International Department”, composed of the “EU information and EU-
database” unit and the “European relations” unit. We counted approximately 21 out of 400 staff 
(approx. 5,25%) dealing directly with EU affairs, but only three civil servants within the 
“European relations” unit assist both EACs. Other staff in departments handling conference 
organization or international relations certainly deal with EU affairs as well, but we did not 
count them, because competence distribution is not clear. The graph hereunder illustrates these 
proportions. 
Figure 79 : Number of parliamentary staff dedicated to EU affairs compared to total 
number of staff (in total), comparative assessment 
 
Notes: The number of staff in Austria does not include the departments A3.3 on conference organization and A3.4 
on international relations, because it is not clear who handles EU affairs. Both departments count 22 staff, some of 
them already counted as EU staff. In Finland, the number of staff counts both the staff in the EU-secretariat and 
the staff in the Foreign Affairs Committee. 
*Total number of parliamentary staff retrieved from annual parliamentary reports. The last known years are 2018 
for Luxembourg, 2017 for Austria and 2016 for Finland. 
**According to interviewees and parliamentary organigram 
 
On the EU level, all three parliaments established parliamentary representations. The 
Eduskunta can be seen as a forerunner, because it created its EU office in 1995 when Finland 
joined the EU. The Austrian parliament established its EU office in May 2005 and Luxembourg 
in January 2006 in the framework of its “European Strategy”. Surprisingly, the Luxembourg 
Chamber of Deputies once again adapted quite late to European Integration compared to the 
newer EU members.  
3
21
10
94
400
431
0 100 200 300 400 500
LU
AT
FI
Number of parliamentary staff dedicated to 
EU affairs
Total parliamentary staff* Staff dedicated to EU affairs**
389 
 
The above-mentioned proportions show that MPs in Luxembourg might rely mainly on 
their parliamentary administration for the preparation of EU dossiers, because the small size of 
parliamentary groups implies also that they have only one EU-collaborator (with the exception 
of the smallest groups) and no parliamentary assistants. Some parties established working 
groups on EU affairs, but depending on their size and own resources. Therefore, the lack of 
resources within parliamentary groups might force MPs to depend on the support of civil 
servants. Even though not directly illustrated by the graph, Finnish MPs also tend to rely more 
on the support of the GC Secretariat. Contrary to Luxembourg, the reason lies less in the lack 
of resources than in the fact that parliamentary groups decided to have few EU-collaborators, 
even though the size and resources of the groups are bigger than in the Luxembourg Chamber 
of Deputies. For instance, the KESK or the SDP have only one EU collaborator each. An 
explanation could be that EU affairs are treated in parliament like any other domestic matter 
and does not require reinforced support compared to other policy fields. Moreover, like in 
Luxembourg, some parties also created working groups on EU affairs that include MPs. In 
Austria, parliamentary groups and parties tend to be bigger and have more elaborated internal 
structures dealing with EU affairs. Parliamentary groups have pools of collaborators, with 
sometimes several staff dealing with EU affairs. 
In all cases, there is a close collaboration between parliamentary staff, group 
collaborators and MPs on decisions concerning the EACs agenda or information transfer on EU 
issues. The “European Unit” of the Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies and the GC Secretariat 
of the Eduskunta are responsible for the classification of EU documents and the management 
of the document tables. The administration can suggest putting specific issues on the EAC’s 
agenda, but the last decision lies between the hands of EAC members in the case of Luxembourg 
and the Speaker of parliament in the case of Finland. In the Eduskunta, the Head of the GC 
Secretariat has access to the parliament and the government database when he needs 
information on EU matters. In the Austrian National Council, parliamentary staff has more 
decisional and analytical competences. The units dealing with EU affairs have the possibility to 
draft ex-ante analyses before a matter is put on the EU-Main Committee’s agenda, but the final 
decision is taken together with the group speakers and collaborators. The Austrian Parliament 
has also a well-developed EU-database with dedicated staff.  
To conclude, we can notice that the strength of scrutiny infrastructures is quite nuanced 
between the three studied chambers. The Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies has the biggest 
proportion of parliamentary staff dedicated to EU affairs, but the least resources in personnel. 
Indeed, the total number of parliamentary staff is considerably lower in the Chamber of 
Deputies than in the other chambers, but the proportion of staff dealing with EU affairs is 
surprisingly higher. Parliamentary groups benefit only recently from EU-collaborators and a 
parliamentary representation in Brussels. The processing of information from the EU level is 
still complicated for Luxembourg MPs, because the small amount of specialised personnel does 
not permit them to go deeper into an issue. Moreover, specialised staff do not have analytical 
competencies just as in the Austrian National Council. They merely classify documents, but do 
not provide in-depth analyses on EU matters. Opposition MPs have fewer financial and 
personnel resources at their disposal, which limits their influence on the decision-making 
process. Without surprise, the Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies is therefore also the least 
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active of the three parliaments. On the contrary, the two other chambers have more personnel 
resources, but allocate them differently to EU affairs. In the National Council, several units deal 
with EU issues and have analytical competences. Parliamentary groups and parties are usually 
well equipped with staff focusing on EU policies. As parliamentary committees in the National 
Council have no committee secretariats, MPs are dependent on the combined support of the 
central parliamentary administration and their group’s staff. The Eduskunta has the smallest 
proportion of EU-dedicated staff and parliamentary groups do not have broad structures 
focusing on EU affairs. However, the Head of the GC Secretariat has privileged contacts with 
the ministries. Due to the decentralised scrutiny system, MPs are more inclined to scrutinise EU 
issues in sectoral committees, because they need to provide opinions requested by the GC. 
Overall, the Eduskunta has the scrutiny infrastructure that encourages the most mainstreaming 
of EU affairs.  
 
8.2.3 A comparative assessment of scrutiny procedures dedicated to EU affairs 
 
The Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies, the Austrian National Council and the Finnish 
Eduskunta have different scrutiny systems. The Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies has a 
document-based scrutiny system, which means that the parliament scrutinises mainly 
documents emanating from EU institutions and not government positions. The Austrian 
National Council scrutinises both documents from EU institutions and sometimes government 
positions. Even though it seems that the Austrian parliament has a document-based system, the 
mandating or procedural system is a more appropriate denomination according to answers given 
to the 8th COSAC bi-annual report545. Finland has a procedural system with some features of 
the document-based system, because the Eduskunta mainly scrutinises governmental 
negotiation positions with EU documents as background information.  
We identified two distinct groups of parliaments, as often classified in the literature546. 
On the one side the Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies with the least institutionalised scrutiny 
procedures, and on the other side the Austrian National Council as well as the Finnish 
Eduskunta with the most institutionalised procedures. In some aspects, the National Council 
only moderately implements its scrutiny rules, but remains a strong parliament. The lack of 
institutionalisation concerns especially rules on parliament-government cooperation. For 
instance, the Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies theoretically has the possibility to invite 
ministers before Council meetings, but does not use this tool because of schedule problems and 
probably of the fact that majority MPs already obtained the needed information from their 
ministers during prior informal party or group meetings. In Austria, binding mandates before 
Council meetings are barely applied, because negotiation results on the EU level might be less 
beneficial for Austria than without a mandate. Additionally, with regard to the ratification 
procedure of EU treaties, the Luxembourg Constitution remains vague and therefore Parliament 
 
545 COSAC, 2007, Eighth bi-annual report: Developments in European Union Procedures and Practices Relevant to 
Parliamentary Scrutiny  
546 See classifications of parliamentary scrutiny strength in EU affairs in Auel/Rozenberg/Tacea (2015), Bergman 
(1997), Karlas (2011), Winzen (2012). 
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approves treaties through the ordinary procedure. In the Finnish Eduskunta and Austrian 
National Council, the ratification procedure is strictly codified and institutionalised, because 
only a two-thirds majority can validate the ratification in parliament. The less institutionalised 
the scrutiny procedures, the less MPs might be able to influence the decision-making process. 
Indeed, blurred rules and absence of implementation give the government more negotiation 
power in EU affairs and thus fundamentally affects how parliament and government work 
together.  
The degree of institutionalisation of scrutiny systems also diverges on several other 
aspects: the extent of cooperation between parliament and government, the scope of information 
transfer from government to parliament, the autonomy level of EACs and the relation with 
MEPs. First, we observe that exchanges between parliament and government are more frequent 
and intense in Austria and Finland than in Luxembourg. The constant cooperation between 
MPs, parliamentary civil servants and ministries, be it in the pre-parliamentary arena or within 
parliament, ensures a high level of updated information on current processes. In Luxembourg, 
the memorandum on the cooperation between parliament and government on EU affairs was 
established only in 2009 and several rules are not implemented in practice. For instance, the 
memorandum states that sectoral committees dealing with EU issues can take the initiative to 
hear ministers on the EU dossiers547. In practice, the committees almost never invite ministers 
to discuss EU affairs. In theory, the Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies has a system of ex-ante 
and ex-post control of Council meetings. In practice, only the ex-post control is applied, to the 
extent that the responsible ministers are available to come to the EAC after the meetings.  
In the National Council and the Eduskunta, Council meetings are mainly scrutinised ex-
ante, with the possibility to give a mandate to the ministers. Therefore, contrary to Luxembourg, 
MPs are informed earlier on legislative proposals and EU documents. They have the possibility 
to take up a position and be proactive in the scrutiny process. Austria has several national laws 
that regulate precisely the scope and timing of information transfer from the government to 
parliament (EU-Informationsgesetz, 2011; ESM-Informationsordnung, 2014). Before Council 
meetings, the government must transfer all EU documents and information to the National 
Council. The government systematically sends explanatory memoranda on EU documents. The 
Federal Chancellor and the Foreign Affairs minister participate in the meetings of the EU-Main 
Committee to explain negotiation positions before Council meetings. The National Council can 
also establish “Firefighting” committees to stay in contact with the Federal Chancellor during 
European Council meetings.  
The Finnish Eduskunta has almost the same system. Indeed, even though no national 
law regulates the cooperation between parliament and government, the Eduskunta receives 
extensive and frequent information from the ministries. It focuses on ex-ante control with the 
possibility to bind ministers. Just as the Austrian National Council, the Eduskunta 
systematically receives explanatory memoranda from ministries before Council meetings. 
Moreover, ministers come to the GC before and after the meetings. GC members, especially the 
 
547 See Annex 3 RoP, Aide-Mémoire sur la coopération entre la Chambre des Députés et le Gouvernement du 
Grand-Duché de Luxembourg en matière de politique européenne, Section I.4. 
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GC Chair, stays in constant contact with the Prime Minister during European Council meetings 
and closely monitors the negotiation process. Compared to Luxembourg, Austrian and Finnish 
MPs obtain more frequent and direct governmental information, which enables them to affect 
the legislative process at a very early stage. Reversely, MPs in the Chamber of Deputies often 
react too late and remain passive towards their Government’s EU policy.  
Secondly, we can divide the parliaments according to the autonomy level and strength 
of their EACs. The Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies has the weakest EAC of the three cases, 
while the Austrian EU-Main Committee and the Finnish Grand Committee have similarly 
strong competences. In Luxembourg, the EAC’s large scope of competences differs from the 
rather specialised tasks of the Austrian and Finnish EACs. Moreover, while the EU-Main 
Committee and the Grand Committee can act on behalf of the plenary, the Luxembourg 
Committee on Foreign and European Affairs, Defence, Cooperation and Migration does not 
have the competence to do so. The procedure on reasoned opinions in the framework of the 
subsidiarity monitoring also shows differences in terms of committee strength. In the 
Luxembourg chamber, sectoral committees draft the reasoned opinions and send them directly 
to the plenary. In that case, the EAC plays only a limited role whenever matters do not fall into 
its competences.  
On the contrary, in the Austrian and Finnish chambers, the EACs act as coordination 
bodies for reasoned opinions. Therefore, they centralise the opinions of sectoral committees and 
draft a position that tries to represent the opinion of the whole chamber. In the National Council, 
EACs adopt reasoned opinions, with a consultative voice of sectoral committees when needed. 
In the Eduskunta, the GC centralises sectoral committees’ opinions to produce a unified 
position. Moreover, in Austria, the EU-Main Committee has substantial power in terms of 
agenda setting and redistribution of EU documents, while in Luxembourg and in Finland, 
respectively the President and Speaker of Parliament decide about the redistribution of 
documents among sectoral committees (Chamber of Deputies) and the drafting of opinions to 
the GC (Eduskunta). In all three cases, joint committee meetings between EACs and sectoral 
committees are almost non-existent. The diverging strength of EACs tells us more about their 
capacity to constrain the government. Once again, MPs in Luxembourg, especially EAC 
members, seem to have fewer opportunities to affect the EU legislative process than Austrian 
or Finnish MPs. 
Finally, the trends observed above seem to be reversed in the case of parliaments’ 
relation with the EU level, in particular MEPs. The Chamber of Deputies’ EAC invites them 
systematically in its meetings. Sectoral committees can also invite MEPs whenever EU issues 
are on their agenda. The RoP does not specify what kind of rights MEPs have within the 
Chamber of Deputies, which renders the practice quite flexible. MEPs also benefit from regular 
contacts with their affiliated parliamentary groups, as they have an office within the premises 
of their national party. The proximity of Luxembourg to Brussels facilitates frequent exchanges 
between MPs and MEPs. Just as in Luxembourg, Austrian affiliated parliamentary groups can 
invite their MEPs in EAC meetings or in group meetings. Therefore, interactions seem to be 
quite regular, even though more frequent at the group level than at the committee level. MEPs 
have a consultative voice both in the Austrian and Luxembourgish chambers. The Eduskunta 
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has stricter rules concerning MEPs, because they can only be invited in GC meetings as external 
experts.  
While in Luxembourg and Austria, MEPs benefit from special dedicated rules, the 
Finnish chamber does not recognise MEPs’ status in its internal rules. Subsequently, Finnish 
MEPs have the same rights as any other experts that would attend parliamentary hearings. The 
difference of treatment of MEPs on the national level is closely linked to parliaments’ 
perception of European integration and their role in EU affairs. Indeed, as said earlier, 
Luxembourg is a deeply pro-European country, which is reflected in the fact that MPs cooperate 
voluntarily with MEPs to obtain direct information from the EU level. On the contrary, the 
Eduskunta conceives its role independently from the EU level and focuses mainly on 
government control on the national level. Therefore, MEPs are not seen as an additional useful 
source of information for Finnish MPs. Here we can see again the difference between the 
mandating-based system in Finland that focuses primarily on government scrutiny and the 
document-based system in Luxembourg that emphasises the scrutiny of EU documents. 
Moreover, the close relation with MEPs in the Chamber of Deputies might also originate from 
the lack of domestic resources, which forces MPs to diversify their information sources. The 
table hereunder sums up the above-mentioned differences between the two types of scrutiny 
procedures. 
Table 23: Chambers’ scrutiny procedures in EU affairs 
 Chamber of Deputies, 
Luxembourg 
National Council, 
Austria 
Eduskunta, Finland 
Type of scrutiny system Document-based Mandating/procedural 
and document-based 
Mandating/procedural 
and aspects of document-
based 
Ratification procedure 
of EU treaties 
- Government informs 
the parliament on 
upcoming IGCs 
- Treaty ratification 
through ordinary 
procedure 
Two-thirds majority Two-thirds majority 
Control of government’s EU policy 
National law on 
cooperation between 
parliament and 
government on EU 
affairs 
Aide-Mémoire sur la 
coopération entre la 
Chambre des Députés et 
le Gouvernement du 
Grand-Duché de 
Luxembourg en matière 
de politique européenne, 
2009 
- EU-Informationsgesetz, 
2011 
- ESM-
Informationsordnung, 
2014 
No 
Type of government 
control for Council 
meetings 
Ex-ante (barely 
institutionalised) + ex-
post 
- Ex-ante + ex-post 
(rarely) 
- Binding mandates (in 
theory) 
- Ex-ante 
- Binding mandates 
Parliamentary control 
of Council meetings 
- Ministers come after 
the Council meetings 
- No explanatory 
memoranda 
- Federal Chancellor and 
FA Minister come before 
to the EU-HA 
- “Fire-Fighting” 
committee during 
Council meetings 
- Systematic ex-ante 
explanatory memoranda 
- Ministers come before 
and after Council 
meetings 
- Ad-hoc GC meetings 
during Council meetings 
- Systematic ex-ante 
explanatory memoranda 
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Strength of EAC within parliament 
EAC acts on behalf of 
plenary 
No Yes Yes 
Regulated procedure 
for reasoned opinions 
Sectoral committees 
draft opinions and 
transfer them to the 
plenary 
EACs adopt reasoned 
opinions with 
consultative voice of 
sectoral committees 
GC centralises sectoral 
committees’ opinions 
Redistribution of EU 
documents 
President of Parliament 
with suggestion from 
EAC 
EU-HA Parliament Speaker 
decides which sectoral 
committee gives opinion 
to GC or FA committee 
Joint committee 
meetings EAC/sectoral 
committees 
Rare Rare Rare 
Relation with EU level 
Contact between MPs 
and parliamentary EU 
representatives 
Rare Rare Rare 
Participation of MEPs 
in committee meetings 
- Systematically invited 
in EAC meetings 
- Can be invited in 
sectoral committees 
when EU issue on 
agenda 
- Invited in EAC 
meetings or sectoral 
committee meetings 
- Consultative voice 
- Invited in GC as 
external experts 
Source: Own summary based on national Constitutions, RoPs, national laws, interviews and secondary literature. 
8.2.4 Conclusion 
 
In this section, we focused on parliaments’ formal capacities as predetermining factors of 
parliamentary involvement. We observed that the Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies has the 
least rules, resources and institutionalised procedures to deal with EU affairs. On the contrary, 
the Austrian National Council and the Finnish Eduskunta are very similar cases, even though 
the latter implements more thoroughly its formal rules in practice. If we focus back on the 
rankings made by several authors such as Maurer/Wessels (2001), Maurer (2011) or Auel et al. 
(2015), we notice that our arguments correspond to the classifications made in the secondary 
literature. Maurer and Wessels have qualified the Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies as a “slow 
adapter” with a low scope of participation and reactive behaviour towards EU affairs. The 
Finnish and Austrian parliaments were described as “national players” focusing on government 
control, with a high scope of participation and an “anticipative, pro-active and institutionalized” 
way to handle EU affairs (Maurer/Wessels, 2001, p.68).  
We can confirm these elements through our analysis of each chamber’s legal bases, scrutiny 
infrastructure and procedures. We discovered that the degree of institutionalisation of the 
Luxembourg chamber was low compared to the other two chambers. Moreover, even though 
Luxembourg belonged to the founding countries of the EU, the parliament adapted very late to 
European integration, sometimes even later than the Austrian or Finnish parliaments. The 
analysis of the scrutiny procedures also showed that the Chamber of Deputies tends to get 
involved quite late in the EU decision-making process, while the other chambers have 
developed ex-ante practices. Auel et al. based their ranking on existing ones and measured 
parliamentary strength according to three criteria: timing and access to information, scrutiny 
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infrastructure and oversight (Auel/Rozenberg/Tacea, In: Hefftler/Neuhold/Rozenberg/Smith, 
2015).  
Once again, the Eduskunta occupied the first position in their ranking on institutional 
strength and parliamentary activity, while the National Council counted among the moderately 
strong parliaments due to lacking implementation of formal rules548. The Chamber of Deputies 
counted among the weakest in both categories. Overall, based on these criteria measuring the 
strength of parliaments’ scrutiny models, the authors described the Austrian National Council 
and the Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies as “debating arenas” and the Finnish Eduskunta as 
a “policy shaper”. Both the Austrian and Luxembourg chambers have been put in the same 
category, because plenary debates on EU issues play an important role compared to other 
parliaments in the EU. As the authors’ classification shows, both chambers receive ex-ante and 
ex-post information from the government and focus mainly on oral scrutiny instruments in 
plenaries.  
In terms of access to information, the Chamber of Deputies receives EU documents, but 
cannot react ex-ante to government positions because the latter are communicated only once 
negotiations have been concluded on the EU level. On the contrary, the Austrian and Finnish 
chambers scrutinise their governments’ positions before ministers participate in Council 
meetings. Their extensive ex-ante information rights makes them more proactive in EU affairs. 
For this reason, a classification of the Austrian scrutiny model as made by Auel et al. (In: 
Hefftler/Neuhold/Rozenberg/Smith, 2015) turns out to be more contrasted, because the 
chamber tends to be formally a “policy shaper”, but is in practice a “debating arena”. The 
Finnish Eduskunta is described as a “policy shaper”, because as our own research proved, the 
chamber focuses on ex-ante information received mainly by the Finnish Government. Just as 
the Austrian chamber, it can give mandates and binding opinions. Parliamentary activity in EU 
affairs is mainly concentrated in the EAC or sectoral committees (Rozenberg/Hefftler, In: 
Hefftler/Neuhold/Rozenberg/Smith, 2015). Moreover, the scrutiny infrastructure of each 
parliament shows that EACs have divergent levels of autonomy in terms of agenda setting and 
government control. The Chamber of Deputies has a quite weak EAC compared to the two other 
chambers. Indeed, the latter can take decisions instead of the plenary and bind ministers to a 
certain position. For instance, the Eduskunta focuses on the scrutiny of government positions 
and thus aims to exert more influence on the legislative process itself. 
Overall, the elements outlined in this section confirm the main rankings of Maurer/Wessels 
and Auel/Rozenberg/Tacea. The differences between the cases have a clear impact on 
parliamentary involvement. The more institutionalised and strongly regulated a scrutiny system 
is, the more MPs will be motivated to make use of their rights. Mainstreaming of EU affairs 
within parliaments also depends on parliaments’ formal capacities. Therefore, from an 
institutional point of view, we can say that mainstreaming seems to be more advanced in the 
Finnish Eduskunta than in the two other chambers. However, the analysis of MPs’ motivations 
 
548 Auel/Rozenberg/Tacea, Chapter 3: Fighting back? And, If So, How? Measuring Parliamentary Strength and 
Activity in EU Affairs, In: Hefftler/Neuhold/Rozenberg/Smith, The Palgrave Handbook of National Parliaments 
and the European Union, 2015. 
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will show later on that parliamentary strength in EU affairs can be relative, because strong 
institutional settings do not systematically mean strong motivations to get involved in EU 
matters. 
 
8.3 Comparison of parliamentary activity during EU and intergovernmental treaty 
negotiations 
 
The present section focuses on one of the two components of parliamentary involvement, 
namely parliamentary activity. We will first compare the activity levels in all three parliaments 
and check if there is a link with the salience level of the studied treaties. In a second part, we 
focus on MPs’ motivations as drivers of parliamentary activity. 
 
8.3.1 Evolution of parliamentary activity from 2002 to 2015 
 
Parliamentary activity during EU and intergovernmental treaty negotiations can best be 
illustrated through the analysis of the evolution of EAC meetings and parliamentary questions 
on EU affairs. Evolutionary trends are quite similar in all three cases and are linked both to the 
salience level of the treaties, but also to national legislative elections. Indeed, if we compare the 
evolution of EAC meetings between 2002 and 2015, we see that the lowest number of meetings 
in the graph correspond most of the time to parliamentary elections on the national level. Treaty 
negotiations correspond each time to higher numbers of EAC meetings, even though the latter 
are not systematically examining treaties in their agenda. The graph below assesses the 
evolution of EAC meetings in each parliament. 
Figure 80: Comparative evolution of EAC meetings (in total) 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
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The green arrows show national legislative elections in Luxembourg, Austria and 
Finland. We observe that each time elections were organised, the number of EAC meetings 
dropped. Therefore, we can affirm that in all three cases, national events played a significant 
role in parliamentary activity. Overall, the number of EAC meetings were lower in the Austrian 
National Council compared to the Chamber of Deputies or the Eduskunta, because the EU-Main 
Committee meets on average once per month. The EACs of the other chambers meet once per 
week on average. Moreover, both tend to first centralise EU matters before delegating them to 
sectoral committees, which can explain why they meet more often. We observe as well that 
fluctuations seem to be very similar between EU-HA/EU-UA and GC meetings until the 
economic crisis, while the EAC of the Chamber of Deputies followed a different trend (in 
orange). Specifically, while EAC meetings increased in Luxembourg during discussions on the 
Constitutional Treaty (2004-2005), they decreased in Finland and Austria. The drastic increase 
of EAC meetings in the Chamber of Deputies does not indicate that the committee’s agenda 
focused on the treaty itself, but is indicative of a potential influence of the European context on 
parliamentary activity. In the case of the Lisbon Treaty, we note that all three EACs met more 
often in 2007-2008, before a drop in Luxembourg and Austria around national legislative 
elections, respectively at the beginning of 2009 and late 2008. Finally, the evolution of EAC 
meetings during the economic crisis were more similar between Luxembourg and Austria, while 
Finland stood out. Indeed, EAC meetings dropped in 2010-2011 before the national legislative 
elections, while they increased in the Chamber of Deputies and the National Council.  
In particular, if we now focus on the number of committee meetings that were 
specifically dedicated to each treaty within the chambers, we see that the number of committee 
meetings decreases continuously over time, while plenary debates fluctuate between each 
treaty. Indeed, in the three chambers, committees met more often to discuss the Constitutional 
Treaty than the other studied treaties. The most noticeable feature of the graph below is the 
significantly higher number of committee meetings in the Finnish Eduskunta. The main 
explanation is that almost all sectoral committees were directly involved in the discussions, 
while in the Chamber of Deputies and the National Council only the EACs and the 
Constitutional Affairs committees handled the treaty. Moreover, compared to the other treaties, 
the Constitutional Treaty was examined over a longer period of time, which thus involved more 
often parliamentary committees. 
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Figure 81: Comparative evolution of committee meetings on EU treaties and 
intergovernmental treaties on the EMU (in total) 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
Notes: CT = Constitutional Treaty; LT = Lisbon Treaty 
 
In the context of the Lisbon Treaty, the lower number of committee meetings probably 
shows the fatigue of MPs after the failure of the Constitutional Treaty and thus the lower interest 
for the treaty. During the economic crisis, plenary debates seemed to be more popular, 
especially in the Finnish Eduskunta. The main reason lies in the fact that the True Finns used 
the plenary as an arena to publicise their sceptical position in order to attract voters’ attention, 
because committee meetings are not public. The opposition used the plenary as a means to 
influence the government’s position on the ESM and the TSCG.  
More than committee meetings, parliamentary questions are indicative of how often 
MPs use scrutiny tools to control their government’s EU policy. Again, fluctuations are quite 
similar between the three cases, with a major difference during discussions on the Lisbon 
Treaty, as illustrated below. 
Figure 82: Comparative evolution of PQs on EU affairs (in total), 2003-2015 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
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The red circles indicate the periods of discussions on each treaty. Overall, we observe 
that Austrian MPs submitted more questions on EU affairs over the whole period than the rest. 
During negotiations on the Constitutional Treaty, we observe that the number of parliamentary 
questions on EU affairs grew in all three parliaments. Austrian MPs submitted an even higher 
number of questions on EU affairs around the Lisbon Treaty, while MPs in Luxembourg and 
Finland submitted the least questions. During the economic crisis, the number of submitted 
questions on EU affairs decreased slightly in all three parliaments, even though MPs followed 
the European context with more concern. Finnish MPs seemed to have focused more on the 
2010-2011 period, which corresponds to the context of financial help packages to Greece, Spain 
and Portugal. Overall, the evolution of the percentage of parliamentary questions on EU affairs 
compared to the total number of questions was somewhat similar between the cases. 
Figure 83: Comparative evolution of the percentage of PQs on EU affairs, 2003-2015 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
Within the three chambers, the percentage of questions on EU affairs increased in the 
framework of the Constitutional Treaty (2004-2006) and during the Lisbon Treaty with the 
exception of Finland (2008-2009). The context of the economic crisis also shows an increase in 
the percentage of questions, with the exception of Austria in 2011-2012. Even though we cannot 
establish a straightforward correlation between the treaties and the proportion of questions on 
EU affairs, fluctuations observed above seem to indicate that the context of treaty negotiations 
affected parliamentary activity in the three studied chambers. 
If we compare in particular the proportion of parliamentary questions on each treaty 
compared to the total number of questions on EU affairs, we observe that Luxembourgish MPs 
submitted the highest proportion of parliamentary questions on the Constitutional Treaty549. 
The main explanation could be the organisation of the national referendum on the treaty, which 
fuelled more attention than the Constitutional Treaty itself. Indeed, most of the questions dealt 
with the referendum (see chapter 5). In the National Council and the Eduskunta, the proportion 
 
549 Own calculations based on parliamentary questions retrieved from parliaments’ reports and databases. Detailed 
information can be found in chapters 6, 7 and 8. 
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of questions asked on the Constitutional Treaty was low, probably because of the rather large 
consensus prevailing between the parties at that time, but also the fact that the amount of 
questions on EU affairs was significantly higher than in Luxembourg. Therefore, the order of 
magnitude represented a challenge in the calculation of the proportion of questions on EU 
treaties and intergovernmental treaties on the EMU. 
During negotiations on the Lisbon Treaty, the proportion of questions dropped in 
Luxembourg because of a lack of interest for the treaty after the tiring referendum campaign in 
2005. On the contrary, the number of questions on the Lisbon Treaty increased in the National 
Council and the Finnish Eduskunta. However, proportionally speaking, the increase in the 
National Council was only minimal, because the amount of questions on EU affairs was 
significantly higher in 2007-2009 than in 2003-2005, while the number of questions on the 
Lisbon Treaty itself barely grew. In the Eduskunta, the number of questions on EU affairs 
decreased substantially in 2007-2009 compared to 2003-2006, while the number of questions 
on the Lisbon Treaty was similar to those on the Constitutional Treaty. The different order of 
magnitude explains why proportionally there were more questions on the Lisbon Treaty 
compared to parliamentary questions on EU affairs. Surprisingly, the context of the economic 
crisis did not lead to a higher percentage of questions on the ESM and the TSCG. On the 
contrary, MPs’ use of questions stagnated in the Chamber of Deputies, increased very slightly 
in the National Council and decreased dramatically in the Eduskunta. While we can explain the 
increase in Austria with the fact that the FPÖ made more use of questions to scrutinise the 
government, MPs’ behaviour in Finland can be explained by the fact that they favoured other 
types of scrutiny instruments: committee opinions and dissenting opinions. 
Based on the analysis of parliamentary activity, we will now check if there is any 
correlation between the salience level of each treaty and parliamentary activity in the three 
chambers. With parliamentary activity, we mean here the number of committee and plenary 
meetings combined with the usage level of scrutiny tools such as parliamentary questions, 
motions, resolutions or interpellations. The Constitutional Treaty was salient only for the 
Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies, because MPs transformed a European issue into a national 
priority: the organisation of a referendum. Within the Chamber of Deputies, as outlined above, 
parliamentary activity on the treaty was high. MPs used several scrutiny tools less to control 
their government than to ask for additional information. The treaty’s salience seemed to have 
affected parliamentary activity. Within the National Council and the Eduskunta, the 
Constitutional Treaty was only moderately salient. While parliamentary activity was 
accordingly low in the National Council, Finnish MPs were very active despite the low salience 
of the treaty. Here, we cannot clearly say that salience and parliamentary activity are linked, 
because the Finnish case proves the contrary. The main explanatory factor could be the scrutiny 
system itself, which is designed in a way to encourage all sectoral committees to participate in 
the scrutiny of EU affairs, no matter their salience. Therefore, the amount of committee opinions 
and dissenting opinions was high because the procedure was decentralised. In all three cases, 
there was no sign of ideological polarisation between parties. On the contrary, the Lisbon Treaty 
did not attract much attention within the Chamber of Deputies due to its similarity with the 
failed Constitutional Treaty and the general fatigue in the aftermath of the 2005 referendum 
campaign. Finnish MPs did not pay as much attention to the Lisbon Treaty as well, probably 
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because several domestic issues distracted them from the European level (see chapter 7). In 
both cases, the low salience level was also reflected in parliamentary activity, which was quite 
moderate. On the contrary, the FPÖ’s shift into the opposition in Austria explains why the 
Lisbon Treaty was particularly salient in the National Council. The higher salience of the treaty 
can thus be linked to the growing polarisation between Austrian parties. Consequently, MPs 
were actively scrutinising their government’s EU policy. 
Finally, the economic crisis including the ESM and TSCG were very salient in all three 
countries, but for different reasons. In Luxembourg, MPs were worried about the future of their 
financial place, as well as the budgetary competences of their parliament. However, even though 
political tensions grew within parliament, polarisation trends remained non-existent. The 
absence of political competition and clear ideological gaps was reflected in parliamentary 
activity. Both majority and opposition MPs scrutinised only moderately the treaties in the 
Chamber of Deputies. In Austria and Finland, Eurosceptic opposition MPs fuelled heated 
debates on parliamentary sovereignty and the need to include citizens in the decisions. The 
polarisation of opinions between opponents and proponents of the ESM and the TSCG attracted 
general attention on the treaties and increased their salience on the national level. However, the 
salience of both treaties affected parliamentary activity differently. In the National Council, 
MPs from both the Eurosceptic and pro-European opposition actively scrutinised their 
government. Within the Eduskunta, PS MPs were the sole scrutinisers, while the broad majority 
supported the government and abstained from using scrutiny tools. Therefore, the correlation 
applies only for the National Council in the case of the economic crisis. The table hereunder 
sums up our findings. 
Table 24: Activity level in the three chambers during treaty negotiations related to their 
salience and ideological polarisation 
 Chamber of Deputies, 
Luxembourg 
National Council, 
Austria 
Eduskunta, Finland 
Constitutional Treaty 
Salience High Moderate Moderate 
Polarisation Low Low Low 
Activity level High Low High 
Lisbon Treaty 
Salience Low High Low 
Polarisation Low Moderate Low 
Activity level Moderate High Moderate 
ESM/TSCG 
Salience High High High 
Polarisation Low High High 
Activity level Moderate High Moderate 
Source: Own calculations. 
We observe here that countries’ positions on European integration combined with the 
nature of their political systems (consensual vs conflictual) determined MPs’ salience 
perception of the respective treaties. However, salience was not the main determiner of the level 
of parliamentary activity during EU and intergovernmental treaty negotiations, but played a 
significant role. The motivations behind parliamentary activity show that political dynamics 
and sociodemographic factors were the two main explanatory factors in all three cases, 
determining at the same time how salient a treaty would become on the national level. 
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8.3.2 Main explanatory factors of parliamentary activity during EU treaties and 
intergovernmental treaties on the EMU 
 
After the comparative analysis of the strength of scrutiny systems, we will outline 
political dynamics within and outside parliaments, but also MPs’ sociological profiles, because 
we assume that they significantly affected parliamentary activity.  
Parliamentary culture: majority/opposition dynamics on EU affairs 
As seen earlier, political dynamics within parliament or parliamentary culture as March 
and Olsen call it550, depend on the type of political system in each country, but also on the 
ideological distance between the parties and the general government-parliament relations. 
We saw that Luxembourg kept its consociational and consensus-based system on EU affairs 
throughout the period under analysis, while Austria and Finland became more competitive. 
These trends are therefore also reflected in the way government parties interact with the 
opposition in parliament. Overall, in all three parliaments, the government narrowly supervised 
discussions on the four treaties. Firstly, MPs from coalition parties had a better access to 
information than opposition parties. In addition to the official information transferred from the 
government to parliament, majority MPs benefit from direct contacts with their ministers. 
Indeed, the latter participate in group and party meetings, providing useful information during 
informal exchanges. Moreover, the larger size of majority groups provides them with more 
financial and personnel resources that give them an advantage in terms of influence capacities. 
MPs receive ex-ante information and have more time to deal with EU dossiers. They also benefit 
from expert support from ministries, while opposition MPs have to rely on their own resources 
or external support from the civil society, the media or Constitutional Courts. During treaty 
ratification processes, the government usually obtained support from a large majority in 
parliament, be it from its own majority or the additional support of the pro-European opposition. 
The only exception was the vote in the National Council on the ESM, which requested the 
support of an additional opposition group so that the majority could ratify the treaty with the 
two-thirds majority rule. In all three cases, governmental coalitions were so largely represented 
in parliament that opposition had almost no chance to counteract the governments’ ratification 
proposals. 
Secondly, governments could systematically rely on their majorities in parliament 
through their affiliated committee chairpersons. Indeed, in the Chamber of Deputies, the EAC 
chair occupied his position during the period under analysis and came from the majority party 
LSAP. During the scrutiny of the ESM and the TSCG, the chair of the Finance Committee came 
from the coalition party CSV. Within the National Council, both ÖVP and SPÖ shared the 
chairs of the EACs and the Finance Committee. During negotiations on the Constitutional 
Treaty, the ÖVP chaired both EACs, ensuring the pro-European government line in parliament. 
During discussions on the Lisbon Treaty, the majority party SPÖ chaired the EU-Main 
 
550 March and Olsen (1998) characterise parliamentary culture as relations between parliamentary actors, that can 
be either consensual or conflictual. 
403 
 
Committee, while the ÖVP chaired the EU Sub-Committee. The Finnish Parliament is the only 
case that had a GC chair from the opposition party KOK during negotiations on the 
Constitutional Treaty and from the SDP during negotiations on the Lisbon Treaty. The majority 
party SDP chaired the Foreign Affairs Committee until 2007. After 2007, the SDP chaired the 
GC until the economic crisis. Even though in the opposition, we can assume that the SDP’s pro-
European agenda still strengthened the Government’s EU policy. The majority party KOK 
chaired both the Foreign Affairs Committee and the Finance Committee during discussions on 
the ESM and TSCG. Overall, we observe that pro-European parties from the majority or parties 
used to participate in coalitions (in Finland) kept control over discussions on the treaties. 
Through chairmanships in the key committees dealing with the treaties, government parties also 
affect the general direction of the discussions. Therefore, parliamentary activity is impacted in 
the sense that majority MPs know that their influence is considerable through the control of the 
most renowned committees in parliament. Their attitude remains passive towards government 
positions, because their large majority secures the needed support. Opposition MPs have to find 
other channels of influence and scrutiny tools to affect decisions.  
Thirdly, the nomination of rapporteurs on each treaty also demonstrates the 
government’s influence on parliamentary discussions. With the exception of the Eduskunta, the 
Chamber of Deputies and the National Council chose rapporteurs for all the treaties. In the 
Finnish parliamentary system, single MPs do not draft reports, rather whole committees with 
the help of the parliamentary administration. Therefore, the committee chairs mostly exert the 
influence on committee reports. In the Chamber of Deputies, an LSAP MP was responsible to 
draft reports on the ratification laws of the Constitutional Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty. The 
CSV nominated one rapporteur for both the ESM and the TSCG. Within the National Council, 
the ÖVP and the SPÖ shared once again rapporteurships. ÖVP MPs were responsible to draft 
the reports on the ratification law of the Constitutional Treaty and the ESM, while SPÖ MPs 
drafted reports on the Lisbon Treaty and the TSCG. Both in the Luxembourg and Austrian 
chambers, groups from the governmental majority closely monitored the treaties through their 
rapporteurs. The following table sums up our findings concerning committee chairmanships 
and rapporteurships on the treaties per parliament. 
Table 25: Committee chairmanships and rapporteurships on the treaties per chamber 
 Chamber of Deputies, 
Luxembourg 
National Council, 
Austria 
Eduskunta, Finland 
Committee chairmanships during treaty negotiations 
Constitutional Treaty EAC: LSAP (majority) EU-HA*: ÖVP 
(majority) 
EU-UA**: ÖVP 
(majority) 
GC: KOK (opposition) 
FA: SDP (majority) 
Lisbon Treaty EAC: LSAP (majority) EU-HA: SPÖ (majority) 
EU-UA: ÖVP (majority) 
GC: SDP (opposition) 
ESM/TSCG EAC: LSAP (majority) 
COMFI: CSV (majority) 
EU-HA: SPÖ (majority) 
EU-UA: ÖVP (majority) 
COMFI: ÖVP (majority) 
GC: SDP (majority) 
FA: KOK (majority) 
COMFI: KOK (majority) 
Rapporteurships on EU treaties and intergovernmental treaties on the EMU 
Constitutional Treaty LSAP  (majority) ÖVP (majority) Committee reports 
Lisbon Treaty LSAP (majority) SPÖ (majority) Committee reports 
ESM/TSCG CSV (majority) ESM: ÖVP (majority) 
TSCG: SPÖ (majority) 
Committee reports 
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Notes: * EU-HA: EU-Main Committee 
**EU-UA : EU-Sub Committee 
Source : Own calculations. 
 
If we analyse now in detail who was more active during treaty negotiations, we conclude 
without surprise that it was mostly opposition MPs. A reason for this is the fact that majority 
MPs already benefitted from an information advantage and largely supported governmental 
positions. Moreover, as discussed earlier, the involvement level of opposition and majority MPs 
also depended on the salience level of each treaty. The higher the salience of a treaty, the higher 
the polarisation of ideological positions. The opposite is also true. Indeed, the more an EU issue 
polarises parties and the more competitive the party relations become, the more opposition MPs 
will try to influence the decision-making process in parliament. As we explained in the first 
section of this chapter, the activity level of majority and opposition MPs depended highly on 
how consensual or competitive the political system became in each country. At this stage, we 
have to specify that the composition itself of majority and opposition forces, as well as the 
relations between them, continuously changed in each country over the period under analysis. 
Therefore, political dynamics were never the same from one legislative period to another. 
In the Chamber of Deputies, majority and opposition used scrutiny tools alternatively 
depending on the treaty and the level of consensus among parties. During discussions on the 
Constitutional Treaty, both majority and opposition MPs equally used scrutiny tools, but only 
to ask for information from the government. The ideological proximity between most parties 
was higher with respect to the Constitutional Treaty than the other treaties. At that time, pro-
European parties such as the CSV and the LSAP still dominated the political landscape and 
were supported by a predominantly pro-European opposition. The highly consensual 
atmosphere on EU affairs in 2004-2005 explains why single majority MPs had more leeway to 
scrutinise their own government. The absence of political tensions encouraged single majority 
MPs to follow personal motives by setting aside their political affiliation. Pro-European 
opposition MPs were the most active government scrutinisers during the Lisbon Treaty, again 
without the aim to harshly criticise the government. At that time, the sovereignist party ADR 
started to criticise more systematically the institutional changes ensuing from the Lisbon Treaty, 
but they were facing a large pro-European majority composed of the CSV, LSAP, DP and Déi 
Gréng. During the economic crisis, both pro-European and sovereignist opposition MPs used 
scrutiny instruments. This time, ideological divergences appeared between ADR, Déi Gréng 
and coalition MPs, but also within the LSAP-CSV coalition. The growing tensions forced 
majority MPs to observe group discipline and limit government scrutiny. On the contrary, 
speeches in plenary debates on all the treaties did not show any clear domination of the majority 
over the opposition. Rather, debates showed the predominance of pro-European positions, be 
they from the majority or the opposition, thereby reflecting Luxembourg’s deeply rooted 
consensual political system. Over the period under analysis, successive coalition governments 
stayed the same and followed the same political line on EU affairs, despite some disagreements 
during the ESM and the TSCG. 
Within the National Council, the composition of majority and opposition were quite 
fluctuant between 2004 and 2015. Overall, the distinction between opposition and majority was 
clearer in the Austrian Parliament. During discussions on the Constitutional Treaty, the 
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opposition was composed only of pro-European groups, while the Eurosceptic FPÖ was in the 
majority. This explains why pro-European opposition MPs were the most active scrutinisers. 
The ÖVP-FPÖ coalition was split between 1999 and 2005 on EU policies. The FPÖ gradually 
strengthened its Eurosceptic discourse. While the party agreed on future EU-enlargements 
under specific conditions in its electoral programme in 2002551, it rejected Turkeys’ accession 
in its 2004 electoral programme for the European elections. Despite growing ideological 
divergences within the coalition and with the pro-European opposition, the FPÖ voted in favour 
of the Constitutional Treaty, probably under the political pressure of its coalition partner. When 
the FPÖ shifted into opposition after 2005, the dynamics changed and subsequently 
parliamentary involvement. Indeed, FPÖ and BZÖ MPs were the most active scrutinisers of the 
Lisbon Treaty, the ESM and the TSCG. Ideological polarisation and political tensions grew 
between pro-Europeans and Eurosceptics. While pro-European opposition MPs tended to 
support the coalition, the Eurosceptic FPÖ repeatedly used the scrutiny tools to criticise the 
government and requested to respect Austria’s sovereignty and neutrality. At some occasions, 
single majority MPs submitted questions, resolutions and motions on all treaties. However, the 
amount of scrutiny tools used by single majority MPs diminished during the economic crisis in 
a context of higher political tensions with the Eurosceptic opposition. Even within the SPÖ-
ÖVP coalition, ideological divergences started to appear during the economic crisis. The TSCG 
fuelled harsh criticism on the side of the SPÖ and the Greens on the scope of the austerity 
measures. The pro-European camp composed of the SPÖ, ÖVP and the Greens, which usually 
agreed unanimously on the previous treaties, became divided on the TSCG. While the 
successive coalitions could count on large support from the pro-European opposition552, this 
support became less obvious with the TSCG. The increased polarisation between the parties 
pushed the Greens to scrutinise more often the government and to express their discontent 
through parliamentary motions. The loss of the Greens’ backing put a strain on the legitimacy 
of the SPÖ-ÖVP’s EU policy. In the end, the SPÖ voted in favour of the TSCG, probably for 
the same reason as the FPÖ on the Constitutional Treaty: to artificially maintain the credibility 
of the government.  
Majority and opposition forces changed substantially from one legislative period to the 
other, due to the pluralist political system in Finland. From 2003 until 2015, pro-European 
parties were largely represented in government and in the parliamentary majority. The 
opposition was constituted mostly of the Eurosceptic PS and some pro-European parties such 
as the VIHR or KOK, which switched in and out of new coalition formations during the studied 
period. Discussions on the Constitutional Treaty in the Finnish Eduskunta centred on the 
potential organisation of a national referendum supported both by the pro-European and 
Eurosceptic opposition. At that time, the KESK and SD represented the pro-European majority, 
while the pro-European KOK landed in the opposition. The ideological closeness of all the 
parties on EU affairs facilitated consensus and compromises on the Constitutional Treaty. 
Single MPs from time to time submitted dissenting opinions in a bid to express their 
 
551 FPÖ, Programm 2002, Wir gestalten Österreich mit Sicherheit 
552 Under the ÖVP-FPÖ coalition until 2005, the SPÖ and the Greens supported any initiatives towards deeper 
European integration and welcomed the Constitutional Treaty. Under the SPÖ-ÖVP coalition from 2005-2013, 
the Greens supported the Lisbon Treaty and the ESM. 
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disagreement with a majority-led committee opinion. However, these opinions did not have a 
big impact on parliamentary activity. The Lisbon Treaty and the economic crisis triggered more 
activity among Eurosceptic opposition MPs. In particular, the higher polarisation of opinions 
on the ESM and the TSCG encouraged the PS to become more active. After the 2011 elections, 
the PS gained substantial seats in parliament, but also faced a larger coalition composed of the 
biggest pro-European parties in Finland. The substantial popularity gain of the PS pushed its 
MPs to get involved in a campaign of criticism against the Finnish Government. These evolving 
trends are also reflected in plenary debates. While majority MPs controlled discussions on the 
Constitutional Treaty, the gradual growth of the PS and the increasing scepticism towards EU 
and intergovernmental treaties led to the predominance of Eurosceptic opposition MPs in 
plenary debates. Moreover, ideological divergences also appeared within the ruling coalition. 
The SDP and the VAS distanced themselves from the government position on financial help 
packages before joining the coalition, but also on the ESM once they joined the government. 
However, contrary to the PS, all government parties were tied to their long-lasting pro-European 
position, which prevented them of overtly blaming the EU and reject the treaties (Salo, 2018).  
In sum, the rise of Eurosceptic oppositions in Austria and Finland destabilised 
ideologically pro-European mainstream parties and led to growing disagreements within 
coalitions. The internal political divergences in coalitions formed of pro-European parties, as 
well as growing dissent among the pro-European opposition towards their government, were 
triggered by anti-EU discourses of populist parties. Mainstream parties had to adapt their 
discourses and attitude to the emerging Eurosceptic sentiment. However, they were not able to 
harshly criticise the EU just like the FPÖ or PS did because of their long-established pro-
European political stance. The loss of credibility of Austrian and Finnish governments during 
the economic crisis gave Eurosceptic MPs the floor in parliament. Majority MPs became more 
passive, because they were focused on supporting their coalition in a bid to save their 
government’s crumbling legitimacy in EU politics. Therefore, this behaviour is reflected in 
parliamentary activity, especially in the Austrian National Council and the Finnish Eduskunta. 
The table hereunder summarises our findings on the dominant players of parliamentary activity 
during EU and intergovernmental treaty negotiations. The analysis of the table should take into 
account the changing political landscapes outlined above. Indeed, majorities and oppositions 
were not identical from one treaty to the other. 
Table 26: Comparative assessment of the role of majority and opposition in parliamentary 
activity during each studied treaty  
 Constitutional Treaty Lisbon Treaty ESM/TSCG 
Chamber of Deputies, Luxembourg 
Composition majority 
vs opposition 
Majority: CSV, LSAP 
Opposition: DP, ADR, 
Déi Gréng 
Majority: CSV, LSAP 
Opposition: DP, ADR, 
Déi Gréng 
Majority : CSV, LSAP 
Opposition : DP, ADR, 
Déi Gréng, Déi Lénk 
Scrutiny tools Majority + Opposition Pro-European opposition Opposition (pro-
European and 
sovereignist) 
Plenary debates Majority + Opposition Majority + Opposition Majority + Opposition 
National Council, Austria 
Composition majority 
vs opposition 
Majority: ÖVP, FPÖ-
BZÖ 
Opposition: SPÖ, Grüne 
Majority: SPÖ, ÖVP 
Opposition: FPÖ, BZÖ, 
Grüne 
Majority: SPÖ, ÖVP 
Opposition: FPÖ, Grüne 
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Scrutiny tools Pro-European opposition Eurosceptic opposition Eurosceptic + Pro-
European opposition 
Plenary debates Pro-European opposition Eurosceptic opposition Eurosceptic opposition 
Eduskunta, Finland 
Composition majority 
vs opposition 
Majority: KESK, SD, 
SFP 
Opposition: KOK, PS, 
VAS, VIHR, KD 
Majority: KESK, KOK, 
VIHR, SFP 
Opposition: SD, VIHR, 
VAS, PS, KD 
Majority: KOK, SD, 
VAS, VIHR, SFP, KD 
Opposition: KESK, PS 
Scrutiny tools Pro-European + 
Eurosceptic opposition 
Eurosceptic opposition Eurosceptic opposition 
Plenary debates Majority Majority + Opposition Eurosceptic opposition 
Source: Own calculations. 
The nature of the treaties seemed to affect parliamentary involvement. Luxembourgish 
MPs were generally in favour of European integration and did not question the EU treaties on 
the institutional functioning of the EU. Some tensions started to appear on the 
intergovernmental treaties regarding the solidarity question, but stayed at the level of mere 
controversial debates rather than real political conflicts. In Austria, the Lisbon Treaty, but also 
the ESM and the TSCG, had considerable implications for two elements that Eurosceptic 
opposition MPs cherished: the country’s sovereignty and neutrality. In light of these 
observations, it is not surprising that the FPÖ and BZÖ proactively criticised these treaties and 
increased their parliamentary participation. The intergovernmental help packages also raised 
doubts among the coalition partners SPÖ and ÖVP, as well as the usually pro-European Greens. 
The last treaties put a strain on political relations within the pro-European majority. Just as in 
Austria, the Finnish Eurosceptic opposition started to see the Lisbon Treaty as a threat to 
Finland’s sovereignty. The ESM and the TSCG represented even bigger threats due to their 
intergovernmental nature and the imperative for Finland to contribute financially to the 
European solidarity principle. 
Thus, we observe that there is a close link between the salience level of treaties, 
ideological polarisation (depending on MPs’ position on the political spectrum) and 
parliamentary activity.  Therefore, we can confirm hypothesis H1 for our cases. Indeed, the 
stronger the consensual features of a political system, the less there is ideological polarisation 
and the more majority and opposition MPs get equally involved (example: Luxembourg). Both 
camps agree on similar positions and majority MPs scrutinise their own government for 
personal instead of political reasons. Reversely, the higher the competitive nature of a political 
system, the more polarised it becomes and the bigger the gap and tensions between the majority 
and opposition (example: Austria and Finland). In that case, group discipline seems to play a 
bigger role and MPs tend to keep to their own side of the political spectrum. Eurosceptic 
opposition MPs use the scrutiny instruments more “aggressively” to criticise the government, 
while majority MPs and pro-European opposition MPs support the coalition partners. 
Socio-demographic characteristics 
The second explanatory factor of parliamentary activity and influence on the salience 
perception of treaties is MPs’ motivations originating from their sociological profiles. Firstly, 
we will analyse the general features of EAC members compared to the rest of the chambers, 
assuming that EACs are generally more active in EU affairs. Secondly, we will analyse in detail 
the profile of key players who followed the four treaties in each chamber. The analysis bases 
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on interviews with MPs and former MPs, as well as biographies available on each parliament’s 
website or archives. For each treaty, we selected the most active key players according to 
minutes of committee and plenary debates, when available. Sociological features help us 
understand what type of players were involved in EU and intergovernmental treaty negotiations 
and for which reasons. 
General socio-demographic features observed during the last legislative period 
Overall, indicators such as MPs’ length of mandate, their experience in government or 
the distribution of local functions help understanding the professionalisation level of EAC 
members in each chamber, as well as their predisposition to get interested in EU affairs. We 
assume that the more professionalised an MP, i.e. the longer his/her mandate, the more the MP 
will be familiar with parliamentary practices, will have accumulated political experience and 
thus will be detached from pure re-election-oriented prospects. Therefore, senior MPs would be 
more prone to get involved in EU affairs despite their low attractiveness for voters. 
If we compare the length of parliamentary mandates in each chamber, we see that MPs 
in the Chamber of Deputies tend to have slightly more recent mandates, with 33 MPs exerting 
their first or second mandate and 27 MPs exerting their third or more mandate by the legislative 
period 2013-2018553. A similar trend can be observed in the Eduskunta, where a substantial 
proportion of MPs exert recent mandates. 117 MPs exerted their first or second mandate and 83 
MPs exerted their third or more mandate by the legislative period 2015-2019. The high 
proportion of recent MPs can be explained by the success of the PS during the 2015 legislative 
elections and its entrance in parliament for the first time as a majority party. Within the Austrian 
National Council, MPs had a higher seniority in parliament by the legislative period 2013-2017. 
Indeed, 66 MPs exerted their first or second mandate, while 117 MPs exerted their third or more 
mandate. Therefore, we can say that the Austrian National Council seemed to be more 
professionalised during the last legislative period than the two other chambers. If we now 
compare the general length of mandates with mandates of EAC members, we observe diverging 
trends between our three cases. The graph below illustrates the comparison between the length 
of mandates of EAC members compared to the whole parliament in each country. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
553 Own calculations based on MPs’ biographical data available on parliament’s website. 
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Figure 84: Comparison of MPs' length of parliamentary mandates* in EAC compared to 
the rest of the parliament (in total) 
 
Source: Own calculations.  
*The length of parliamentary mandates was calculated based on data available during the last legislative periods 
for each parliament as of 2018. In Luxembourg, we took the legislative period of 2013-2018; in Austria we took 
the legislative period of 2013-2017; in Finland, we took the legislative period of 2015-2019. Therefore, the data 
might show different trends compared to parliaments’ composition during EU and intergovernmental treaty 
negotiations. 
 
Within the Chamber of Deputies, more than half of the 15 EAC members exerted their 
third or more mandate by 2013. Among MPs that exerted more than 3 mandates in the Chamber 
of Deputies, 36,4% came from the EAC554. Thus, senior MPs tend to be more represented in 
the EAC than recently elected MPs. The professionalisation level of Austrian EAC members is 
also higher than the average. Among the 25 EU-Main Committee members, 13 have been in 
parliament for more than 3 legislative periods by 2013. Finnish GC members illustrate an 
opposite trend mirroring the general composition of the parliament. A bigger proportion of GC 
members exerted their first or second mandate by 2015, probably because a substantial amount 
of newly elected PS MPs joined the committee. Overall, Luxembourg and Austrian EAC 
members seemed to be more professionalised in EU affairs during the last legislative period 
than Finnish GC members. This might have had an impact on parliamentary work in EU affairs, 
because senior MPs have more knowledge on scrutiny procedures related to EU policy than 
recently elected MPs. Moreover, senior MPs might benefit from more information from 
diversified resources thanks to the network of contacts that they built on the EU level during 
their prior mandates. The professionalisation level also affects MPs’ behaviour towards EU 
affairs. While senior MPs would be more prone to pursue personal convictions and focus on 
EU affairs as such, recently elected EAC members might still be more interested in re-election 
and focused on political strategies.  
Prior experience in government is another indicator that affects MPs’ involvement in 
EU affairs. To some extent, it also affects their professionalisation level in parliament, 
 
554 Own calculations. 
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especially if they exerted political functions close to EU affairs prior to their parliamentary 
mandates. If we compare our three cases, we find out that Finnish MPs had the most experience 
in government (26%), followed by Luxembourgish MPs (21%) and Austrian MPs (11,5%)555. 
The low percentage among Austrian MPs is surprising, considering that party politics plays a 
significant role in Austria. In Finland, despite a high number of newly elected PS MPs without 
government experience, the proportion remains high. This could be explained by the large 
coalitions that recruit ministers among several parliamentary groups and the regular changes in 
ministerial positions, which gives a higher chance to MPs to become minister at some point in 
their political career. The graph below illustrates the proportion of EAC members with prior 
experience in government compared to the rest of parliament.  
Figure 85: Comparison of EAC members' experience in government* compared to total 
number of MPs with experience in government (in total) 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
* MPs’ prior experience in government was calculated based on data available during the last legislative periods 
for each parliament as of 2018 (see note of previous graph). 
 
While Finnish MPs have comparatively more experience with government affairs, the 
trend is reversed when we compare government experience among EAC members. Indeed, all 
three EACs have the same amount of MPs with prior government experience. However, the 
numbers in total show that Luxembourgish and Austrian EAC members have certainly more 
experience than Finnish GC members. Within the Chamber of Deputies, 38,5% of MPs with 
prior government experience belong to the EAC. In Luxembourg, the parliamentary mandate 
often serves as a springboard for ministerial positions. Austrian EU-Main Committee members 
represent 23,8% of MPs with prior government experience, while only 9,6% of Finnish MPs 
with government experience belong to the GC556. Overall, we observe that government parties 
might exert more influence on EACs in the Luxembourg or Austrian chambers than in the 
Finnish Eduskunta. The fact that several EAC members were ministers prior to their 
parliamentary mandate might affect their opinion on and involvement in parliamentary scrutiny 
of EU affairs. Indeed, they might be more supportive of their government’s EU policy, be they 
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from the opposition or the majority. Previous government members might have the feeling to 
belong to a privileged circle of elites that kept in touch with the contact network that they built 
when they occupied a ministerial position. 
Finally, the distribution of local, national and European functions on top of their 
parliamentary mandate indicates that EAC members’ profiles reflect more or less general trends 
observed in each parliament. The graph below illustrate the distribution of extra-parliamentary 
functions among EAC members compared to the whole parliament. Within the Luxembourg 
Chamber of Deputies, we see in the graph below that MPs are mainly members in a national 
union or representatives in a local municipality. 
Figure 86: Number of EAC members with extra-parliamentary functions among total 
number of MPs with extra-parliamentary functions, Chamber of Deputies (in total) 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
If we check the profiles of EAC members according to these criteria, we find that the 
proportions increased in all categories, except memberships in national unions, which still 
remain the most common positions. Overall, EAC members mainly occupy two types of extra-
parliamentary functions in municipal councils and national unions. Among the 40 MPs within 
the chamber that occupy parallel functions in national unions, 9 come from the EAC. 33,3% of 
EAC members are municipal councillors compared to 18,3% of MPs in the whole parliament557. 
This can be explained by the double-mandate policy in parliament. MPs’ functions as local 
representatives provide them with a higher chance of re-election than local party affiliation, 
because the proportional electoral system favours individualised campaigns. Therefore, the 
proximity with voters is ensured through local representative mandates. EAC members occupy 
more European functions than the average MPs. However, their proportion remains low 
considering that Luxembourg is an active supporter of European integration. Indeed, only 
13,3% of EAC members have functions on the EU level558. The low proportion of functions in 
local parties is also reflected in EAC members’ profiles. Overall, these features illustrate 
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Luxembourg’s political system centred on neocorporatism and geographical proximity with the 
voters. 
Within the National Council’s EU-Main Committee, we observe without surprise that positions 
in local parties and national unions play a significant role in MPs’ profiles, including EAC 
members.  
Figure 87: Number of EAC members with extra-parliamentary functions among total 
number of MPs with extra-parliamentary functions, National Council (in total) 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
As we saw earlier, the proximity of political elites with trade union organisations 
illustrates the Austro-corporatist model. MPs’ close ties with their local parties is due to the fact 
that political parties play a predominant role in the Austrian political system. Political affiliation 
is thus essential for MPs to progress in their political career. Just as in the Luxembourg 
Chamber, the two most represented functions (local party and national unions) also constitute 
the main features of EAC members’ profiles. Members of the EU-Main Committee have 
proportionally more functions in municipalities, national unions and European associations than 
the rest of MPs in parliament559. Only the proportion of EAC members with functions in local 
parties decreased compared to the rest of MPs560, which could indicate that EAC members are 
more detached from party politics on the local level. They focus more on national or European 
politics. 
The distribution of extra-parliamentary functions among Finnish MPs resembles 
Luxembourgish MPs, but to a different extent. Indeed, the graph below shows that just as in the 
Chamber of Deputies, MPs tend to have more functions in municipalities and trade union 
organisations. Municipal councillors represent 151 out of 200 MPs (75,5%) in the Eduskunta 
 
559 Own calculations based on biographical data. 16% of EU-Main Committee members are municipal councillors, 
64% are member of a national union and 24% are member of a European association or body, while respectively 
10,3% of MPs in the whole parliament are municipal councillors, 58% are member of a national union and 8,2% 
are member of a European association or body.  
560 Own calculations. 56% of EU-Main Committee members have functions in local parties while 65,6% of MPs 
in the whole parliament have the same functions.  
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and 19 out of 25 GC members (76%)561. This feature can be explained by the proportional 
electoral system that favours individual candidates and personalised campaigns, just as in 
Luxembourg. Therefore, MPs depend on their own popularity to gain votes, rather than on their 
party. Among Finnish MPs, local party affiliations are thus very low. Just as in Luxembourg, 
neocorporatist practices and the strong power of the local level in the Finnish state system 
influence the composition of the Eduskunta and specifically the GC. 
Figure 88: Number of GC members with extra-parliamentary functions among total 
number of MPs with extra-parliamentary functions, Eduskunta (in total) 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
Profiles of GC members reflect the general trend in parliament. Functions in municipalities and 
national unions also count among the most represented within the GC. Moreover, just as in the 
Luxembourg and Austrian chambers, functions in European associations are more common 
among GC members than among the rest of MPs in parliament. 
To conclude, we observed that EAC members’ profiles reflect the sociological features 
of their parliament. In each case, the nature of the political system substantially affects MPs’ 
extra-parliamentary functions. Neocorporatism, the electoral system and the importance given 
to party politics influenced parliaments’ composition. MPs’ seniority level and their prior 
experience in government indicate their professionalisation level and governments’ influence 
on parliamentary activity. We observe that the above-mentioned socio-demographic features 
played a more or less crucial role in MPs’ involvement during treaty negotiations. Indeed, the 
more MPs hold local or national-based functions, the more they might emphasise domestic 
instead of European issues. 
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0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
Municipal councillor Function in local
political party
Function in national
unions
Function in European
associations,
networks, CoR
FI, whole parliament FI, GC members
414 
 
Socio-demographic features of key players active during EU and intergovernmental treaty 
negotiations 
Even though the sociological characteristics outlined above concern the last legislative 
period, EAC members’ profiles did not change substantially. We chose to focus on EAC 
members, because they tended to be the most competent players in parliament to deal with EU 
affairs. In the present section, we will check which key players were the most involved for each 
treaty. We will then analyse MPs’ professionalisation level in EU affairs, as well as their 
relationship with the government, the EU level, their party or national unions. These elements 
will tell us more about the typical profiles of key players and their motivations. 
The analysis of key players’ profiles brought to light multiple similarities between the 
three parliaments, even though the level of parliamentary activity was different. We 
distinguished two ideal-typical profiles of key players involved in the scrutiny of EU and 
intergovernmental treaties: 1) “pragmatic users” of EU affairs instrumentalising the treaties to 
satisfy domestic interests and 2) MPs socialised into European norms promoting European 
integration. We base our first category on an article of Raunio and Wiberg (2001), who argue 
that the concept of Europeanisation should be replaced by “pragmatic adaptation” in the case 
of Finland. By “pragmatic adaptation”, they understand “the emphasis on defending national 
economic and political interests in the EU” (Raunio/Wiberg, 2001, p.24). Applied to the micro 
level (i.e. MPs), we argue that sectoral committee members who get involved in EU affairs are 
not motivated by their personal belief in European integration, but rather by the defence of 
national interests. Therefore, they instrumentalised the treaties to promote rational domestic 
preferences by following political strategies. “Pragmatic users” were typically sectoral 
committee members and opposition MPs with recent mandates and an absence of experience in 
EU affairs, who focused on re-election objectives through the mediatisation of EU affairs to 
seek popular support.  
The emergence of “pragmatic users” as active key players during negotiations on the 
studied treaties is strongly correlated to the salience perception of treaties and the country’s 
political system that encouraged polarisation trends or not. Indeed, the higher the salience of a 
treaty for specific players, the more competitive a political system and the more domestic 
interests are at stake, the wider the ideological gap will grow and “pragmatic users” will become 
active to defend their political interests. These observations confirm arguments from the theory 
of Historical Institutionalism, according to which agents’ preferences are products of their 
institutional context and interactions between structures and other agents. Complementing this 
approach, Sociological Institutionalism affirms that behaviour depends on agents’ rational 
calculations and their ideas. In the present thesis, the involvement of “pragmatic users” depends 
on how they prioritise aspects of European integration as well as the degree of ideological 
competition emerging on EU affairs. The wider the ideological gap between parties on 
European integration, the more recently elected MPs will instrumentalise matters to raise 
attention among voters. They use EU affairs to emphasise domestic-centred priorities close to 
their political programme and to make themselves visible on the national level. Overall, we can 
say that there is a link between the salience level of EU treaties and the involvement of 
“pragmatic users”. 
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MPs socialised into European norms or MPs with “Europeanised” profiles are usually 
senior EAC members seen as EU experts with extensive professional and personal experience 
in EU affairs. Majority MPs with this type of profiles are also more prone to have prior 
experience in government, sometimes in related fields. EU experts are more legitimate and 
credible to follow EU treaties, because their fellow MPs see them as more competent. Often 
they hold EU-Speaker positions, are EAC Chairs or participate in interparliamentary conference 
formats on the EU level. MPs socialised into EU norms tend to be autonomous players in the 
sense that they are detached from political competition and less dependent on party affiliation. 
Whenever they decided to scrutinise the treaties, even controlling their own government, they 
did it because of personal convictions rather than political strategies.  
Our observations reflect previous studies carried out in political sociology on the 
Europeanisation of career paths (Georgakakis and De Lassalle, 2006; De Lassalle and 
Georgakakis, In: Rowell and Mangenot, 2010; De Lassalle, In: Rowell and Mangenot, 2010). 
For instance, Georgakakis and De Lassalle (2006) analyse the Europeanisation of political and 
administrative career paths in the European Commission. In this framework, they check whether 
actors stay attached to national values and cultures or get socialised into European values by 
defending the “Community’s interests”. This analysis turns out to reflect MPs’ career patterns 
in national parliaments. Indeed, based on criteria such as prior professional and political 
experiences linked to EU affairs or institutions, memberships in European associations or 
international educational backgrounds, the authors conclude that EU specialists acquired 
European competences thanks to an accumulated “international capital” (Georgakakis and De 
Lassalle, 2006). Their professionalisation in EU affairs happened through the creation of 
“European properties or resources” (De Lassalle and Georgakakis, In: Rowell and Mangenot, 
2010) during their career. This argument can be applied to the case of MPs with “Europeanised” 
profiles, because they distinguish themselves from the rest of the parliament with a certain 
social and political capital linked to EU affairs. This category of MPs tends to promote 
European rather than national interests. According to Sociological Institutionalism, the 
institutional framework defines agents’ actions. Institutions contribute to the formation of 
identities and beliefs. Indeed, MPs built their expertise in EU affairs and thus their identity and 
role as EU-experts through their long-term political career within parliament. MPs’ 
socialisation process into EU norms as outlined by the Sociological Institutionalist Theory gave 
them the needed legitimacy to quasi monopolise EU affairs in the chambers. 
The two identified ideal-typical profiles include several sub-types of roles that 
Rozenberg (2018) described in detail based on Searing’s work (1994). Our purpose was not to 
analyse these sub-roles, but we can at least partially rely on some of Rozenberg’s findings. 
Indeed, the author distinguishes four roles that MPs endorse when dealing with EU affairs: 
“constituency member”, “policy advocate”, “ministerial aspirant” and “parliament man” 
(Rozenberg, 2006 and 2018). If we generalise our findings according to this classification of 
roles, we observed that “MPs socialised into EU norms”, i.e. the most active EU experts mainly 
from the pro-European majority and opposition, can be considered as “policy advocates”. In the 
Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies, these “policy advocates” were primarily pro-federalist MPs 
who also pushed for institutional change. In the Austrian and Finnish chambers, the role can be 
applied to MPs specialised in EU affairs, mainly EAC or GC members. Some of them were 
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EAC or GC chairs and participated in the EU-accession negotiations. On the contrary, the 
identified “pragmatic users” of EU affairs endorsed either the role of “sovereignists” or of 
“ministerial aspirants”, with few being “policy advocates”. In particular, Eurosceptic opposition 
MPs in the Austrian National Council and the Finnish Eduskunta tended to defend national-
based interests, i.e. national sovereignty, mostly for the sake of re-election. These MPs were 
not genuinely interested in EU affairs, but instrumentalised specific matters linked to domestic 
priorities to attract voters and increase their individual or party reputation in a bid to get (re-) 
elected on the base of their activism in parliament. In the Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies, 
“policy advocates” outnumbered “sovereignists” during the discussions on the treaties and 
parliamentary reforms. The main reason was certainly the high awareness and consensus about 
the importance of the EU for Luxembourg that limited the emergence of domestic-based 
interests. Only few MPs from the Eurosceptic opposition in Austria and Finland (FPÖ, PS) were 
EU-experts.  
Within the Chamber of Deputies, MPs with “Europeanised” profiles were the main 
scrutinisers of all EU and intergovernmental treaties, alongside sectoral committee members in 
the context of the Constitutional Treaty and Finance Committee members in the context of the 
ESM and TSCG. The latter two treaties were characterised by their high salience on the national 
level, which motivated sectoral committee members with “specialised” profiles to get involved 
as well. The salience of both treaties also motivated Austrian MPs from sectoral committees to 
engage in scrutiny activities. MPs with “Europeanised” profiles were the most active during the 
Lisbon Treaty and the economic crisis. In the Eduskunta, the scrutiny of the Constitutional 
Treaty was monopolised by MPs with “Europeanised” profiles. The Lisbon Treaty also attracted 
the attention of sectoral committee members on top of MPs from the second ideal-typical 
category. Finally, specialised MPs (Finance Committee members) monopolised the scrutiny of 
the ESM and the TSCG due to their technicity. Overall, we cannot confirm that the scrutiny of 
EU and intergovernmental treaties was monopolised solely by MPs with the most 
“Europeanised” profiles, which only partially validates sub-hypothesis H2.2. Indeed, the 
salience of some treaties and subsequent higher political competition motivated MPs from 
specialised committees to get involved as well. 
The table hereunder sums up our findings on key players’ profiles in the context of each 
treaty. 
Table 27: Comparative assessment of scrutiny key players in the context of treaty  
negotiations 
 Chamber of Deputies, 
Luxembourg 
National Council, 
Austria 
Eduskunta, Finland 
Constitutional Treaty 
Involved parliamentary 
committees 
- EAC 
- Sectoral committees  
- EAC 
- Sectoral committees 
- GC 
- FA Committee 
Key players’ ideal-
typical profiles 
MPs socialised into EU 
norms 
+ 
“pragmatic users” 
 
“pragmatic users” 
 
MPs socialised into EU 
norms 
 
Lisbon Treaty 
Involved parliamentary 
committees 
EAC EAC - GC  
- FA Committee 
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- Sectoral committees 
Key players’ ideal-
typical profiles  
 
MPs socialised into EU 
norms 
 
MPs socialised into EU 
norms 
MPs socialised into EU 
norms 
+ 
“pragmatic users” 
ESM/TSCG 
Involved parliamentary 
committees 
- EAC 
- COMFI 
- EAC 
- COMFI 
- Sectoral committees, 
mainly COMFI 
Key players’ ideal-
typical profiles 
MPs socialised into EU 
norms 
+ 
“pragmatic users” 
MPs socialised into EU 
norms 
+ 
“pragmatic users” 
 
“pragmatic users” 
Source: Own summary. 
During discussions on the Constitutional Treaty, MPs from the most competent 
committees in EU affairs were involved in all three parliaments, namely the EACs in the 
Chamber of Deputies and the National Council as well as the GC and FA Committee in the 
Eduskunta. MPs from sectoral committees were equally involved in the Luxembourg and 
Austrian chambers. Within the Chamber of Deputies, two types of key players scrutinised the 
treaty: EAC members with “Europeanised” profiles and sectoral committee members with 
specialised profiles. The first had extensive personal experience linked to EU affairs and 
participated in interparliamentary conferences, which explains why they were more interested 
in EU topics and were motivated by personal convictions (Interview 3, 11, 2017). Sectoral 
committee members had mostly leadership positions (in parliament or in the parliamentary 
group), which shows that they were more focused on representing political interests. Both types 
of MPs had a high seniority in parliament and therefore a high professionalisation level.  
Within the National Council, both EAC members and sectoral committee members held 
leadership positions, mainly within their group, which illustrates the influence of party politics 
on parliamentary work. Both categories of key players had also a high seniority in parliament 
and were familiar with scrutiny procedures in EU affairs. However, contrary to Luxembourgish 
EAC members, Austrian EU-Main Committee members did not have a “Europeanised” profile 
and did not participate as much in interparliamentary conference formats562. Finnish GC and 
FA Committee members had similar profiles to those of Luxembourgish EAC members, 
because they had highly “Europeanised” profiles. Indeed, most had long-term mandates in 
parliament and had already prepared the EU accession in 1994 (Interview 5b, 10b, 2018). Their 
extensive knowledge on EU affairs came also from their frequent participation in 
interparliamentary conferences. Most Finnish key players also held leadership positions in 
committee or parliamentary groups. This is proof that discussions on the Constitutional Treaty 
were reserved to a privileged circle of representatives in parliament. While membership in 
national unions did not play any role in all three cases, government experience was an important 
feature that might have shaped MPs’ motivations in Austria and Finland. In both cases, party 
politics, the close relationship between parliament and government and regular changes in 
ministerial positions (in Finland) explain why MPs tend to switch frequently from one 
institution to the other and have higher government experience. 
 
562 According to biographical data retrieved from the dedicated section on the National Council’s Grand 
Committee, on the website of the National Council. 
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The Lisbon Treaty triggered attention only from EAC members in the Luxembourg and 
Austrian chambers, probably because of the general weariness after the failure of the 
Constitutional Treaty. Within the Chamber of Deputies, EAC members’ profiles entailed the 
exact same features as in the context of the previous treaty. Motivations to engage in EU affairs 
originated from personal convictions about the need to support European integration (Interview 
4, 21, 2017). Profiles of Austrian EAC members were also the same as previously, with the 
particularity that Eurosceptic EAC members with “Europeanised” profiles became more active 
than before563. Their motivation was rather to use the EAC arena to criticise the government’s 
position and suggest alternatives to the Lisbon Treaty. Finnish key players came both from the 
GC, FA Committee and sectoral committees, but their degree of professionalisation in 
parliament and in EU affairs differed. Indeed, active MPs from the GC and FA Committee had 
a long-term mandate in parliament, prior experience in government, but participated in fewer 
interparliamentary conferences (Interview 4b, 5b, 2018). Sectoral committee members had a 
lower seniority564 in parliament and thus less knowledge on parliamentary procedures in EU 
affairs. While majority MPs were more active in sectoral committees, both majority and 
opposition MPs were equally involved within the GC.  
Finally, the economic crisis saw the emergence of similar key players in all three 
parliaments. Apart from EAC members with the usual “Europeanised” profiles that remained 
active in the Chamber of Deputies and the National Council, another type of “specialised” key 
players (the “pragmatic users” of EU affairs) emerged in the three chambers: Finance 
Committee members (Interview 16a, 18a, 2017). While both categories of players still had a 
high seniority and thus a high professionalisation level within the Luxembourg chamber, 
sociological divergences were more pronounced in the National Council and the Finnish 
Eduskunta. Indeed, unlike EAC or GC members who had a high seniority in parliament and 
more experience on the EU level, Finance Committee members and key players from other 
involved sectoral committees had recent mandates in parliament565. Their professionalisation 
level was thus lower than that of EAC members. In all three cases, leadership positions were 
very common among key players, especially Finance Committee members. Political leaders 
belonged mostly to the opposition, because they needed to defend their whole party’s position 
in parliament when faced to an influential majority. Moreover, in all three cases, key players 
from both categories had no prior experience in government, which can be explained by the fact 
that “younger” MPs were mostly involved and that specialised knowledge played a more 
important role than political experience. In the Austrian chamber, a high proportion of Finance 
Committee members were also members of national unions such as professional chambers or 
trade union organisations. The economic crisis forced national unions to defend their positions 
through their MPs in parliament. Generally, as political parties are massively represented in 
 
563 Calculated based on the number of FPÖ-BZÖ MPs participating in committee and plenary debates and 
subsequently on their biographical data on the National Council’s website. 
564 According to biographical data retrieved from the dedicated section on the Eduskunta’s Grand Committee, on 
the website of the Eduskunta. 
565 Calculated based on the number of Finance committee members participating in committee and plenary debates 
and subsequently on their biographical data on the National Council’s, Chamber of Deputies’ and Eduskunta’s 
websites. 
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professional chambers and trade union organisations, a high proportion of Austrian MPs has a 
membership in these organisations and tend to be more sensitive to their demands in parliament.  
In conclusion, the fact that Austrian and Finnish MPs tend to be closer to the local and 
national levels certainly influenced the way they perceived the studied treaties. They tended to 
defend domestic-centred priorities, contrary to Luxembourgish MPs who generally supported 
deeper European integration. We observed that the higher the salience of treaties and political 
competition between parties, the wider the awareness about EU affairs grew among MPs and 
the more non-professional sectoral committee members engaged in the scrutiny of the treaties 
for pragmatic reasons.  
 
8.3.3 Conclusion 
 
In this section, we saw that the evolution of parliamentary activity in all three 
parliaments presented some similarities and differences, but depended on the same factors: 
countries’ positions on European integration and dynamics between political actors. Indeed, the 
salience level was different from one treaty to the other and affected the way parliaments 
handled EU affairs. While the Constitutional Treaty and the economic crisis were salient in 
Luxembourg, Austria focused its attention on the Lisbon Treaty and the economic crisis. 
Parliamentary activity in Finland indicates that the ESM and the TSCG were the most salient 
of all the treaties. Scrutiny fluctuated accordingly. Moreover, national elections invariably led 
to a brake in parliamentary activity.  
Other factors of parliamentary activity on the micro level were parliamentary culture 
(consensual vs conflictual) and MPs’ socio-demographic features. Overall, government parties 
tended to dominate the discussions on EU treaties and intergovernmental treaties on the EMU, 
while opposition MPs tried to use other channels to obtain information and influence decision-
making. The higher the competitive political environment, the more key players drew their 
motivation from rational calculations and preferences, focusing on re-election and popularity 
gain (confirming the Historical Institutionalist argument). In a competitive environment, EAC 
members from the majority tended to abstain from scrutinising their own government, sticking 
to a stronger group discipline. The less salient the treaties and the less political competition 
among MPs, the less they got interested in scrutinising EU affairs, delegating this task to highly 
professionalised key players detached from national re-election prospects. The stronger the 
consociational nature of the political environment, the more key players’ motivations to get 
engaged in the scrutiny of treaties originated from personal beliefs about European integration 
based on their personal experiences linked to EU affairs (confirming the Sociological 
Institutionalist argument). The consensual political atmosphere motivated EAC members from 
the majority to scrutinise their own government for personal reasons rather than for political 
reasons. Consociational systems such as Luxembourg or Austria before 2005 and Finland 
before 2011 encouraged key players to be more detached from political affiliations and the 
imperative of group discipline. 
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Overall, mainstreaming of EU affairs remained limited to a certain circle of MPs. In 
Luxembourg, the highly consensual model limited mainstreaming, while the design of the 
Finnish scrutiny system forced all sectoral committees to give their opinion on each treaty. The 
most professionalised MPs with extensive personal and political experience in EU affairs 
tended to be continuously active throughout treaty negotiations, even when the treaties’ salience 
was low. This confirms sub-hypothesis H2.1. The higher the salience of treaties and the more 
conflictual the political relations, the more MPs with low professionalised profile became active 
to defend their interests. Therefore, we can also validate sub-hypothesis H2.2. Therefore, 
parliamentary activity on the micro level was strongly dependent on MPs’ positioning on the 
political spectrum (opposition/majority). The more consensual the political system, the more 
individual professionalised MPs monopolised EU affairs. On the contrary, the higher the 
competitive and conflictual nature of the political system, the more MPs from the opposition 
got involved according to political strategies. The next section will focus on institutional change 
and its factors. We will see that parliamentary culture and MPs’ profiles also play a determinant 
role in the direction and scope of change within each chamber. 
 
8.4 Comparative assessment of institutional change in the Luxembourg, Austrian and 
Finnish chambers in the wake of EU treaties and intergovernmental treaties on the EMU 
 
The last section of the present chapter focuses on the second dimension of parliamentary 
involvement: the evolution of scrutiny systems as a consequence of legal developments on 
parliamentary participation in EU affairs induced by the four treaties. We identified two types 
of explanatory factors of change: institutional and motivational factors. We will first study the 
effective change conducted in each parliament between 2004 and 2013. The three chambers 
differ from each other in terms of the strength of their scrutiny systems and therefore in the way 
they amended their procedures and structures. The second section will focus on the way MPs’ 
motivations affected institutional change. 
8.4.1 Institutional factors of institutional change in the three chambers: same direction, but 
different scope 
 
When we observe the amendments made to the legal bases, parliamentary scrutiny 
procedures and infrastructures, we notice that the salience of the treaties and the legal 
developments that they imply somewhat affected institutional change on the national level. The 
Constitutional Treaty included several provisions on the role of national parliaments that were 
kept in the Lisbon Treaty. The table hereunder sums up all the provisions on parliamentary 
participation in EU affairs set on the EU level and their equivalents in both treaties566. We 
exclude from the table the ESM and the TSCG, which set their own rules for parliaments in 
respectively one and two articles. 
 
566 Both treaties can be found under the following links : https://europa.eu/european-
union/sites/europaeu/files/docs/body/treaty_establishing_a_constitution_for_europe_en.pdf and https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/En/TXT/?uri=CELEX:12007L/TXT (last accessed 17.06.2019) 
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Table 28: Provisions on parliaments’ participation rights in the CT and LT 
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe Treaty of Lisbon (Version 2007) 
Title III, Union Competences, Article I-11 § 3 
“National Parliaments shall ensure compliance 
with that principle in accordance with the 
procedure set out in that Protocol.” 
General provisions, Article 3b §3 
“National Parliaments ensure compliance with the 
principle of subsidiarity in accordance with the 
procedure set out in that Protocol.” 
Title III, Union Competences, Article I-18 §2 
Flexibility clause  
“Using the procedure for monitoring the 
subsidiarity principle referred to in Article I-
11(3), the European Commission shall draw 
national Parliaments' attention to proposals based 
on this Article.” 
General and Final Provisions, Article 308 
“Using the procedure for monitoring the subsidiarity 
principle referred to in Article 3b(3) of the Treaty on 
European Union, the Commission shall draw national 
Parliaments' attention to proposals based on this Article.” 
Chapter II, Specific Provisions, Article I-42 §2  
“National Parliaments may, within the framework 
of the area of freedom, security and justice, 
participate in the evaluation mechanisms provided 
for in Article III-260.” 
 
 
/ 
Title VI, The Democratic Life of the Union, 
Article I-46 § 2 
“Member States are represented in the European 
Council by their Heads of State or Government 
and in the Council by their governments, 
themselves democratically accountable either to 
their national Parliaments, or to their citizens.” 
Title II Provisions on Democratic Principles, Article 
8A §2 
“Member States are represented in the European Council 
by their Heads of State or Government and in the 
Council by their governments, themselves 
democratically accountable either to their national 
Parliaments, or to their citizens.” 
 
/ 
Title II Provisions on Democratic Principles, Article 8 
C 
“National Parliaments contribute actively to the good 
functioning of the Union […]” 
Title IX, Union Membership, Article I-58 § 2 
“Any European State which wishes to become a 
member of the Union shall address its application 
to the Council. The European Parliament and 
national Parliaments shall be notified of this 
application.” 
 
 
 
/ 
Chapter IV, Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice, Section 1, Article III-259 
“National Parliaments shall ensure that the 
proposals and legislative initiatives submitted 
under Sections 4 and 5 of this Chapter comply 
with the principle of subsidiarity, in accordance 
with the arrangements laid down by the Protocol 
on the application of the principles of subsidiarity 
and proportionality.” 
Chapter 1, Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, 
General provisions, Article 61 B 
“National Parliaments ensure that the proposals and 
legislative initiatives submitted under Chapters 4 and 5 
comply with the principle of subsidiarity, in accordance 
with the arrangements laid down by the Protocol on the 
application of the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality.” 
Chapter IV, Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice, Section 1, Article III-260 
(whole article) 
Chapter 1, Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, 
General provisions, Article 61 C 
Chapter IV, Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice, Section 1, Article III-261 
(whole article) 
Chapter 1, Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, 
General provisions, Article 61 D 
 
 
 
 
/ 
Chapter 3, Judicial cooperation in civil matters, 
Article 65 §3 
“The proposal referred to in the second subparagraph 
shall be notified to the national Parliaments. If a national 
Parliament makes known its opposition within 
six months of the date of such notification, the decision 
shall not be adopted.” 
Chapter IV, Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice, Section 4, Article III-273 §1 
Chapter 4 Judicial cooperation in criminal matters, 
Article 69 D §1 
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“European laws shall also determine 
arrangements for involving the European 
Parliament and national Parliaments in the 
evaluation of Eurojust's activities.” 
“These regulations shall also determine arrangements for 
involving the European Parliament and national 
Parliaments in the evaluation of Eurojust's activities.” 
Chapter IV, Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice, Section 5, Article III-276 §2 
“European laws shall also lay down the 
procedures for scrutiny of Europol's activities by 
the European Parliament, together with national 
Parliaments.” 
Chapter 5, Police cooperation, Article 69 G 
“These regulations shall also lay down the procedures for 
scrutiny of Europol's activities by the 
European Parliament, together with national 
Parliaments.” 
Part IV, General and Final Provisions, Article 
IV-443 §1 
“The government of any Member State, the 
European Parliament or the Commission may 
submit to the Council proposals for the 
amendment of this Treaty. These proposals shall 
be submitted to the European Council by the 
Council and the national Parliaments shall be 
notified.” 
Final provisions, Article 48 §2 
“The Government of any Member State, the European 
Parliament or the Commission may submit to the 
Council proposals for the amendment of the Treaties. 
These proposals may, inter alia, serve either to increase 
or to reduce the competences conferred on the Union in 
the Treaties. These proposals shall be submitted to the 
European Council by the Council and the national 
Parliaments shall be notified.” 
Part IV, General and Final Provisions, Article 
IV-444, §3 
“Any initiative taken by the European Council on 
the basis of paragraphs 1 or 2 shall be notified to 
the national Parliaments. If a national Parliament 
makes known its opposition within six months of 
the date of such notification, the European 
decision referred to in paragraphs 1 or 2 shall not 
be adopted. In the absence of opposition, the 
European Council may adopt the decision.” 
 
 
 
 
/ 
Protocol on the role of national parliaments in 
the European Union 
(whole protocol) 
Protocol on the role of national parliaments in the 
European Union 
(whole protocol) 
Protocol on the application of the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality 
(whole protocol) 
Protocol on the application of the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality 
(whole protocol) 
Source: Own summary based on the legal texts. 
We observed that most discussions on scrutiny rights and most amendments within 
parliaments happened around these two treaties, probably because the role of national 
parliaments on the EU level was extensively discussed at that time. On the contrary, the ESM 
contained only one article on national parliaments (Article 30 §5) and the TSCG mentioned 
parliaments in two articles (Title III, Article 3 §2 and Title V, Article 13). We can thus assume 
that the treaties triggered discussions within parliaments about the need to change the scrutiny 
rules. Within the Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies, EAC members discussed extensively the 
need to strengthen the parliament’s participation rights. However, the implementation of reform 
ideas was not as fruitful as the discussions. The Chamber of Deputies amended its RoP in 2003 
in the wake of the Convention on the Future of Europe and established a chapter on European 
Affairs mentioning for the first time the prerogatives of the chamber in EU affairs. Moreover, 
after the parliamentary vote on the Constitutional Treaty, EAC members launched the 
chamber’s “European Strategy” which was adopted in 2006 and aimed to strengthen its 
participation rights both in theory and in practice. Amendments in the chamber came to a halt 
until the Lisbon Treaty. The RoP Chapter on European Affairs was renamed in 2007 and a 
memorandum on the cooperation between government and parliament in EU affairs was added 
in 2009, in the wake of the Lisbon Treaty. MPs incorporated among others the subsidiarity 
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monitoring mechanism in the chamber’s RoP in 2010. After that date, the following treaties 
(ESM and TSCG) triggered debates on the preservation of parliament’s budgetary powers, but 
did not lead to any substantial reforms in the Chamber of Deputies. Even though the 
Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies is considered as having one of the weakest scrutiny systems 
in the EU, amendments did not reflect a strong will to change the situation. As we will see in 
the next section, single MPs pushed towards institutional change, but their efforts remained at 
the stage of suggestions. 
Within the Austrian National Council, the Constitutional Treaty was not salient enough 
to justify reforms of the parliamentary scrutiny system. The only change carried out in 2005 
was a reorganisation of departments in the parliamentary administration handling EU affairs. 
The Lisbon Treaty and the ESM triggered substantial procedural change. Indeed, in the wake 
of both treaties, MPs amended the Constitution in 2010 to extend parliament’s information 
rights and include the control of the subsidiarity mechanism in the Austrian legal system. 
Constitutional amendments in 2012 incorporated rules related to the ESM. The RoP was also 
amended several times in 2010, 2011 and 2012. In the wake of the Lisbon Treaty, the parliament 
adopted an EU-Information Law to reinforce the information flow between the government and 
parliament. After the ratification of the ESM, MPs also passed the ESM-Information Law in 
2014 and two additional Information Laws in 2014 and 2015 that aimed to strengthen 
parliamentary scrutiny rights in the framework of the ESM. The National Council underwent 
multiple reforms to strengthen its scrutiny system even though it counts among the most 
developed ones. We observe that some treaties that were particularly salient in parliament 
triggered substantial change. 
Finally, the Finnish Eduskunta underwent limited reforms, but they happened each time 
in the context of EU and intergovernmental treaty negotiations. Just as in Austria, the Lisbon 
Treaty seemed to have encouraged Constitutional revisions and amendments to the RoP. In 
2009, MPs amended Section 30 of the RoP and Article 18a of the GC’s RoP to incorporate the 
subsidiarity mechanism in parliamentary working methods. Committees’ competences and 
information rights in EU affairs were strengthened through RoP amendments in 2011 and 2013. 
Moreover, Constitutional amendments in 2012 aimed to regulate EU treaty approval by the 
parliament, Finland’s status as EU member and the executive’s competences in EU 
negotiations. Just as in Austria, the Eduskunta’s scrutiny system ranks among the most powerful 
in the EU. However, revisions were more circumscribed than in the Austrian National Council.  
The table hereunder sums up all reforms undergone in our three cases and their potential 
correlation with modifications undergone on EU-level legal provisions. We observe that unlike 
in the case of parliamentary activity, the salience level of EU and intergovernmental treaties 
had a limited impact on institutional change. Rather, the development of legal provisions on 
parliamentary participation in EU affairs and the way MPs perceived their parliament’s power 
in EU affairs played a more significant role, as we will see in the next section. 
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Table 29: Comparative assessment of amendments to each chamber’s scrutiny system in 
the wake of treaty negotiations 
 Chamber of Deputies, 
Luxembourg 
National Council, 
Austria 
Eduskunta, Finland 
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (2004-2006) 
Legal provisions on 
national parliaments in 
treaty 
- Title III, Union Competences, Article I-11 § 3  
- Title III, Union Competences, Article I-18 §2 Flexibility clause  
- Chapter II, Specific Provisions, Article I-42 §2  
- Title VI, The Democratic Life of the Union, Article I-46 § 2 
- Title IX, Union Membership, Article I-58 § 2 
- Chapter IV, Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, Section 1, Article 
III-259 
- Chapter IV, Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, Section 1, Article 
III-260 
- Chapter IV, Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, Section 1, Article 
III-261 
- Chapter IV, Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, Section 4, Article 
III-273 §1 
- Chapter IV, Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, Section 5, Article 
III-276 §2 
- Part IV, General and Final Provisions, Article IV-443 §1 
- Part IV, General and Final Provisions, Article IV-444 
- Protocol on the role of national parliaments in the European Union 
- Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality 
 
Salience on the national 
level 
High Moderate Moderate 
Revision of national 
scrutiny systems 
- RoP amendment (2003) 
- European Strategy 
(2006) 
- Reorganisation of 
parliamentary 
administration 
departments handling EU 
affairs (2005) 
 
 
/ 
Treaty of Lisbon (2007-2009) 
Legal provisions on 
national parliaments in 
treaty 
- General provisions, Article 3b §3 
- General and Final Provisions, Article 308 
- Title II Provisions on Democratic Principles, Article 8A §2 
- Title II Provisions on Democratic Principles, Article 8 C 
- Chapter 1, Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, General provisions, 
Article 61 B 
- Chapter 1, Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, General provisions, 
Article 61 C 
- Chapter 1, Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, General provisions, 
Article 61 D 
- Chapter 3, Judicial cooperation in civil matters, Article 65 §3 
- Chapter 4, Judicial cooperation in criminal matters, Article 69 D §1 
- Chapter 5, Police cooperation, Article 69 G 
- Final provisions, Article 48 §2 
- Protocol on the role of national parliaments in the European Union 
- Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality 
Salience on the national 
level 
Low High Low 
Revision of national 
scrutiny systems 
- RoP amendments 
(2007, 2009 and 2010) 
- Constitutional 
amendments (2010) 
- RoP amendments (2010 
and 2011) 
- Constitutional 
amendments (2012) 
- RoP amendments 
(2009, 2011 and 2013) 
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- EU-Information Law 
(2011) 
ESM (2011-2012) 
Legal provisions on 
national parliaments in 
treaty 
- Article 30 §5 
 
Salience on the national 
level 
High High High 
Revision of national 
scrutiny systems 
 
/ 
- Constitutional 
amendments (2012) 
- RoP amendments 
(2012) 
- ESM-Information Law 
(2014) 
- Information Laws 
(2014 and 2015) 
 
/ 
TSCG  (2011-2012) 
Legal provisions on 
national parliaments in 
treaty 
- Title III, Article 3 §2 and Title V, Article 13 
 
Salience on the national 
level 
High High High 
Revision of national 
scrutiny systems 
/ / / 
Source: Own summary based on parliamentary documents and secondary literature. 
Overall, we saw that institutional change followed somewhat the same direction in all 
three cases, with differences in scope. Even though there was a “misfit” between European 
provisions on parliaments and their scrutiny systems, the three cases reacted differently to 
institutional change. The measurement of the direction of change bases on the concepts outlined 
in the Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change (see Chapter 3). We assumed in sub-
hypothesis H3.3 that institutional change happened through “layering” in all three cases, i.e. 
through an incremental process consisting in a successive addition of new rules over pre-
existing ones. Amendments and revisions are the most common tools leading to change through 
“layering”. This sub-hypothesis can be partially confirmed, because Luxembourg and Finland 
proved to be to some extent deviant cases. In all three cases, amendments to parliaments’ legal 
framework were made successively in the wake of almost each studied treaty. However, the 
rhythm of revisions differed between the chambers.  
Within the Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies, amendments were rather limited and 
most of the suggestions made by EAC members stayed at the stage of rhetorical promises. Until 
the Lisbon Treaty, amendments to existing RoP rules characterised institutional change in the 
chamber. In the wake of the Lisbon Treaty, new rules on the subsidiarity monitoring and the 
cooperation mechanism between government and parliament in EU affairs had to be 
established. No rules regulating these procedures existed before, which explains why 
institutional change happened through “layering”. Missing rules in a context of an evolving 
European legal framework implied the completion of legal gaps with new institutional 
arrangements. Finally, even though the ESM and the TSCG were salient treaties in 
Luxembourg, they did not lead to modifications of MPs’ scrutiny framework. Therefore, “drift” 
can best illustrate the situation in the chamber during the economic crisis, because MPs did not 
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implement new rules despite a changing institutional context on the EU level. The only 
exception is that contrary to Streeck and Thelen’s (2005) arguments, “drift” within the Chamber 
of Deputies did not lead to the “death” of the institution, i.e. the scrutiny system of EU affairs. 
Rather, we use the notion to emphasise the fact that MPs passively witnessed how the ESM and 
the TSCG affected parliamentary rights without implementing concrete revisions to remedy a 
potential competence loss. 
Legal revisions in Austria were successive and substantial, even though the parliament’s 
scrutiny system is considered in the literature as moderate to strong. Among the three cases, the 
National Council pursued the strongest reforms of its scrutiny procedures. In the context of the 
Constitutional Treaty, only structural re-arrangements were done in the parliamentary 
administration. Parliament reshuffled and renamed its administrative departments handling EU 
affairs to guarantee effective support to MPs. Therefore, institutional change happened through 
“layering”, because pre-existing institutional arrangements were modified to be adapted to 
institutional evolutions induced by European integration. In the wake of the Lisbon Treaty and 
the ESM, the National Council introduced most of its institutional reforms. The latter followed 
the same dynamics as before, in the sense that existing rules were amended. However, they 
were completed with new rules that did not exist before, such as the subsidiarity control that 
appeared in the Constitutional Treaty, but was only implemented in the Lisbon Treaty. The 
National Council had to create new procedures on reasoned opinions. Additionally, an EU-
information Law aimed to reinforce the information flow between government and parliament. 
The ESM also encouraged Parliament to create new procedures and information requirements 
in the Constitution, the RoP and additional information laws. New provisions established 
notably an ESM sub-committee, new information rights, as well as regulations empowering the 
Parliament to mandate the Austrian representative in the ESM Board of Governors. Therefore, 
the Lisbon Treaty and the ESM triggered change in the National Council through “layering”. 
MPs amended pre-existing rules and completed missing rules by creating new ones. Old 
institutions remained in place and new provisions were added on top of them. 
 Within the Eduskunta, dynamics of institutional change showed similarities to the 
Chamber of Deputies, especially in the context of the Lisbon Treaty and the economic crisis. 
However, the origins of these dynamics were different, as we will explain in the second section 
below. The Parliament established an EU-review Committee that worked between 2003 and 
2005 and suggested avenues for reform to further strengthen the already strong scrutiny system. 
However, it did not lead to any implementation, which is the reason why we used the concept 
of “drift”. MPs did not see it as necessary to change their scrutiny system and deliberately 
maintained the status quo despite institutional developments on the EU level. The same applies 
to the context of the economic crisis, just as in Luxembourg. MPs discussed the preservation of 
Parliament’s budgetary competences, but did not initiate change. The Lisbon Treaty brought 
with it the most revisions in the Eduskunta, probably because the new rules on the subsidiarity 
mechanism obliged MPs to integrate them in their procedures. In practice, these instruments 
were rarely used. Just as in the Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies, amendments to the RoP and 
the Constitution completed existing rules. Thus, “layering” defines change in this context 
according to the Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change. Overall, the Finnish Eduskunta 
carried out the least change compared to the other cases. 
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The table hereunder sums up our findings on dynamics of institutional change within 
the three chambers. 
Table 30: Direction of institutional change in the three chambers 
 Chamber of Deputies, 
Luxembourg 
National Council, 
Austria 
Eduskunta, Finland 
Treaty establishing a 
Constitution for 
Europe (2004-2006) 
Layering Layering Drift 
Treaty of Lisbon (2007-
2009) 
Layering  
 
Layering  
 
Layering  
 
ESM/TSCG (2011-
2012) 
Drift Layering  
 
Drift 
Source: Own summary based on parliaments’ legal bases, interviews and secondary literature. 
As in all three cases, rules were either amended, added or preserved, “layering” and 
“drift” were the only concepts that could be applied. Indeed, MPs kept their “old” institutions 
in place while refining their existing legal provisions. The observations made above exclude 
institutional change through “displacement” (see Chapter 3), as existing rules were not removed 
and replaced by new ones. The current scrutiny systems were not reshuffled to the extent that 
new rules supplanted pre-existing ones. Moreover, MPs did not redirect scrutiny procedures 
and structures to serve different purposes than the scrutiny of EU affairs, therefore also 
excluding change through “conversion”. Finally, we did not observe any breakdown of the 
existing scrutiny systems, which also excludes the “exhaustion” argument. The next section 
analyses the factors of institutional change in each chamber. 
If we now link institutional change to the actual use of the newly established 
instruments, we observe that the Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies uses primarily the scrutiny 
tools developed at the European level (such as the subsidiarity control mechanism), while the 
Austrian and Finnish chambers continued to focus on the scrutiny of their national governments. 
Indeed, the Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies submitted the most reasoned opinions since 2010 
compared to the two other chambers567. Contrary to the Finnish and Austrian chambers, MEPs 
tend to be systematically present as well. Moreover, the proportion of parliamentary questions 
on EU affairs shows that the Luxembourgish chamber used mostly this scrutiny instrument 
among our cases, while the two other chambers tended to use more motions to control their 
government. Therefore, based on the ideal-types suggested by Auel/Rozenberg/Tacea (In: 
Hefftler/Neuhold/Rozenberg/Smith, 2015), we can say that the Luxembourg Chamber of 
Deputies as both a “debating arena” and a “Commission watchdog” successfully used its newly 
established formal tools to scrutinise the EU level. However, the parliament was not as 
successful in reinforcing its influence on the government’s EU policy, because the 
memorandum adopted in 2009 is still not fully applied. Reversely, the Austrian National 
Council and the Finnish Eduskunta as “policy shapers” (and to some extent “debating arenas”) 
developed tools to strengthen their control over national EU policies. Here, we need to point 
out that the Austrian chamber established more scrutiny tools than the Finnish chamber, but 
 
567 The Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies submitted 20 reasoned opinions since 2010, while the Austrian National 
Council and the Finnish Eduskunta submitted each 3 reasoned opinion. See IPEX: http://ipex.eu/IPEXL-
WEB/search.do (last accessed 17.06.2019) 
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that there is still a lacking implementation of some rules. For instance, §31f RoP stipulates that 
MPs can request information on documents provided by the government. However, since 2014, 
the chamber made use of this possibility only 10 times. The Finnish case is different in the sense 
that formal rules are not as detailed as in the Austrian case, but MPs rely on a strongly 
established practice of narrow cooperation and information exchange with the government. 
Overall, each parliament’s perception on European integration might be the main reason 
explaining the difference in the use of scrutiny tools. The Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies 
evolved in a deeply pro-European environment, where the EU level was seen as a benefit for 
the country. The parliament naturally invested time in communicating directly with European 
Institutions. On the contrary, the Austrian and Finnish chambers evolved in contexts where 
European integration was not always self-evident, which pushed them to focus on a strong 
national scrutiny model. 
 
8.4.2 Motivational factors of institutional change in the Luxembourg, Austrian and Finnish 
chambers 
 
We identified three interdependent motivational factors that explain the origin, scope 
and direction of institutional change: MPs’ socio-demographic characteristics, MPs’ normative 
interpretation of their parliament’s role in the EU and MPs’ parliamentary culture deriving from 
the nature of their political system (consensual vs conflictual). We noticed that the second and 
last factors of change were the same causes of parliamentary activity, but to a different extent. 
The following paragraphs sum up our findings for each explanatory factor. 
The drivers of change: the ideal-typical profile of “political entrepreneurs” of change 
In the Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change, “political entrepreneurs” of change 
are agents who lead the contestation of existing rules and initiate rule reinterpretation and 
change. Their sociological profiles determine to what extent MPs will engage in reform 
discussions. Bottom-up dynamics are at the centre of the second branch of the Historical 
Institutionalist theory, just as Sociological Institutionalism. In all three cases, we observed 
sociological similarities. Most “political entrepreneurs” both scrutinised the treaties and at the 
same time promoted procedural revisions. Therefore, we found the same sociological features 
as those of the key players that led parliamentary scrutiny on the studied treaties. Indeed, 
initiators’ professionalisation level, i.e. their personal, professional and political experience 
linked to EU affairs, was high compared to the professionalisation level of an average MP. 
Overall, initiators of procedural and structural amendments had without exception a high 
seniority in parliament. At the time of each reform discussions, they exerted at least their third 
mandate. 
Most of the time, EAC members were the main initiators of change, sometimes 
alongside members of RoP or Constitutional Affairs committees. These committees are 
obviously the most competent to discuss institutional change within the chambers. In the 
Finnish case, Finance Committee members were also actively discussing parliamentary 
competences in the context of the ESM and the TSCG. In the context of the economic crisis, 
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MPs with a recent mandate and sectoral committee membership also became involved in reform 
discussions, but not for the same reasons. While EU professionals were motivated by personal 
beliefs or by the fact that their committee was competent to deal with revisions of the 
parliamentary scrutiny system, the rest of the MPs only sought to publicise their positions to 
gain voters’ support. This logic of action mirrors the one observed during parliamentary activity 
in EU and intergovernmental treaty negotiations. MPs with “Europeanised” profiles can be 
considered as the main entrepreneurs of change in all three cases during the period under 
analysis. Single “technician” MPs only got involved in the Eduskunta for electoral reasons. 
Therefore, we can equate “political entrepreneurs of change” to “MPs socialised into EU 
norms” as outlined in the section of factors influencing parliamentary activity. 
Membership in national unions or government experience barely affected their 
motivation to trigger institutional change. On the contrary, the expertise level in EU policy 
represented the most significant determiner of involvement. In all three chambers, “political 
entrepreneurs” of change participated in interparliamentary conferences, mainly the COSAC, 
and had direct links with the EU-level (Interview 4, 21, 4a, 17a, 2017, and 4b, 5b, 2018). They 
benefitted from privileged contacts and information that they could use in domestic 
parliamentary debates. COSAC discussions entailed details about the impact of certain treaties 
on national scrutiny systems, which turned out to be useful ex-ante information for MPs. 
Leadership positions were also quite common, mostly in parliamentary groups or committees. 
Key players of change benefitted from influential functions within parliament, drawing their 
legitimacy from that. We can say that their legitimacy to deal with these issues originated from 
their highly professionalised profiles. The parliamentary administration supported and 
sometimes initiated change within the Chamber of Deputies (Lisbon Treaty) and the Eduskunta 
(Constitutional Treaty and Lisbon Treaty).  
Finally, if we look at the political positioning of the key players of institutional change, 
we come to the conclusion that majority MPs led the discussions in the Luxembourg Chamber 
of Deputies, while majority and opposition groups were almost equally involved in the Austrian 
and Finnish chambers. The nature of the political system (consensual vs conflictual), as well as 
the importance of party politics in parliamentary work are the main reasons of such 
observations. We will enter into details about these arguments in the section on parliamentary 
culture as factor of change (see below). However, we can already conclude that government 
parties managed to control the direction of change in all three parliaments. 
The table hereunder sums up the main findings about the profile of entrepreneurs of institutional 
change in each chamber. We identify for instance the main initiators of change, MPs’ seniority 
level and how many MPs occupied leadership positions, participated in interparliamentary 
conferences or had a prior experience in government. 
Table 31: Profile of “political entrepreneurs of change” in the three chambers 
 Chamber of Deputies, 
Luxembourg 
National Council, 
Austria 
Eduskunta, Finland 
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe 
Initiators - EAC: initiator 
- RoP + Institutions and 
Constitutional Revision 
- EAC 
- Sectoral committees 
- EU-review Committee 
- GC 
- FA Committee 
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committees: 
implementation 
- Parliamentary 
administration 
MPs’ seniority level High High High 
Political or 
parliamentary leadership 
positions 
Most MPs Most MPs (non-EAC 
members) 
Few MPs 
Political positioning Majority MPs Majority + opposition 
MPs 
Majority + opposition 
MPs 
Participation in 
interparliamentary 
conferences 
Most MPs (COSAC) Most MPs (COSAC) Most MPs (COSAC + 
international 
conferences) 
Government experience Few MPs Few MPs Most MPs 
Membership in national 
union 
No No No 
Treaty of Lisbon 
Initiators - EAC 
- RoP Committee 
- EAC: initiator 
- RoP + Constitutional 
Affairs committees: 
implementation 
- GC 
- EU-review Committee 
- Parliamentary 
administration 
MPs’ seniority level High High High 
Political or 
parliamentary leadership 
positions 
Most MPs Most MPs Most MPs 
Political positioning Majority MPs Majority + pro-European 
opposition MPs 
Majority + pro-European 
opposition MPs 
Participation in 
interparliamentary 
conferences 
Most MPs (COSAC) Most MPs (COSAC) Most MPs (COSAC) 
Government experience Few MPs Few MPs Few MPs 
Membership in national 
union 
No No No 
ESM/TSCG 
Initiators - EAC 
- RoP Committee 
- EAC 
- Constitutional Affairs 
Committee 
- GC  
- FA Committee 
- Finance Committee 
MPs’ seniority level High High High + recent mandates 
(sectoral committee 
members) 
Political or 
parliamentary leadership 
positions 
Most MPs Most MPs (Eurosceptic 
MPs) 
Few MPs 
Political positioning Majority MPs Majority + pro-European 
opposition MPs 
Majority + opposition 
MPs 
Participation in 
interparliamentary 
conferences 
Most MPs (COSAC) Few MPs Few MPs 
Government experience Few MPs Few MPs Few MPs 
Membership in national 
union 
No No No 
Source: Own summary, based on biographical data and interviews. 
The way and the extent MPs (re)interpret their parliament’s role in EU affairs highly 
depends on how sensitised they are to EU issues. The analysis of their sociological profiles 
shows that only the most sensitised MPs, i.e. MPs with an extensive experience linked to EU 
affairs, led the discussions on parliamentary reforms. 
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The normative origins of change: MPs’ normative interpretation of their parliament’s 
role in the EU 
Through interviews with (former) MPs and civil servants of the parliamentary 
administration, as well as minutes of committee meetings and plenary sessions, we identified 
three different ways of perceiving parliamentary power in EU affairs. Normative interpretation 
of parliamentary strength depends also on each country’s position towards European 
integration.  
As we saw earlier in this chapter, Luxembourg is the most euro-friendly country of all 
three cases. It supports deeper integration and federalisation trends. The chamber’s document-
based scrutiny system also focuses on the scrutiny of documents coming from the European 
Institutions instead of the national government. Overall, MPs wish to reinforce their 
Parliament’s scrutiny procedures, but also support the strengthening of the European Parliament 
(Interview 4, 21, 2017). Moreover, the Chamber of Deputies encourages interparliamentary 
cooperation, because it allows MPs to diversify their information sources and build EU-level 
contact networks (Interview 5, 2017). EU-level cooperation represents an advantage for the 
chamber with regard to its small size and lack of resources.  
On the contrary, the Austrian and Finnish chambers have similar opinions on their 
parliament’s role in the EU. MPs (mostly from the majority) and civil servants are usually 
satisfied with their scrutiny systems (Interview 18a, 2017). In both parliaments, the emphasis is 
put on the control of governmental positions, while EU documents serve as background 
information. The scrutiny of national positions and the strong focus on parliamentary 
sovereignty are characteristic of both cases. However, Austrian MPs and civil servants 
acknowledge that improvements are necessary (Interview 6a, 16a, 2017), while Finnish 
parliamentary players affirm that their scrutiny system counts among the strongest in the EU 
(Interview 2b, 5b, 2018). Interviews showed that Finnish MPs and parliamentary civil servants 
did not see institutional change as a necessity, considering that their scrutiny system was already 
strong enough. Moreover, there is a general perception in the Eduskunta that interparliamentary 
conferences, contacts with MEPs and reasoned opinions in the framework of the subsidiarity 
mechanism do not constitute an added value to Parliament’s EU scrutiny (Interview 1b, 2b, 4b, 
5b, 2018). Indeed, MPs’ belief that they exert strong government control and benefit from a 
well-functioning information policy does not encourage them to further develop their 
procedures, especially not at the expense of their domestic-centred EU scrutiny system. These 
elements validate sub-hypothesis H3.1, because MPs evolving in a strong scrutiny system did 
not deem it necessary to initiate change. 
While Austrian and Luxembourgish MPs thought of constantly improving their own 
procedures, institutional change within the Finnish chamber remained circumscribed. Even 
though the dynamics of change looked similar in the Luxembourg and Finnish chambers, the 
reasons differ. Indeed, the absence of substantial change within the Chamber of Deputies can 
best be explained by its lack of resources and the predominance of the Luxembourg Government 
over parliamentary work. In the Eduskunta, the general reluctance towards change comes from 
the general opinion that the scrutiny system should remain as it is. While in the first case, the 
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political will is present but implementation is lacking, in the second case, there is a clear lack 
of political will to trigger reforms because of a strong normative belief.  
The table hereunder sums up the correlation between countries’ position on European 
integration and MPs’ opinion on the role of their parliament in EU affairs. 
Table 32: Correlation between countries’ position on European integration and MPs’ 
opinion of the role of their parliament in EU affairs 
 Country’s position on European 
integration 
Opinion of NPs’ role in EU 
politics 
National Council, Austria Pro-European with caution 
concerning sovereignty and 
neutrality  
- Strengthen national scrutiny 
model and encourage NPs’ role on 
the EU level 
- Further institutional change 
necessary 
Eduskunta, Finland Pro-European with caution 
concerning sovereignty, neutrality 
and defence 
- Strengthen national scrutiny 
model 
- Scepticism about efficiency of 
subsidiarity control mechanism 
and interparliamentary cooperation 
- No further institutional change 
necessary 
Chamber of Deputies, 
Luxembourg 
Pro-European - Strengthen national scrutiny 
model and encourage NPs’/ EP’s 
role on the EU level 
- Further institutional change 
necessary 
Source: Own compilation. 
We observe that MPs’ perception of their parliament’s role in EU affairs depends on the 
way European integration is perceived in each country. The table gives an overview of a general 
feeling, without entering into details on each party’s position. On the one hand, we observe that 
the fundamentally strong pro-European feeling among Luxembourgish MPs pushed them to 
encourage further institutional changes on the European level. This could explain why the 
Chamber of Deputies’ scrutiny model encourages to a greater extent direct communication with 
EU representatives rather than the control of governmental positions. On the other hand, Austria 
and Finland joined the EU much later and were still attached to old-established principles such 
as a strong state sovereignty and neutrality. In Austria, the parliament adapted to European 
integration on paper, but certain practices568 show that parliament’s mentality is still focused on 
domestic-based matters. Finally, the Eduskunta is the least prepared to change its institutional 
settings, because it is very confident in its strong domestic-based scrutiny model. Both the 
Austrian and Finnish parliaments have mandate-based scrutiny models, but the particularity of 
the Eduskunta is its strong belief that it can efficiently control its government’s EU policy 
without relying on EU-based formats (such as interparliamentary cooperation, MEPs, 
subsidiarity control, etc). The reason might lie in the fact that the country’s recent independence 
from Russia and its rather utilitarian way of conceiving the EU at the beginning forged a strong 
feeling among Finnish political actors that they needed to preserve their recently recovered 
political sovereignty. In that sense, the Eduskunta conceived its strong scrutiny system 
 
568 Such as the low submission of reasoned opinions or the low participation of MEPs in parliamentary discussions. 
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accordingly, putting an emphasis on government control rather than on the sole screening of 
EU documents. 
These observations lead us to arguments of Sociological Institutionalism, according to 
which agents’ actions are defined by their institutional framework made among others of 
cultures, symbol systems and cognitive scripts. Institutions (parliaments) contribute to the 
formation of agents’ identities and beliefs. The opposite also applies: agents shape their 
institutional environment through their personal beliefs and perceptions. In the case of EU and 
intergovernmental treaties, the evolution of legal provisions on parliamentary rights on the EU 
level created a legal gap on the national level. Therefore, a gap also appeared between MPs’ 
normative perception of their parliament’s role in EU affairs and the status quo of their scrutiny 
system. In some cases, especially in the Luxembourg and Austrian chambers, MPs became 
dissatisfied with the existing rules that did not guarantee proper participation rights in EU 
affairs. Institutional change happened therefore through bottom-up dynamics originating from 
MPs’ normative reinterpretation of their parliaments’ role in the EU. However, the 
reinterpretation of parliaments’ functions does not mean that new rules were effectively 
implemented. Indeed, the best example is the Luxembourg chamber, where most suggestions 
were not applied. This leads us to the last factor of change: MPs’ parliamentary culture, which 
determined who embodied the political will to initiate reforms.  
The political or rational origins of change: MPs’ parliamentary culture 
Whether relations between majority and opposition MPs were consensual or conflictual 
determined which “political entrepreneurs” of change became active and to what extent. The 
normative reinterpretation of rules as outlined above depended highly on parliamentary culture. 
Both Sociological Institutionalism and the Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change argue 
that change is caused by a dissatisfaction about existing rules. However, the motivations behind 
the modification of MPs’ legal framework manifest themselves differently: they originate either 
from personal conviction or from political contestation leading to political competition. We 
discovered that the more a system was consensual, the more the motivation of “political 
entrepreneurs” was driven by single MPs with a strong personal belief that parliamentary rights 
should be strengthened. Their motivations originated from the belief that only their actions 
could help to raise awareness about the need to reform the scrutiny system. As EU-
professionals, they had the legitimacy and credibility to appear as the most competent leaders 
of change. In a consensual atmosphere, majority and opposition both agree on the direction of 
change, with majority MPs mainly leading the process. On the contrary, the more a system 
showed signs of conflicts and political competition between actors, the more parliamentary 
reforms became a political matter and mobilised entire parliamentary groups. Institutional 
change obeyed political strategies and opposition groups pushed reforms to increase their 
scrutiny rights in parliament. In the Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change, agents 
compete over the rule reinterpretation and try to build coalitions with agents having similar 
positions.  
If we apply these observations to the studied treaties, we find without surprise that 
initiators of change within the Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies relied mainly on personal 
motivations. Relations between opposition and majority on institutional change were highly 
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consensual, despite some tensions with the ADR during the Constitutional Treaty, the ESM and 
the TSCG. MPs with highly professionalised and “Europeanised” profiles led the discussions. 
The absence of conflicts between parliamentary groups over the direction of change allowed 
single MPs, mainly from the majority, to orient the discussions according to their personal 
beliefs rather than political considerations. Pro-European opposition MPs supported the 
majority’s initiatives. The best example is the fact that a single senior LSAP MP who chaired 
the EAC between the Constitutional Treaty and the economic crisis engaged into the most 
debates about scrutiny revisions, because he was deeply convinced about the need to promote 
EU matters in the chamber.  
Within the Austrian National Council, consensus on institutional change reigned until 
the Lisbon Treaty. Eurosceptic parties such as the FPÖ supported revisions of the scrutiny 
system in the context of the Constitutional Treaty, probably because they were in the majority. 
At that time, all parliamentary groups unanimously initiated reform proposals. However, after 
2005, the FPÖ started to become sceptical about certain scrutiny tools, such as the subsidiarity 
control mechanism established by the Lisbon Treaty. Therefore, consensus over procedural 
amendments prevailed only among majority and pro-European opposition MPs. The situation 
changed during the economic crisis, where we observed the emergence of polarisation trends 
between parties. This time, pro-European opposition MPs from the Green parliamentary group 
pushed the majority to initiate reforms in exchange for their support with the ratification of the 
ESM treaty. Here, we can say that institutional change happened through political pressure 
originating from higher ideological polarisation. The origin of change within the National 
Council was mostly political, even though individual MPs stood out as the main “political 
entrepreneurs” of change. However, party politics still played a more important role.  
Within the Eduskunta, the dynamics between parliamentary groups resembled those in 
the Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies until the Lisbon Treaty. The first EU-review Committee 
was composed of both opposition and majority MPs from all parliamentary groups. All groups 
drafted together the committee report in 2005. In the context of the Lisbon Treaty, the second 
EU-review Committee was only composed of majority MPs. However, all groups agreed on the 
amendments made to the RoP. In that case, we could identify only a few “political 
entrepreneurs” of change with highly professionalised profiles. The main reason could be the 
general lack of interest for institutional change due to the above-mentioned perception that the 
Eduskunta’s scrutiny system already counts among the strongest in the EU. In that case, few 
MPs with “Europeanised” profiles endorsed the roles of amendment initiators. While the 
economic crisis fuelled ideological conflicts between the parties, consensus on the need to 
strengthen parliament’s budgetary competences also prevailed between majority and opposition 
MPs (both pro-European and Eurosceptic). However, the increased polarisation between parties 
even transformed discourses on institutional change into political advocacy. The fact that 
parliament’s scrutiny power was discussed publicly in plenaries instead of committees like 
previously shows that parliamentary groups aimed to publicise the matter in the same line as 
discussions on the ESM or the TSCG. The mediatisation of discussions on institutional change 
put MPs focusing on political strategies on the centre stage rather than MPs with personal 
convictions. This explains why the “political entrepreneurs” of change were split between 
senior MPs from the GC and recently elected MPs from the Finance Committee. The first had 
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a “Europeanised” profile and had already triggered amendments in the wake of the past treaties. 
The second got interested in parliament’s budgetary competences as part of their ideological 
fight against the government’s EU policy.  
 To end, whether parliamentary culture was consensual or conflictual determined how 
“political entrepreneurs” behaved.  The more polarised the political positions on a treaty, the 
more MPs initiating change followed political strategies rather than personal beliefs. Therefore, 
we can validate sub-hypothesis H3.2, because “Europeanised” MPs tended to be more involved 
in consensual environments, while “technicians” started to engage in institutional change when 
their political environment became conflictual. In the case of the Austrian and Finnish chambers 
in the context of the economic crisis, we can clearly say that contestation, competition and to 
some extent coalition-building between MPs triggered institutional change, as underlined by 
the Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change. In the case of the Luxembourg Chamber of 
Deputies and the two other chambers until the Lisbon Treaty, the consensual atmosphere 
permitted “Europeanised” MPs with strong convictions towards European integration to be the 
main drivers of change. In that case, arguments from Sociological Institutionalism apply.  
 
8.4.3 Conclusion 
 
In the last section, we analysed institutional change and its origins through the lenses of 
Sociological Institutionalism and the Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change. We identified 
two types of factors that influenced institutional change in the chambers. Both institutional and 
motivational factors showed similarities and differences between the cases. Overall, we can say 
that the direction of change depended to some extent on the salience of the treaties and the gap 
between new EU-level provisions regarding parliamentary participation in EU affairs and 
national scrutiny systems. We observed that change took the form of “layering” and “drift”. 
Whenever MPs did not initiate change, they did it because of divergent reasons: the 
predominance of governmental parties in a highly consensual atmosphere that gave them the 
leverage to decide about institutional change; the lack of parliamentary resources to conduct 
change; the absence of political will linked to a general perception that change is not needed.  
Motivational factors indicate how MPs used their institutional framework and the context 
of the treaties to initiate change. We discovered that MPs’ general perception about European 
integration and more importantly, the strength of their scrutiny system affected institutional 
change. Moreover, MPs’ socio-demographic features showed that key players with 
“Europeanised” and professionalised profiles were the main “political entrepreneurs” of 
change. Finally, parliamentary culture also influenced their actions. Indeed, whether political 
relations were consensual or conflictual determined whether “political entrepreneurs” of change 
were motivated by personal beliefs or by political strategies.  
To sum up, both institutional and motivational factors found to be the drivers of institutional 
change more or less underpinned parliamentary activity. Here we cannot dissociate both 
dimensions, as agents and structures influence themselves mutually. 
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8.5 Summary and conclusion 
 
The present chapter aimed at comparing parliamentary involvement in the Luxembourg 
Chamber of Deputies, the Austrian National Council and the Finnish Eduskunta. The first 
sections analysed the chambers’ institutional framework and its influence on parliamentary 
involvement. We noticed that the nature itself of political systems and the general perception 
about European integration represented crucial incentives for parliamentary involvement. The 
more a parliament evolved in a consensual and pro-European environment, the less MPs 
scrutinised their government. On the contrary, the more political dynamics became conflictual 
and Eurosceptic groups emerged, the more MPs scrutinised their government. Even though we 
cannot apply this argument to every treaty, we can say that the treaties’ salience affected MPs’ 
awareness about EU affairs and motivated adversaries of the government’s EU policy to 
become active. However, their actions were limited by the fact that large pro-European 
majorities in parliament outnumbered them. Overall, hypothesis H1 can be partially confirmed 
with regard to these observations. 
The analysis of parliaments’ formal capacities and their evolution shows that the rankings 
established by several authors in the Europeanisation literature569 turn out to be accurate from 
a purely institutional point of view. The Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies counts among the 
weakest parliaments in terms of EU scrutiny strength, while the Austrian National Council and 
the Finnish Eduskunta count among the strongest. Even though Austria and Finland joined the 
EU only in 1995, their parliaments adapted very quickly to European integration. The main 
difference with the Luxembourg Chamber is their strong ex-ante control rights, including a 
strong information policy and a mandating system. Overall, the institutionalisation level of EU 
scrutiny systems is low in the Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies and high in the two other 
cases. Formal capacities affect among others parliamentary activity, in the sense that the weaker 
MPs’ rights and resources, the less they are able to scrutinise their government’s EU policy, 
and the more the governmental majority monopolises the decision-making process.  
The analysis of the evolution of parliamentary activity in the three chambers showed 
that national elections and the treaties themselves both affected the most MPs’ activities. 
Scrutiny of EU affairs diminished each time national legislative elections were organised. EU 
treaties and intergovernmental treaties on the EMU triggered more activity, but not 
automatically related to the treaties themselves. Overall, we observed that fluctuations in 
parliamentary activity could be explained by different salience perceptions, but also by the 
polarisation level between parliamentary groups, i.e. parliamentary culture. As explained above, 
the higher the logic of competition over EU affairs among parliamentary groups, the higher 
parliamentary activity. Depending on the salience and polarisation level within each chamber, 
MPs’ socio-demographic features also affected their motivations to engage in the scrutiny of 
the treaties. Indeed, we identified two ideal-typical profiles of key players: “pragmatic users” 
of EU affairs and “MPs socialised into European norms” or MPs with “Europeanised” profiles. 
We observed that the more each chamber’s political environment became conflictual and/or 
polarised, the more “pragmatic users” became active with the objective to instrumentalise the 
 
569 See Auel et al. (2015), Bergman (1997), Karlas (2011), Winzen (2012). 
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treaties to publicise their positions and gain electoral benefits. On the contrary, MPs with 
“Europeanised” profiles (usually EAC members) were constantly active because the treaties fell 
into their field of competences. They followed the treaties, because they had strong beliefs with 
regard to European integration. Overall, we can say that the salience level of the four treaties 
affected MPs’ awareness about EU affairs and thus the mainstreaming of EU affairs in 
parliament. In all three cases, we observed mainstreaming trends, but only within a restrained 
circle of MPs. Therefore, we can validate hypothesis H2, even though the scope of 
mainstreaming remained circumscribed. Sectoral committee MPs who mainly endorsed the role 
of “pragmatic users” of EU affairs became particularly active during the Constitutional Treaty 
(in Luxembourg and Austria) and the economic crisis (all three cases). 
Finally, the last section focused on institutional change within the chambers. In all three 
chambers, change happened through either “layering” or “drift”. We saw that the same factors 
that influenced parliamentary activity also affected institutional change: MPs’ perception about 
their parliament’s role in the EU, MPs’ socio-demographic features and their parliamentary 
culture. The higher MPs’ satisfaction about their scrutiny system, the less they were inclined to 
amend it. Moreover, MPs with “Europeanised” profiles were the main initiators of change, 
because their extensive experience linked to EU affairs made them more legitimate to lead 
amendment processes. However, we noticed again that the more conflictual the political 
environment, the more recently elected MPs with “technician” profiles, i.e. the “pragmatic 
users”, become also active in promoting institutional change. The latter depended not only on 
the gap between EU-level provisions and national scrutiny systems, but also on different other 
factors outlined above. Therefore, we can partially validate hypothesis H3.  
Overall, we concluded that parliamentary culture and MPs’ profiles mainly affected the 
way they perceived the four treaties and thus their parliamentary involvement. The scheme 
hereunder shows the motivational origins of parliamentary involvement in EU and 
intergovernmental treaty negotiations.  
 
Source: Own summary. 
Of course, institutional factors such as parliament’s formal capacities, the presence of 
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accession to the EU affected as well MPs’ motivations and their parliamentary involvement. 
However, we emphasise here the sociological dimension of motivations, as these have been 
barely outlined in previous Europeanisation studies. The scheme can also be applied to the 
analysis of parliamentary involvement with regard to the implementation of regular EU public 
policies on the national level.  
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Chapter 9. Conclusion 
 
The present thesis aimed to study variations and origins of parliamentary involvement 
in a historical-comparative perspective. Parliamentary involvement was understood in the thesis 
as both parliamentary activity and institutional change within parliaments. The Luxembourg 
Chamber of Deputies, the Austrian National Council and the Finnish Eduskunta served as 
research objects in a bid to conduct in-depth analyses on the evolution of parliamentary 
involvement during negotiations on EU treaties and intergovernmental treaties on the EMU. 
We assumed that these extraordinary events would trigger larger attention among MPs and 
encourage them to scrutinise actively their government’s EU policy. We used both historical 
and sociological institutionalist approaches to understand the link between institutional, 
temporal and motivational factors triggering parliamentary activity and institutional change 
with regard to EU affairs. The Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change was meant to help 
us explain the dynamics and origins of institutional change within our parliaments. The 
motivational approach served to study MPs’ incentives underpinning parliamentary 
involvement. Contrary to most studies undergone on parliaments’ adaptation to European 
integration, we decided to narrow down the research in order to open the parliamentary “black 
box”. 
Previous literature on Europeanisation already acknowledged the differences between 
our three cases in terms of formal parliamentary strength in EU affairs (Auel/Rozenberg/Tacea, 
In: Hefftler/Neuhold/Rozenberg/Smith, 2015; Karlas, 2011; Maurer/Wessels, 2001; Raunio, 
2005; Winzen, 2012). Authors concluded that formally, the Eduskunta had the strongest 
scrutiny system, while the Austrian Parliament was placed in the middle of the rankings and the 
Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies at the bottom end. The choice of the chambers in 
Luxembourg, Austria and Finland base precisely on the conclusions made on their formal 
capacities. The main outcome in our study was the diverging capacities of our parliaments in 
terms of scrutiny of EU affairs. Starting from there, we sought to go beyond the sole analysis 
of formal capacities and to focus on MPs’ motivations to use parliamentary instruments and 
reform their institutional framework. We sought to understand why these parliaments had 
different powers in EU affairs despite two assumed similarities: their size (all three are 
considered small chambers) and their political system570 (based on consensus and governmental 
coalitions). An additional difference between the cases that we had to take into consideration 
was also their date of EU accession, which we expected would influence MPs’ opinion on 
European integration and subsequently their involvement in EU affairs.  
One main question guided this thesis: How does parliamentary involvement in EU 
affairs vary across small European parliaments in the context of EU and intergovernmental 
treaty negotiations? 
To answer this question, we developed a series of hypotheses illustrating our expectations: 
 
570 This assumption would prove to be partially wrong in Austria after 2005 and Finland from the economic crisis 
onwards. 
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H1: The higher the ideological polarisation on EU affairs between parties, the higher was 
parliamentary activity during EU and intergovernmental treaty negotiations. 
We assumed that the ideological gap between parliamentary groups on European integration 
and the treaties would encourage MPs to seize scrutiny instruments to control their government. 
Whether they were in the majority or opposition, and whether they positioned themselves as 
pro- or anti-European affected their involvement in EU affairs. 
H2: The higher the salience of EU treaties and intergovernmental treaties on the EMU 
within parliament, the more likely trends towards the mainstreaming of EU affairs 
emerged.  
The second hypothesis focused on the socio-demographic features of MPs and assumed that the 
more salient a treaty, the more widespread the attention and involvement in parliament. 
However, we also assumed that the core key players would be MPs with an EU-expert profile. 
H 3: The higher the perceived misfit between treaty provisions on parliamentary 
participation rights and domestic parliamentary scrutiny systems, the more MPs initiated 
institutional change. 
Finally, we checked for “misfits” between provisions on parliamentary participation developed 
on the EU level and parliaments’ scrutiny systems. We thought that the stronger parliamentary 
procedures on EU affairs, the less institutional change would happen. Moreover, we assumed 
that the drivers of change would be MPs with higher experience in EU matters than the average. 
The direction of change would take the form of “layering”, i.e. the addition of new rules onto 
old ones. 
The following sections will present the main results of the thesis, as well as the strengths and 
limitations of our analysis. The last section will focus on the outlook and suggestions for future 
research. 
 
9.1 Main results 
 
Each empirical chapter aimed to explain in detail the evolution and motivational origins 
of parliamentary activity and institutional change in the studied chambers. The comparison 
between the cases permitted to show trends in parliamentary involvement, as well as to identify 
the main factors underpinning MPs’ involvement in EU affairs.  
The first section will focus on the trends observed in the three chambers, while the 
second section will sum up the explanatory factors. 
 
 
 
441 
 
9.1.1 Evolutionary trends of parliamentary involvement in EU affairs 
 
1. Parliamentary activity in the three chambers varied alongside treaty negotiations on 
the EU level and national legislative elections.  
We analysed the evolution of parliamentary activity in the three chambers by counting 
the number of EAC meetings, parliamentary questions and motions on EU affairs, as well as 
question hours or topical debates on EU issues between 2002 and 2015. We observed in our 
comparative chapter (Chapter 8) that MPs’ activity in EU affairs fluctuated alongside EU and 
intergovernmental treaty negotiations, without necessarily being related to them. Parliamentary 
questions on EU issues illustrated best these trends. In the context of the Constitutional Treaty 
(2004-2005), the Lisbon Treaty (2007-2009), the ESM and the TSCG (2011-2012), the number 
of questions reached peaks. Moreover, we also noticed that legislative elections put each time 
a halt on parliamentary activity in EU affairs in all the chambers. Prior to the elections, MPs 
might become focused on their election campaign, while after the elections, parliaments have 
to start a new legislative period with new members who might not be familiar with 
parliamentary work. Overall, the punctual boosts of parliamentary activity were not 
systematically correlated with the salience of the treaties. Indeed, as we saw in chapter 8, MPs’ 
involvement depended also on the nature itself of their political system. For instance, we 
observed that in post-consociational contexts such as in Austria after 2005 or Finland after the 
2011 elections, polarisation and competition between parties triggered higher activity levels 
within parliaments.  
Overall, government parties dominated the discussions over the treaties, while opposition MPs 
used the most the scrutiny instruments. Eurosceptic MPs were the most active in the Austrian 
and Finnish chambers during the economic crisis, especially because of the growing dissent and 
polarisation trends between the mainstream majority parties and the opposition (both 
Eurosceptic and pro-European). Among the used scrutiny instruments, we saw that 
Luxembourgish MPs used mostly PQs, while Austrian MPs used mostly motions and Finnish 
MPs (dissenting) committee opinions. The main reason for these differences lies in their 
respective scrutiny systems. Indeed, contrary to Luxembourgish MPs, Austrian and Finnish 
MPs controlled their government’s negotiation position on the treaties rather than solely EU 
documents. This illustrates the difference between a document-based scrutiny system 
(Luxembourg) and a mandating system (Austria and Finland). Moreover, as hypothesis H1 
suggests, we expected ideological polarisation between the parties to fuel larger attention on 
the treaties from MPs’ side. The empirical analysis showed that the higher the ideological 
distance and the competition between parliamentary groups, the more MPs were scrutinising 
the treaties. This was especially the case in the context of the ESM and TSCG in the Austrian 
and Finnish chambers, where Eurosceptic MPs expressed harsh criticism towards their 
governments’ EU policy. Therefore, to some extent, the peaks of activity observed during the 
economic crisis might originate from this highly competitive mood between the parties, even 
though scrutiny instruments on the ESM and TSCG themselves were not used as much as during 
the previous treaties. The Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies turned out to be the exception, as 
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we could not identify any clear polarisation trends due to its deeply entrenched consensual 
system that limited ideological gaps. 
2. A limited circle of key players made the most use of their scrutiny system to control the 
treaty negotiations. Either they were “pragmatic users” of EU affairs or “MPs socialised 
into EU norms”. The latter were also the main “political entrepreneurs” of change in the 
three chambers.  
Sociological Institutionalism and the motivational approach helped to understand how 
a specific ideal-type of MPs monopolised the debates and the scrutiny of EU treaties and 
intergovernmental treaties on the EMU. We expected the treaties to encourage a mainstreaming 
of EU affairs within the three chambers (hypothesis H2), but the empirical results show that 
only two main types of key players were involved regularly in discussions: “pragmatic users” 
of EU affairs or “MPs socialised into EU norms”. The first ideal-type of MPs focuses on the 
use of EU topics to defend national interests. The high salience of EU affairs and the ideological 
polarisation between parliamentary groups encourages “technician” MPs to instrumentalise EU 
topics, especially for re-election purposes. Typically, “pragmatic users” belong to sectoral 
committees and/or the opposition (mostly Eurosceptic). Contrary to EU specialists, they exerted 
recent parliamentary mandates and had few or no experience linked to EU matters. These MPs 
were particularly active during the economic crisis, when they had the opportunity to make their 
criticism towards their government’s EU policy public in parliament, in a context of 
disaggregating popular trust towards mainstream parties.  
These elements seem to contradict arguments from Sociological Institutionalism, 
because agents’ motivations originated from rational interests rather than normative/ non-
rational considerations. Therefore, the result is interesting in the sense that we could see a clear 
division between key players that based their involvement on rational-strategical motivations, 
and EU-experts who relied on personal and cognitive considerations. The latter “MPs socialised 
into European norms” represent overall the most active category of key players across the 
studied period. Contrary to “pragmatic users”, they get involved in EU affairs in the name of 
the “EU’s interests” and tend to prioritise EU-level issues. MPs with this profile have usually 
long-lasting parliamentary mandates, are EAC members or EU group speakers, participate 
regularly in interparliamentary meetings, are more prone to have prior government experience 
and had professional and/or political experience closely linked to EU affairs. This category of 
MPs dominated discussions on treaties that were perceived as less salient by the rest of the 
parliament, such as the Lisbon Treaty for instance. Due to their highly professionalised and 
“Europeanised” profiles, they appeared to be the most legitimate players to deal with treaty 
negotiations, but also institutional reforms. Indeed, “political entrepreneurs” of change were 
mainly MPs with “Europeanised” profiles that followed closely institutional developments on 
the EU level. An exception would be again the context of the ESM and TSCG, where the higher 
polarisation and the technical nature of the EU topics pushed sectoral committee members with 
recent mandates to become as well “political entrepreneurs” of change in the Eduskunta.  
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3. Institutional change happened through either “layering” or “drift” and followed quite 
similar patterns in all three chambers. 
Using the Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change, we analysed the direction and 
origin of change in all three chambers, trying to provide an answer to the hypothesis H3. We 
assumed that change would happen through “layering”, i.e. through gradual amendments to 
existing formal rules. The empirical results show that “layering” was indeed a predominant 
dynamic of change, but that “drift” happened in the Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies in the 
context of the ESM/TSCG and in the Finnish Eduskunta in the context of the Constitutional 
Treaty as well as the ESM/TSCG.  
Overall, whenever reforms happened, then usually in the wake of EU and 
intergovernmental treaty ratification, which reflects the same trends observed for parliamentary 
activity. “Drift” in the Chamber of Deputies might come from the reluctance of coalition-
affiliated parliamentary groups to reform the scrutiny system despite some MPs mentioning the 
need to reinforce the chamber’s competences in EU affairs. Moreover, the lack of resources 
combined with the predominance of government forces over parliamentary work due to the 
absence of binding scrutiny instruments probably dampened MPs’ efforts to initiate reforms.  
On the contrary, the absence of change in the Eduskunta emanates from the general 
perception that the chamber’s scrutiny model counts among the strongest and most developed 
one in the EU. Therefore, MPs did not see the need to reform their institutional framework. On 
the contrary, the Austrian National Council continuously amended its formal rules. While the 
Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies emphasised the establishment of instruments enhancing the 
direct communication with EU Institutions, the two other chambers focused on instruments 
destined for the scrutiny of their government’s positions in EU affairs. Even though the Austrian 
and Finnish chambers included for instance the subsidiarity monitoring mechanism in their 
formal rules, they barely used it. As we will see later, MPs’ normative perception on their 
parliament’s role in European integration constitutes the main explanatory factor of such a 
behaviour towards change.  
 
9.1.2 Explanatory factors of parliamentary involvement in EU affairs 
 
4. Parliamentary involvement, i.e. the extent to which MPs’ used parliamentary 
instruments and thought about institutional reforms during EU and intergovernmental 
treaty negotiations was predetermined by four explanatory factors: 
a. Chambers’ formal capacities: the nature and institutionalisation level of chambers’ scrutiny 
systems, confirming previous studies571. 
Previous rankings based on the institutional strength of parliaments in EU affairs usually 
acknowledged the Eduskunta’s strong formal capacities by classifying the chamber on the top 
 
571 See Auel/Rozenberg/Tacea, In: Hefftler/Neuhold/Rozenberg/Smith, 2015; Karlas, 2011; Maurer/Wessels, 
2001; Raunio, 2005; Winzen, 2012 
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of the scale, alongside the Danish Parliament (for instance Auel/Rozenberg/Tacea, In: 
Hefftler/Neuhold/Rozenberg/Smith, 2015). The Austrian Parliament appeared to be above the 
middle of the ranking, even though its scrutiny system has been considerably developed over 
the past years. Finally, the Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies is usually placed at the bottom 
end of the rankings. In our empirical analysis of the chambers’ formal powers in EU affairs, we 
can only confirm these observations and highlight the fact that they constituted one explanation 
of the scope of parliamentary involvement. Indeed, we assumed that the more scrutiny 
instruments an MP would have at his/her disposal, the more he/she would be ready to use them 
to control their government. Parliamentary activity during negotiations on EU treaties and 
intergovernmental treaties on the EMU based mostly on MPs’ institutional framework and the 
opportunities they had in terms of scrutiny tools.  
Overall, we observed that the institutionalisation level of the Luxembourg Chamber of 
Deputies’ scrutiny system is low, while the one of the Austrian and Finnish chambers is the 
most developed. The Chamber of Deputies has the least personnel resources and legal bases of 
the three cases. The autonomy level of its EAC is low compared to the EACs of the Austrian 
and Finnish chambers. The latter too can for instance take decisions in place of the plenary and 
exert more influence on EU affairs. Moreover, the diverging nature itself of the scrutiny systems 
are indicative of how much influence parliaments can have on their governments’ EU policy. 
While the Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies focuses mostly on the screening of EU documents 
(document-based scrutiny system), the Austrian and Finnish chambers have mandate-based 
scrutiny systems that allow them to bind their governments to parliamentary positions. 
Therefore, the influence on the European legislative process is different.  
Austrian and Finnish MPs have more power over their governmental representatives 
than Luxembourgish MPs. The close relation between parliament and government in the 
formulation of EU positions in Austria and Finland gives more power to MPs and encourages 
them to participate actively in the legislative process. The most important determinant is the 
way and the extent to which MPs decide to make use of scrutiny instruments. For instance, even 
though the Finnish and Luxembourg chambers have the least written rules compared to the 
Austrian chamber, the first established strong and systematic control practices, while the second 
remains quite passive towards its government with the low implementation of its cooperation 
memorandum (Interview 14, 2017). We saw that the Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies’ 
scrutiny system was turned towards the EU level, while the Austrian and Finnish chambers’ 
scrutiny system focused primarily on national positions on EU matters. 
With regard to the second component of parliamentary involvement, institutional 
change, we assumed that the strength of a scrutiny system would affect the scope and direction 
of change within parliaments. The empirical study shows that this assumption is only partially 
verified. Indeed, the Finnish chamber was involved in the least changes, because MPs were 
generally satisfied with their scrutiny system and thought of it as the strongest in the EU. 
However, even though the Austrian Parliament had developed substantial rules on its 
participation in EU affairs in 1995, it continuously amended its formal rules. Therefore, we 
cannot clearly state that the stronger a scrutiny system, the less MPs engage in parliamentary 
reforms. Indeed, the Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies debated and thought about amendments 
445 
 
to its scrutiny model throughout the period under analysis, even though it counts among the 
least strong parliaments in terms of formal capacities.  
b. Chambers’ parliamentary culture: the balance of power between majority-opposition MPs 
and the nature of their relation (consensual vs competitive). 
The institutional framework alone cannot explain entirely the patterns of parliamentary 
involvement in EU affairs. Indeed, we discovered that the nature of a country’s political system 
and the way majority and opposition MPs interact affected both parliamentary activity and 
institutional change in contexts of treaty negotiations.  
Overall, we observed that competitive political environments tended to encourage 
higher parliamentary activity within parliaments. These competitive environments increased the 
salience of certain treaties and to some extent led to larger ideological gaps and polarisation 
between parties. Luxembourg was the only case where consensus between the parties remained 
predominant throughout the entire period under analysis, with nevertheless some tensions 
around negotiations on the TSCG. Majority and opposition MPs were both equally active in 
parliamentary debates. On the contrary, political consensus faded in Austria after the split of 
the FPÖ in 2005 and its eviction from the coalition. The FPÖ and BZÖ entered into a 
competitive mood and opposed systematically the government’s EU policy. In Finland, 
consensus between the parties manifested itself through large coalitions and the predominance 
of mainstream pro-European parties until 2011. The 2011 elections represented a turning point 
towards a more competitive environment, because the PS gained substantial votes and started a 
systematic campaign of criticism against the Finnish Government’s management of the 
economic crisis.  
We found that, on the one hand, the higher the consensus between majority and 
opposition groups within parliaments, the more equally both camps got involved in the scrutiny 
of their government. On the other hand, the more competitive the system, the more opposition 
MPs used control instruments. The opposition’s ideological orientation also changed whether 
there was a consensual or competitive atmosphere. Indeed, in the absence of polarisation 
between parties, pro-European opposition MPs tended to be the most active scrutinisers. In the 
context of the economic crisis and the growing polarisation between parties in Austria and 
Finland, Eurosceptic MPs became the most active in parliament, both through their participation 
in debates and the use of scrutiny tools. These MPs followed a strategy of systematic 
denunciation of their government’s EU policy in a bid to gain popular support among the voters. 
On the contrary, as polarisation was absent in the Chamber of Deputies, both majority and 
opposition were equally involved in the discussions and both pro-European and sovereignist 
MPs used the scrutiny tools. Discourses from the side of the sovereignists were not as harsh and 
critical as the ones observed in the other chambers.  
Overall, we acknowledged that despite these changing political dynamics, governments 
kept control over the discussions, reports and ratification of the treaties through their politically 
affiliated committee chairs (EAC, Foreign Affairs committee and Finance committee) and 
rapporteurs. In some cases like in the Austrian and Finnish chambers, mainstream parties either 
formed larger coalitions to minimise the impact of Eurosceptic voices (Finland after 2011) or 
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bargained with ideologically close supporters to secure a large majority voting on the treaties 
(Austria in the context of the Lisbon Treaty and the ESM). 
 Parliamentary culture also played a role in the direction and origins of institutional 
change triggered by MPs. Indeed, we observed that the higher the consensus in key players’ 
political environment, the more they relied on personal motivations and convictions to trigger 
change within parliament. As political competition was absent between parties, “political 
entrepreneurs” of change tended to be MPs with “Europeanised” profiles who made reform 
initiatives their personal concern. Growing tensions and competition between parties such as in 
Austria after 2005 and Finland after 2011 saw “technicians” get interested in reforms for 
politically strategical reasons. This observation confirmed the argument of the Theory of 
Endogenous Institutional Change, according to which change originates from the competition 
between actors, who try to form coalitions to reinterpret rules. In the Austrian National Council, 
the Greens bargained their support to the ESM in exchange of amendments to the parliament’s 
participation rights in EU affairs. Within the Eduskunta, the Eurosceptic PS publicly discussed 
the chamber’s role in the EU as part of its strategy to gain electoral support.  
c. MPs’ socio-demographic features: MPs’ experiences linked to EU affairs and their impact 
on their motivations to scrutinise EU affairs. 
As we saw earlier, whether MPs had a “Europeanised” or a “technical” profile 
influenced their motivations to get involvement in the scrutiny of EU treaties and 
intergovernmental treaties on the EMU. The more an MP is sensitised to EU affairs through 
previous or current experiences, the more likely he/she will actively follow treaty negotiations 
and push institutional reforms in a bid to strengthen the chamber’s participation rights. 
Founding on the motivational approach, we observed that whether “pragmatic users” or “MPs 
socialised into EU norms” became key players of parliamentary debates and institutional change 
in the context of treaty negotiations depended mainly on the parliamentary culture, i.e. the 
relation between majority and opposition. Indeed, the analysis of the users of scrutiny 
instruments, the authors of parliamentary reports or the chairs of the main competent 
committees and bodies created to think about amendments to the scrutiny system showed that 
MPs with “Europeanised” profiles were predominant players in highly consensual political 
environments. The higher the consensus between the majority and opposition, the more MPs 
delegate the scrutiny of EU matters to the most competent among them, who had already an 
extensive experience linked to the EU. In this context, MPs with “Europeanised” profiles 
seemed to be the most legitimate and credible to deal with treaties and institutional change. 
They were able to act according to personal convictions with regard to European integration, 
rather than political considerations.  
In the Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies, this category of MPs dominated the debates 
throughout the entire period. On the contrary, in the Finnish chamber, the growing polarisation 
during the Lisbon Treaty and the economic crisis encouraged “technicians” or “pragmatic 
users” to take up the role of active scrutinisers and initiators of change alongside MPs 
“socialised into EU norms”. The Austrian case represents somewhat an exception, because 
“pragmatic users” tended to be more involved during the Constitutional Treaty, even though 
polarisation was low between the parliamentary groups. Moreover, when the ideological gap 
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became bigger between pro-European parties and the FPÖ-BZÖ in the context of the Lisbon 
Treaty, MPs with “Europeanised” profiles occupied the frontstage. An explanation could be for 
the first the dominant role played by pro-European MPs from sectoral committees (SPÖ and 
Grüne) in the scrutiny of the Constitutional Treaty. As they were under-represented in the EAC 
because in the opposition, they used their political leaders to insist on the ratification of the 
treaty. Therefore, these MPs were not automatically the most sensitised to EU affairs, because 
political reasons motivated primarily their engagement in government scrutiny. The second 
exception during the Lisbon Treaty can be explained by the fact that active MPs came mainly 
from the Eurosceptic opposition (FPÖ-BZÖ) and were also member of the EAC. Key players 
tended to be more sensitised to EU affairs, even though they held anti-EU discourses. 
Eurosceptic opposition MPs used their EAC membership to legitimate their interventions and 
become more active in parliament. 
In conclusion, the more competitive the relation between majority and opposition 
became, the more MPs needed to stick to the collective interest of their group/party and defend 
their ideological line. For majority MPs, sticking closer to the group discipline meant preserving 
the government’s credibility and staying united towards a stronger Eurosceptic camp. For 
Eurosceptic opposition MPs who became more active, they aimed to impose their discontent on 
the political stage. Therefore, MPs with “Europeanised” profiles turned out to be the main 
scrutinisers and “political entrepreneurs” of change in contexts of low ideological polarisation 
and low competition. In this case, change happened mainly through the normative 
reinterpretation of rules. “Pragmatic users” of EU affairs, mainly Eurosceptic opposition MPs 
and/or sectoral committee members, became the main scrutinisers and initiators of change 
alongside MPs with “Europeanised” profiles during contexts of high ideological polarisation572. 
According to the Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change, the reinterpretation of norms and 
rules happened in that case through competition and coalition formation. MPs disagreed with 
the current rules in place and tried to change them according to strategical interests. Of course, 
even in highly polarised contexts, a small circle of loyal senior MPs with “Europeanised” 
profiles continued to lead the discussions on amendments to their respective scrutiny systems.  
d. MPs’ normative interpretation of their parliament’s role in the EU: MPs’ perception of 
European integration and subsequently the role parliaments should play in EU affairs. This 
factor can be derived from MPs’ socio-demographic features. 
Finally, MPs’ ideological position towards European integration influenced not only 
parliamentary activity, but also institutional change. As we saw earlier, whether MPs were pro-
Europeans or Eurosceptics affected their use of scrutiny instruments. With regard to 
institutional change, we discovered that the more a parliament supported European integration, 
the more it favoured scrutiny instruments developed on the EU level, such as the subsidiarity 
control mechanism established by the Lisbon Treaty. Within the Luxembourg Chamber of 
Deputies, MPs supported direct contacts with EU institutions, a strengthening of the EP’s 
powers and stronger cooperation with MEPs. The Austrian and Finnish chambers started to deal 
with EU affairs only in the mid-1990s, with reluctance to abandon national competences in the 
 
572 During negotiations on the Lisbon Treaty, ESM and TSCG in the Austrian National Council, and during 
negotiations on the ESM and TSCG in the Finnish Eduskunta. 
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name of their sovereignty. Even though supporting European integration, these two parliaments 
focused on the scrutiny of national positions, rather than on EU-documents themselves. 
Considering these elements, we observed that attitudes towards institutional change followed 
the countries’ positions on European integration. The Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies 
amended its rules to incorporate the subsidiarity control mechanism and used it more often than 
the two other chambers. Even though parliamentary reforms were not numerous, MPs continued 
to debate on the need to reinforce their parliament’s participation in EU affairs, by emphasising 
in the meantime the need to strengthen cooperation on the EU level.  
In the Austrian and Finnish chambers, the focus lied in reinforcing their government 
control powers. Finnish parliamentary actors still consider the Eduskunta as having one of the 
strongest scrutiny models in the EU. Therefore, they see no necessity in amending it. On top of 
that, they express scepticism towards EU-level control instruments. Their reluctance towards a 
deeper federalisation of the EU, combined with a strongly-established cooperation system 
between parliament and government explains why further scrutiny rules are not deemed 
necessary. Within the Austrian National Council, reluctance towards an ever-closer Union was 
less pronounced, but was still present. Interviews showed that the multiple instruments 
developed in the context of the Lisbon Treaty and the ESM were and are barely used by MPs. 
In closing, the stronger the perceived parliamentary power in EU affairs and the less the 
perceived gap between EU-level provisions on parliamentary rights in EU affairs and national 
scrutiny systems, the less scrutiny rules were amended and/or implemented. Of course, we do 
not forget the influence of institutional frameworks on the scope of institutional change. In 
particular, even though Luxembourgish MPs were aware of their parliament’s weakness and 
expressed their wish to integrate it more in the European legislative process, the lack of 
personnel resources and the small infrastructure limited their reform attempts.  
We summarise the main findings of our empirical study and the results of the hypotheses testing 
in the following table: 
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Hypotheses Theoretical approach Luxembourg Austria Finland 
H1: The higher the ideological 
polarisation on EU affairs between 
parties, the higher was parliamentary 
activity during EU and 
intergovernmental treaty negotiations. 
Historical Institutionalism 
(Theory of endogenous institutional 
change) 
 
Sociological institutionalism 
(Motivational approach) 
Partially confirmed Confirmed Partially confirmed 
H1.1: Whether MPs had pro-European or 
Eurosceptic positions on European 
integration affected parliamentary 
activity in EU and intergovernmental 
treaty negotiations. 
Sociological institutionalism 
(Motivational approach) 
Confirmed Confirmed Partially confirmed 
H1.2: Whether MPs belonged to the 
majority or the opposition affected 
parliamentary activity in EU and 
intergovernmental treaty negotiations. 
Historical Institutionalism 
(Theory of endogenous institutional 
change) 
Partially confirmed Confirmed Partially confirmed 
H1.3: The higher the ideological 
polarisation between political parties on 
EU treaties and intergovernmental 
treaties on the EMU, the more MPs 
defended their party’s position and stuck 
to strong group discipline within 
parliament. 
Historical Institutionalism 
(Theory of endogenous institutional 
change) 
Not confirmed Confirmed Confirmed 
H2: The higher the salience of EU 
treaties and intergovernmental treaties 
on the EMU within parliament, the 
more likely trends towards the 
mainstreaming of EU affairs emerged. 
Sociological Institutionalism 
(Motivational approach) 
 
Historical Institutionalism 
(Theory of endogenous institutional 
change) 
Not confirmed Not confirmed Partially confirmed 
H2.1: MPs with a “Europeanised” profile 
tended to be the most involved during EU 
and intergovernmental treaty 
negotiations due to their extensive 
experience in EU affairs. 
Sociological Institutionalism 
(Motivational approach)  
Confirmed Confirmed Partially confirmed 
H2.2: The higher the ideological 
polarisation on EU treaties and 
intergovernmental treaties on the EMU, 
the more sectoral committee members 
with “technician” profiles became key 
players of parliamentary activity. 
Sociological Institutionalism 
(Motivational approach)  
Historical Institutionalism 
(Theory of endogenous institutional 
change) 
Partially confirmed Confirmed Confirmed 
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H 3: The higher the perceived misfit 
between treaty provisions on 
parliamentary participation rights and 
domestic parliamentary scrutiny 
systems, the more MPs took initiatives 
towards institutional change. 
Historical Institutionalism 
(Theory of endogenous institutional 
change) 
Partially confirmed Confirmed Partially confirmed 
H3.1 : The stronger a parliament’s 
scrutiny system, the less MPs engaged in 
institutional change. 
Historical Institutionalism 
(Theory of endogenous institutional 
change)  
Partially confirmed Not confirmed Confirmed 
H3.2: The parliamentary culture 
(conflictual vs consensual) determined 
whether MPs with “Europeanised” or 
“specialised” profiles became the 
“political entrepreneurs of change”. 
Historical Institutionalism 
(Theory of endogenous institutional 
change) 
Sociological Institutionalism 
(Motivational approach)  
Confirmed Confirmed Confirmed 
H3.3: Institutional change within 
parliaments happened through 
“layering” in the wake of the ratification 
of EU treaties and intergovernmental 
treaties on the EMU. 
Historical Institutionalism 
(Theory of endogenous institutional 
change) Partially confirmed Confirmed Partially confirmed 
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The results of our thesis are generalisable, because MPs’ motivations to get involved in 
EU affairs will certainly not differ much from our observations, even in contexts diverging from 
treaty negotiations. Indeed, whenever EU public policies are being scrutinised in parliaments, 
we assume that EAC members and EU experts from sectoral committees will keep their hands 
over EU affairs. Non-EU experts delegate the matters to their most competent colleagues 
sensitised to EU affairs. Broader attention could be expected whenever an EU directive touches 
upon a public policy considered as a national priority. In that case, as shown previously, MPs 
with strategical interests would become active alongside EU-experts. Even though motivations 
themselves would differ depending on the nature of parliaments’ political systems, their EU-
accession time, etc, the present thesis offers an analytical framework to assess parliamentary 
actors’ incentives in different contexts and institutional frameworks. The indicators developed 
to measure the motivational origins of parliamentary involvement could be used in other 
research settings, notably in the analysis of MPs’ involvement in EU affairs in general, in 
specific EU policies or in interparliamentary networks.  
 
9.2 Strengths of the present thesis 
 
The present thesis aimed to analyse parliamentary involvement in EU affairs from a 
bottom-up perspective, by highlighting the often-ignored role of agents in both parliamentary 
activity and institutional change. The complementary theoretical approach sought to study the 
interaction between MPs’ motivations and their institutional framework, using both Historical 
and Sociological Institutionalism. While previous studies on the Europeanisation of national 
parliaments ranked them according to quantitative criteria in large-N studies (Karlas, 2011; 
Maurer/Wessels, 2001; Raunio, 2005; Winzen, 2012), we decided to base on a new set of 
studies emphasising the role of parliamentary actors (Rozenberg, 2018). The Theory of 
Endogenous Institutional Change permitted not only to analyse evolutionary trends, but also to 
understand how “political entrepreneurs” of change emerged and led parliamentary reforms. 
Our focus was on parliamentary practices and their origin, as few was known on this aspect in 
our three cases. Historical Institutionalism helped us identifying the direction of change in each 
chamber, in relation to institutional developments on the EU level. Thanks to the motivational 
approach, we discovered how MPs’ socio-demographic features, their opinion on European 
integration and the role of their parliament in the EU affected their motivations and involvement 
during negotiations on EU treaties and intergovernmental treaties on the EMU. We observed 
that institutional change did not always happen in a competitive environment, as assumed by 
the Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change, but resulted also from MPs’ normative 
reinterpretation of their scrutiny system in a consensual atmosphere, hence the need to move 
away from a strictly rational and strategical vision of parliamentary involvement. In the end, if 
we make abstraction from parliaments’ formal capacities, we saw that in terms of motivations 
to get involved in EU affairs, the Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies appears to be the first in 
the ranking among our three cases. Even though the activity level in Parliament was quite 
moderate and institutional change barely implemented, all the interviewed parliamentary actors 
expressed deep interest in EU affairs. Moreover, the analysis of EAC meetings and plenary 
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debates throughout the period under analysis showed that the same key players insisted 
continuously on promoting the chamber’s role in EU affairs. Of course, we are aware that the 
motivation level depends highly on the profile of the involved MP. In the chamber’s case, a 
group of senior MPs led by the LSAP EAC Chair pushed constantly to more involvement 
between 2004 and 2013. Even sovereignist EAC members actively supported the objectives of 
the LSAP EAC Chair to increase the proportion of EU matters in Parliament. The large 
consensus helped MPs to stick to a coherent line with regard to their parliament’s role in the 
European legislative process. 
In our new ranking, the Austrian National Council would be second, because the 
enthusiasm observed among Luxembourgish MPs was not as tangible among Austrian MPs. A 
small circle of agents highly sensitised to EU matters pushed the parliament to undergo reforms 
and get more involved in EU affairs, but the growing competition with the Eurosceptic camp 
and the Eurozone crisis nuanced the tone of the debates. Moreover, several established rules 
were barely used within the chamber, such as the subsidiarity control mechanism. Cooperation 
with MEPs within the chamber was not obvious until the anchoring of their rights in another 
RoP amendment in 2015. Overall, reluctance towards aspects of European integration cast a 
shadow over MPs’ motivations and efforts to strengthen the National Council’s role in EU 
affairs. Finally, the Finnish Eduskunta lands on the last place of our small ranking, partly 
because of the strong belief of some parliamentary actors that their scrutiny model does not 
need to be reformed due to its satisfactory functioning, and partly because of the few efforts 
made to amend the scrutiny system despite some parliamentary actors affirming the opposite. 
Overall, if we compare the circle of “political entrepreneurs” of change in the Eduskunta and 
the Chamber of Deputies, we find that despite its higher number of MPs, the Finnish chamber 
has the lowest amount of key players interested in enhancing their chamber’s role in EU affairs. 
To sum up, the inclusion of motivations in our study shows different results from previous 
quantitative studies if we consider only the motivational aspect. Therefore, if we come back to 
the original dichotomy between institutional and emotional Europeanisation, we can say that 
the Europeanisation level of each chamber is different whether we consider the first or the 
second element573. Indeed, as we just illustrated, both the Austrian and Finnish chambers have 
an advanced Europeanised scrutiny system from an institutional perspective, but a rather low 
score in terms of emotional Europeanisation. Reversely, the Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies 
remains institutionally weak, but its emotional Europeanisation turns out to be more developed 
than in the two other chambers.  
 The emphasis on qualitative data, such as interviews, enabled the creation of in-depth 
and new empirical knowledge on each of our cases. Literature on the Europeanisation of the 
Luxembourg and Finnish chambers was quite sparse, while attention on the Austrian case was 
outdated. Thanks to the analysis of parliamentary documents, we managed to retrace 
chronologically the different negotiation and ratification steps of the treaties within parliaments. 
Committee reports, plenary and committee debates helped us understanding MPs’ positions on 
 
573 The difference between institutional and emotional europeanisation has also been emphasised by Olivier 
Rozenberg on the French parliament, in his book « Les députés français et l’Europe, Tristes hémicycles ? » (2018). 
The author points out that despite a gradual institutionalization of the parliament’s scrutiny system, EU affairs 
remain relevant and interesting only to a very small circle of EU experts. 
453 
 
the treaties. We completed the documentary research with more than 60 interviews with 
different parliamentary actors and representatives from other state institutions and the civil 
society. The crosschecking of information from documents and interviews gave us indications 
on the functioning of the parliaments, but most importantly on MPs’ motivations and opinions 
on the treaties and European integration.  
 
9.3 Limitations 
 
We are aware that the present thesis faces some limitations regarding the theoretical 
approach, the used data and the results. 
Firstly, we deliberately chose to use Historical and Sociological Institutionalism to 
analyse parliamentary involvement in EU affairs, because we needed to narrow down the 
research object as well as the corresponding theoretical approach. In our understanding and 
considering our research goals, we thought that these two complementary approaches were the 
most appropriate. However, we are aware that our results also show elements that could relate 
to the last strand of new-institutionalism, i.e. rational choice institutionalism. Indeed, we saw 
that some key players’ motivations were clearly rational-based instead of purely normative. 
Even though Historical Institutionalism includes both rational and cognitive elements to explain 
agents’ involvement, the thesis focused primarily on the normative origins of MP’s incentives. 
Secondly, the deliberate choice to analyse parliamentary involvement in exceptional 
cases such as treaty negotiations obviously presents a bias in terms of the category of involved 
agents. We are aware that the role of national parliaments is usually circumscribed during treaty 
negotiations, due to the predominance of governments in the process. Moreover, the small circle 
of active MPs reflected certain types of profiles that are probably not observable whenever EU 
public policies are discussed in parliament. We focused on the most involved key players, 
ignoring at the same time other actors that might deal with EU affairs, but that are maybe more 
discrete. Indeed, outside of the treaty ratification periods, sectoral committees tend to deal more 
often with EU matters alongside the EAC than during negotiations on EU treaties or 
intergovernmental treaties on the EMU. Therefore, results could be somewhat different inside 
the Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies and the Austrian National Council, because EACs would 
redistribute EU affairs to other parliamentary committees. Therefore, other actors inside the 
parliament might become active depending on the public policy in question.  
Thirdly, MPs’ motivations per se turned out to be difficult to measure exhaustively. The 
challenge lied in the absence of unanimously accepted and developed criteria on incentives in 
the secondary literature on Europeanisation. Therefore, we relied on some authors’ 
measurements (Auel/Rozenberg/Tacea, 2015; Rozenberg, 2018) and completed them with 
own-established criteria. The latter allowed us to design an interview grid that aimed at 
assessing MPs’ opinions on European integration and motivations with regard to EU matters. 
However, motivations remain a blurred concept that is difficult to grasp as a whole. 
Parliamentary actors’ discourses might not reflect accurately their real motivations, because 
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they might be subjected consciously or unconsciously to the pressure of prescribed roles from 
the institution to which they belong.  
Finally, on the practical side, we encountered challenges during the data collection. We 
relied on official data retrieved from parliaments’ websites and archives. This means that MPs’ 
informal activities are not included in our research. We are aware that the official parliamentary 
activity does not reflect entirely the actual practices, but the practical measurement of informal 
activity would not have been exhaustive either. For the Finnish case, the language barrier 
represented a considerable hurdle. Moreover, we could not access minutes of committee 
meetings, as the latter are not publicly available. The collection of statistics was difficult for 
two reasons: in the Finnish case, statistics were sometimes sparse or not compiled properly; in 
the Austrian case, the sheer amount of data forced us to proceed with key words, which probably 
concealed some data. 
 
9.4 Outlook for future research 
 
The observation made on parliamentary involvement in EU affairs between 2004 and 
2013 was indicative of trends that continued after the studied period until recently. Indeed, we 
saw that in the Austrian and Finnish case, higher competition fuelled higher parliamentary 
activity among Eurosceptic MPs, due to an increased polarisation over EU affairs. After 2013, 
the migration crisis triggered politicisation trends, i.e. increased political awareness and 
contestation, both in Austria and in Finland (Grande et al., 2018). Luxembourg remained the 
outsider among our cases, because the highly consensual atmosphere and pro-European 
position did not lead to any harsh anti-immigration discourses. 
On the contrary, the immigration issue became a hot topic in Austria and Finland and 
was picked up by populists such as the True Finns/Blue Reform Party574 and the FPÖ. The 
growing popular support given to these parties helped them foster their anti-EU positions. Anti-
immigration discourses aimed to gain popular support for upcoming elections. In 2015, the True 
Finns gained even more seats in parliament and entered the governmental coalition with the 
KESK and the KOK until April 2019575. Between 2015 and 2019, a Blue Reform minister 
occupied the position of Minister for Foreign Affairs. This same minister had been actively 
criticising the treaties mentioned in the present thesis during his MP mandate since 2003. In 
Austria, legislative elections in 2017 saw the return of the FPÖ in a coalition with the ÖVP 
(before its fall in May 2019576). The rise and over-representation of populists and Eurosceptic 
MPs in both parliaments surely challenged the mainstream parties’ fundamentally pro-
European stance on European integration. The ÖVP became more reluctant towards EU-level 
 
574 The Blue Reform Party was created after the split of the True Finns in 2017. It is a populist and Eurosceptic 
party. 
575 See https://www.touteleurope.eu/revue-de-presse/revue-de-presse-finlande-les-sociaux-democrates-en-tete-
score-historique-pour-l-extreme-droite.html (last accessed 02.07.2019) 
576 See https://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/oesterreich-nach-ibiza-video-was-kurz-und-strache-jetzt-
bevorsteht/24359838.html ; https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/wie-der-oesterreichische-nationalrat-
kurz-regierung-das-vertrauen-entzog-16209465.html (last accessed 02.07.2019) 
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measures concerning the migration crisis and the institutional developments of the EU577. Just 
as in Finland with the Blue Reform Party, the FPÖ obtained the mandate of the Minister for 
Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs, a clear change compared to the ÖVP-FPÖ-BZÖ 
coalition from 1999-2007. Indeed, for the first time in an ÖVP-FPÖ coalition, EU affairs were 
between the hands of the populists. While the ÖVP took the FPÖ in the 1999-2005 coalition to 
tame the party, the second ÖVP-FPÖ coalition in 2017-2019 was established because of 
ideological similarities. Indeed, the ÖVP and SPÖ drifted apart during the last coalition, while 
the ÖVP and FPÖ shared a more conservative political line. In EU affairs, the newly elected 
Chancellor Kurz was in accord with the FPÖ and declared his objective to fight illegal 
immigration578. In both countries, polarisation between pro-Europeans and populists rose 
significantly. The distribution of power between classical majority and opposition forces 
changed, as Eurosceptic MPs became part of the parliamentary majority. With regard to these 
newest developments, we assume that the highly competitive and politically tense environments 
encouraged non-EU experts in parliament to become even more active until 2019. Just as during 
the economic crisis, strategical considerations might have been the main reasons underpinning 
MPs’ involvement in EU affairs, because the media coverage and attention from the public 
opinion were high on immigration issues. Moreover, the distribution of positions within 
parliament changed in favour of Eurosceptic MPs. Since 2017, FPÖ MPs are Vice-chairs of the 
Austrian National Council’s EU-Main Committee and EU Sub-Committee, alongside ÖVP 
Chairs and SPÖ Vice-Chairs. In the Eduskunta, an MP from the Finns Party579 occupies the 
position of first GC Vice-Chair, even though the group landed in the opposition in April 2019. 
However, it still represents the second force in parliament, after the SDP.  
Newest developments show that populists in Austria and Finland lost their position in 
the coalition formations. In Austria, the ÖVP-FPÖ coalition imploded due to the “Ibiza 
scandal”580. The political future remains uncertain in Austria and could lead to two possible 
paths: a renewed coalition with the FPÖ or the return to previous coalition formations between 
the ÖVP and SPÖ. The latter could be all the more possible as the two biggest mainstream 
parties obtained high scores during the European elections in May 2019581. In Finland, the Blue 
Reform Party left the coalition following the 2019 legislative elections in April. However, the 
party still enjoys popularity among voters, as illustrated by its fourth highest score during the 
European elections582. These political developments might affect the composition and political 
dynamics within the Austrian and Finnish chambers. Even though populists are not part of the 
majority anymore, they still represent a big proportion of the seats and can weigh on 
parliamentary work. 
 
577 See https://derstandard.at/2000102488006/Kurz-fordert-Neuverhandlung-des-EU-Vertrags (last accessed 
02.07.2019) 
578 See https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/wahl-in-oesterreich-kurz-und-strache-regieren-oesterreich-
1.3794568 (last accessed 02.07.2019) 
579 The True Finns renamed themselves « The Finns » after their split in June 2017, when 20 MPs left the party to 
form the “Blue Reform” party in protest against the nomination of a new party leader. See 
https://www.neweurope.eu/article/blue-reform-new-party-finnish-far-right/ [last accessed 01.07.2019] 
580 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/may/20/austria-ibiza-scandal-sting-operation-what-happened-why-
does-it-matter (last accessed 02.07.2019) 
581 See https://www.bmi.gv.at/412/Europawahlen/Europawahl_2019/start.aspx (last accessed 02.07.2019) 
582 See https://election-results.eu/finland/ (last accessed 02.07.2019) 
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In terms of institutional change in the three cases, we observed the same trends. Without 
surprise, the Austrian Parliament implemented the most reforms, while the Finnish and 
Luxembourg chambers barely changed anything to their scrutiny system. In 2013, the National 
Council modified its EU database to make it more transparent. In 2015, European and 
international personalities obtained the right to make a declaration in plenary (§19a GOG-NR). 
Moreover, sectoral committees were allowed to give their advice on reports produced by the 
EU Main Committee (§31d GOG-NR). MEPs received the right to participate in EU debates 
with a consultative voice. The new provisions also added EU declarations of government 
members twice per year in parliament before meetings of the European Council or the Council. 
However, the effective implementation of such instruments remains circumscribed and highly 
dependent on the willingness of MPs to make use of their rights. In Luxembourg, the European 
Semester triggered some discussions within the chamber (Interview 24, 2018). On the 16th 
March 2015, MPs and civil servants from the Ministry of Finance met informally in parliament 
to reflect on procedural changes in the wake of the European Semester583. However, no concrete 
rules were implemented in the end. 
The theoretical approach used in the present thesis could be interesting for further in-
depth analyses of MPs’ involvement in EU affairs. Europeanisation literature is still missing 
in-depth knowledge on patterns and origins of parliamentary involvement in several 
parliaments across the EU. Therefore, future research should dig deeper into the motivational 
aspects of Europeanisation and parliamentary involvement to complement the existing 
observations made on parliaments’ institutional Europeanisation. Qualitative-based research 
helps opening the parliamentary “black box” and understanding the dynamics between the 
actors and their incentives to act in a certain way. By incorporating systematically the 
motivational approach, future research projects might be able to assess actual parliamentary 
involvement and institutional change. Existing rankings on parliamentary strength in EU affairs 
could also be refined and possibly modified by taking into account the motivational elements 
constituting parliamentary involvement.  
The present thesis focused mainly on the micro-level through the analysis of single MPs’ 
motivations underpinning parliamentary activity and institutional change. We explained among 
others how MPs’ political affiliation and positioning affected their motivations, but future 
research could assess more thoroughly the link between political dynamics within 
parliamentary groups or parties and their impact on individual motivations. Indeed, as we saw 
in the present thesis, political affiliations play a significant role in the orientation of MPs’ 
involvement in EU affairs. As outlined previously, it could be interesting to analyse these 
dynamics in more recent contexts, such as the migration crisis since 2015, or the impact of 
rising populism and how it affects parliamentary involvement and MPs’ motivations in EU 
affairs.  
 
  
 
583 See Procès-verbal de la réunion informelle du 16 mars 2015 sur la mise en place de « procédures » relatives 
au semestre européen au sein de la Chambre des Députés, Chambre des Députés, 2014-2015, CG/pk 
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Appendixes 
APPENDIX 1: Tables 
LUXEMBOURG 
Table A: Parliamentary meetings on the CT, Chamber of Deputies 
Date Type of parliamentary 
activity 
Nature of document Subject discussed 
Ordinary session 2003-2004 
01.07.2003 64th plenary session Minutes of plenary session Debate on final document 
of Convention on the 
future of Europe; 
discussion on organisation 
of national referendum on 
Constitutional treaty 
30.01.2004 Meeting of the CFEADCI*  Minutes of committee 
meeting 
IGC on Constitutional 
treaty 
04.02.2004 Meeting of the CFEADCI*  Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Luxembourgish position 
on Constitutional treaty 
Extraordinary session 2004 
20.09.2004 Meeting of the CFEADCI*  Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Luxembourg EU 
Presidency; internal 
scrutiny procedures in EU 
affairs 
11.10.2004 Meeting of the CFEADCI*  Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Luxembourg EU 
Presidency; internal 
scrutiny procedures in EU 
affairs; Constitutional 
treaty 
12.10.2004 Meeting of the CFEADCI*  Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Luxembourg EU 
Presidency; 
Luxembourgish 
referendum on 
Constitutional treaty 
13.10.2004 Meeting of CIRC** Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on organisation 
of referendum on 
Constitutional treaty 
20.10.2004 Meeting of CIRC** Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on organisation 
of referendum on 
Constitutional treaty 
27.10.2004 Meeting of CIRC** Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on organisation 
of referendum on 
Constitutional treaty 
15.11.2004 Meeting of the CFEADCI*  Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Priorities of Luxembourg 
EU Presidency 
24.11.2004 Meeting of the CFEADCI*  
 
Meeting of CIRC** 
Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Internal scrutiny 
procedures on EU affairs 
 
Discussion on organisation 
of referendum on 
Constitutional treaty 
29.11.2004 Meeting of the CFEADCI*  Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Luxembourgish 
referendum on 
Constitutional treaty 
10.01.2005 Meeting of the CFEADCI*  Minutes of committee 
meeting 
National law implementing 
Luxembourgish 
referendum on 
Constitutional treaty 
28.02.2005 Meeting of the CFEADCI*  Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Examination of law 
ratifying constitutional 
treaty 
02.03.2005 Meeting of CIRC** Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on law 
proposal organising 
481 
 
referendum on 
Constitutional treaty 
07.03.2005 Meeting of the CFEADCI*  Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Examination of law 
ratifying constitutional 
treaty 
23.03.2005 Meeting of CIRC** Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on Council of 
State opinion on law 
proposal organising 
referendum on 
Constitutional treaty 
24.03.2005 Meeting of CIRC** Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Adoption of parliamentary 
report on law proposal 
organising referendum on 
Constitutional treaty 
12.04.2005 29th plenary session Minutes of plenary session Discussion on law 
proposal on Constitutional 
treaty 
22.04.2005 Meeting of the CFEADCI*  Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Audition with civil society 
in framework of 
referendum on 
Constitutional treaty 
25.04.2005 Meeting of the CFEADCI*  Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Examination of Council of 
State opinion on 
Constitutional treaty 
29.04.2005 Meeting of the CFEADCI*  Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Constitutional treaty; 
Audition with civil society 
in framework of 
referendum on 
Constitutional treaty 
06.05.2005 Meeting of the CFEADCI*  Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Audition with civil society 
in framework of 
referendum on 
Constitutional treaty 
20.05.2005 Meeting of the CFEADCI*  Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Meeting with members of 
General Affairs Group of 
European Council and 
discussion on 
Constitutional treaty 
30.05.2005 Meeting of the CFEADCI*  Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on results of 
French referendum on 
Constitutional treaty 
06.06.2005 Meeting of the CFEADCI*  Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Examination of 
parliamentary report on 
Constitutional treaty 
08.06.2005 38th plenary session Minutes of plenary session Discussion on second 
parliamentary vote on 
Constitutional treaty 
depending on referendum 
results 
20.06.2005 Meeting of the CFEADCI*  Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on results of 
French referendum on 
Constitutional treaty 
28.06.2005 42nd plenary session Minutes of plenary session First vote on the Treaty 
establishing a Constitution 
for Europe 
11.07.2005 Meeting of the CFEADCI*  Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on results of 
French referendum on 
Constitutional treaty; 
internal scrutiny 
procedures on EU affairs 
12.07.2005 46th plenary session Minutes of plenary session Debate on results of 
national referendum on 
Constitutional treaty 
Ordinary session 2005-2006 
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25.10.2005 5th plenary session Minutes of plenary session Discussion on law 
proposal ratifying 
Constitutional treaty 
* Committee on Foreign and European Affairs, Defence, Cooperation and Immigration 
**Committee on Institutions and Constitutional Revision 
Source: Own calculations, 
http://www.chd.lu/wps/portal/public/Accueil/TravailALaChambre/Recherche/RoleDesAffaires (last accessed 
02.03.2018). 
 
Table B: Parliamentary instruments used by MPs to scrutinise the CT, Chamber of 
Deputies 
Date Type of parliamentary 
instrument 
Initiator Topic Status 
13.02.2003, 31st 
plenary session 
Motion Gast Gybérien, 
Fernand Greisen, 
Jacques-Yves 
Henckes, Jean-Pierre 
Koepp, Robert 
Mehlen (ADR) 
National referendum on 
Constitutional treaty 
Rejected 
01.07.2003, 64th 
plenary session 
Resolution Ben Fayot, Jean 
Asselborn, Alex 
Bodry, Jeannot 
Krecké, Jos Scheuer 
(LSAP) 
National referendum on 
Constitutional treaty 
Adopted 
01.07.2003, 64th 
plenary session 
Motion Ben Fayot (LSAP) IGC on Constitutional 
treaty 
Adopted 
01.07.2003, 64th 
plenary session 
Motion Renée Wagener, 
François Bausch, 
Robert Garcia, 
Camille Gira, Jean 
Huss (Déi Gréng) 
Revision of 
EURATOM treaty 
Rejected 
01.07.2003, 64th 
plenary session 
Motion Renée Wagener, 
François Bausch, 
Robert Garcia, 
Camille Gira, Jean 
Huss (Déi Gréng) 
IGC on Constitutional 
treaty 
Rejected 
14.10.2003 Written question n° 328 Laurent Mosar 
(CSV) 
Organisation of 
referendum on 
Constitutional treaty 
Answered 
(Minister for 
Foreign Affairs) 
24.10.2003 Written question n° 
2369 
Ben Fayot (LSAP) Organisation of 
information campaign 
on Constitutional treaty 
Answered 
(Minister for 
Foreign Affairs) 
08.03.2004 Written question n° 
2656 
Ben Fayot (LSAP) Dismantling of 
EURATOM control 
service 
Answered 
(Minister for 
Foreign Affairs) 
19.10.2004 Written question 
n°0675 
Claude Meisch (DP) Reinforced cooperation 
in the EU 
Answered (Prime 
Minister)  
03.03.2005 Written question n° 330 Ben Fayot (LSAP) EURATOM institution Answered 
(Minister for 
Foreign Affairs) 
08.06.2005, 38th 
plenary session 
Resolution Ben Fayot (LSAP) Second constitutional 
vote by parliament 
should depend on 
referendum results 
Adopted 
14.06.2005 Written question 
n°0476 
Aly Jaerling (ADR) Referendum on 
Constitutional treaty 
Answered (Prime 
Minister) 
15.06.2005 Written question n°477 Aly Jaerling (ADR) Financing of 
information campaign 
on national referendum 
on Constitutional treaty 
Answered 
(Minister for 
Foreign Affairs) 
21.06.2005, 41st 
plenary session 
Resolution Ben Fayot (LSAP) Date of national 
referendum on 
Constitutional treaty 
Adopted 
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12.07.2005, 46th 
plenary session 
Motion François Bausch, 
Claude Adam, Félix 
Braz, Camille Gira, 
Henri Kox, Viviane 
Loschetter (Déi 
Gréng) 
Develop knowledge on 
EU in schools 
Adopted 
02.08.2005 Written question 
n°0539 
Aly Jaerling (ADR) Information campaign 
during referendum on 
Constitutional Treaty 
Answered (Prime 
Minister) 
08.09.2005 Written question n°589 Ben Fayot (LSAP) Ratification deadline of 
Constitutional treaty 
Answered 
(Minister for 
Foreign Affairs) 
22.09.2005 Written question 
n°0619 
Claude Meisch (DP) Ratification of 
Constitutional Treaty 
Answered (Prime 
Minister) 
Source: Own calculations584. 
 
Table C: Parliamentary meetings on institutional reforms in the context of the CT, 
Chamber of Deputies 
Date Type of parliamentary 
activity 
Nature of document Subject discussed 
Extraordinary session 2004 
20.09.2004 Meeting of the CFEADCI*  Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Luxembourg EU 
Presidency; internal 
scrutiny procedures in EU 
affairs 
11.10.2004 Meeting of the CFEADCI*  Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Luxembourg EU 
Presidency; internal 
scrutiny procedures in EU 
affairs; Constitutional 
treaty 
24.11.2004 Meeting of the CFEADCI*  
 
Meeting of CIRC** 
Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Internal scrutiny 
procedures on EU affairs 
 
Discussion on organisation 
of referendum on 
Constitutional treaty 
11.07.2005 Meeting of the CFEADCI*  Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on results of 
French referendum on 
Constitutional treaty; 
internal scrutiny 
procedures on EU affairs 
03.10.2005 Meeting of the CFEADCI*  Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on test phase 
subsidiarity control 
Ordinary session 2005-2006 
24.10.2005 Meeting of the CFEADCI*  Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on delay in EU 
directive implementation 
28.11.2005 Meeting of the CFEADCI*  Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Internal scrutiny 
procedures in EU affairs 
23.01.2006 Meeting of the CFEADCI*  Minutes of committee 
meeting 
European strategy of the 
chamber 
 
584 Calculations on the basis of the Chamber’s analytical tables and the online archives of the parliament, 
http://www.chd.lu/wps/portal/public/Accueil/TravailALaChambre/SeancesPubliques/ComptesRendusSeances ; 
http://www.chd.lu/wps/portal/public/Accueil/TravailALaChambre/Recherche/RechercheArchives/!ut/p/z1/nZC7
DoJAEEW_hS_YYXiXvDK7QEDABdzGUBESRQvj92uIhTQrcbqbnHMzuUyxgallfM7T-Jhvy3h555Nyz-
hzHpbpEakqUghl4ucZHEziDutXIMGka4SN4McBgqC6yGPTAWotpvb4sLkQogYjC4Aq_Mf_btrnawClr--
ZWhHdAluAvNoGzNLMk21pUeB-
AN0Gv764X6WUA8xiMowX6GTAgg!!/dz/d5/L0lDU0lKSWdrbUEhIS9JRFJBQUlpQ2dBek15cXchLzRKQ2l
qb01MdEJqZFJQWVZERUEhL1o3XzI4SEhBTkVUMkdPTEUwQVVEOEtKMFAxOFU3LzA!/?PC_Z7_28H
HANET2GOLE0AUD8KJ0P18U7019404_action=query&PC_Z7_28HHANET2GOLE0AUD8KJ0P18U701940
4_newsearch=true#Z7_28HHANET2GOLE0AUD8KJ0P18U7 (last accessed 02.03.2018). 
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13.02.2006 Meeting of the CFEADCI*  Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on internal 
selection of EU documents 
* Committee on Foreign and European Affairs, Defence, Cooperation and Immigration 
**Committee on Institutions and Constitutional Revision 
Source: Own calculations585 
Table D: Parliamentary meetings on the LT, Chamber of Deputies 
Date Type of parliamentary 
activity 
Nature of document Subject discussed 
12.06.2006 Meeting of the CFEADCI*  Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Examination of 
parliamentary report on 
Constitutional treaty 
26.06.2006 Meeting of the CFEADCI*  Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Examination of 
parliamentary report on 
Constitutional treaty 
Ordinary session 2006-2007 
07.05.2007 Meeting of the CFEADCI*  Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on future of 
Constitutional treaty 
18.05.2007 Meeting of the CFEADCI*  Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on future of 
Constitutional treaty 
13.06.2007 36th plenary session Minutes of plenary session Consultation debate on 
mandate for IGC on new 
European constitutional 
treaty 
18.06.2007 Meeting of the CFEADCI*  Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on future of 
Constitutional treaty 
25.06.2007 Meeting of the CFEADCI*  Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on future of 
Constitutional treaty 
10.09.2007 Meeting of the CFEADCI*  Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on future 
Lisbon treaty 
08.10.2007 Meeting of the CFEADCI*  Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on future 
Lisbon treaty 
Ordinary session 2007-2008 
17.10.2007 Meeting of the CFEADCI*  Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on future 
Lisbon treaty 
22.10.2007 Meeting of the CFEADCI*  Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on future 
Lisbon treaty 
24.10.2007 Topical debate Minutes of plenary session Debate on new Lisbon 
treaty 
09.11.2007 Meeting of the CFEADCI*  Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Public audition on Lisbon 
treaty in framework of 
information campaign 
19.11.2007 Meeting of the CFEADCI*  Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Evaluation of public 
audition on Lisbon treaty 
20.12.2007 Meeting of the CFEADCI*  Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on future 
Lisbon treaty 
18.01.2008 Meeting of the CFEADCI*  Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Public audition on Lisbon 
treaty in framework of 
information campaign 
11.02.2008 Meeting of the CFEADCI*  Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Nomination of rapporteur 
on Lisbon treaty 
22.02.2008 Meeting of the CFEADCI*  Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Public audition on Lisbon 
treaty in framework of 
information campaign 
19.05.2008 Meeting of the CFEADCI*  Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on ratification 
law on Lisbon treaty 
21.05.2008 Meeting of the CFEADCI*  Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Adoption of ratification 
law on Lisbon treaty 
29.05.2008 43rd plenary session Minutes of plenary session Discussion on law 
proposal ratifying Lisbon 
treaty 
 
585 Calculations on the basis of the Chamber’s analytical tables and the online archives of the parliament. 
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18.06.2008 Meeting of the CFEADCI*  Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on negative 
referendum in Ireland 
21.06.2008 Meeting of the CFEADCI*  Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on negative 
referendum in Ireland 
14.07.2008 Meeting of the CFEADCI*  Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on negative 
referendum in Ireland; 
Internal scrutiny 
procedures in EU affairs 
15.12.2008 Meeting of the CFEADCI*  Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on ratification 
law on Lisbon treaty 
* Committee on Foreign and European Affairs, Defence, Cooperation and Immigration 
Source: Own calculations586 
Table E: Parliamentary instruments used by MPs to scrutinise the LT, Chamber of 
Deputies 
Date Type of 
parliamentary 
instrument 
Initiator Topic Status 
20.06.2006 Oral question n°110 Paul Helminger (DP) Ratification process of 
Constitutional treaty 
Answered 
(Minister for 
Foreign Affairs) 
15.11.2006 Oral question n°136 Charles Goerens (DP) Future of 
Constitutional treaty 
Answered 
(Minister for 
Foreign Affairs) 
29.01.2007 Written question n° 
142 
Ben Fayot (LSAP) Future of constitutional 
treaty 
Answered 
(Deputy-minister 
for Foreign 
Affairs) 
30.01.2007 Written question n° 
141 
Charles Goerens (DP) Relaunch of debate on 
constitution for Europe 
Answered 
(Deputy-minister 
for Foreign 
Affairs) 
07.06.2007 Request for 
orientation debate 
LSAP parliamentary 
group 
Debate prior to 
European Council 
summit on Mandate of 
IGC on constitutional 
treaty  
Accepted 
13.06.2007 Motion Ben Fayot (LSAP) Future of 
Constitutional treaty 
Accepted 
12.09.2007 Written question n° 
1972 
Laurent Mosar (CSV) Future of EU 
constitutional treaty 
Answered 
(Minister for 
Foreign Affairs) 
17.10.2007 Request for topical 
debate 
CFEADCI* Future EU treaty Discussed in 4th 
plenary session, 
23.10.2007 
23.10.2007, 4th 
plenary session 
Motion Jacques-Yves 
Henckes (ADR) 
Request organisation of 
referendum on Lisbon 
treaty 
Lapsed 
23.10.2007, 4th 
plenary session 
Resolution Ben Fayot (LSAP) Ratification vote on 
Lisbon treaty requested 
to be parliamentary 
Accepted 
18.12.2007 Oral question n° 234 Xavier Bettel (DP) Working group on the 
future of EU 
Answered 
(Minister for 
Foreign Affairs) 
24.07.2009 Written question 
n°0011 
Fernand Kartheiser 
(ADR) 
Composition of 
European Commission 
and maintenance of 
Luxembourgish 
Commissioner 
Answered (Prime 
Minister) 
* Committee on Foreign and European Affairs, Defence, Cooperation and Immigration 
 
586 Calculations on the basis of the Chamber’s analytical tables and the online archives of the parliament. 
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Source: http://www.chd.lu/wps/portal/public/Accueil/TravailALaChambre/Recherche/RoleDesAffaires (last 
accessed 01.07.2019) 
Table F: Parliamentary meetings on institutional reforms in the context of the LT, 
Chamber of Deputies 
Date Type of parliamentary 
activity 
Nature of document Subject discussed 
12.06.2006 Meeting of the CFEADCI*  Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion of working 
paper on Chamber’s goals 
in EU scrutiny 
26.06.2006 Meeting of the CFEADCI*  Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion of working 
paper on Chamber’s goals 
in EU scrutiny 
14.07.2006 Meeting of the CFEADCI*  Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Internal scrutiny 
procedures in EU affairs 
17.07.2006 Meeting of the CFEADCI*  Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on cooperation 
ChD/ European Parliament 
09.10.2006 Meeting of the CFEADCI*  Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Internal scrutiny 
procedures in EU affairs 
Ordinary session 2006-2007 
16.10.2006 Meeting of the CFEADCI*  Minutes of committee 
meeting 
First time European 
commissioner attending 
meeting of CFEADCI 
16.11.2006 Meeting of the CFEADCI*  Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on internal 
selection of EU documents 
29.01.2007 Meeting of the CFEADCI*  Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Evaluation of European 
strategy of the chamber 
12.02.2007 Meeting of the CFEADCI*  Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Evaluation of European 
strategy of the chamber 
16.04.2007 Meeting of the CFEADCI*  Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Evaluation of European 
strategy of the chamber 
07.05.2007 Meeting of the CFEADCI*  Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on information 
exchange Chamber-
Government 
02.07.2007 Meeting of the CFEADCI*  Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Debate on report on 
governmental European 
policy 
Ordinary session 2007-2008 
21.01.2008 Meeting of the CFEADCI*  Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on information 
exchange on EU matters 
between parliament and 
government 
18.02.2008 Meeting of the CFEADCI*  Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on 
memorandum on 
information exchange on 
EU matters between 
chamber and government 
07.07.2008 Meeting of the CFEADCI*  Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Internal scrutiny 
procedures in EU affairs 
14.07.2008 Meeting of the CFEADCI*  Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on negative 
referendum in Ireland; 
Internal scrutiny 
procedures in EU affairs 
15.09.2008 Meeting of the CFEADCI*  Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on information 
policy towards MEPs 
27.10.2008 Meeting of the CFEADCI*  Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Debate on report on 
governmental European 
policy 
05.01.2009 Meeting of the CFEADCI*  
 
 
Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on 
memorandum on 
information exchange on 
EU matters between 
chamber and government 
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08.01.2009 Meeting of CRP*** Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on information 
exchange between 
parliament and 
government 
09.02.2009 Meeting of the CFEADCI*  
 
Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on internal 
selection of EU documents 
18.03.2009 Meeting of CIRC** Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on introduction 
in Constitution of chapter 
on EU affairs 
04.05.2009 Meeting of the CFEADCI*  Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Evaluation of European 
strategy of the chamber 
05.05.2009 Meeting of CRP*** Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Parliamentary report on 
modification of RoP 
introducing rules on 
cooperation between 
parliament and 
government on EU affairs 
Extraordinary session 2009 
14.09.2009 Meeting of the CFEADCI*  Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Evaluation of internal 
selection procedure of EU 
documents 
08.10.2009 Meeting of the CFEADCI*  Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on internal 
selection of EU documents 
Ordinary session 2009-2010 
09.11.2009 Meeting of the CFEADCI*  Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on institutional 
part of Lisbon treaty; 
procedure of information 
exchange with MEPs 
30.06.2010 Meeting of CRP*** Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on 
modification of RoP after 
Lisbon treaty 
14.07.2010 44th plenary session Minutes of plenary session Discussion on 
modification of RoP in 
framework of Lisbon 
treaty 
22.07.2010 Meeting of the CFEADCI*  Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on new rules in 
Lisbon treaty on role of 
national parliaments 
* Committee on Foreign and European Affairs, Defence, Cooperation and Immigration 
**Committee on Institutions and Constitutional Revision 
***Committee on Rules of Procedures 
Source: http://www.chd.lu/wps/portal/public/Accueil/TravailALaChambre/Recherche/RoleDesAffaires (last 
accessed 01.07.2019) 
 
Table G: Parliamentary meetings on the ESM and the TSCG, Chamber of Deputies 
Date Type of parliamentary 
activity 
Nature of document Subject discussed 
15.12.2010 Meeting of the CFEADCI*  Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on IGC on 
ESM 
Ordinary session 2010-2011 
08.03.2011 25th plenary session Minutes of plenary session Consultation debate on 
European Stability Pact 
and economic governance 
in EU 
07.06.2011 35th plenary session Minutes of plenary session Topical debate on 
management of economic 
crisis in Europe 
14.07.2011 46th plenary session Minutes of plenary session Discussion on sovereign 
debt crisis 
15.09.2011 47th plenary session Minutes of plenary session Discussion on 
Luxembourg’s financial 
participation in EFSF 
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Ordinary session 2011-2012 
16.11.2011 Debate on Foreign policy 
declaration 
Minutes of plenary session Declaration of foreign 
affairs minister and 
discussion on economic 
crisis and future of EU 
06.12.2011 7th plenary session Minutes of plenary session Debate on Budget 2012 
and European Semester 
14.12.2011 12th plenary session Minutes of plenary session Discussion on EU summit 
establishing Fiscal 
Compact 
16.01.2012 Meeting of the CFEADCI*  Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on European 
Fiscal Compact  
26.01.2012 14th plenary session Minutes of plenary session Government declaration on 
position on Fiscal Compact 
06.02.2012 Meeting of the CFEADCI*  Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on Fiscal 
Compact 
06.03.2012 Topical debate, 18th plenary 
session 
Minutes of plenary session Discussion on greek 
sovereign debt and 
stability mechanism 
20.03.2012 Meeting of COMFI** Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on laws 
implementing ESM and 
EU treaty revision in 
framework of ESM 
(Article 136 TFEU) 
09.05.2012 27th and 28th plenary sessions Minutes of plenary session Discussion on the state of 
the nation, economic crisis 
and future of EU 
16.05.2012 Meeting of COMFI** Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Visit EFSF 
19.06.2012 Meeting of COMFI** Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on ESM 
22.06.2012 Meeting of COMFI** Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on 
parliamentary reports on 
laws implementing ESM 
26.06.2012 34th plenary session Minutes of plenary session Ratification of laws 
implementing ESM and 
EU treaty revision in 
framework of ESM 
(Article 136 TFEU) 
Ordinary session 2012-2013 
17.12.2012 Meeting of the CFEADCI*  Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on article 13 
interparliamentary 
conference Fiscal Compact 
19.12.2012 19th plenary session Minutes of plenary session Discussion on role of 
national parliaments in 
future European budgetary 
union 
08.01.2013 Meeting of COMFI** Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on Fiscal 
Compact 
27.02.2013 23rd plenary session Minutes of plenary session Ratification of Fiscal 
Compact 
04.03.2013 Meeting of the CFEADCI*  Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on article 13 
interparliamentary 
conference Fiscal Compact 
25.04.2013 Meeting of COMFI** Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Adaptation of scrutiny 
procedures to European 
Semester 
09.07.2014 30th plenary session Minutes of plenary session Ratification of national law 
on coordination and 
governance of public 
finances implementing 
Fiscal Compact 
* Committee on Foreign and European Affairs, Defence, Cooperation and Immigration 
**Finance Committee 
Source: http://www.chd.lu/wps/portal/public/Accueil/TravailALaChambre/Recherche/RoleDesAffaires (last 
accessed 01.07.2019) 
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Table H: Parliamentary instruments used by MPs to scrutinise the ESM and the TSCG, 
Chamber of Deputies 
Date Type of 
parliamentary 
instrument 
Initiator Topic Status 
15.12.2009 Interpellation Claude Meisch (DP) Future of Luxembourg’s 
financial place 
Discussed in 31st 
plenary session, 
01.06.2010 
07.12.2010, 12th 
plenary session 
Motion Alex Bodry (LSAP) Government requested 
to associate parliament 
in budgetary procedure 
in framework of 
European Semester 
Adopted 
23.12.2010 Written question n° 
1121 
Fernand Kartheiser 
(ADR) 
FESF Answered 
(Finance minister, 
Prime Minister) 
08.02.2011 Request for topical 
debate 
LSAP parliamentary 
group 
Economic governance in 
the EU 
Transformed into 
consultation 
debate 
08.03.2011, 25th 
plenary session 
Motion Déi Gréng 
parliamentary group 
Requests government to 
support solidarity pact 
on EU level 
Transferred to 
Finance 
Committee 
26.05.2011 Request for topical 
debate 
Déi Gréng 
parliamentary group 
Management of the 
economic crisis by the 
EU 
Discussed in 35th 
plenary session, 
07.06.2011 
07.06.2011 Interpellation Claude Meisch (DP) European debt crisis Discussed in 46th 
plenary session, 
14.07.2011 
28.11.2011 Written question n° 
1775 
Lydie Polfer (DP) Reform of EU treaties Answered (Prime 
Minister) 
07.12.2011, 8th 
plenary session 
Urgent question 
n°1787 
Gast Gibéryen (ADR) Reform of EU treaties, 
Governmental position 
on EU treaty revisions 
and Fiscal Compact 
Answered 
(Finance minister) 
14.12.2011 Motion François Bausch (Déi 
Gréng) 
Reinforcement of fiscal 
solidarity and financial 
regulation 
Rejected 
02.01.2012 Urgent question n° 
1827   
François Bausch (Déi 
Gréng) 
Governmental position 
on international 
agreement aiming at 
reinforcing economic 
governance in EMU 
Answered (Prime 
Minister) 
25.01.2012 Written question n° 
1887 
Fernand Kartheiser 
(ADR) 
ESM Missed deadline 
for answer 
26.01.2012, 14th 
plenary session 
Motion Claude Meisch (DP) Necessity of impact 
assessments in fiscal 
matters and 
development of long-
term strategy in fiscal 
policy 
Adopted 
13.02.2012 Request for 
orientation debate 
Octavie Modert 
(Minister for 
Relations with 
parliament) 
Orientation of 
governmental budgetary 
policy in framework of 
European Semester 
Discussed in 22nd 
plenary session, 
29.03.2012 
30.03.2012 Written question 
n°2044 
Fernand Kartheiser 
(ADR) 
Additional financial 
contribution of 
Luxembourg to help 
package 
Answered (Prime 
Minister, Finance 
Minister) 
18.05.2012 Written question 
n°2112 
Fernand Kartheiser 
(ADR) 
Fiscal Compact Answered (Prime 
Minister, Finance 
Minister) 
26.06.2012, 34th 
plenary session 
Motion François Bausch (Déi 
Gréng) 
Transparency of 
governance of ESM 
Adopted 
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26.06.2012, 34th 
plenary session 
Motion François Bausch (Déi 
Gréng) 
Reinforcement of ESM 
action 
Rejected 
26.06.2012, 34th 
plenary session 
Motion François Bausch (Déi 
Gréng) 
Respect of employment 
objectives and social 
protection in framework 
of ESM 
Rejected 
03.07.2012, 36th 
plenary session 
Resolution Claude Meisch (DP) Organisation of 
orientation debate on 
consequences of 
competence transfer in 
fields of budgetary, 
financial and economic 
policies towards EU 
Accepted 
20.08.2012 Urgent question n° 
2243 
Fernand Kartheiser, 
Gast Gibéryen (ADR) 
Potential burst of 
Eurozone 
Answered (Prime 
Minister, Finance 
Minister, Minister 
for Foreign 
Affairs) 
18.12.2012 Resolution Ben Fayot (LSAP) Role of national 
parliaments in future 
budgetary, financial and 
economic union 
Accepted 
16.04.2013 Written question n° 
2668 
Jean Colombera 
(Independent) 
Eurozone crisis Answered 
(Finance Minister) 
06.06.2013 Request for topical 
debate 
CSV, DP, LSAP, Déi 
Gréng parliamentary 
groups 
Recommendations of 
EU Commission on 
Stability and Growth 
Pact 
Discussed in 38th 
plenary session, 
18.06.2013 
Source: http://www.chd.lu/wps/portal/public/Accueil/TravailALaChambre/Recherche/RoleDesAffaires (last 
accessed 01.07.2019) 
Table I: Parliamentary meetings on institutional reforms in the context of the ESM and 
TSCG, Chamber of Deputies 
Date Type of parliamentary 
activity 
Nature of document Subject discussed 
Ordinary session 2012-2013 
01.06.2010 31st plenary session Minutes of plenary session Discussion on preservation 
of Luxembourg financial 
place, regulation of 
financial markets 
19.12.2010 19th plenary session Minutes of plenary session Discussion on LSAP 
resolution on the role of 
parliaments in the 
budgetary union 
14.07.2011 46th plenary session Minutes of plenary session Discussion on sovereign 
debt crisis 
15.09.2011 47th plenary session Minutes of plenary session Discussion on 
Luxembourg’s financial 
participation in EFSF 
Ordinary session 2011-2012 
06.12.2011 7th plenary session Minutes of plenary session Debate on Budget 2012 
and European Semester 
26.01.2012 14th plenary session Minutes of plenary session Government declaration on 
position on Fiscal Compact 
20.03.2012 Meeting of COMFI** Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on laws 
implementing ESM and 
EU treaty revision in 
framework of ESM 
(Article 136 TFEU) 
17.12.2012 Meeting of the CFEADCI*  Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on article 13 
interparliamentary 
conference Fiscal Compact 
19.12.2012 19th plenary session Minutes of plenary session Discussion on role of 
national parliaments in 
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future European budgetary 
union 
08.01.2013 Meeting of COMFI** Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on Fiscal 
Compact 
27.02.2013 23rd plenary session Minutes of plenary session Ratification of Fiscal 
Compact 
04.03.2013 Meeting of the CFEADCI*  Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on article 13 
interparliamentary 
conference Fiscal Compact 
25.04.2013 Meeting of COMFI** Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Adaptation of scrutiny 
procedures to European 
Semester 
18.11.2014 Meeting of CRP*** Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Amendments to RoP on 
budgetary procedures 
* Committee on Foreign and European Affairs, Defence, Cooperation and Immigration 
**Finance Committee 
***Committee on Rules of Procedures 
Source: http://www.chd.lu/wps/portal/public/Accueil/TravailALaChambre/Recherche/RoleDesAffaires (last 
accessed 01.07.2019) 
 
AUSTRIA 
TABLE J: Parliamentary meetings on the CT, National Council 
 
Date Type of parliamentary 
activity 
Nature of document Subject discussed 
Ordinary session 2002-2003 
30.09.2003 Meeting EU HA Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Preparation of the IGC; 
Discussion on the draft 
text of the constitutional 
treaty 
Ordinary session 2003-2004 
14.10.2003 Meeting EU HA Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Preparation of the IGC; 
Discussion on the draft 
text of the constitutional 
treaty 
25.11.2003 Meeting EU HA Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on the draft 
text of the constitutional 
treaty 
09.12.2003 Meeting EU HA Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Preparation of the IGC; 
Discussion on the draft 
text of the constitutional 
treaty 
17.03.2004 Meeting EU HA Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Preparation of the IGC; 
Discussion on the draft 
text of the constitutional 
treaty 
04.06.2004 Plenary session Minutes of plenary session Discussion on Austria’s 
position during 
negotiations on 
Constitutional treaty 
15.06.2004 Meeting EU HA Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Preparation of the IGC; 
Discussion on the draft 
text of the constitutional 
treaty 
25.06.2004 69th plenary session Minutes of plenary session Federal Chancellor 
explains June IGC on 
Constitutional Treaty 
11.08.2004 Meeting EU HA Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on the draft 
text of the constitutional 
treaty 
Ordinary session 2004-2005 
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18.10.2004 Meeting EU HA Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on the draft 
text of the constitutional 
treaty 
03.11.2004 Meeting EU HA Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Preparation of the IGC; 
Discussion on the draft 
text of the constitutional 
treaty 
17.02.2005 Meeting Constitutional Affairs 
committee 
Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Report on the 
constitutional law setting 
ratification conditions on 
Constitutional treaty 
02.03.2005 96th Plenary session Minutes of plenary session Discussion and vote on the 
constitutional law setting 
ratification conditions on 
Constitutional treaty 
28.04.2005 Meeting Constitutional Affairs 
committee 
Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion of the report on 
the ratification of the 
Constitutional treaty 
11.05.2005 Plenary session Minutes of plenary session Ratification of the 
Constitutional treaty 
10.06.2005 Meeting EU HA Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Preparation of the IGC; 
Discussion on the draft 
text of the constitutional 
treaty 
Ordinary session 2005-2006 
20.10.2005 Meeting EU HA Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Preparation of European 
Council meeting, 
Discussion on the draft 
text of the constitutional 
treaty and Austria’s EU 
Presidency 
07.06.2006 Meeting Constitutional Affairs 
committee 
Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Examination of the petition 
for a referendum 
“Österreich bleib frei!” 
14.06.2006 Meeting EU HA Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on the results 
of Austrian EU Presidency 
and future of 
Constitutional treaty 
21.06.2006 Plenary session Minutes of plenary session Discussion on the report of 
the Constitutional Affairs 
committee on the 
referendum plan 
“Österreich bleib frei!” 
Source: Own calculations, based on committee meetings and plenary session meetings retrieved from the 
parliament’s website. 
 
TABLE K: Parliamentary instruments used by MPs to scrutinise the CT, National 
Council 
Date Type of parliamentary 
instrument 
Initiator Topic Status 
30.09.2003 Opinion EU HA Information policy on 
IGC on Constitutional 
Treaty 
Adopted 
29.01.2004 Motion for a resolution Environment 
committee 
Request amendment of 
EURATOM treaty 
Adopted 
29.01.2004 Motion for a resolution SPÖ (Sima), 
GRÜNE 
(Glawischnig) 
Request amendment of 
EURATOM treaty 
Rejected 
26.05.2004 Motion for a resolution SPÖ (Cap) Anchorage of EU-wide 
referendum instrument 
in Constitutional Treaty 
and organisation of EU-
wide referendum on 
Rejected 
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withdrawal from 
nuclear energy 
27.05.2004 Urgent question FPÖ (Scheibner), 
ÖVP (Lopatka) 
Austria’s position on 
CSDP and 
Constitutional Treaty 
Answered 
27.05.2004 Motion for a resolution FPÖ (Scheuch), 
ÖVP (Lopatka) 
Anchorage of 
unanimity principle in 
Constitutional Treaty 
for measures on water 
resources and welfare 
services 
Adopted 
04.06.2004 Urgent written question GRÜNE Clarification on 
government’s position 
on Constitutional 
Treaty 
Answered 
(Federal 
Chancellor) 
04.06.2004, 64th 
plenary session 
Motion for a resolution GRÜNE Clarification on 
government’s position 
on Constitutional 
Treaty and transparency 
of negotiations 
Rejected 
04.06.2004, 64th 
plenary session 
Motion for a resolution SPÖ Clarification on 
government’s position 
on Constitutional 
Treaty and EU 
referendum 
Rejected 
04.06.2004, 64th 
plenary session 
Urgent question GRÜNE (Van der 
Bellen) 
Clarification on 
government’s position 
on Constitutional 
Treaty and European 
Democracy 
Answered 
(Federal 
Chancellor) 
22.12.2004, 92nd 
plenary session 
Motion for a resolution GRÜNE (Van der 
Bellen) 
EU-wide referendum 
on EU issues 
Rejected 
22.12.2004, 92nd 
plenary session 
Motion for a resolution ÖVP (Molterer), 
FPÖ (Scheibner) 
Referendum on 
Turkey’s accession to 
EU and possibility of 
EU-wide referenda 
Adopted 
22.12.2004, 92nd 
plenary session 
Motion for a resolution SPÖ (Cap) Referendum on 
Turkey’s accession to 
EU and possibility of 
EU-wide referenda 
Rejected 
11.05.2005 Motion for a resolution ÖVP, BZÖ, FPÖ Government should 
promote organisation of 
EU-wide referendum 
on Constitutional treaty 
Adopted 
11.05.2005 Motion for a resolution GRÜNE Government should 
promote organisation of 
EU-wide referendum 
on Constitutional treaty 
Adopted 
11.05.2005 Motion Barbara Rosenkranz 
(FPÖ) 
Organisation of 
referendum on 
Constitutional treaty 
Rejected 
06.12.2005 Written question GRÜNE Information from 
government on 
programme of Austria’s 
EU Presidency 
Answered, 
Foreign Affairs 
minister 
Source: Own calculations, based on the parliament’s online database. 
 
TABLE L: Parliamentary meetings on institutional reforms in the context of the CT, 
National Council 
Date Type of parliamentary 
activity 
Nature of document Subject discussed 
25.11.2003 Meeting EU HA Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Role of national 
parliaments in EU affairs 
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09.12.2003 Meeting EU HA Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Better information policy 
from the government’s 
side 
15.06.2004 Meeting EU HA Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Better information policy 
from the government’s 
side 
18.10.2004 Meeting EU HA Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on 
Constitutional Treaty and 
parliamentary procedures 
in EU affairs 
20.10.2005 Meeting EU HA Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Better information policy 
from the government’s 
side 
07.04.2005 105th plenary session Minutes of plenary session Discussion on four-party 
motion amending the RoP 
21.04.2005 Committee on Rules of 
Procedure 
Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Report and vote on four-
party motion amending the 
RoP 
11.05.2005 109th plenary session Minutes of plenary session Discussion on report on 
four-party motion 
amending the RoP 
26.11.2006 4th plenary session Minutes of plenary session Information policy 
between parliament and 
government 
Source: Own calculations, based on committee meetings and plenary session meetings retrieved from the 
parliament’s website. 
 
TABLE M: Parliamentary meetings on the LT, National Council 
Date Type of parliamentary 
activity 
Nature of document Subject discussed 
19.06.2007 Meeting EU HA Minutes of committee 
meetings 
Discussion of the IGC on 
the Lisbon Treaty 
06.07.2007 30th plenary session Minutes of plenary 
sessions 
EU topical debate on 
government declaration on 
EU affairs and new 
negotiation round on EU 
treaty 
17.10.2007 Meeting EU HA Minutes of committee 
meetings 
Discussion of the IGC on 
the Lisbon Treaty 
08.11.2007 38th plenary session Minutes of plenary 
sessions 
Declaration of the Federal 
Chancellor of Treaty of 
Lisbon 
04-05.12.2007 40th Plenary session Minutes of plenary 
sessions 
Topical debate organized 
by FPÖ on “Damit 
Österreich souverän und 
neutral bleibt” 
06.12.2007 42nd plenary session Minutes of plenary 
sessions 
Question hour on new 
treaty 
12.12.2007 Meeting EU HA Minutes of committee 
meetings 
Discussion of the IGC on 
the Lisbon Treaty 
25.01.2008 Meeting EU HA Minutes of committee 
meetings 
Discussion of BZÖ motion 
on the organization of a 
national referendum on the 
Lisbon Treaty 
05-06.02.2008 Constitutional Affairs 
Committee 
Minutes of committee 
meetings 
Examination of Lisbon 
Treaty 
22.02.2008 Constitutional Affairs 
Committee 
Minutes of committee 
meetings 
Expert hearing on Lisbon 
Treaty 
27.02.2008 Constitutional Affairs 
Committee 
Minutes of committee 
meetings 
Examination of Lisbon 
Treaty 
25.03.2008 Meeting EU HA Minutes of committee 
meetings 
Discussion of BZÖ motion 
on the organization of a 
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national referendum on the 
Lisbon Treaty 
25.03.2008 Constitutional Affairs 
Committee 
Minutes of committee 
meetings 
Report approving 
ratification of the Lisbon 
Treaty 
02.04.2008 Constitutional Affairs 
Committee 
Minutes of committee 
meetings 
Expert hearing on Lisbon 
Treaty 
09.04.2008 55th plenary session Minutes of plenary 
sessions 
Ratification Lisbon Treaty 
17.06.2008 Meeting EU HA Minutes of committee 
meetings 
Preparation of the IGC and 
discussion on negative 
referendum results in 
Ireland  
10.07.2008 68th plenary session Minutes of plenary 
sessions 
Declaration of the Federal 
Chancellor on Austria’s 
EU policy 
09.12.2008 Meeting EU HA Minutes of committee 
meetings 
Discussion about future of 
Lisbon Treaty 
17.03.2009 Meeting EU HA Minutes of committee 
meetings 
Discussion about future of 
Lisbon Treaty 
28.10.2009 Meeting EU HA Minutes of committee 
meetings 
Discussion about Lisbon 
Treaty 
Source: Own calculations, based on committee meetings and plenary session meetings retrieved from the 
parliament’s website. 
 
TABLE N: Parliamentary instruments used by MPs to scrutinise the LT, National 
Council 
Date Type of parliamentary 
instrument 
Initiator Topic Status 
07.03.2007, 13th 
plenary session 
Motion for a resolution FPÖ (Strache, 
Bösch, Rosenkranz) 
Request the support of 
the government for a 
national referendum on 
the new EU treaty 
Rejected 
06.06.2007, 25th 
plenary session 
Oral question SPÖ (Einem) Content of the Treaty of 
Lisbon 
Answered 
(Federal 
Chancellor) 
06.06.2007, 25th 
plenary session 
Oral question ÖVP (Karl) Preservation of one EU 
commissioner per 
country 
Answered 
(Federal 
Chancellor) 
06.06.2007, 25th 
plenary session 
Oral question BZÖ (Scheibner) Establishment of core 
Europe and referenda 
on EU treaty 
Answered 
(Federal 
Chancellor) 
06.06.2007, 25th 
plenary session 
Oral question FPÖ (Strache) National referendum on 
the new EU treaty 
Answered 
(Federal 
Chancellor) 
19.06.2007 Motion for an opinion GRÜNE (Lunacek, 
Van der Bellen) 
Government should 
support incorporation 
of Charta on 
Fundamental rights in 
treaty 
Rejected 
19.06.2007 Motion for an opinion FPÖ (Bösch, 
Strache, 
Fichtenbauer) 
Government should 
encourage ratification 
of new treaty and 
organize national 
referendum 
Rejected 
06.07.2007 Motion for a resolution FPÖ (Strache, 
Bösch, Rosenkranz) 
Government requested 
to submit enabling act 
to National Council to 
organise national 
referendum on new 
treaty 
Adopted 
27.09.2007 Written question FPÖ (Bösch) Representation of 
Austrian position in 
Answered 
(Minister for 
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National Council on 
transit problem, water 
resources, etc 
Foreign and 
European Affairs) 
27.09.2007 Motion for a resolution GRÜNE (Pilz, 
Lunacek) 
Preservation of 
Austria’s neutrality 
Adopted 
17.10.2007 Urgent motion FPÖ (Strache) Against ratification of 
Lisbon Treaty 
N/A 
08.11.2007 Motion BZÖ (Westenthaler) Organisation of 
national referendum on 
EU treaty 
Rejected 
08.11.2007, 38th 
plenary session 
Motion for a resolution SPÖ (Cap, 
Grossmann), ÖVP 
(Schüssel, 
Neugebauer) 
Information of citizens 
on Treaty of Lisbon 
Adopted 
08.11.2007, 38th 
plenary session 
Motion for a resolution GRÜNE (Lunacek, 
Van der Bellen, 
Sburny) 
Government should 
initiate EU-wide 
referendum on EU 
treaty 
Rejected 
08.11.2007, 38th 
plenary session 
Motion for a resolution FPÖ (Strache, 
Bösch, Rosenkranz) 
Against ratification of 
Lisbon Treaty 
Rejected 
05.12.2007, 41st 
plenary session 
Motion for a resolution FPÖ (Aspöck, 
Strache) 
Against ratification of 
Lisbon Treaty 
Rejected 
06.12.2007, 42nd 
plenary session 
Oral question ÖVP (Höfinger) Preservation of 
Austria’s neutrality 
Answered 
(Minister for 
Foreign and 
European Affairs) 
06.12.2007, 42nd 
plenary session 
Oral question FPÖ (Strache) Government position 
on national referendum 
on EU treaty 
Answered 
(Minister for 
Foreign and 
European Affairs) 
12.12.2007 Motion for committee 
assessment 
GRÜNE (Lunacek, 
Van der Bellen, 
Glawischnig) 
EU-wide referendum 
on Lisbon Treaty 
Rejected 
12.12.2007 Motion for an opinion FPÖ (Bösch, Graf, 
Fichtenbauer) 
Against ratification of 
Lisbon Treaty 
Rejected 
12.12.2007 Motion for an opinion BZÖ (Scheibner) Government should 
restart negotiations on 
new EU treaty 
Rejected 
09.04.2008, 55th 
plenary session 
Motion BZÖ (Westenthaler) National referendum on 
Lisbon Treaty 
Adopted 
09.04.2008, 55th 
plenary session 
Motion for a resolution SPÖ (Cap), ÖVP 
(Schüssel), GRÜNE 
(Glawischnig-
Piescek) 
Government should 
inform citizens on new 
treaty, organise EU-
wide referendum, etc 
Adopted 
09.04.2008, 55th 
plenary session 
Motion for a resolution BZÖ (Westenthaler, 
Darmann) 
Government should 
submit to National 
Council a proposal to 
implement national 
referendum 
Adopted 
17.06.2008 Motion for committee 
assessment 
GRÜNE (Lunacek, 
Glawischnig, Van 
der Bellen) 
Measures against 
Euroscepticism, 
establishment 
„European Act of 
Democracy“ 
Rejected 
09.07.2008 Motion for a resolution FPÖ (Strache, 
Bösch) 
Government should 
revoke ratification of 
EU treaty 
Rejected 
10.07.2008, 68th 
plenary session 
Motion for a resolution BZÖ (Westenthaler) EU treaty reforms 
should be subjected to 
national referenda 
Rejected 
10.07.2008, 68th 
plenary session 
Motion for a resolution GRÜNE (Lunacek) EU-wide referendum 
on EU treaty, inclusion 
of Charta on 
Fundamental rights, etc 
Rejected 
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09.12.2008 Motion for an opinion FPÖ (Strache, 
Bösch) 
Government should 
revoke ratification of 
EU treaty 
Rejected 
09.12.2008 Motion for an opinion BZÖ (Scheibner) Renegotiation of EU 
treaty and national 
referendum on future 
treaty reforms 
Rejected 
10.12.2008 Motion for a resolution FPÖ (Stadler) Renegotiation of EU 
treaty and national 
referendum on future 
treaty reforms 
Rejected 
17.03.2009 Motion for an opinion FPÖ (Hübner) Renegotiation of EU 
treaty and national 
referendum on future 
treaty reforms 
Rejected 
17.03.2009 Motion for an opinion FPÖ (Stadler) Renegotiation of EU 
treaty and national 
referendum on future 
treaty reforms 
Rejected 
28.10.2009 Motion for an opinion FPÖ (Strache) National referendum on 
EU treaty 
Rejected 
Source: Own calculations, based on committee meetings and plenary session meetings retrieved from the 
parliament’s website. 
 
TABLE O: Parliamentary meetings on institutional reforms in the context of the LT, 
National Council 
Date Type of parliamentary 
activity 
Nature of document Subject discussed 
25.03.2008 Meeting Constitutional Affairs 
Committee 
Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Constitutional amendments 
anchoring national 
referendum on future EU 
treaty reforms 
09.04.2008 55th plenary session Minutes of plenary session Constitutional amendments 
anchoring national 
referendum on future EU 
treaty reforms (Rejected) 
18.11.2009 Meeting Committee on Rules 
of Procedure 
Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Examination RoP 
amendment 
10-11.12.2009 49th and 50th plenary session Minutes of plenary session Examination RoP 
amendment 
29.01.2010 53rd plenary session Minutes of plenary session Adoption RoP amendment 
30.06.2010 Meeting Constitutional Affairs 
Committee 
Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Examination “Lissabon 
Begleitnovelle” 
08.07.2010 Plenary session Minutes of plenary session Adoption “Lissabon 
Begleitnovelle” 
06.10.2011 Meeting Constitutional Affairs 
Committee 
Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Report on EU information 
law and RoP amendments 
20.10.2011 124th plenary session Minutes of plenary session Discussion on EU 
information law 
15.11.2011 130th plenary session Minutes of plenary session Adoption EU information 
law and RoP amendments 
Source: Own calculations, based on committee meetings and plenary session meetings retrieved from the 
parliament’s website. 
 
TABLE P: Parliamentary meetings on the ESM and TSCG, National Council 
Date Type of parliamentary 
activity 
Nature of document Subject discussed 
16.12.2010 Meeting EU HA Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Establishment of 
permanent stability 
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mechanism in the 
Eurozone 
20.01.2011 93rd plenary session Minutes of plenary session Discussion on stability 
mechanism and national 
referendum 
23.03.2011 Meeting EU HA Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on ESM before 
European Council meeting 
30.03.2011 99th plenary session Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on ESM 
22.06.2011 Meeting EU HA Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on ESM and 
amendment of article 136 
TFUE 
19.07.2011 Meeting EU HA Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on ESM, 
financial stability of the 
Eurozone and help 
package for Greece 
13.09.2011 Meeting Budget Committee Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on ESM and 
Greek debt crisis 
27.09.2011 Plenary session Minutes of plenary session Debate on increase of 
Austrian financial 
participation in EFSF 
21.10.2011 Meeting EU HA Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on EFSF 
22.11.2011 Meeting EU UA Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on ESM and 
ratification rules in 
National Council 
07.12.2011 Meeting EU HA Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on ESM, 
financial stability of the 
Eurozone 
27.01.2012 Meeting EU HA Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on ESM and 
TSCG before European 
Council meeting 
28.02.2012 Meeting EU HA Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on TSCG, 
financial stability of the 
Eurozone 
30.05.2012 Meeting EU HA Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on ESM and 
TSCG 
14.06.2012 Plenary session Minutes of plenary session Debate on ESM 
28.06.2012 Meeting Constitutional Affairs 
Committee 
Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Hearing on ESM and 
TSCG 
02.07.2012 Meeting Constitutional Affairs 
Committee 
Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on TSCG; 
Adoption reports on ESM, 
amendment Article 136 
TFUE 
02.07.2012 Meeting Budget Committee Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on ESM and 
TSCG 
04.07.2012 Plenary session Minutes of plenary session Ratification ESM and 
TSCG 
17.10.2012 Meeting EU HA Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on TSCG and 
establishment of EU 
Convention 
12.12.2012 Meeting EU HA Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on TSCG 
Source: Own calculations, based on committee meetings and plenary session meetings retrieved from the 
parliament’s website. 
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TABLE Q: Parliamentary instruments used by MPs to scrutinise the ESM and TSCG, 
National Council 
 
Date Type of parliamentary 
instrument 
Initiator Topic Status 
05.05.2010 Motion FPÖ (Strutz, 
Hübner) 
National referendum on 
European financial 
package for Greece 
Rejected 
27.10.2010 Opinion EU HA Preservation of 
National Council’s 
budgetary competences 
Adopted 
27.10.2010 Motion for an opinion SPÖ (Muttonen), 
ÖVP (Stummvoll) 
Preservation of 
National Council’s 
budgetary competences 
Adopted 
27.10.2010 Motion for an opinion BZÖ (Hagen) Removal of voting 
rights for MS with 
regular deficits 
Rejected 
16.12.2010 Motion for an opinion SPÖ (Krainer), ÖVP 
(Stummvoll) 
Amendment Article 
125 TFUE; 
establishment 
permanent stability 
mechanism 
Adopted 
16.12.2010 Motion for an opinion FPÖ (Hübner, 
Gradauer) 
Exclusion of MS with 
bad macroeconomic 
situation from 
Eurozone 
Rejected 
16.12.2010 Motion for committee 
opinion 
BZÖ (Hagen) Creation of “Euro-
light” and “Euro core” 
zones, rejection of 
stability mechanism 
Rejected 
16.12.2010 Opinion EU HA Rejection amendment 
Article 125 TFUE 
Adopted 
23.03.2011 Opinion EU HA Chancellor should 
promote further 
amendments to Article 
136 TFUE 
Adopted 
23.03.2011 Motion for an opinion SPÖ (Cap), ÖVP 
(Neugebauer) 
Chancellor should 
adopt amendments to 
Article 136 TFUE 
Adopted 
23.03.2011 Motion for an opinion FPÖ (Strache) Rejection ESM treaty; 
Exclusion of MS with 
bad macroeconomic 
situation from 
Eurozone 
Rejected 
23.03.2011 Motion for an opinion GRÜNE (Van der 
Bellen, Glawischnig- 
Piesczek) 
Chancellor should 
propose establishment 
of ESM within EU 
institutional system 
during European 
Council meeting and 
creation of a 
Convention 
Rejected 
30.03.2011, 99th 
plenary session 
Motion for a resolution FPÖ (Strache) Exclusion of MS with 
bad macroeconomic 
situation from 
Eurozone; national 
referendum on 
amendments Article 
136 TFUE 
Rejected 
31.03.2011 Oral question FPÖ (Podgorschek) Referendum on 
Austria’s participation 
in ESM 
Answered 
(Federal 
Chancellor) 
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31.03.2011 Oral question ÖVP (Tamandl) Austria’s participation 
in ESM 
Answered 
(Federal 
Chancellor) 
31.03.2011 Oral question GRÜNE (Van der 
Bellen) 
Simultaneous 
ratification of ESM 
treaty and amendment 
Article 136 TFUE 
Answered 
(Federal 
Chancellor) 
17.05.2011, 105th 
plenary session 
Urgent question FPÖ (Strache) Information on ESM Answered 
(Federal 
Chancellor) 
22.06.2011 Motion for an opinion FPÖ (Strache) Rejection ESM treaty; 
national referenda on 
future EU treaty 
reforms 
Rejected 
22.06.2011 Motion for an opinion GRÜNE (Van der 
Bellen, Kogler, 
Korun) 
Chancellor should 
promote establishment 
of Eurobonds, tax on 
financial transactions, 
European Convention 
Rejected 
22.06.2011 Motion for an opinion BZÖ (Bucher, 
Stadler) 
Rejection ESM treaty; 
Creation of “Euro-
light” and “Euro core” 
zones 
Rejected 
19.07.2011 Motion for an opinion FPÖ (Hübner) Rejection ESM treaty; 
national referenda on 
future EU treaty 
reforms 
Rejected 
19.07.2011 Motion for an opinion GRÜNE 
(Glawischnig, Van 
der Bellen, Kogler) 
Chancellor should 
promote establishment 
of Eurobonds, tax on 
financial transactions, 
European Convention 
Rejected 
19.07.2011 Motion for an opinion BZÖ (Stadler, 
Spadiut) 
Rejection ESM treaty; 
Creation of “Euro-
light” and “Euro core” 
zones 
Rejected 
21.09.2011 Urgent question FPÖ (Bucher, 
Stadler), BZÖ 
(Westenthaler) 
Information on ESM 
and EFSF 
Answered 
(Finance 
Minister) 
12.10.2011 Motion for a resolution BZÖ (Bucher, 
Stadler) 
Government should 
organise national 
referenda for future EU 
treaty revisions 
Rejected 
20.10.2011, 126th 
plenary session 
Motion for a resolution FPÖ (Hübner) Stop payment increase 
for EFSF; national 
referendum on future 
EU treaty revisions 
Rejected 
21.10.2011 Motion for an opinion FPÖ (Hübner) Rejection of and 
referendum on increase 
of Austria’s 
participation in EFSF  
Rejected 
21.10.2011 Motion for an opinion GRÜNE (Van der 
Bellen, Kogler, 
Brunner) 
Chancellor should 
promote establishment 
of Eurobonds, tax on 
financial transactions, 
European Convention 
Rejected 
21.10.2011 Motion for an opinion BZÖ (Bucher) Rejection of any 
participation in rescue 
mechanisms and help 
packages 
Rejected 
22.11.2011 Motion for an opinion BZÖ (Petzner) Rejection ESM treaty Rejected 
22.11.2011 Motion for an opinion GRÜNE (Van der 
Bellen, Kogler) 
Chancellor should 
promote establishment 
of Eurobonds, tax on 
financial transactions, 
European Convention 
Rejected 
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07.12.2011 Motion for an opinion FPÖ (Hübner) Rejection ESM treaty; 
referendum on future 
EU treaty revisions 
Rejected 
07.12.2011 Motion for an opinion GRÜNE 
(Glawischnig-
Piesczek, Kogler, 
Van der Bellen) 
Chancellor should 
promote establishment 
of Eurobonds, tax on 
financial transactions, 
democratic European 
Economic Government 
Rejected 
07.12.2011 Motion for an opinion BZÖ (Petzner) Rejection of any 
participation in rescue 
mechanisms and help 
packages 
Rejected 
07.12.2011 Written question FPÖ (Tadler) Information on ESM 
treaty and referendum 
on its implementation 
Answered 
(Finance 
Minister) 
27.01.2012 Motion for an opinion FPÖ (Hübner) Rejection of any 
participation in rescue 
mechanisms and help 
packages 
Rejected 
27.01.2012 Motion for an opinion FPÖ (Hübner) Rejection ESM treaty 
and TSCG, referendum 
on future EU treaty 
revisions 
Rejected 
27.01.2012 Motion for an opinion GRÜNE 
(Glawischnig, 
Kogler) 
Rejection TSCG; 
Chancellor should 
promote establishment 
of Eurobonds, tax on 
financial transactions, 
democratic European 
Economic Government 
Rejected 
27.01.2012 Motion for an opinion BZÖ (Petzner) Rejection ESM treaty Rejected 
28.02.2012 Motion for an opinion GRÜNE (Kogler, 
Van der Bellen) 
Rejection TSCG; 
Chancellor should 
promote establishment 
of Eurobonds, tax on 
financial transactions, 
democratic European 
Economic Government 
Rejected 
28.02.2012 Motion for an opinion BZÖ (Grosz) Rejection of any 
participation in rescue 
mechanisms and help 
packages; creation 
“Euro core” zone 
Rejected 
13.06.2012 Urgent question FPÖ (Strache) Information on Euro 
crisis, ESM and TSCG 
Answered 
(Finance 
Minister) 
25.06.2012 Written question FPÖ (Deimek) Information on ESM Answered 
(Finance 
Minister) 
06.07.2012 Written question FPÖ (Jury) Accountability of ESM 
governors board 
towards National 
Council 
Answered 
(Finance 
Minister) 
19.09.2012 Motion for a resolution FPÖ (Hübner, 
Strache) 
Limitation of Austria’s 
contribution to the 
ESM 
Rejected 
17.10.2012 Motion for an opinion FPÖ (Hübner) Government should 
stop budgetary 
sovereignty transfer to 
EU level 
Rejected 
17.10.2012 Motion for an opinion GRÜNE (Rossmann, 
Kogler) 
Establishment of 
European Convention 
Rejected 
17.10.2012 Motion for an opinion BZÖ (Huber) Government should 
stop budgetary 
Rejected 
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sovereignty transfer to 
EU level 
Source: Own calculations, based on committee meetings and plenary session meetings retrieved from the 
parliament’s website. 
 
TABLE R: Parliamentary meetings on institutional reforms in the context of the ESM 
and TSCG, National Council 
Date Type of parliamentary 
activity 
Nature of document Subject discussed 
14.06.2012 161st plenary session Minutes of plenary session RoP amendment in the 
framework of the ESM 
02.07.2012 Meeting Constitutional Affairs 
committee 
Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Report on RoP and 
constitutional amendments 
in the framework of the 
ESM 
04.07.2012 164th plenary session Minutes of plenary session Adoption of report on 
constitutional amendments 
in the framework of the 
ESM 
06.07.2012 167th plenary session Minutes of plenary session Adoption of report on RoP 
amendments in the 
framework of the ESM 
Source: Own calculations, based on committee meetings and plenary session meetings retrieved from the 
parliament’s website. 
 
FINLAND 
TABLE S: Parliamentary meetings on the CT, Eduskunta 
Date Type of parliamentary 
activity 
Nature of document Subject discussed 
29.11.2005 Plenary session Minutes of plenary session Government report on the 
Constitutional Treaty of 
the European Union 
01.12.2005 Constitutional Law committee  Agenda of committee 
meeting 
Ibid 
02.12.2005 GC*  Agenda of committee 
meeting 
Ibid 
07.12.2005 GC  Agenda of committee 
meeting 
Ibid 
09.12.2005 FA** committee  Agenda of committee 
meeting 
Ibid 
14.12.2005 Commerce committee Agenda of committee 
meeting 
Ibid 
15.12.2005 Committee on Employment 
and Equal Opportunities 
Agenda of committee 
meeting 
Ibid 
20.12.2005 Agriculture and Forestry + FA 
committee  
Agenda of committee 
meeting 
Ibid 
07.02.2006 Environment + Commerce  + 
Social and Health + Education 
and Culture + Administration 
+ Finance committee  
Agenda of committee 
meeting 
Ibid 
08.02.2006 Administration committee + 
GC  
Agenda of committee 
meeting 
Ibid 
09.02.2006 Committee on Employment 
and Equal Opportunities + 
Committee on Transport and 
Communications 
Agenda of committee 
meeting 
Ibid 
10.02.2006 Committee on Employment 
and Equal Opportunities + 
Agenda of committee 
meeting 
Ibid 
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Environment + Education and 
Culture + Defense committee 
+ Legal affairs committee + 
GC  
14.02.2006 Agriculture and Forestry + 
Finance committee  
Agenda of committee 
meeting 
Ibid 
15.02.2006 GC + FA committee  Agenda of committee 
meeting 
Ibid 
16.02.2006 Committee on Employment 
and Equal Opportunities + 
Commerce + Social and Health 
+ Defense committee + 
Committee on Transport and 
Communications + 
Administration committee  
Agenda of committee 
meeting 
Ibid 
17.02.2006 Administration committee + 
FA committee  
Agenda of committee 
meeting 
Ibid 
21.02.2006 Environment + Agriculture 
and Forestry + FA committee  
Agenda of committee 
meeting 
Ibid 
22.02.2006 GC + FA committee  Agenda of committee 
meeting 
Ibid 
23.02.2006 Education and Culture + 
Administration committee + 
Constitutional Law + FA 
committee  
Agenda of committee 
meeting 
Ibid 
24.02.2006 Committee on Employment 
and Equal Opportunities + 
Legal Affairs committee + 
Administration committee + 
Finance committee  + GC + 
FA committee  
Agenda of committee 
meeting 
Ibid 
28.02.2006 Social and Health + 
Committee on Transport and 
Communications + FA 
committee  
 
Agenda of committee 
meeting 
Ibid 
01.03.2006 Environment + Defense 
committee + GC  
Agenda of committee 
meeting 
Ibid 
02.03.2006 Education and Culture + 
Defense committee + 
Constitutional Law + FA 
committee  
Agenda of committee 
meeting 
Ibid 
03.03.2006 Committee on Transport and 
Communications + Legal 
Affairs committee + 
Administration committee + 
FA committee  
Agenda of committee 
meeting 
Ibid 
08.03.2006 GC + FA committee  Agenda of committee 
meeting 
Ibid 
09.03.2006 Education and Culture + 
Constitutional Law committee 
Agenda of committee 
meeting 
Ibid 
10.03.2006 Constitutional Law + FA 
committee  
Agenda of committee 
meeting 
Ibid 
14.03.2006 FA committee  Agenda of committee 
meeting 
Ibid 
15.03.2006 Environment + Commerce + 
Social and Health + GC + FA 
committee  
 
Agenda of committee 
meeting 
Ibid 
16.03.2006 Committee on Employment 
and Equal Opportunities + 
Social and Health committee 
Agenda of committee 
meeting 
Ibid 
21.03.2006 Commerce + Education and 
Culture + Legal Affairs + 
Constitutional Law + FA 
committee  
Agenda of committee 
meeting 
Ibid 
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22.03.2006 Agriculture and Forestry + 
Constitutional Law committee 
+ GC  
Agenda of committee 
meeting 
Ibid 
23.03.2006 Education and Culture + FA 
committee  
Agenda of committee 
meeting 
Ibid 
24.03.2006 Committee on Employment 
and Equal Opportunities + 
Commerce + Constitutional 
Law committee  
Agenda of committee 
meeting 
Ibid 
28.03.2006 Agriculture and Forestry 
committee 
Agenda of committee 
meeting 
Ibid 
29.03.2006 Agriculture and Forestry  + FA 
committee  
Agenda of committee 
meeting 
Ibid 
30.03.2006 Committee on Employment 
and Equal Opportunities + 
Commerce + FA committee  
Agenda of committee 
meeting 
Ibid 
31.03.2006 Committee on Employment 
and Equal Opportunities + 
Commerce + Legal Affairs + 
FA committee  
Agenda of committee 
meeting 
Ibid 
04.04.2006 Education and Culture 
committee 
Agenda of committee 
meeting 
Ibid 
05.04.2006 GC + FA committee  Agenda of committee 
meeting 
Ibid 
07.04.2006 GC + FA committee  
 
Agenda of committee 
meeting 
Ibid 
18.04.2006 FA committee  Agenda of committee 
meeting 
Ibid 
19.04.2006 FA committee  Agenda of committee 
meeting 
Ibid 
20.04.2006 FA committee  Agenda of committee 
meeting 
Ibid 
21.04.2006 FA committee  Agenda of committee 
meeting 
Ibid 
27.04.2006 FA committee  Agenda of committee 
meeting 
Ibid 
28.04.2006 FA committee  Agenda of committee 
meeting 
Ibid 
10.05.2006 Plenary session Minutes of plenary session Ibid 
12.05.2006 Plenary session Minutes of plenary session Vote on Government 
report on the 
Constitutional Treaty of 
the European Union 
07.06.2006 Plenary session Minutes of plenary session Government proposal to 
Parliament on the adoption 
of the Treaty establishing a 
Constitution for Europe 
and the act on the 
transposition of its 
legislative provisions 
08.06.2006 Plenary session Minutes of plenary session Ibid 
12.06.2006 Agriculture and Forestry 
committee 
Agenda of committee 
meeting 
Ibid 
13.06.2006 Environment + Employment 
and Equal opportunities + 
Social affairs and Health + 
Education and Culture + 
Defense + Legal Affairs + 
Administration + Finance + 
Constitutional Law committee 
Agenda of committee 
meeting 
Ibid 
14.06.2006 GC + FA committee  Agenda of committee 
meeting 
Ibid 
05.09.2006 Education and Culture 
committee 
Agenda of committee 
meeting 
Ibid 
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06.09.2006 Committee for the Future + 
Committee on transport and 
communications  
Agenda of committee 
meeting 
Ibid 
07.09.2006 Employment and Equal 
opportunities committee 
Agenda of committee 
meeting 
Ibid 
12.09.2006 Environment + Education and 
Culture + Agriculture and 
Forestry committee 
Agenda of committee 
meeting 
Ibid 
13.09.2006 Constitutional Law committee 
+ GC 
Agenda of committee 
meeting 
Ibid 
14.09.2006 Social affairs and Health 
committee 
Agenda of committee 
meeting 
Ibid 
15.09.2006 Environment + Committee on 
transport and communications 
+ Administration + Finance + 
Constitutional Law committee 
Agenda of committee 
meeting 
Ibid 
19.09.2006 Employment and Equal 
opportunities + Education and 
Culture + Defense + 
Agriculture and Forestry 
committee + Administration 
committee 
Agenda of committee 
meeting 
Ibid 
21.09.2006 Employment and Equal 
opportunities committee 
Agenda of committee 
meeting 
Ibid 
22.09.2006 Environment + Agriculture 
and Forestry committee + 
Legal Affairs + Constitutional 
Law committee 
Agenda of committee 
meeting 
Ibid 
26.09.2006 Social affairs and Health 
committee 
Agenda of committee 
meeting 
Ibid 
27.09.2006 GC Agenda of committee 
meeting 
Ibid 
28.09.2006 Constitutional Law committee Agenda of committee 
meeting 
Ibid 
29.09.2006 Committee for the Future + 
Defense + GC 
Agenda of committee 
meeting 
Ibid 
03.10.2006 Finance committee Agenda of committee 
meeting 
Ibid 
06.10.2006 GC Agenda of committee 
meeting 
Ibid 
11.10.2006 Education and Culture 
committee 
Agenda of committee 
meeting 
Ibid 
12.10.2006 Constitutional Law committee Agenda of committee 
meeting 
Ibid 
13.10.2006 Committee for the Future + 
Administration + 
Constitutional Law committee 
+ FA committee  
Agenda of committee 
meeting 
Ibid 
18.10.2006 Committee for the Future + 
Legal Affairs committee 
Agenda of committee 
meeting 
Ibid 
19.10.2006 FA committee  Agenda of committee 
meeting 
Ibid 
25.10.2006 Committee for the Future + 
Constitutional Law committee 
Agenda of committee 
meeting 
Ibid 
26.10.2006 Constitutional Law committee Agenda of committee 
meeting 
Ibid 
27.10.2006 Constitutional Law committee Agenda of committee 
meeting 
Ibid 
07.11.2006 FA committee  Agenda of committee 
meeting 
Ibid 
08.11.2006 FA committee  Agenda of committee 
meeting 
Ibid 
09.11.2006 FA committee  Agenda of committee 
meeting 
Ibid 
14.11.2006 FA committee  Agenda of committee 
meeting 
Ibid 
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15.11.2006 FA committee  Agenda of committee 
meeting 
Ibid 
16.11.2006 FA committee  Agenda of committee 
meeting 
Ibid 
21.11.2006 FA committee  Agenda of committee 
meeting 
Ibid 
22.11.2006 FA committee  Agenda of committee 
meeting 
Ibid 
23.11.2006 FA committee  Agenda of committee 
meeting 
Ibid 
28.11.2006 FA committee  Agenda of committee 
meeting 
Ibid 
29.11.2006 FA committee  Agenda of committee 
meeting 
Ibid 
30.11.2006 Plenary session Minutes of plenary session Ibid 
04.12.2006 Plenary session Minutes of plenary session Ibid 
05.12.2006 Plenary session Minutes of plenary session Vote on Government 
proposal to Parliament on 
the adoption of the Treaty 
establishing a Constitution 
for Europe and the act on 
the transposition of its 
legislative provisions 
*FA = Foreign Affairs 
**GC = Grand Committee 
Source: Own calculations, based on committee meetings and plenary session meetings retrieved from the 
parliament’s website. 
 
TABLE T: Parliamentary instruments used by MPs to scrutinise the CT, Eduskunta 
Date Parliamentary 
instruments 
Initiator Topic Status 
09.06.2003 Written question, KK 
92/2003vp  
Meriläinen, Rosa 
(VIHR) 
Safeguard clauses 
for public services 
in the new EU 
Constitutional 
Treaty 
Answered (FA 
minister) 
12.01.2005 Written question Kimmo Kiljunen 
(SDP) 
Establishment of an 
EU task force to the 
civilian crisis 
management 
Answered (Minister 
of Interior) 
18.02.2005 Law proposal, LA 
11/2005 vp 
Arja Alho, (SDP) 
(main initiator) 
VIHR, KESK, KOK, 
PS, KD 
Consultative 
referendum on the 
Treaty establishing 
a Constitution for 
Europe 
Abandoned 
13.10.2006 
26.05.2005 Oral question, SKT 
76/2005vp 
Heidi Hautala, (VIHR) Effect of French 
and Dutch 
referendums on the 
ratification of the 
EU Constitutional 
Treaty 
Answered (PM and 
FA Minister) 
02.06.2005  
 
Oral question SKT 
80/2005 vp 
Soini Timo (PS) Consideration of 
the EU 
Constitutional 
Treaty 
Answered Foreign 
Affairs Minister 
Erkki Tuomioja 
02.06.2005  Oral question Tarja Cronberg 
(VIHR) 
Impact on security 
policy of CT 
rejection by French 
citizens  
Answered Foreign 
Affairs Minister 
Erkki Tuomioja 
02.06.2005  Oral question Ben Zyskowicz 
(KOK) 
Plan B after the 
negative referenda 
in France and NL  
Answered Foreign 
Affairs Minister 
Erkki Tuomioja 
507 
 
02.06.2005  Oral question Astrid Thors (SFP) Government action 
to make CT 
understandable to 
citizens 
Answered Foreign 
Affairs Minister 
Erkki Tuomioja 
02.06.2005  Oral question Outi Ojala (VAS) Plans Finnish EU 
Presidency for 
Future of CT 
Answered Foreign 
Affairs Minister 
Erkki Tuomioja 
02.06.2005  Oral question Markku Rossi (KESK) New governmental 
information policy 
Answered Foreign 
Affairs Minister 
Erkki Tuomioja 
02.06.2005  Oral question Arja Alho (SDP) Government 
position on national 
referendum 
Answered Foreign 
Affairs Minister 
Erkki Tuomioja 
02.06.2005  Oral question Anne Huotari (VAS) Place of social 
rights in future 
treaty negotiations 
Answered Foreign 
Affairs Minister 
Erkki Tuomioja 
08.09.2005 Oral question, SKT 
97/2005 vp 
Soini Timo (PS) Ratification of the 
EU Constitutional 
Treaty 
Answered PM 
02.03.2006 Opinion PuVL 2/2006 
vp – VNS 6/2005vp 
Defense committee Government report 
on the Treaty 
establishing a 
Constitution for 
Europe 
 
Submitted 
03.03.2006 Opinion HaVL 7/2006vp 
– VNS 6/2005vp 
Administration 
Committee 
Idem Submitted 
09.03.2006 Opinion  SiVL 7/2006vp 
– VNS 6/2005vp 
Education committee Idem Submitted 
15.03.2006 Opinion YmVL 7/2006 
vp – VNS 6/2005 vp 
Environment 
committee 
Idem Submitted 
16.03.2006 Opinion  StVL 5/2006vp 
– VNS 6/2005vp 
Committee on Social 
Affairs and Health 
Idem Submitted 
24.03.2006 Opinion PeVL 9/2006 
vp – VNS 6/2005vp 
Constitutional Law 
Committee 
Idem Submitted 
24.03.2006 Dissenting opinion Ibid : Annika Lapintie 
(VAS), Arja Alho 
(SDP), Irina Krohn 
(VIHR), Outi Ojala 
(VAS), Veijo Puhjo 
(VAS) 
Referendum on CT 
necessary 
Submitted 
29.03.2006 Opinion MmVL 
1/2006vp – VNS 
6/2005vp 
Committee on 
Agriculture 
Idem Submitted 
30.03.2006 Oral question, SKT 
41/2006 vp 
Kekkonen Antero 
(SDP) 
Consideration of 
the EU 
Constitutional 
Treaty 
Answered PM 
31.03.2006 Opinion  TaVL 
11/2006vp – VNS 
6/2005vp 
Committee on 
Economic affairs 
Government report 
on the Treaty 
establishing a 
Constitution for 
Europe 
 
Submitted 
31.03.2006 Dissenting opinion Ibid: Sari Essayah 
(KD) 
Preservation of the 
Finnish welfare 
system and 
rejection of CT 
Submitted 
31.03.2006 Opinion TyVL 5/2006vp 
– VNS 6/2005vp 
Committee on 
Employment and 
Equal opportunities 
Idem Submitted 
31.03.2006 Dissenting opinion Ibid.: Sari Essayah 
(KD), Leena Rauhala 
(KD), Tero Rönni 
(SD), Esa Lahtela 
(SD), Jukka Roos 
No clarification 
between social 
rights and 
economic rights 
Submitted 
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(SD), Markus 
Mustajärvi (VAS) 
31.03.2006 Opinion LaVV 5/2006vp 
– VNS 6/2005 vp 
Committee on Legal 
Affairs 
Idem Submitted 
31.03.2006 Dissenting opinion 1 Ibid : Timo Soini (PS), 
Tero Rönni (SD) 
Rejection CT 
because restrains 
MS sovereignty 
Submitted 
31.03.2006 Dissenting opinion 2 
 
Ibid: Petri 
Neittaanmäki (KESK) 
Rejection CT Submitted 
07.04.2006 Opinion SuVL 2/2006 
vp – VNS 6/2005 vp 
Grand Committee Idem  Submitted 
07.04.2006 Dissenting opinion 1 Ibid: Arja Alho (SDP), 
Heidi Hautala (VIHR), 
Outi Ojala (VAS), 
Pentti Tiusanen (VAS) 
National 
referendum on CT 
Submitted 
07.04.2006 Dissenting opinion 2 Ibid: Toimi 
Kankaanniemi (KD) 
National 
referendum on CT 
and rejection of CT 
Submitted 
15.09.2006 Opinion LiVL 16/2006 
vp - HE 67/2006 vp 
 
Committee on  
Transport 
Government 
proposal for the 
adoption of a 
Treaty establishing 
a Constitution for 
Europe and a law 
on the transposition 
of its legislative 
provisions 
Submitted 
21.09.2006 Opinion TyVL 14/2006 
vp - HE 67/2006 vp 
 
Committee on 
Employment and 
Equal Opportunities 
Ibid. Submitted 
21.09.2006 Dissenting opinion Ibid: Sari Essayah / kd 
Matti Kauppila / Vas 
Esa Lahtela / sd 
Markus Mustajärvi / 
vas 
Leena Rauhala / kd 
Jukka Roos / sd 
Tero Rönni / sd 
 
Reject 
Constitutional 
Treaty  
Submitted 
22.09.2006 Opinion MmVL 12/2006 
vp 
Committee on 
Agriculture 
Government 
proposal for the 
adoption of a 
Treaty establishing 
a Constitution for 
Europe 
Submitted 
26.09.2006 Opinion StV 16/2006 vp 
- HE 67/2006 vp 
 
Committee on Social 
Affairs and Health 
 Submitted 
29.09.2006  Opinion PuVL 7/2006vp 
– HE67/2006 vp 
Defense committee Government 
proposal for the 
adoption of a 
Treaty establishing 
a Constitution for 
Europe 
Submitted 
29.09.2006 Dissenting opinion Ibid: Jaakko Laakso 
(VAS) 
Rejection of CT 
and CFSP 
Submitted 
03.10.2006 Opinion VaVL 24/2006 
vp - HE 67/2006 vp 
 
Finance Committee Government 
proposal for the 
adoption of a 
Treaty establishing 
a Constitution for 
Europe 
Submitted 
 Dissenting opinion Ibid: Iivo Polvi /vas 
Kari Uotila /vas 
 
Reject 
Constitutional 
Treaty 
Submitted 
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06.10.2006 Opinion SuVL 8/2006vp 
– HE 67/2006vp 
GC Government 
proposal for the 
adoption of a 
Treaty establishing 
a Constitution for 
Europe 
Submitted 
06.10.2006 Dissenting opinion 1 Ibid: Toimi 
Kankaanniemi (KD) 
Rejection CT Submitted 
06.10.2006 Dissenting opinion 2 Ibid : Kari Uotila, 
Pentti Tiusanen (VAS) 
Renegotiation CT 
and organization 
national referendum 
Submitted 
06.10.2006 Dissenting opinion 3 Ibid : Heidi Hautala et 
al. (VIHR) 
Organization 
national referendum 
on CT 
Submitted 
10.10.2006 Opinion Committee on 
Economic Affairs 
Government 
proposal for the 
adoption of a 
Treaty establishing 
a Constitution for 
Europe 
 
11.10.2006 Opinion SiVL 14/2006 
vp-HE 67/2006 vp 
Education Committee Government 
proposal for the 
adoption of a 
Treaty establishing 
a Constitution for 
Europe 
Submitted 
13.10.2006  Opinion HaVL 
42/2006vp – 
HE67/2006vp 
Administration 
committee 
Government 
proposal for the 
adoption of a 
Treaty establishing 
a Constitution for 
Europe 
Submitted 
18.10.2006  Opinion LaVM 
16/2006vp – HE 
67/2006vp 
Committee on Legal 
affairs 
Idem Submitted 
18.10.2006  Dissenting opinion 1 Ibid: Minna Sirnö 
(VAS) 
Rejection CT, 
organization of 
national referendum 
Submitted 
18.10.2006  Dissenting opinion 2 Ibid: Petri 
Neittaanmäki (KESK), 
Timo Soini (PS) 
 
Rejection CT Submitted 
25.10.2006 Opinion TuVL 4/2006 
vp - HE 67/2006 vp 
 
Committee for the 
Future 
Government 
proposal for the 
adoption of a 
Treaty establishing 
a Constitution for 
Europe 
Submitted 
27.10.2006  Opinion PeVL 
36/2006vp – 
HE67/2006vp 
Constitutional Law 
committee 
Government 
proposal for the 
adoption of a 
Treaty establishing 
a Constitution for 
Europe 
Submitted 
29.11.2006  Opinion UaVM 
13/2006vp – HE 
67/2006 vp 
Foreign Affairs 
Committee 
Idem Submitted 
29.11.2006  Dissenting opinion 1 Ibid: Petri 
Neittaanmäki (KESK) 
Rejection CT Submitted 
29.11.2006  Dissenting opinion 2 Ibid: Ulla Anttila 
(VIHR), Suvi-Anne 
Siimes (VAS)  
Organization 
national referendum 
on CT 
Submitted 
Source: Own calculations, based on the parliament’s online database. 
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TABLE U: Parliamentary meetings on institutional reforms in the context of the CT, 
Eduskunta 
Date Type of parliamentary 
activity 
Nature of document Subject discussed 
04.12.2003 GC Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Establishment of an EU-
review committee, 
Discussion on 
improvement of scrutiny 
procedure in EU affairs 
09.12.2003 EU-review committee Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on 
improvement of scrutiny 
procedure in EU affairs 
16.12.2003 EU-review committee Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Ibid. 
10.02.2004 EU-review committee Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Ibid. 
24.03.2004 EU-review committee Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Ibid. 
14.04.2004 EU-review committee Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Ibid. 
04.05.2004 EU-review committee Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Ibid. 
25.05.2004 EU-review committee Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Ibid. 
09.06.2004 EU-review committee Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Ibid. 
15.06.2004 EU-review committee Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Ibid. 
22.06.2004 EU-review committee Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Ibid. 
24.08.2004 EU-review committee Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Ibid. 
07.09.2004 EU-review committee Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Ibid. 
23.09.2004 EU-review committee Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on 
improvement of scrutiny 
procedure in EU affairs; 
Consultation of Aland 
Parliament 
12.10.2004 EU-review committee Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on 
improvement of scrutiny 
procedure in EU affairs 
26.10.2004 EU-review committee Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Ibid. 
17.11.2004 EU-review committee Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Ibid. 
07.12.2004 EU-review committee Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Ibid. 
14.12.2004 EU-review committee Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Ibid. 
20.12.2004 EU-review committee Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Ibid. 
08.02.2005 EU-review committee Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Ibid. 
Source: Minutes of the EU-review committee received by Peter Saramo, Head of the GC Secretariat. 
TABLE V: Parliamentary meetings on the LT, Eduskunta 
Date Type of parliamentary 
activity 
Nature of document Subject discussed 
08.04.2008 Education and Culture 
committee 
Minutes of committee 
meetings 
Government proposal to 
parliament on the adoption 
of the Treaty of Lisbon 
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09.04.2008 FA* committee Minutes of committee 
meetings 
Ibid 
10.04.2008 Plenary session + Employment 
and Equal opportunities + 
Committee on Social affairs 
and Health 
Minutes of plenary 
session, Minutes of 
committee meetings 
Ibid 
15.04.2008 Environment + Education and 
Culture committee + FA 
committee 
Minutes of committee 
meetings 
Ibid 
16.04.2008 Plenary session + GC** + 
Constitutional Law committee 
+ Employment and Equal 
opportunities + Education and 
Culture committee + 
Commerce committee 
Minutes of plenary 
session, Minutes of 
committee meetings 
Ibid 
17.04.2008 Employment and Equal 
opportunities + Agriculture 
and Forestry + FA committee 
Minutes of committee 
meetings 
Ibid 
18.04.2008 Environment +Agriculture and 
Forestry + Legal Affairs + GC 
+ FA committee + 
Constitutional Law committee 
Minutes of committee 
meetings 
Ibid 
22.04.2008 Defense + FA committee + 
Constitutional Law committee 
+ Education and Culture 
committee + Committee on 
Social affairs and Health 
Minutes of committee 
meetings 
Ibid 
23.04.2008 Employment and Equal 
opportunities + Defense + 
Legal Affairs + Administration 
+ FA committee + 
Constitutional Law committee 
Minutes of committee 
meetings 
Ibid 
24.04.2008 Transport and 
Communications + 
Administration + FA 
committee + Commerce 
committee 
Minutes of committee 
meetings 
Ibid 
25.04.2008 Environment +Administration 
+ GC + FA committee 
Minutes of committee 
meetings 
Ibid 
29.04.2008 Education and Culture 
committee + Agriculture and 
Forestry + Legal Affairs + 
Administration + FA 
committee + Constitutional 
Law committee + Committee 
on Social affairs and Health 
Minutes of committee 
meetings 
Ibid 
06.05.2008 Environment +Defense + 
Agriculture and Forestry + 
Transport and 
Communications + 
Administration + Finance + 
FA committee + Constitutional 
Law committee 
Minutes of committee 
meetings 
Ibid 
07.05.2008 FA committee + Education and 
Culture committee 
Minutes of committee 
meetings 
Ibid 
08.05.2008 Defense + Agriculture and 
Forestry + Transport and 
Communications + Legal 
Affairs + FA committee 
Minutes of committee 
meetings 
Ibid 
09.05.2008 Administration + GC + FA 
committee + Constitutional 
Law committee + Commerce 
committee 
Minutes of committee 
meetings 
Ibid 
13.05.2008 Defense + FA committee Minutes of committee 
meetings 
Ibid 
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14.05.2008 GC + FA committee Minutes of committee 
meetings 
Ibid 
15.05.2008 Defense + FA committee Minutes of committee 
meetings 
Ibid 
16.05.2008 GC + Constitutional Law 
committee 
Minutes of committee 
meetings 
Ibid 
20.05.2008 Constitutional Law committee Minutes of committee 
meetings 
Ibid 
21.05.2008 FA committee + Constitutional 
Law committee 
Minutes of committee 
meetings 
Ibid 
23.05.2008 FA committee + Constitutional 
Law committee 
Minutes of committee 
meetings 
Ibid 
27.05.2008 FA committee Minutes of committee 
meetings 
Ibid 
28.05.2008 FA committee Minutes of committee 
meetings 
Ibid 
29.05.2008 FA committee Minutes of committee 
meetings 
Ibid 
30.05.2008 FA committee Minutes of committee 
meetings 
Ibid 
04.06.2008 Plenary session Minutes of plenary session Ibid 
10.06.2008 Plenary session Minutes of plenary session Ibid. 
11.06.2008 Plenary session Minutes of plenary session Vote on Government 
proposal to parliament on 
the adoption of the Treaty 
of Lisbon 
*FA = Foreign Affairs 
**GC = Grand Committee 
Source: Own calculations, based on committee meetings and plenary session meetings retrieved from the 
parliament’s website. 
 
TABLE W: Parliamentary instruments used by MPs to scrutinise the LT, Eduskunta 
Date Parliamentary 
instruments 
Initiator Topic Status 
25.05.2007 Written question, KK 
120/2007vp 
Markus Mustajärvi 
(VAS) 
Government’s 
answers to 
Chancellor 
Merkel’s questions 
Answered (PM) 
31.05.2007 SKT 25/2007vp, oral 
question 
Arhinmäki, Paavo 
(VAS) 
Adoption of a new 
EU Constitutional 
Treaty 
Answered (PM) 
31.05.2007 Oral question Eero Heinäluoma 
(SDP)  
Preservation of 
social rights in 
future treaty 
Answered (PM) 
31.05.2007 Oral question Heidi Hautala (VIHR) Content of the new 
treaty compared to 
the CT 
Answered (PM) 
31.05.2007 Oral question Liisa Jaakonsaari 
(SDP)  
Place of charter of 
fundamental rights 
in new treaty 
Answered (PM) 
31.05.2007 Oral question Antti Kaikkonen 
(KESK) 
Finland position 
about the place of 
sparsely populated 
regions, small MS, 
security issues in 
new treaty? 
Answered (PM) 
20.06.2007 Opinion SuVL 1/2007vp 
– E 149/2006vp 
GC Government report 
on Finland’s 
positions on the EU 
Constitutional 
Treaty debates 
under the German 
Presidency 
Submitted 
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20.06.2007 Dissenting opinion 1  Ibid: Matti Kauppila, 
Esko-Juhani Tennilä, 
(VAS) 
against EU 
Presidency of 
European Council 
Submitted 
20.06.2007 Dissenting opinion 2 Ibid: Timo Soini (PS) against new EU 
treaty limiting 
sovereignty, 
referendum on any 
new EU treaty 
Submitted 
23.04.2008 Opinion TyVL 9/2008 
vp - HE 23/2008 vp 
 
Committee on 
Employment and 
Equal Opportunities 
Government 
proposal to 
parliament on the 
adoption of the 
Treaty of Lisbon 
Submitted 
 Dissenting opinion Markus Mustajärvi, 
Pentti Tiusanen, 
Jyrki Yrttiaho (VAS) 
Reject ratification 
bill 
Submitted 
29.04.2008 Opinion StVL 6/2008 vp 
- HE 23/2008 vp 
 
Committee on Social 
Affairs and Health 
Government 
proposal to 
parliament on the 
adoption of the 
Treaty of Lisbon 
Submitted 
06.05.2008 Opinion YmVL 10/2008 
vp - HE 23/2008 vp 
 
Environment 
Committee 
Ibid. Submitted 
07.05.2008 Opinion SiVL 6/2008 vp 
- HE 23/2008 vp 
 
Education Committee Ibid. Submitted 
08.05.2008 Opinion LaVL 8/2008vp 
– HE 23/2008vp 
Committee on Legal 
Affairs 
Government 
proposal to 
parliament on the 
adoption of the 
Treaty of Lisbon 
Submitted 
08.05.2008 Dissenting opinion Ibid: Paavo Arhinmäki 
(VAS), Tero Rönni 
(SDP), Pirkko 
Ruohonen-Lerner (PS) 
Rejection of Lisbon 
Treaty 
Submitted 
08.05.2008 Opinion LiVL 11/2008 
vp - HE 23/2008 vp 
 
Committee on 
Transport and 
Communications 
Government 
proposal to 
parliament on the 
adoption of the 
Treaty of Lisbon 
Submitted 
09.05.2008 Opinion TaVL 15/2008 
vp - HE 23/2008 vp 
 
Commerce Committee Government 
proposal to 
parliament on the 
adoption of the 
Treaty of Lisbon 
Submitted 
09.05.2008 Dissenting opinion Ibid: Toimi 
Kankaanniemi (KD), 
Matti Kangas (VAS) 
 
Renegotiation of 
treaty with 
emphasis on state 
cooperation instead 
of supranationalism 
Submitted 
09.05.2008 Opinion HaVL 11/2008 
vp - HE 23/2008 vp 
 
Administration 
Committee 
Government 
proposal to 
parliament on the 
adoption of the 
Treaty of Lisbon 
Submitted 
09.05.2008 Dissenting opinion Ibid: Unto Valpas 
(VAS), Pirkko 
Ruohonen-Lerner (PS) 
 
Reject Lisbon 
Treaty 
Submitted 
15.05.2008 Opinion PuVL 4/2008vp 
– HE 23/2008vp 
Defense committee Government 
proposal to 
parliament on the 
adoption of the 
Treaty of Lisbon 
Submitted 
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15.05.2008 Dissenting opinion Ibid: Jaakko Laakso 
(VAS) 
Rejects military 
union and security 
guarantees 
Submitted 
16.05.2008 Opinion SuVL 1/2008vp 
– HE 23/2008 vp 
GC Government 
proposal to 
parliament on the 
adoption of the 
Treaty of Lisbon 
Submitted 
16.05.2008 Dissenting opinion 1 Ibid: Timo Soini (PS) Rejects Lisbon 
Treaty 
Submitted 
16.05.2008 Dissenting opinion 2 Ibid: Esko-Juhani 
Tennilä, Matti 
Kauppila (VAS) 
National 
referendum on 
Lisbon Treaty 
Submitted 
23.05.2008 Opinion PeVL 
13/2008vp – HE 
23/2008vp 
Constitutional Law 
Committee 
Government 
proposal to 
parliament on the 
adoption of the 
Treaty of Lisbon 
Submitted 
23.05.2008 Dissenting opinion 1 Ibid: Jacob Söderman, 
Antti Vuolanne, Tuula 
Peltonen (SDP), Veijo 
Puhjo (VAS) 
Strengthen role of 
parliament in EU 
affairs 
Submitted 
23.05.2008 Dissenting opinion 2  Ibid: Veijo Puhjo 
(VAS) 
Consultative 
referendum on 
Lisbon Treaty 
Submitted 
30.05.2008 Opinion UaVM 
6/2008vp – HE 
23/2008vp 
Foreign Affairs 
committee 
Government 
proposal to 
parliament on the 
adoption of the 
Treaty of Lisbon 
Submitted 
30.05.2008 Dissenting opinion Ibid: Annika Lapintie 
(VAS) 
Consultative 
referendum on 
Lisbon Treaty 
Submitted 
26.11.2009 Oral question, 113th 
plenary session 
Pertti Salolainen 
(KOK) 
Mutual assistance 
rule in CFSP 
Answered by 
Minister of Defense 
and PM 
26.11.2009 Oral question, 113th 
plenary session 
Jaakko Laakso (VAS) Mutual assistance 
rule in CFSP 
Answered by 
Minister of Foreign 
Affairs 
26.11.2009 Oral question, 113th 
plenary session 
Juha Korkeaoja 
(KESK) 
Structured 
cooperation 
Answered by 
Minister of Defense 
26.11.2009 Oral question, 113th 
plenary session 
Kimmo Kiljunen 
(SDP) 
Assessment of 
military capacities 
at EU level 
Answered by 
Minister of Foreign 
Affairs 
26.11.2009 Oral question, 113th 
plenary session 
Kimmo Sasi (KOK) Mutual assistance 
rule in CFSP 
Answered by 
Minister of Foreign 
Affairs and 
Minister of Defense 
26.11.2009 Oral question, 113th 
plenary session 
Eero Heinäluoma 
(SDP) 
Reduction of 
President’s powers 
in CFSP 
Answered by PM 
Source: Own calculation, based on the parliament’s database587. 
TABLE X: Parliamentary meetings on institutional reforms in the context of the LT, 
Eduskunta 
Date Type of parliamentary 
activity 
Nature of document Subject discussed 
07.03.2008 GC Minutes of committee 
meetings 
Guidelines for the 
preparation and 
implementation of EU 
agreements 
 
587 The number of submitted instruments might not be exhaustive due to difficult access to the data. 
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03.06.2008 GC Minutes of committee 
meetings 
Guidelines for the 
preparation and 
implementation of EU 
agreements 
18.06.2008 GC Minutes of committee 
meetings 
Guidelines for the 
preparation and 
implementation of EU 
agreements 
16.06.2009 EU-review committee Minutes of committee 
meetings 
Discussion on amendments 
to EU procedures 
08.09.2009 EU-review committee Minutes of committee 
meetings 
Discussion on amendments 
to EU procedures 
08.10.2009 EU-review committee Minutes of committee 
meetings 
Discussion on amendments 
to EU procedures 
22.10.2009 EU-review committee Minutes of committee 
meetings 
Discussion on amendments 
to EU procedures 
04.11.2009 EU-review committee Minutes of committee 
meetings 
Discussion on amendments 
to EU procedures 
18.11.2009 Plenary session Minutes of plenary session Proposal by the Speaker's 
Council on Parliament's 
decision to amend 
Parliament's Rules of 
Procedure 
24.11.2009 Constitutional Law committee Minutes of committee 
meetings 
Proposal by the Speaker's 
Council on Parliament's 
decision to amend 
Parliament's Rules of 
Procedure 
24.11.2009 EU-review committee Minutes of committee 
meetings 
Discussion on amendments 
to EU procedures 
25.11.2009 Constitutional Law committee Minutes of committee 
meetings 
Proposal by the Speaker's 
Council on Parliament's 
decision to amend 
Parliament's Rules of 
Procedure 
26.11.2009 Constitutional Law committee Minutes of committee 
meetings 
Proposal by the Speaker's 
Council on Parliament's 
decision to amend 
Parliament's Rules of 
Procedure 
30.11.2009 Plenary session Minutes of plenary session Proposal by the Speaker's 
Council on Parliament's 
decision to amend 
Parliament's Rules of 
Procedure 
03.12.2009 Plenary session Minutes of plenary session Proposal by the Speaker's 
Council on Parliament's 
decision to amend 
Parliament's Rules of 
Procedure 
04.12.2009 GC Minutes of committee 
meetings 
Government report to the 
Parliament on the Council 
of State's amendments to 
the European Council on 
the Lisbon Treaty 
08.12.2009 Constitutional Law committee Minutes of committee 
meetings 
Government report to the 
Parliament on the Council 
of State's amendments to 
the European Council on 
the Lisbon Treaty 
09.12.2009 FA committee Minutes of committee 
meetings 
Government report to the 
Parliament on the Council 
of State's amendments to 
the European Council on 
the Lisbon Treaty 
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10.12.2009 FA committee Minutes of committee 
meetings 
Government report to the 
Parliament on the Council 
of State's amendments to 
the European Council on 
the Lisbon Treaty 
11.12.2009 FA committee Minutes of committee 
meetings 
Government report to the 
Parliament on the Council 
of State's amendments to 
the European Council on 
the Lisbon Treaty 
14.12.2009 EU-review committee Minutes of committee 
meetings 
Discussion on amendments 
to EU procedures 
15.12.2009 Constitutional Law committee Minutes of committee 
meetings 
Government report to the 
Parliament on the Council 
of State's amendments to 
the European Council on 
the Lisbon Treaty 
16.12.2009 GC + FA committee Minutes of committee 
meetings 
Government report on EU 
impact assessment; 
Government report to the 
Parliament on the Council 
of State's amendments to 
the European Council on 
the Lisbon Treaty 
17.12.2009 FA committee Minutes of committee 
meetings 
Government report to the 
Parliament on the Council 
of State's amendments to 
the European Council on 
the Lisbon Treaty 
15.01.2010 EU-review committee Minutes of committee 
meetings 
Discussion on amendments 
to EU procedures; 
adoption of final report 
03.02.2010 Constitutional Law committee Minutes of committee 
meetings 
Government report to the 
Parliament on the Council 
of State's amendments to 
the European Council on 
the Lisbon Treaty 
04.02.2010 FA committee Minutes of committee 
meetings 
Government report on EU 
impact assessment 
05.02.2010 GC + Constitutional Law 
committee 
Minutes of committee 
meetings 
Government report on EU 
impact assessment; 
Government report to the 
Parliament on the Council 
of State's amendments to 
the European Council on 
the Lisbon Treaty 
10.02.2010 GC + Constitutional Law 
Committee 
Minutes of committee 
meetings 
Government report on EU 
impact assessment 
11.02.2010 FA committee Minutes of committee 
meetings 
Government report on EU 
impact assessment 
12.02.2010 GC + Constitutional Law 
committee 
Minutes of committee 
meetings 
Government report on EU 
impact assessment; 
Government report to the 
Parliament on the Council 
of State's amendments to 
the European Council on 
the Lisbon Treaty 
Source: Own calculations based on the parliament’s database and committee minutes provided by the Head of the 
GC Secretariat. 
TABLE Y: Parliamentary meetings on the ESM and TSCG, Eduskunta 
Date Type of parliamentary 
activity 
Nature of document Subject discussed 
27.10.2010 107th plenary session Minutes of plenary session Coordination of economic 
policies in the EU 
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13.05.2011 GC*  Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Preparation of Council 
meeting, Management of 
the European Economic 
crisis 
14.09.2011 33rd plenary session Minutes of plenary session Discussion on amending 
article 136 TFUE 
27.09.2011 COMFI**  Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on amending 
article 136 TFUE 
04.10.2011 Constitutional Law committee Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on amending 
article 136 TFUE 
12.10.2011 Constitutional Law committee Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on amending 
article 136 TFUE 
06.03.2012 COMFI meeting Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on amending 
article 136 TFUE 
20.03.2012 FA*** committee Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on amending 
article 136 TFUE 
26.04.2012 FA committee Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on amending 
article 136 TFUE 
03.05.2012 46th Plenary session Minutes of plenary session Discussion on ESM treaty 
04.05.2012 47th Plenary session Minutes of plenary session Discussion on amending 
article 136 TFUE 
08.05.2012 COMFI meeting + Plenary 
session 
Minutes of committee 
meeting + Minutes of 
plenary session 
Discussion on ESM treaty 
+ Discussion on amending 
article 136 TFUE 
09.05.2012 49th Plenary session Minutes of plenary session Vote on amendment article 
136 TFUE 
15.05.2012 Commerce committee Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on ESM treaty 
16.05.2012 Audit committee  Discussion on ESM treaty 
22.05.2012 COMFI  Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on ESM treaty 
24.05.2012 Commerce committee + Audit 
committee 
Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on ESM treaty 
29.05.2012 COMFI + Constitutional Law 
+ Audit committee 
Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on ESM treaty 
01.06.2012 COMFI  Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on ESM treaty 
06.06.2012 Constitutional Law committee Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on ESM treaty 
07.06.2012 Constitutional Law committee Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on ESM treaty 
12.06.2012 COMFI  Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on ESM treaty 
13.06.2012 COMFI + 66th Plenary session Minutes of committee 
meeting + Minutes of 
plenary session 
Discussion on ESM treaty 
19.06.2012 69th Plenary session Minutes of plenary session Discussion on ESM treaty 
21.06.2012 71st Plenary session Minutes of plenary session Vote on ESM treaty 
09.11.2012 Plenary session Minutes of plenary session Discussion on TSCG 
13.11.2012 109th Plenary session Minutes of plenary session Discussion on TSCG 
16.11.2012 Constitutional Law committee Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on TSCG 
20.11.2012 COMFI  Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on TSCG 
21.11.2012 Audit committee Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on TSCG 
22.11.2012 Constitutional Law committee Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on TSCG 
27.11.2012 COMFI  Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on TSCG 
29.11.2012 Meeting Audit committee Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on TSCG 
30.11.2012 COMFI  Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on TSCG 
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04.12.2012 COMFI + Constitutional Law 
committee 
Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on TSCG 
12.12.2012 COMFI  Minutes of committee 
meeting 
Discussion on TSCG 
13.12.2012 128th Plenary session Minutes of plenary session Discussion on TSCG 
14.12.2012 130th Plenary session Minutes of plenary session Discussion on TSCG 
17.12.2012 131st Plenary session Minutes of plenary session Vote on TSCG 
*GC: Grand Committee 
**COMFI: Finance Committee 
***FA: Foreign Affairs 
Source: Own calculations, based on committee meetings and plenary session meetings retrieved from the 
parliament’s website. 
 
TABLE Z: Parliamentary instruments used by MPs to scrutinise the ESM and the TSCG, 
Eduskunta 
Date Parliamentary 
instruments 
Initiator Topic Status 
ESM 
14.06.2011 Opinion PeVL 1/2011vp 
– U6/2011vp 
Constitutional Law 
Committee 
Government 
Statement on a draft 
amendment to the 
European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM) 
Submitted 
14.06.2011 Dissenting opinion 1 Constitutional Law 
Committee: Vesa-
Matti Saarakkala, Tom 
Packalen, Kimmo 
Kivelä (PS) 
Mismatch between 
ESM and Finnish 
Constitution 
requires 
constitutional 
amendments  
Submitted 
14.06.2011 Opinion VaVL 1/2011vp 
– U 5/2011vp U 
6/2011vp E 13/2011vp 
COMFI Government 
Statement on a draft 
amendment to the 
European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM) 
Submitted 
14.06.2011 Dissenting opinion 1 COMFI: Mikko 
Savola, Juha Sipilä, 
Kimmo Tiilikainen, 
Ari Torniainen 
(KESK) 
Against solidarity 
principle through 
ESM 
Submitted 
14.06.2011 Dissenting opinion 2 COMFI: Pentti 
Kettunen, Ville 
Vähämäki, Kauko 
Tuppainen (PS) 
Reject ESM 
because accelerates 
federalisation of 
EU 
Submitted 
17.06.2011 Opinion SuVL 2/2011vp 
– U 5/2011 vp, U 6/2011 
vp, E 13/2011vp 
GC Financial crisis 
management and 
crisis management 
tools EFSF and 
ESM 
Submitted 
17.06.2011 Dissenting opinion 1 GC: Antti Kaikkonen, 
Esko Kiviranta, Jari 
Leppä, Tuomo 
Puumala, Inkeri 
Kerola (KESK) 
Against doubling 
Finnish guarantee 
liabilities in EFSF 
Submitted 
17.06.2011 Dissenting opinion 2 GC: Juho Eerola, Peter 
Jääskeläinen, Anne 
Louhelainen, Vesa-
Matti Saarakkala (PS) 
Against solidarity 
mechanism 
Submitted 
02.09.2011 Opinion 3/2011vp GC Government 
statement on the 
draft amendment to 
the European 
Stability 
Mechanism (ESM) 
Submitted 
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02.09.2011 Dissenting opinion 1 GC: Antti Kaikkonen, 
Tuomo Puumala, 
Timo Kalli, Jari Leppä 
(KESK) 
Reject ESM; MS 
should bear own 
responsibility for 
their national 
economic situation 
Submitted 
02.09.2011 Dissenting opinion 2 GC: Juho Eerola, Peter 
Jääskeläinen, Anne 
Louhelainen, Vesa-
Matti Saarakkala (PS) 
Reject ESM; 
preservation of 
national financial 
and economic 
sovereignty 
Submitted 
29.09.2011 Written question KK 
77/2011vp 
Saarakkala, Vesa-
Matti (PS) 
Draft agreement on 
the European 
Stability 
Mechanism 
Answered (Finance 
Minister) 
12.10.2011 Opinion PeVL 6/2011vp 
– HE 12/2011vp 
Constitutional Law 
committee 
Government 
proposal to 
parliament to 
approve the 
amendment to 
Article 136 of the 
Treaty on the 
Functioning of the 
European Union 
Submitted 
12.10.2011 Dissenting opinion Constitutional Law 
committee: Vesa- 
Matti Saarakkala, Tom 
Packalen, Pirkko 
Ruohonen-Lerner (PS) 
Parliament’s 
approval needed to 
amend Article 136 
TFUE 
Submitted 
08.12.2011 Opinion PeVL 
22/2011vp – U 
27/2011vp 
Constitutional Law 
committee 
Government 
Statement on a draft 
amendment to the 
European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM) 
Submitted 
08.12.2011 Dissenting opinion 1 Vesa-Matti 
Saarakkala, Tom 
Packalen, Kimmo 
Kivelä (PS) 
Reject ESM 
because transfer of 
power to IO 
Submitted 
08.12.2011 Dissenting opinion 2 Kimmo Sasi (KOK) Parliament’s 
consent needed for 
any decisions in the 
ESM board of 
governors 
Submitted 
08.12.2011 Opinion , SuVL 7/2011 
vp – U 27/2011vp, E 
71/2011vp 
GC Stabilization of the 
Monetary Union; 
modification of the 
treaties and ESM 
Submitted 
08.12.2011 Dissenting opinion 1 GC: Antti Kaikkonen, 
Mauri Pekkarinen, 
Sirkka-Liisa Anttila, 
Kimmo Tiilikainen, 
Tuomo Puumala 
(KESK) 
Against solidarity 
clause in ESM 
Submitted 
08.12.2011 Dissenting opinion 2 GC: Juho Eerola, Peter 
Jääskeläinen, Anne 
Louhelainen, Vesa-
Matti Saarakkala (PS) 
Against transfer of 
budgetary 
competences to EU 
level 
Submitted 
06.03.2012 Opinion VaVL 3/2012vp 
– HE 12/2011vp 
COMFI Government 
proposal to 
parliament to 
approve the 
amendment to 
Article 136 of the 
Treaty on the 
Functioning of the 
European Union 
Submitted 
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26.04.2012 Opinion UaVM 
5/2012vp – HE 
12/2011vp 
FA Committee Ibid Submitted 
26.04.2012 Dissenting opinion FA Committee: Maria 
Lohela, Tom Packalen 
(PS) 
Reject ESM Submitted 
11.05.2012 Written question KK 
309/2012 vp 
Saarakkala, Vesa-
Matti (PS) 
Purpose of the 
Government as 
regards the increase 
in the combined 
capacity of the 
ESFS and EVM 
Answered (Finance 
Minister) 
29.05.2012 Opinion TaVL 
24/2012vp – HE 
34/2012vp 
Commerce Committee Government 
proposal to 
parliament to 
approve the 
agreement 
establishing the 
European Stability 
Mechanism (EVM) 
and to transpose its 
legislative 
provisions 
Submitted 
29.05.2012 Dissenting opinion 1 Commerce 
Committee: Kaj 
Turunen, Teuvo 
Hakkarainen, James 
Hirvisaari (PS) 
Reject ESM Submitted 
29.05.2012 Dissenting opinion 2 Commerce 
Committee: Mauri 
Pekkarinen, Arto 
Pirttilahti, Juha Sipilä 
(KESK) 
Reject ESM; 
against solidarity in 
crisis management 
Submitted 
30.05.2012 Opinion TrVL 5/2012 vp 
– HE  34/2012vp 
Audit Committee Government 
proposal to 
parliament to 
approve the 
agreement 
establishing the 
European Stability 
Mechanism (EVM) 
and to transpose its 
legislative 
provisions 
Submitted 
07.06.2012 Opinion PeVL 
13/2012vp – HE 
34/2012vp 
Constitutional Law 
committee 
Ibid Submitted 
07.06.2012 Dissenting opinion Vesa-Matti 
Saarakkala, Kimmo 
Kivelä, Tom Packalen 
(PS) 
ESM threatens 
Finland’s 
sovereignty 
Submitted 
13.06.2012 Dissenting opinion 1 COMFI: Timo Kalli, 
Eero Reijonen, 
Markku Rossi, Esko 
Kiviranta (KESK) 
Reject ESM and 
request referendum 
if financial 
measures increase 
federalization 
trends 
Submitted 
13.06.2012 Dissenting opinion 2 COMFI: Pentti 
Kettunen, Ville 
Vähämäki, Tuppainen 
Kauko (PS) 
Against 
federalization of 
EU through fiscal 
union 
Submitted 
TSCG 
29.11.2012 Opinion TrVL 8/2012vp 
– HE 155/2012vp 
Audit Committee Proposal by the 
government to 
parliament on the 
approval of the 
Submitted 
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treaty on stability, 
coordination and 
governance in the 
economic and 
monetary union and 
on the law 
enforcing its 
legislative 
provisions 
04.12.2012 Opinion PeVL 
37/2012vp – HE 
155/2012vp 
Constitutional Law 
committee 
Ibid. Submitted 
04.12.2012 Dissenting opinion Constitutional Law 
committee: Vesa-Matti 
Saarakkala, Kimmo 
Kivelä, Tom Packalen 
(PS) 
TSCG requires 
two-thirds majority 
Submitted 
12.12.2012 Dissenting opinion 1 COMFI: Timo Kalli, 
Eero Reijonen, Esko 
Kiviranta, Tapani Tölli 
(KESK) 
Preservation of 
parliament’s 
budgetary 
competences 
Submitted 
12.12.2012 Dissenting opinion 2 COMFI: Pentti 
Kettunen, Ville 
Vähämäki, Tuppainen 
Kauko (PS) 
Reject TSCG; 
favour consultative 
referendum on 
integration in Euro 
area 
Submitted 
Source: Own calculation, based on the parliament’s database588. 
  
 
588 The number of submitted instruments might not be exhaustive due to difficult access to the data. 
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APPENDIX 2: List of interviewees 
Luxembourg 
1. Official, « Cellule Européenne », International Relations Service, Chamber of Deputies, 
26.01.2017 : Interviewee 1 
2. Official, « Cellule Européenne », International Relations Service, Chamber of Deputies, 
26.01.2017 : Interviewee 2 
3. MP, Demokratesch Partei parliamentary group, Chamber of Deputies, 01.02.2017 : Interviewee 
3 
4. Former MP, LSAP parliamentary group, Chamber of Deputies, 13.02.2017: Interviewee 4 
5. MP, LSAP parliamentary group, Chair of Committee for Foreign and European Affairs, 
Cooperation, Migration, Chamber of Deputies, 14.02.2017 : Interviewee 5 
6. Official, « Cellule Européenne », International Relations Service, Chamber of Deputies, 
15.02.2017 : Interviewee 6 
7. MP, CSV parliamentary group, Chamber of Deputies, 17.02.2017 : Interviewee 7 
8. Former MP, Déi Gréng parliamentary group, Chamber of Deputies, 20.02.2017 : Interviewee 8 
9. MP, ADR parliamentary group, Chamber of Deputies, 06.03.2017 : Interviewee 9 
10. Vice Secretary General, International Relations Service, Chamber of Deputies, 06.03.207 : 
Interviewee 10 
11. Former MP, DP parliamentary group, Chamber of Deputies, 07.03.2017 : Interviewee 11 
12. MP, Déi Gréng parliamentary group, Chamber of Deputies, 07.03.2017 : Interviewee 12 
13. Secretary General, Council of State, 08.03.2017 : Interviewee 13 
14. Parliamentary collaborator, LSAP parliamentary group, Chamber of Deputies, 10.03.2017 : 
Interviewee 14 
15. Former MPs, Déi Lénk parliamentary group, Chamber of Deputies, 13.03.2017 : Interviewee 
15 et 16 
16. MP, CSV parliamentary group, Chamber of Deputies, 15.03.2017 : Interviewee 17 
17. Parliamentary collaborator, CSV parliamentary group, Chamber of Deputies 17.03.2017 : 
Interviewee 18 
18. MP, CSV parliamentary group, Chamber of Deputies, 21.03.2017 : Interviewee 19 
19. Director of Economic Affairs Department, Business Chamber, 10.04.2017 : Interviewee 20 
20. MEP and former MP of the Chamber of Deputies, DP, 24.04.2017: Interviewee 21 
21. MP, CSV parliamentary group, Chamber of Deputies, 14.06.2017: Interviewee 22 
22. EU affairs collaborator, Business Chamber, email interview, 25.04.2018: Interviewee 23 
23. Official, Secretariat of the Finance Committee, 19.01.2018: Interviewee 24 
Austria 
24. Former MP, GRÜNE parliamentary group, National Council, 17.03.2017: Interviewee 1a 
25. Former MP, ÖVP parliamentary group, National Council, 23.03.2017 : Interviewee 2a 
26. Adviser, SPÖ parliamentary group, European Affairs, National Council, 27.03.2017 : 
Interviewee 3a 
27. Former MP, ÖVP, National Council, 28.03.2017 : Interviewee 4a 
28. Adviser, GRÜNE parliamentary group, European Affairs Coordinator, National Council, 
28.03.2017 : Interviewee 5a 
29. Director and two officials of the Department « EU-Mitwirkung und Europäische 
Beziehungen », Parliamentary administration, National Council, 28.03.2017 : Interviewee 6a, 
7a, 8a 
30. Director of the department « EU-Informations- und –Datenbankmanagement » and Director of 
the department « Parlamentswissenschaftliche Grundsatzarbeit », Parliamentary administration, 
National Council, 28.03.2017 : Interviewee 9a et 10a 
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31. MP, FPÖ parliamentary group, National Council, 29.03.2017 : Interviewee 11a 
32. MP and Chair of the ÖVP parliamentary group, National Council, 29.03.2017 : Interviewee 12a 
33. MP, SPÖ parliamentary group, National Council, 29.03.2017 : Interviewee 13a 
34. MP, FPÖ parliamentary group, National Council, 29.03.2017 : Interviewee 14a 
35. MP, GRÜNE parliamentary group, National Council, 30.03.2017 : Interviewee 15a 
36. MP, SPÖ parliamentary group, National Council, 30.03.2017 : Interviewee 16a 
37. Former MP, SPÖ parliamentary group, National Council, 10.04.2017 : Interviewee 17a 
38. MP, ÖVP parliamentary group, National Council, 10.04.2017 : Interviewee 18a 
39. Former MP, FPÖ parliamentary group, National Council, 20.10.2017: Interviewee 19a 
40. Parliamentary representative, EU Office Brussels, National Council, 19.01.2018: Interviewee 
20a 
41. MP, ÖVP parliamentary group, National Council, email interview, 05.04.2017 : Interviewee 
21a 
42. MP, ÖVP parliamentary group, National Council, email interview, 20.05.2017 : Interviewee 
22a 
Finland, Eduskunta 
43. Parliamentary representative, EU Office Eduskunta, Brussels, 26.01.2018: Interviewee 1b 
44. Director of the EU secretariat, Eduskunta, 26.03.2018: Interviewee 2b 
45. Former MP, Centre Party parliamentary group, Eduskunta, 27.03.2018: Interviewee 3b 
46. MP, SDP parliamentary group, Eduskunta, 27.03.2018: Interviewee 4b 
47. Former MP, SDP parliamentary group, Eduskunta, 28.03.2018: Interviewee 5b 
48. Parliamentary advisor, Left Alliance Group, Eduskunta, 28.03.2018: Interviewee 6b 
49. Former MP, National Coalition Party, Eduskunta, 25.04.2018: Interviewee 7b 
50. EU specialist, SDP parliamentary group, Eduskunta, 24.05.2018: Interviewee 8b 
51. MP and Vice-Chair of the Grand Committee, SDP parliamentary group, Eduskunta, 24.05.2018: 
Interviewee 9b 
52. Former MP, National Coalition Party, Eduskunta, 25.05.2018 : Interviewee 10b 
53. EU advisor, Centre Party parliamentary group, Eduskunta, 28.05.2018: Interviewee 11b 
54. EU advisor, KD parliamentary group, Eduskunta, email interview, 21.03.2018: Interviewee 12b 
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APPENDIX 3: Interview grid (French), Chamber of Deputies 
 
Profil: 
- Parcours professionnel/carrière, expériences ? 
- Avez-vous une expérience professionnelle antérieure liée aux questions européennes ? 
- Fonctions actuelles au sein de la ChD ? 
- Faites-vous partie d’associations, de groupes ou d’organisations européennes ou s’intéressant à 
des thèmes européens (think tanks, associations parlementaires, associations internationales, 
etc) ? 
Motivations : 
- Combien de temps et d’effort personnel consacrez-vous aux sujets européens dans le cadre de 
votre travail parlementaire ?  
- Parmi les quatre traités européens (les citer), lesquels avez-vous suivi dans le cadre de votre 
travail à la ChD ? 
- (Suivant réponse 3) Qu’est-ce qui vous a motivé à vous investir dans les négociations sur le 
Traité constitutionnel/Traité de Lisbonne/MES/TSCG ? 
- (Uniquement rapporteurs) Comment êtes-vous devenu rapporteur sur le traité 
constitutionnel/traité de Lisbonne/MES/TSCG? Quels thèmes vous tenaient particulièrement à 
cœur (à vous et à votre commission parlementaire) ?  
Travail parlementaire: 
- Lisez-vous le bulletin de Bruxelles envoyé par le représentant de la Chambre ? 
- Selon vous, quels ont été les moments clés pour la ChD pendant les négociations sur le Traité 
constitutionnel, le Traité de Lisbonne et pendant la crise économique et financière ? Quels ont 
été les principaux défis à relever, pour vous et pour la ChD de manière générale?  
- Comment avez-vous participé aux processus de négociation sur le Traité constitutionnel/Traité 
de Lisbonne/MES/TSCG ? Quel rôle avez-vous joué ? 
- Avec qui avez-vous coopéré pendant les négociations (gouvernement, chambres 
professionnelles, autres partis politiques, députés européens, représentation permanente, etc) ? 
Comment vous êtes-vous coordonné avec ces acteurs ? 
- Comment avez-vous travaillé avec vos collègues de votre parlement ? Comment avez-vous 
travaillé avec vos collègues d’autres parlements nationaux ? 
- Avez-vous participé à des programmes d’échanges ? 
- Comment travaillez-vous avec vos collègues députés européens ? Comment avez-vous travaillé 
avec eux dans le cadre des traités européens ? Vous rendez-vous à Bruxelles ? Si oui, pourquoi 
et à quelle fréquence ? 
Evolutions potentielles du travail parlementaire : 
- Dans le cadre des négociations sur les traités européens (nommer les traités), quel a été l’effet 
déclencheur du changement dans vos méthodes de travail? Comment vos méthodes /habitudes 
de travail ont-elles changées ?  
- Quelles réformes la ChD a-t-elle effectué dans le cadre de ces traités ? Quels ont été les 
changements les plus importants ? Avez-vous participé à/initié l’une d’entre elles ? 
- Selon vous, les nouveaux instruments créés à la suite des traités européens ont-ils fait la 
différence dans la manière dont la ChD participe en matière européenne ? Si oui, laquelle ? Ont-
ils eu un impact sur votre travail parlementaire ?  
- Vos habitudes de travail ont-elles changé pendant et après les négociations sur les traités 
européens ? Si oui, comment ? 
- Êtes-vous satisfait des informations que vous avez personnellement reçues pendant les 
négociations sur les traités européens (de la part de la ChD, du ministère des affaires 
européennes, de la représentation permanente, etc) ? 
- La relation entre la ChD et le gouvernement/ministères luxembourgeois a-t-elle changé 
avant/après les traités (notamment en termes de flux d’information) ? Comment ?  
- Suivant réponses aux questions 16 et 17 : 
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o Pourquoi avoir opté pour un changement de dénomination de la CAUE ? Quels 
changements par rapport à l’ancienne dénomination (en termes de compétences et 
autres) ? 
o En quoi consistait la Stratégie Européenne de la ChD ? Quels changements a-t-elle 
entraîné ? Quels bénéfices en avez-vous tiré ? 
o Dans quel contexte la représentation permanente de la ChD a-t-elle été établie ? Quelle 
différence cela a-t-il fait pour votre travail parlementaire ? Quels aspects ont changé 
pour vous ? 
o L’aide-mémoire sur la coopération entre le gouvernement et le parlement a-t-il changé 
la manière de travailler de la ChD ? Quelles différences observez-vous dans votre 
travail parlementaire par rapport à avant ? 
o Pourquoi avoir modifié le RI de la ChD en 2010 ? Les révisions du règlement intérieur 
concernant les affaires européennes (2010) ont-elles eu un impact sur votre travail 
parlementaire ? Qu’est-ce qui a changé par rapport aux règles et pratiques en vigueur 
avant les révisions ? 
o Que pensez-vous de la délégation auprès de la Conférence interparlementaire sur la 
stabilité, la coordination économique et la gouvernance ? Qu’est-ce que ce nouveau 
format de coopération apporte à votre parlement ? 
Perceptions: 
- Personnellement, quelle importance accordez-vous à l’intégration européenne ?  
- De manière générale, êtes-vous satisfait du rôle que joue la ChD dans le processus décisionnel 
national et des mécanismes de coopération avec le gouvernement et les autres acteurs 
institutionnels ? 
- Êtes-vous satisfait du rôle qu’a joué la ChD dans les négociations sur le Traité constitutionnel, 
le Traité de Lisbonne et dans la gestion de la crise économique ? 
- Concernant la participation parlementaire aux affaires européennes, quels aspects devraient être 
potentiellement améliorés selon vous ?  
- Êtes-vous satisfait du soutien que vous avez reçu de l’administration parlementaire pendant les 
négociations sur les traités européens ? 
- Avez-vous remarqué un changement d’attitude de la part de vos collègues députés vis-à-vis des 
affaires européennes à la suite de la ratification des traités?  
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APPENDIX 4: Relevant quotations from interviews 
Luxembourg 
 
Interviewee 4 : […] Et malgré cet aide-mémoire, moi je pense que le gouvernement, je ne sais pas ce 
qu'il en est dans les autres pays, mais au Luxembourg je sais que le gouvernement... ce n'est peut-être 
pas entièrement de mauvaise foi, mais c'est quand même lent cette information, ce flux d'information 
entre le gouvernement et le parlement. Ce qui explique qu'évidemment, souvent les positions d'un 
parlement sont des positions qu'il reprend de la part de son gouvernement. 
 
 
E: Justement dans ce cadre-là, est-ce que vous avez remarqué qu'il y a eu une évolution dans l'attitude 
des parlementaires, même dans d'autres parlements nationaux. Quand vous avez coopéré avec eux 
notamment sur certains points? 
Interviewee 4: Oui, oui, absolument. Moi je pense... Vous savez, c'est aussi une question de génération 
des parlements. Beaucoup dépend comme toujours des hommes et des femmes qui s'impliquent dans 
ces questions. Ce n'est pas purement une question institutionnelle, c'est aussi une question d'attitude 
personnelle. Et selon que vous avez dans un parlement des gens qui se sont intéressé depuis un certain 
temps ou qui reprennent un héritage, cela fonctionne et cela continue de faire des vagues. Et si tout à 
coup cet influx se casse et qu'il n'y a... alors des choses se perdent assez facilement. 
 
 
Interviewee 4 : Mais au Luxembourg, c'est effectivement... j'ai trouvé ça très difficile dans le travail 
quotidien de la Chambre, d'avoir tellement de membres d'exécutifs communaux, qui ont aussi leurs 
obligations au niveau communal, et ce temps qu'ils mettent pour cela manque pour le travail, par 
exemple pour le travail européen, international, à la chambre des députés. 
 
 
E: D'accord, du coup en lien avec les affaires européennes, est-ce que ça a été un sujet que vous avez 
traité dès le départ ou...? 
Interviewee 7: Oui parce que j'ai été dès le départ presque... dès le début j'ai été toujours membre de la 
Commission des  Affaires Etrangères et Européennes et j'ai été également pendant dix ans chef de 
délégation de la COSAC, que vous connaissez. Forcément, ça m'a toujours intéressé, les affaires 
européennes, et comme surtout pendant cette période où j'ai été chef de délégation de la COSAC, j'étais 
très proche de toutes les discussions et ensuite quand j'ai été président de la Chambre des Députés, je 
présidais de par ma fonction également un certain nombre de groupes. J'ai en fait toujours suivi de très 
près tout ce qui concerne les affaires européennes. 
 
 
Interviewee 7 : Ce qui n'est pas forcément un désavantage, mais je dirais dans une Europe qui devient 
de plus en plus compliquée, on a intérêt quand même à organiser toutes les forces vives d'un parlement 
dans une commission et qu'il y ait vraiment quelques spécialistes qui se consacrent exclusivement à ces 
dossiers. Mais bon, c'est très difficile de convaincre ses collègues, parce que les affaires européennes, 
c'est pas très sexy. En plus, ça ne rapporte pas de voix, donc la plupart  de mes collègues, et je ne les 
critique pas pour ça, préfèrent se consacrer plutôt à leurs sujets nationaux ou locaux, qui sont plus 
intéressant d'un point de vue électoral, que les affaires européennes. 
 
 
Interviewee 9 : Je suis membre de la Commission des Affaires Etrangères, ce qui me permet d'être 
informé dans la mesure où le parlement est informé. Sa commission n'exerce pratiquement aucune 
influence, ou très peu, très peu, pas aucune. Mais très peu d'influence en tant que commission sur le 
cours de la politique étrangère. C'est surtout, comme toujours en politique, le poids des uns et des autres, 
la présence dans les médias, les prévisions ou craintes que les uns et les autres peuvent avoir en vue des 
prochaines élections qui déterminent le jeu politique. 
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Interviewee 9: Les parlements essayent dans une certaine mesure d'avoir plus d'influence, mais cela n'est 
que, en anglais je dirais "windows dressing". Donc en fait on fait de l'agitation, on met cela dans les 
vitrines, les fenêtres pour donner l'impression d'une participation parlementaire qui en réalité n'est pas 
inexistante, mais extrêmement faible. Et il n'y a pas de volonté politique pour changer cela, parce que 
l'élite dont je vous avais parlé tout à l'heure, ceux qui forment la volonté européenne encore actuellement 
n'ont pas intérêt à faire participer les parlements ou les populations dans un sens plus large […] 
 
 
Interviewee 9 : Je vous dirais que sauf hasard et expérience personnelle, etc, vu les effectifs réels et les 
possibilités réelles d'un parti relativement petit, qu'il ne serait pas utile de verser dans la spécialisation, 
mais plutôt de rester au niveau des généralistes. […]Je crois qu'en politique, il est important de garder 
une vue d'ensemble et de voir quelles sont les implications à long terme, quelle est l'intention profonde 
d'un document. 
 
 
Interviewee 11 : On a longtemps à la Chambre des Députés discuté sur le fait s'il fallait y avoir une 
commission spéciale sur les Affaires Européennes et honnêtement, je n'ai plus souvenir quel était 
l'aboutissement de cela. Je crois que finalement on ne l'a pas décidé. Un peu par le raisonnement, comme 
je disais, ça va encore augmenter la complexité des... parce que tout en fin de compte sera européen, 
même si c'est une directive qui nous arrive sur les transports ou sur l'environnement etc. 
 
E: Et donc concrètement, vous avez vous constatez qu'il y a eu un changement d'attitude parmi vos 
collègues, qu'ils se sont davantage intéressé à ces questions-là? 
 
Interviewee 11: Oui dans les fractions, dans les groupes parlementaires à la Chambre, c'est devenu 
beaucoup plus... alors qu'au départ c'était un truc qui était réservé à ceux qui étaient membres de la 
Commission des Affaires Etrangères et Européennes, et puis au gouvernement quand on était au 
gouvernement. Aux ténors du parti de le dire et tout le monde écoutait, c'était ça. Non les débats sont 
quand même devenus plus vivants et plus informés aussi. 
 
 
E: En parlant de ce changement de position, j'avais remarqué qu'au Luxembourg beaucoup de députés 
deviennent ministres, puis redeviennent députés. Ils changent du gouvernement au parlement. C'est dû 
à quoi, pourquoi? Est-ce qu'il y a plus de facilités au Luxembourg de changer et est-ce que ça a une plus-
value pour ces personnes de changer d'institution? 
 
Interviewee 18: C'est pas volontaire en général. C'est très rare qu'un ministre veuille retourner à la 
Chambre. Les ministres qui sont redevenus députés en général, c'est parce qu'il y a un changement de 
coalition. […] C'est sûr que tous les partis à la Chambre préfèrent être au gouvernement, c'est le but. 
C'est très rare qu'une personne ministre va choisir la Chambre, parce qu'elle pense qu'elle est plus 
attractive. 
 
 
Interviewee 19: Le désavantage que vous avez avec moi, c'est que je ne fais pas partie de la Commission 
des Affaires  Etrangères, qui traite également des affaires de l'Europe. Dans ma carrière de député, je 
n'ai jamais été membre de cette commission-là. J'étais membre de la Commission des Institutions, 
Commission Juridique, Famille, Sécurité Sociale, etc, mais pas... donc tout ce qui concerne l'Europe est 
un peu, comment dire, plus loin que pour d'autres membres de la Chambre des Députés. 
 
 
Interviewee 19: Vous savez qu'au Luxembourg, en ce qui concerne les questions européennes, il y a 
quasiment unanimité de tous les partis politiques en ce qui concerne la politique à suivre. Il n'y avait 
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pas d'opposition entre les partis politiques en ce qui concerne notre point de vue, notamment le traité 
de Lisbonne et la Convention Européenne. 
 
 
E: Pour aussi voir comment vous travaillez, est-ce que vous avez des contacts avec les députés européens 
dans votre travail quotidien? 
 
Interviewee 19: Rarement. En principe les députés luxembourgeois pourraient participer à toutes les 
réunions de notre groupe, mais ils viennent rarement. Nous avons des réunions tous les mardis, mais 
c'est rare de voir un député européen. S'il y a des sujets particuliers concernant l'Europe, il y a bien l'un 
ou l'autre qui vient pour expliquer. Mais je dois dire personnellement que j'ai peu de contact avec nos 
députés européens.  
 
 
 
Austria 
 
E: Auf Europäische Angelegenheiten zurück. Hatten Sie vor Ihren Mandaten bereits politische 
Erfahrungen oder berufliche Erfahrung in diesem Bereich Europäische Angelegenheiten? 
 
Interviewee 2a: Ja das ist schon lange vor dem Mandat mit meiner beruflichen Tätigkeit verbunden 
gewesen. Ich war Assistent von zwei Landwirtschaftsministern, war vorher in der Bäuerlichen 
Vertretungsinteresse für die Europäischen Angelegenheiten eine essentielle Rolle spielen 
logischerweise, und daher ist die Beschäftigung mit Europathemen bei mir immer ein Schwerpunkt 
gewesen, nicht erst mit dem Mandat. 
 
 
Interviewee 2a: Mir ist zumindest aufgefallen, dass es nicht die große Mehrheit der Abgeordneten ist, 
für die Europathemen relevant sind, oder sexy sind, oder wie immer Sie das nennen wollen. Es ist in 
Wahrheit, das ist meine Erfahrung, eine "dedicated minority" der Abgeordneten, und zwar in allen 
Parteien für die Europa wichtig ist und die sich daher kümmern. Das ist auch nicht etwas, was ich im 
Wahlkreis bei der Versammlung vor den Bürgern verkaufen kann, weil es keine Straße ist, die ich 
eröffne. A und B, es erfordert ein sehr spezifisches Wissen über Europäische Politiken, über Europäische 
Institutionen, über das Funktionieren Europäischer Entscheidungsmechanismen um die 
Informationsfülle auch richtig einordnen zu können. 
 
 
Interviewee 3a: Genau es gibt nur zwei, die sich mit den EU-Angelegenheiten beschäftigen. Das ist 
aufgrund des Volumens, oder aufgrund der Spannbreite der Themen oftmals nicht ausreichend. Wir sind 
zu zweit, er hat es früher alleine gemacht. Aber auch zu zweit ist es jetzt... Da steht der Brexit vor der 
Tür, und niemand weiß genau in welcher Richtung wie, was. Es ist zu zweit auch wirklich schwierig. 
Ich habe auch den Eindruck, oder ich weiß dass es bei den anderen Fraktionen höchstens eine Person 
gibt, die das auf inhaltlicher Ebene als Referent oder Referentin betreut. Also da sind wir mittlerweile 
schon gut dran. 
 
 
Interviewee 4a: Natürlich gab es immer wieder die Reibungspunkte schon zwischen den 
Regierungskoalitionen, aber dann natürlich auch mit den Oppositionsabgeordneten. Ganz andere 
Zugänge. Beispiel die Frage von Subsidiarität war immer für die Österreichische Volkspartei sehr 
wichtig, weil wir halt ein föderalisches System gewollt haben. Für Grüne oder für SPÖ war das nie ein 
Thema. Es war ihnen völlig gleichgültig. Dafür war in allen Fragen wo es an mehr an Europa gibt die 
Freiheitliche Partei immer dabei zurückhaltend skeptisch, auch in der Zeit, wo sie in der Regierung war. 
529 
 
Es war immer schwierig, da eine Zustimmung zu finden. Also es war insgesamt eine ziemlich 
Herausforderung. 
 
 
Interviewee 10a: Die Geschichte dabei ist die, als man 1994 die Änderungen in der Verfassung gemacht 
hat, hat man sich teilweise an Dänemark orientiert. Und hat hier ein umfassendes Informationsrecht 
hineingeschrieben, das aber nie wirklich effektuiert wurde. Also im Grunde ist es so, dass seit 1994 die 
Verpflichtung der Regierung besteht, Nationalrat und Bundesrat in allen EU Angelegenheiten zu 
informieren, und dass es seitdem immer wieder die Streitigkeiten gegeben hat, wie weit diese 
Verpflichtung erfüllt wird. 
 
 
E: Und in diesem Rahmen, welche Rolle sollten die nationalen Parlamente spielen? Sollten sie sich 
stärker mit EU Angelegenheiten befassen, oder sollte das das EU Parlament machen? Was ist da Ihre 
Meinung? 
 
Interviewee 14a: Meine Meinung persönlich ist, dass das EU Parlament auch ein Konstruktionsfehler 
ist, das sollte auch ein wichtiger Teil der Reformen sein, die Abschaffung des EU Parlaments. Das ist 
eine inkongruente Einheit in diesem ganzen System und es ist ein wesentliches Vehikel zur ständigen 
Weiterlaufenden Zentralisierung. 
 
 
E: Und jetzt bezogen auf den Nationalrat, wie würden Sie Mitwirkungsrechte des Nationalrats 
hinsichtlich EU Angelegenheiten einschätzen? 
 
Interviewee 14a: In der Verfassungsrealität... Es gibt einmal die Verfassungswirklichkeit und die 
Verfassungstheorie. In der Verfassungsrealität keine, Null. Es gibt zwar in der Verfassung verankerte 
Mitwirkungsrechte, also die Möglichkeit zum Beispiel, den Vertreter im Europäischen Rat zu binden, 
also eine Ausschuss Feststellung zu machen, etwa im Ständigen Unterausschusses des 
Hauptausschusses in Fragen der Europäischen Union, könnte der Ausschuss eine bindende Ausschuss 
Feststellung machen, das heißt der zuständige Fachminister wird beauftragt, diese und diese Linie zu 
vertreten. 
 
 
E: Innerhalb des Parlaments, haben Sie gemerkt, dass sich allgemein Ihre Arbeitsmethoden geändert 
haben im Laufe der Vertragsverhandlungen? Es gab mehrere Reformen, auch 
Geschäftsordnungsveränderungen, usw. 
 
Interviewee 19a: Und die Arbeit im EU Hauptausschuss ist also eher unbefriedigend gewesen, weil 
auch hier Materien gekommen sind, die man zwar diskutieren konnte, aber wo man in Wahrheit nichts 
ändern konnte. Also dieser Bindungsbeschluss an den Minister, der war eher zahnlos, weil der muss an 
ihn nicht halten. Also insgesamt hat man auch im Österreichischen Nationalrat das Gefühl gehabt, dass 
man einen relativ großen Teil an Kompetenz nach Brüssel ans Europäische Parlament, die 
Kommission und den Rat abgegeben hat. Dann zurück kommt es in irgendeiner Placebo Art, in einem 
Placebo Paket, wo man theoretisch diskutieren und abstimmen kann, aber praktisch alles entschieden 
ist. 
 
 
E: Es gab auch die Einführung von Europa Plenartage und später aktuelle Europastunden. Gab es da 
tatsächlich eine Verbesserung der Europapolitischen Diskussionen? 
 
Interviewee 19a: Nein. Also aus meiner Sicht ist es alles Placebo. Weil es ja keine 
Entscheidungsmöglichkeit gibt. Wir können da drüber diskutieren und das war alles so optische 
Verbesserungen... Man hat es auch gesehen, in der Praxis, es sind oft nationale Themen gekommen, 
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weil man ganz einfach gesagt haben, "wir wollen mal was Anderes diskutieren", die man dann 
mühselig mit einem Europaanstrich versehen hat. 
 
Finland 
 
Interviewee 1b: At least the Chair of our Grand Committee frequently retweets my tweets, so she at 
least pays attention. But that is I guess a challenge for all of us here in Brussels to actually reach the 
people and to be sure that they read what you send them, and sometimes all of us feel a bit abandoned 
or a bit on our own, because we get very little feedback from back home. But I tried to be proactive. I 
do not receive a lot of direction, I do not get this kind of request, like can you write on this topic or can 
you provide us information on this and that. They more rely on me telling them what they should be 
interested in, but the other way around... It is sometimes hard to tell who exactly reads my reports or 
benefits from them, but at least I try to communicate with all of them, politicians and officials. 
 
 
Interviewee 2b: The current government, and the previous one, that was ever since 2011, have been 
very unstable coalitions. And clearly held together pretty much by force, which leant there was a 
stronger group discipline then usual and less than usual independence on the part of MPs. Quite lot 
less activity at the parliamentary level. Also the quality of MPs has changed. They are less 
independent, and they are less inclined to do the hard work necessary to maintain the scrutiny system. 
So you get fewer questions to ministers, debates are more general and less specific, and there is more 
preparedness than before to let ministers get away with vague and unspecific statements... 
 
 
E: To focus on your membership in the GC and the Foreign affairs committee, why did you become 
members of these committees and how are people selected to come in these committees? 
 
Interviewee 3b : Good question. We are elected there by our political group. Let me say that there are 
not so many members who really want to go to these committees. I will say mainly that the senior 
members are keen of these. It is telling that senior members are keen about international issues, 
foreign  security and European policy issues. 
 
 
Interviewee 4b: I am not that enthusiastic about the EP. I regret to say that it was a mistake to 
introduce direct elections to the EP. We would have a better, more representative EP if the 
parliamentarians were still elected from the national parliaments. Although obviously they would not 
be member of both parliaments at the same time, so that alternate members would come in the national 
parliament. 
 
 
E: I can explain what I am interested in. [Explanation] If you could introduce yourself and tell me if 
prior to your mandate, you had already a professional experience related to EU affairs. 
 
Interviewee 7b: Actually I did, before I went to parliament, I was active in EU matters. My EU time 
started with the Trinity College in Dublin. I was doing my postgraduate studies in Trinity College in 
Dublin in... And before that I was not really interested in EEA or EC or something like that. But then I 
stumbled during my studies, especially the EU, the EC because it was not the EU, it was the European 
communities at that time. I enrolled myself to classes about the EU and I was amazed to find out how 
much the rural conservative Irish society has transformed and is transformed especially because of the 
EU membership. […] This was when I genuinely became interested in the EU, and after that I also 
applied in a stagiaireship in the commission. I was one of the first few Finns accepted there and 
actually that was my beginning. I felt bringing new ideas and thoughts, feeling opening the doors to a 
different kind of Europe... […] So it was natural that I would follow also the EU politics in the 
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parliament. That is what I did from the very beginning of my political career. Also highlighting the 
fact that I became Minister for EU affairs. 
 
 
E: To finish this interview, I would like to have concluding remarks. I am interested if something 
changed. For example, how would you evaluate nowadays the participation rights of the Eduskunta in 
EU affairs? 
 
Interviewee 10b: It is a common opinion in Finland that our system is the best in the EU. The fact is 
that parliament gets excellent information. The problem is whether people read it this information or 
not, but I would say people are quite aware about what is happening in the EU. Parliament has a lot of 
influence indeed, it can put limits on our minister in the EU, so the parliament cannot require any more 
power. The system is working perfect. The problem is that the parliament is quite reactive, so when 
the commission proposes something, or the political groups in the EU propose something, then the 
parliament reacts. 
 
 
Interviewee 11b : There is a very close contact between the parliament and the government on EU 
affairs. That is a very specific Finnish phenomenon, that we want to have a very close supervision and 
discussion with the government. 
 
